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2022 DIGILAW 1002 (GUJ)

Pragnaben Kaushikbhai Nayak v. Director Of Primary Education

2022-09-01

BIREN VAISHNAV

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Soaham Joshi, learned AGP appearing for respondent State, Mr. Chirag Patel, learned advocate appearing for respondent no. 5 and Mr. Kaushal Pandya, learned advocate appearing for respondent no. 4 waive service of notice of rule. 1.1 Present petition has been filed by the petitioners -teachers who were working with respondent no. 5 school praying to quash and set aside the order dated 25.02.2019 and also the order dated 29.11.2005 passed by respondent no. 1 granting permission to the respondent no. 5 school to close down the classes. The petitioners have also prayed for a direction that the respondents shall ensure that petitioners shall be given their due and payable salaries till date and shall be paid their wages from time to time until the order is passed terminating them in accordance with law by declaring the termination order dated 19.05.2004 as nonest and illegal. In case of the retired petitioners no. 1, 2 and 5, the petitioners have sought salary until retirement and all retirement benefits to the said petitioners. 2. The litigation has a chequered history. The facts, in short, read as under: 2.1 The petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teachers in the school which was managed by the Akhand Anand Vidhya Bhavan Trust, Surat (respondent no. 5). In 2003, the respondent no. 5 filed an application before the District Education Officer, Surat under Section 40 of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947 (for short, the Act) for closure of 8 classes of the school. By that time, the petitioners had put in almost 14 years of service. 2.2 It is the case of the petitioners that on 18.6.2003, they received a letter from the school intimating them that the hearing, on the application filed for closure of some classes, would be held by the office of the Director of Primary Education on 27.06.2003 and therefore they should remain present before him. On receipt of that communication, the petitioners made a representation on 27.06.2003 to protest against the proposed closure of classes. It was their case that the application for closure of some classes was an indirect manner resorted to by the management to terminate the services of the teachers. After hearing the representative of the respondent no. On receipt of that communication, the petitioners made a representation on 27.06.2003 to protest against the proposed closure of classes. It was their case that the application for closure of some classes was an indirect manner resorted to by the management to terminate the services of the teachers. After hearing the representative of the respondent no. 5, the teachers and the District Education Officer, Surat, the Director of Primary Education passed an order dated 01st August 2003 whereby he sanctioned closure of 8 classes of Akhand Anand Vidhya Bhavan, Surat (Primary School) with effect from June 2003. One of the conditions of the order of closure was that the provisions of Section 40B of the Act shall have to be complied with. 2.3 That order was challenged by the present petitioners by filing Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2003. The petition was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the petitioners preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 77 of 2005. By a CAV order dated 14.06.2005, a Division Bench of this court allowed the appeal by quashing the order of closure as illegal and directed that the application of the school be decided afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, representatives of the management and the District Education Officer. The court directed that the parties should appear before the District Education Officer on 14.07.2005. The petitioners therefore received a communication dated 12.07.2005 from the respondent management and on 14.07.2005 they asked for certain documents as directed by the court in the Division Bench so as to defend their case and oppose the closure of the school. 2.4 The proceedings took place and pursuant to the order of the Division Bench, the Director of Primary Education passed an order dated 29.11.2005 granting permission once again to respondent no. 5 to close down the eight classes. One of those terms and conditions again was that the closure shall be subject to compliance of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947. 2.5 That order of closure was challenged once again by the petitioners by filing Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006. Since, by an interim order made in that petition on 03.05.2007, the Court gave the petitioners a liberty to raise a dispute with regard to the salaries, the petitioners had in the interregnum approached the Tribunal for outstanding salaries. 2.5 That order of closure was challenged once again by the petitioners by filing Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006. Since, by an interim order made in that petition on 03.05.2007, the Court gave the petitioners a liberty to raise a dispute with regard to the salaries, the petitioners had in the interregnum approached the Tribunal for outstanding salaries. The petition was heard on 29.06.2016 together with the petition of the management, namely, Special Civil Application No. 17501 of 2011 by which the management challenged the order dated 19.03.2010 of the Tribunal directing the management to pay salaries. 2.6 The management's petition was dismissed, however, as far as the petition filed by the petitioners is concerned, the court prima facie opined that the order dated 29.11.2005 was not in compliance of Section 40B of the Act in its true perspective and therefore the court directed that the Director of Primary Education be asked to call upon the respondent no. 5 to explain in what manner Section 40B of the Act had been complied with. The court further directed that the Director of Primary Education shall also hear the teachers in this regard and take into consideration the materials and their submissions. The court opined that in the event the Director of Primary Education comes to the conclusion that the order dated 29.11.2005 has not been complied with in its true perspective then he shall recall the order dated 29.11.2005 granting permission to the respondent no. 5 for closure of the classes. The petition was disposed of with the aforesaid directions by judgement and order dated 29.06.2016. 2.7 Pursuant to these directions, by the impugned order dated 25.02.2019, the Director of Primary Education has upheld his earlier order of 29.11.2005 holding that the teachers were entitled to salaries upto 29.11.2005 and the order of 29.11.2005 is maintained. That order is a subject matter of challenge before this court by the teachers once again in the multiple rounds that they have undertaken. 3. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned counsel for the petitioners-teachers made the following submissions: (a) Taking the court to the order impugned in this petition, he would submit that a specific and a positive finding has been recorded by the Director of Primary Education that the school had not followed the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. 3. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned counsel for the petitioners-teachers made the following submissions: (a) Taking the court to the order impugned in this petition, he would submit that a specific and a positive finding has been recorded by the Director of Primary Education that the school had not followed the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. The natural consequence thereof therefore should have been that the petitioners be paid their salaries and be treated to be working as teachers and so therefore be permitted to resume their duties with respondent no. 5. (b) That it is evident from reading the oral judgment dated 29.06.2016 that a co-ordinate bench of this court after referring to several decisions of this court had prima facie come to the conclusion that the order dated 29.11.2005 was in violation of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act, which was reiterated in the fresh order that was passed. The school therefore must be directed to reinstate the petitioners and be permitted to resume their duties and those who have attained the age of superannuation be paid the consequential benefits as if they have retired on superannuation. (c) That the services of the petitioners on 19.05.2004 were terminated in violation of the status quo order passed by this court in the earlier rounds of litigation which the management cannot take advantage of and submit that since compensation was paid, by the orders of 2004 there was compliance of Section 40B of the Act. (d) That on the one hand the respondent no. 1 categorically held that the permission dated 29.11.2005 was in violation of Section 40B of the Act however as directed by the court the Director of Primary Education rather than recalling the order opined that salaries be paid to the petitioner for the period upto 29.11.2005. He would submit that the order is perverse and therefore unjustified. (e) That the so-called notice followed by the order of termination dated 19.05.2004 was not in compliance of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act and the fact that compensation was paid by that order was of no relevance because if Section 40B is read, an inquiry has to be held before passing an order of termination and therefore the procedure as envisaged under Section 40B of the Act not being followed, the consequences are that the order be set aside. (f) That Rule 5 of Schedule F would indicate that before proposing closure of classes, the District Education Officer shall have to make an inquiry and shall have to hear the teachers. Since they were not heard, they had approached this court and only after a direction given by the Division Bench of this court that the petitioners were given an opportunity to participate in the hearing regarding closure. Post the order of closure services of the petitioner could not be terminated without following the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. (g) That though the primary section of the school is declared to be closed by the impugned order, the management is also running a secondary school and a higher secondary school and imparting college education. The petitioners should be accommodated in these sections as the school management is getting grant and is also increasing classes. The order of closure of the management is therefore tainted. The order of termination dated 19.05.2004 is no order in the eye of law and therefore the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs as prayed for. 4. Mr. B.S. Patel, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Chirag Patel, learned advocate for the respondent no. 5 would submit that as a result of mushroomisation of the primary schools in the nearby area of the school, the students' strength was diminishing and as a result of the decrease in the students' strength because of the new schools coming up in the nearby areas, the trust was compelled to call a meeting of all the teachers and come to a decision that the school or some sections thereof needed to be closed. 4.1 Mr. Patel would submit that accordingly an application was made to the District Education Officer who was the authorized officer seeking permission of closure. The petitioners were permitted to participate in such exercise by virtue of an order passed by the Division Bench of this court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 77 of 2005 and thereafter the Director of Primary Education Officer had passed an order dated 01.08.2003 ordering closure of the school on the condition that the provisions of Section 40B of the Act are followed. He would submit that accordingly in compliance of Section 40B of the Act compensation of amounts of Rs.82,000/-and odd was paid to each teacher after issuing notice on 12.05.2004 and order accordingly was passed on 19.05.2004 awarding compensation which the petitioners having accepted, it was not open for them to challenge the proceedings again. 4.2 Mr. Patel would further submit that the orders of termination were never challenged by the teachers before the Tribunal for being in non compliance of Section 40B of the Act and therefore no relief should be granted to the petitioners. He would submit that the orders of closure are in nature a cyclostyled order and therefore merely because an observation is made in the order under challenge that the provisions of Section 40B are not followed, it is a clerical error. In all the orders that were passed for closure namely 01.08.2003, 29.11.2005 and the present impugned order dated 25.02.2019, a standard condition having been incorporated that the school shall follow the provisions of Section 40B of the Act does not mean that at every stage of the order the provisions need to be complied with. Once having complied with the provisions of the Section and having awarded compensation in the year 2004, it is not proper for the petitioners now to contend that they are entitled to consequential reliefs once there is non compliance of the order or the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. 4.3 Mr. Patel would submit that the petitioners having participated in the hearing and the closure having been found justified cannot now keep on reiterating and challenging the orders repeatedly on the ground of not following the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. He would submit that the District Education Officer was specifically informed that the petitioners, as early as in the year 2004, having accepted the compensation cannot now reopen the issue. 4.4 Mr. Patel would submit that no reliance could be placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the observations made by this court in order dated 29.06.2016 as even otherwise they were prima facie observations. 5. Mr. 4.4 Mr. Patel would submit that no reliance could be placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the observations made by this court in order dated 29.06.2016 as even otherwise they were prima facie observations. 5. Mr. Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP would support the order passed by the Director of Primary Education and submit that as canvassed by the learned Senior Advocate, the order was just and proper and no further proceedings need to be initiated for compliance of Section 40B of the Act once the amounts had been accepted by the petitioners on their termination by the orders of 19.05.2004. 6. The present petition filed by the teachers is one more instance where repeated litigations between two aggrieved parties may not bring the desired result which the courts to their orders expect the authorities to pass. As indicated in the earlier part of the judgement by narrating the facts, when the school-respondent no. 5 made an application for closure of primary sections - eight classes therein and consequentially ordered closure of the sections on 01.08.2003, the petitioners were compelled to approach this court by filing Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2003. What is therefore indicative of this is that the present petitioners have been fighting for their rights for the past 19 years. The petition filed challenging the order of closure dated 01.08.2003 was dismissed by a co-ordinate bench of this court by an order dated 29.09.2004. Aggrieved by this, the petitioners filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 77 of 2005 contending that the order of closure dated 01.08.2003 was bad inasmuch as the conclusions recorded by the author of the order was in violation of the rules of natural justice and based on misreading of Rule 5 of Schedule F of the Bombay Primary Education Rules. The court through the Division Bench on 14.06.2005 passed the following order: "We have given our most anxious consideration to the respective arguments. Rule 5 contained in Schedule F appended to the Rules reads as under: "5. Closure of School or Reduction in the total number of classes. No management of recognized private primary school shall effect any reduction in the total number of classes in its school or close down the school without the prior permission in writing of the Government. Rule 5 contained in Schedule F appended to the Rules reads as under: "5. Closure of School or Reduction in the total number of classes. No management of recognized private primary school shall effect any reduction in the total number of classes in its school or close down the school without the prior permission in writing of the Government. For this purpose the management shall have to make an application to the Authorized Officer at least six months before the date from which it intends to reduce the number of classes or close down the school. On receipt of such application, Authorized Officer shall hear the management and forward such application with his remarks to Government through the Director of Primary Education. The Government may in such manner as may be appear to it to be necessary and shall decide whether the application should be granted or refused either in whole or in part." A careful reading of the above reproduced rule shows that it is couched in negative language and ordians that the management of recognized primary school shall not effect any reduction in the total number of classes in the school or close down the school without obtaining prior permission from the Government. The rule also lays down the procedure which is required to be followed by the management for obtaining the permission. The management has to make an application to the authorized officer at least six months before the date from which reduction in the number of classes or closure of the school is intended to be effected. The authorized officer is required to hear the management and then forward the application to the Government along with his remarks. The Government is empowered to make appropriate enquiry in the matter and then decide whether the application should be granted or rejected either wholly or partly. In our view, the requirement of hearing the management incorporated in the second part of Rule 5 of Schedule F without a corresponding provision for hearing the teachers is clearly indicative of the fact that the rule making authority did not intent to provide an opportunity of hearing to the teachers at the stage of forwarding of application of the management by the authorized officer to the State Government. This appears to be so because mere forwarding of the application of the management does not result in reduction in total number of classes or closure of the school and the teachers employed in the school are not likely to be affected at that stage. Their right to remain in employment is put to peril only if the State Government, after conducting such further enquiry as it may deem necessary, sanction the application of the management. At that stage the requirement of hearing the teachers can be read as implicit. This is precisely what appears to have happened in the present case, when the management of the school informed the appellants that hearing of this application for reducing the number of classes would be held by the respondent No. 1 on 27.6.2003. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the plea of the appellants that the order sanctioning closure of 8 classes of the primary school run by respondent no. 5 should be quashed on account of denial of opportunity of hearing to them at the stage of forwarding of application by respondent No. 3. However, we find considerable merit in the contention of Shri Dave that order sanctioning reduction of 8 classes of the school should be nullified because the appellants were not given an effective opportunity to represent their cause before respondent no. 1. The facts brought on the record of this appeal show that on receipt of the application of respondent No. 5 along with the comments of the authorized officer, respondent NO. 1 fixed the date of hearing 27.6.2003. The appellants were informed about the date of hearing by the management of the school vide letter dated 18.6.2003. It is neither the case of respondents nor any evidence has been produced before the Court to show that letter dated 18.6.2003 sent by the management of the school to the appellants contained an indication about the material produced along with the application made for closure of the classes or that they were otherwise apprised that the particular documents will be relied in support of the management's prayer for closure of the classes. On his part, respondent no. 1 did not give any intimation to the appellants that the management of the school had relied on the particular documents to support its prayer for closure of the classes. On his part, respondent no. 1 did not give any intimation to the appellants that the management of the school had relied on the particular documents to support its prayer for closure of the classes. This shows that the appellants were through out kept in dark about the material should to be relied by the respondent no. 5 in support of its plea closure of the school and on that account they did not get effective opportunity to counter the claim of the management. Therefore, we are inclined to take the view that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 sanctioning closure of 8 classes of the primary school run by the respondent no. 5 is vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem. The requirement of hearing, whether it is express or implied necessarily means an effective opportunity of hearing. If a person is called upon to contest the claim made by another person without being informed of the material sought to be relied in support of the latter's claim, then the opportunity of hearing given by the competent authority cannot be treated as a substantive and effective opportunity of hearing. This proposition finds support from the judgements of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunkar JT 1993 (6) SCC 1 and Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 7 SCC 739. In view of the above conclusions, we do not consider it necessary to deal with other points raised by the appellants in support of their prayer for quashing order dated 1.8.2003 passed by respondent no. 1. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Order dated 1.8.2003 passed by respondent No. 1 sanctioning closure of 8 classes of the primary school run by respondent No. 5 is declared illegal and quashed with the direction that the application made by respondent No. 5 be declared afresh after giving effective opportunity of hearing to the respondent no. 3. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on July, 14, 2005. The appellants maintainability of the application filed by respondent No. 5 and respondent No. 1 shall decide the same without being influenced by the observations contained in the order of the learned Single Judge." 7. 3. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on July, 14, 2005. The appellants maintainability of the application filed by respondent No. 5 and respondent No. 1 shall decide the same without being influenced by the observations contained in the order of the learned Single Judge." 7. Reading the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench would indicate that the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the requirement of hearing incorporated in the second part of the Rule clearly indicated that an opportunity of hearing was not provided to the teachers at the stage of forwarding of the application to the management for closure to the authorized officer. However, when an application for closure is to be sanctioned by the State, the employment of the petitioners is put to peril and therefore at that stage requirement of hearing of the teachers can be read as implicit. The Division Bench therefore observed that though they were not inclined to accept the plea of the teachers that the order of sanctioning closure be quashed and set aside on account of denial of opportunity of hearing, the court opined that since the petitioners were not given an effective opportunity to represent their case before the State, the order of closure was quashed and set aside and the respondent State was directed to pass a fresh order after the parties i.e. the management and the teachers appeared before it on 14.07.2005. After this order was passed, the petitioners did make a representation for certain documents. That was not apparently in the perception of the petitioners acceded to and a fresh order dated 29.11.2005 was passed reiterating that the school management deserved to have its application for closure accepted. 8. The order dated 29.11.2005 prompted a third round inasmuch as the petitioners filed Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006 challenging the order dated 29.11.2005. On 03.05.2007, the Court admitted the petition and by an interim order reserved the liberty for the petitioners to approach the Tribunal for pending salary dispute. The order dated 03.05.2007 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006 reads as under: "In the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 29.11.2005 passed by the Director of Primary Education. The order dated 03.05.2007 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006 reads as under: "In the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 29.11.2005 passed by the Director of Primary Education. The grievance of the present petitioners is that petitioners are without salary and respondent Institution has not taken any step to terminate the service of petitioners after the order passed by Director of Primary Education and upto date of order, the salary is also not paid by the respondent Institution. This submission made by learned advocate, Mr.Dave, has been disputed strongly by learned advocate, Mr.B.S.Patel, who is appearing on behalf of respondent Institution. However, if there is a dispute, it is open for the petitioner to approach the concerned Tribunal for claiming the salary of remaining days means upto the date of order passed by the Director of Primary Education dated 29.11.2005. In view of the aforesaid facts and since the challenge against the order dated 29.11.2005, therefore, the question required detailed examination. Hence, Rule. Expedited." 9. Having approached the Tribunal in the meantime, for the salary dues, the Tribunal allowed the application of the teachers and directed the management to pay the salaries. It was the case of the teachers before the Tribunal that as teachers the petitioners were entitled to be paid the salaries. In the interregnum since the order of closure was set aside in the year 2003 and the order dated 29.11.2005 was a subject matter of challenge in the High Court, the Tribunal taking into consideration these facts allowed the application directing respondent no. 5 institution to pay salaries upto 29.11.2005. The management challenged the order by filing Special Civil Application No. 17501 of 2011 which was heard together with Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006 of the teachers which had challenged the order dated 29.11.2005. By an oral judgement dated 29.06.2016, after extensively reproducing the order of the Division Bench in LPA No. 77 of 2005 and recording the submissions of the petitioner that there was yet a violation of Section 40B of the Act, the Court disposed of the petitions by observing as under: "24. By an oral judgement dated 29.06.2016, after extensively reproducing the order of the Division Bench in LPA No. 77 of 2005 and recording the submissions of the petitioner that there was yet a violation of Section 40B of the Act, the Court disposed of the petitions by observing as under: "24. I do not propose to go into the issue as regards the legality and validity of the order passed by the Director of Primary Education dated 29.11.2005 so far as granting of the permission for the closure of the eight classes is concerned. However, at the same time, I expect the respondent No.5 to comply with the directions issued therein. I also expect the Director of Primary Education to confirm whether there has been compliance of section 40(b) of the Act at the end of the respondent No.5 as directed by me in the order dated 29.11.2005. 25. Prima facie, I am convinced by the submissions of Mr. Dave that there has been no compliance of section 40(b) of the Act in true perspective. However, I propose to remit the matter to the Director of Primary Education for the purpose of verification whether there has been due and proper compliance of section 40(b) of the Act by the respondent No.5 or not. I may invite the attention of all the respondents to the decision of this Court in the case of Radhanpur Kelavani Mandal vs. Vasantlal Achharatlal Parekh, 2005 (1) GLH (UJ) 7. I may quote the observations made by the learned Single Judge as under; "9. With respect to the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it is not seriously in dispute that the provisions of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act in so far as the same lay down the procedure to be followed before termination of a teacher are pari materia with the provisions of Section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has fairly stated that Section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act have been interpreted by this High Court wherein by judgment dated 8th March, 1979 while deciding Special Civil Application no.652 of 1979, the learned Single Judge of this High Court in the case of SHARDA EDUCATION TRUST v. KIRITKUMAR CHIMANLAL SHELAT AND OTHERS, was pleased to hold that even where the competent authority has granted permission for closing down some of the classes which leads to the action of the management to terminate the services of the teachers, procedure as laid down in Section 36(1) of the Gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal Act is required to be followed. It is also not in dispute that the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of SHARDA EDUCATION TRUST's case (Supra) came to be confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 25th July, 1979 while deciding L.P.A. no.174 of 1979. 10. I also find that while deciding Special Civil Application no.3271/1992 by judgment dated 29th July, 1994, the learned Single Judge of this High Court in the case of SHREE CHUDA EDUCATION TRUST vs. SMT. RAJBALA K. GOHIL AND OTHERS, was pleased to come to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act are pari materia with the provisions of Section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act. The learned Single Judge in the said decision of SHRI CHUDA EDUCATION TRUST (SUPRA) was, therefore, pleased to apply the ratio of the decision in the case of SHARDA EDUCATION TRUST (SUPRA) to the provisions of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act also. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, has sought to draw distinction with respect to the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Act by urging that in the Bombay Primary Education Act under Schedule "F" to the Bombay Primary Education Rules, it is provided that management of a private school shall not terminate otherwise than as a matter of penalty the services of any permanent trained teacher without previous permission of an Administrative Officer and that the teacher to be so terminated shall be entitled to compensation as provided in the said Rule. It is the case of the counsel for the petitioners that in view of the said provisions under Schedule "F", the provisions of Gujarat Secondary Education Act cannot be held as pari materia with the provisions of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act since the entire scheme of the Act under the Bombay Primary Education Act is vitally different from that of Gujarat Secondary Education Act. He has, therefore contended that since the petitioners have already complied with the requirements of payment of compensation to the teachers concerned there was no necessity to give an opportunity as required under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act before terminating the services of such teachers. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Besides being bound by the law of judicial precedents, I am also in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge expressed in the decision of CHUDA EDUCATION TRUST (Supra) and find that the provisions of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act are pari materia with the provisions of Section 30 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act in so far as they pertain to procedure to be followed before terminating the services of a teacher. The presence of Rule 13 under Schedule "F" of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, in my view, would not make any material difference. Compliance thereof would not obviate the requirements of following the procedure laid down under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. Obviously, the requirements of Rule 13 of Schedule "F" are in addition to, and not in substitution of the procedural requirement of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, since by way of the schedule the provisions of Section 40B of the Act can be supplemented and not supplanted. In the result, the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. I accordingly find that, before bringing about a valid termination of the services of the teachers concerned, the petitioners were required to follow the procedure as laid down under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, in the present case, even when the termination was sought to be brought about on account of decision to reduce the classes for which permission was granted by the State authorities and which would have led to closing down the entire primary section. 11.1 As noted earlier, upon being given permission to reduce the classes/ close down the primary section, the petitioners had issued a notice dated 20th May, 1992 to concerned teachers calling upon them to show cause within ten days as to why their services should not be terminated. Immediately thereafter, on 21st May, 1992, the petitioners approached the District Primary Education Officer and sought permission to terminate the services of the teachers concerned. Under Section 40B(1)(a) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, it is provided that no teacher of a recognized private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank; nor his services be otherwise terminated until he has been given by the Manager an opportunity of showing cause against such action proposed to be taken and the action proposed to be taken in regard to him has been approved in writing by the Administrative Officer of the School Board. Under Clause B of subsection (1) of Section 40B, it is provided that the Administrative Officer shall communicate to the Manager of the school in writing his approval or disapproval of the action proposed within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of his proposal. Subsection (2) of Section 40B provides that where the Administrative Officer fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of 45 days as specified in Clause B of subsection (1), the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Administrative Officer on the date of expiry of the said period. 11.2 Thus, before terminating the services of a teacher, he has to be given an opportunity of showing cause against such proposed action. In the present case, the show cause notice in question was issued on 20th May, 1992. The respective teacher was given time for a period of ten days to give his explanation as to why his services should not be terminated. Without waiting for any response from the teachers and even without waiting for the said period of ten days to be over the petitioners straightway approached the District Primary Education Officer on the very next day , that is, on 21st May, 1992 seeking approval for the proposed action to terminate the services of the teachers concerned. Without waiting for any response from the teachers and even without waiting for the said period of ten days to be over the petitioners straightway approached the District Primary Education Officer on the very next day , that is, on 21st May, 1992 seeking approval for the proposed action to terminate the services of the teachers concerned. Thus, the petitioners obviously issued the show cause notice with a prejudged mind and even without ascertaining the response from the teachers proceeded to apply for approval of the proposal to terminate their services. This, in my view, would not meet with the requirement of an opportunity of showing cause being given to the teachers concerned which is a precondition and procedure to be followed before terminating the services of the teachers as provided under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. Thereafter also, the representation of the teachers dated 26th December, 1992 does not appear to have been taken into account and the management appears to have proceeded ahead with their decision to terminate their services. In this view of the matter, I find that the Education Tribunal was correct in concluding that the petitioners have not followed the procedure laid down under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act before terminating the services of the teachers. Therefore, the failure on the part of the District Primary Education Officer to respond to the request of the petitioners to grant approval to the proposed action of termination within a period of 45 days as required under the Act would be inconsequential since I find that from the very inception, the action of the petitioners was illegal, being in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act." � 26. I may also invite the attention of the respondents to the decision of this Court in the case of Natvarbhai Purshottambhai Patel vs. Secretary, Pariraj High School, 1979 (2) GLR 697 . I may quote the observations as under; "[8] The legal position, however, has undergone a sea change since the enactment of the Act. The right of a school management inherent in the relationship of master and servant to fire a members of teaching or non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school subject at the highest to the conditions of contract is now severely restricted by the provisions of sec. The right of a school management inherent in the relationship of master and servant to fire a members of teaching or non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school subject at the highest to the conditions of contract is now severely restricted by the provisions of sec. 36 (1) which has been superimposed by the legislature. Besides, under sec. 38 (1), the Tribunal has been constituted as the authority for the decision of any dispute including dispute arising out of an alleged wrongful, unlawful of unjustified termination. Under sec. 38 (2) read with section 40 (1), jurisdiction of the State Government and of the Civil Court to decide such a dispute has been expressly taken away. Under sec. 39 (4), duty has been cast upon the Tribunal to entertain and decide, inter alia, disputes of the nature referred to in sec. 38 (1). Under sec. 39 (8), the decision of the Tribunal has been made final and it has been provided that no suit shall lie in any civil court in respect of the matters decided by it. Under sec. 39 (9). widest jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Tribunal to give suitable directions as to reinstatement when termination is found to be wrong, unlawful or otherwise unjustified. Under this branch of law, therefore, having regard to the provisions of Secs. 36 (1), 38 (1), 39 (4) and 39 (9), a member of teaching or non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school, who is wrongfully dismissed, is entitled to a declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service and other consequential benefits such as back wages etc. It needs to be emphasized, however, that each one of these reliefs, although inextricably interconnected with the other, is an independent relief and that the question of grant of one or the other depends upon considerations relevant to each relief. Undoubtedly, the relief of declaration is the main relief and, therefore, unless the termination is found to be illegal or wrongful or otherwise unjustified, the question of granted, the Tribunal in exercise of its judicial discretion will be required to grant one or more of the consequential reliefs bearing in mind of the circumstances of the case and relevant legal principles. [9] Against this background, let us examine the question relating to award of back wages in the instant case. [9] Against this background, let us examine the question relating to award of back wages in the instant case. The Tribunal has, in terms, found the termination to be wrongful, inter alia being in violation of sec. 36 (1) (a). Therefore, the main relief or the relief, which constitutes of foundation for granting the consequential reliefs, has been given to the petitioners and they were entitled to claim the consequential reliefs. However, as the petitioners found suitable alternative employment meanwhile, they did not press for the relief of reinstatement to which they would have been otherwise entitled because no other exceptional circumstances are pleaded or proved. Could the petitioners, for having voluntarily opted to give up such relief under the aforesaid circumstances, be legitimately penalized by denying to them the other consequential relief of back wages on the sole ground that since no order of reinstatement is made, they would not be paid their full back wages ? Could the school management, which has obviously acted arbitrarily and in patent disregard of statutory provisions, be legitimately allowed to benefit for its wrong by such denial merely because the petitioners, have opted not to press the relief of reinstatement under special circumstances of the case ? Even if the petitioners themselves had not given up the relief of reinstatement but the Tribunal had refused to grant such relief on the ground of their having been gainfully employed elsewhere in a similar position without any loss (assuming that on such a ground, relief of reinstatement could be refused, on which question this Court should not be taken to have expressed any opinion), could the Tribunal at the same time have legitimately refused the just relief of compensation for their wrongful termination ? It is conceivable that this benevolent legislation enacted with the end in view of ameliorating the conditions of service of the much exploited class of secondary teachers has authorised the Tribunal to deny to an aggrieved teacher adequate compensation equivalent at least to full back wages in a case where wrongful termination is found but reinstatement is not ordered under special circumstances, especially when under the ordinary law some compensation at least would have been given and under Regulation 33 a fairly generous compensation is payable to permanent teachers even if termination is in accordance with sec. 36 ? The answers to these questions cannot but be in the negative. 36 ? The answers to these questions cannot but be in the negative. In taking the view that it has done, the Tribunal with respect, has failed to appreciate not only the content and extent of the remedy available under the ordinary law but also under the special law which it was administering. The Tribunal also overlooked that once the main relief of declaration of unlawful termination is granted, the right to consequential reliefs arises and that the question of granting each consequential reliefs has to be independently examined, in the light of the relevant legal principles and on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The Tribunal further overlooked that mere denial of the relief of reinstatement of a relevant ground does not necessarily disentitle the aggrieved teacher from claiming the relief of just compensation for having been illegally prevented by the management from working and earning unless it is shown that he was gainfully employed during the period of his enforced idleness. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal refusing full back wages to the petitioners from the date of wrongful termination of their services t111 the date of their reemployment proceeds upon a total misconception of law. [10] The foregoing discussion would show that the decision of the Tribunal, in so far as it refused the relief of full back wages to the petitioners during the aforesaid period, suffers from an apparent error of law and that to that extent it requires to be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal has found that the first petitioner was absorbed in another school with effect from July 25, 1978 and that the second petitioner was so absorbed with effect from July 10, 1978. The petitioners would, therefore, be entitled to full back wages for the period from June 10, 1978 till their respective dates of reemployment in another school. It was not the case of the school management before the Tribunal nor it is its case before me that during the aforesaid period the petitioner were gainfully employed anywhere. No other cogent or relevant ground was urged before the Tribunal or before me. It is under these circumstances that this Court is of the opinion that award of full back wages for the aforesaid period is the only just and proper order which could be made. No other cogent or relevant ground was urged before the Tribunal or before me. It is under these circumstances that this Court is of the opinion that award of full back wages for the aforesaid period is the only just and proper order which could be made. Having regard to the fact that the order of termination was passed in patent disregard of the mandatory provisions of sec. 36 (1) (a) and that the petitioners had to fight their legitimate battle right upto this Court in order to get the relief to which they were obviously entitled, on account of the intransigent attitude of the school management, it would be just and reasonable to direct that the school management shall bear the burden of back wages. The public revenue cannot be saddled with the liability of back wages for the obvious fault of the school management. However, in order to ensure that the relief granted by this Court is not frustrated and that the petitioners have not still to fight a further battle in order to recover back wages from the school management, the third respondent herein is directed to pay to each petitioner the amount of back wages calculated in accordance with the aforesaid directions and to deduct the amount so paid from the next instalment of the grant payable to the school management. The payment instalment of the grant payable to the school management. The payment will be made within a period of one month from the receipt of the writ. The first and second respondents will give discharge certificate and service books to the petitioners bringing the same in accordance with this decision and if the service-books are already given to the petitioners, they will be corrected accordingly. Writ will issue accordingly to the respondents as expenditiously as possible. [11] Before parting with the case, it requires to be mentioned that on behalf of the school management a lame attempt was made to attack the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the violation of the provisions of sec. 36 (1) (a). The argument advanced in this behalf was that the petitioners were in any event heard by the third respondent before he permitted closure of classes by his order dated April 11, 1978 and that, therefore, the petitioners were already afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard before the termination was made. 36 (1) (a). The argument advanced in this behalf was that the petitioners were in any event heard by the third respondent before he permitted closure of classes by his order dated April 11, 1978 and that, therefore, the petitioners were already afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard before the termination was made. This is a somewhat extra-ordinary argument. Sec. 36 (1)(a) in terms provides that the person whose services are to be terminated must be given by the manager a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The opportunity has to be afforded before the action is taken and not thereafter. Besides, it has to be afforded by the manager and not by some other person. In the instant case, no opportunity was afforded by the manager before the order of termination was passed. Therefore, the school management cannot take shelter behind the hearing given by the third respondent, which was in a totally different context, namely, in regard to the application of the school management for closure of certain classes in the school." 27. In view of the above, this writ application is disposed of with a direction to the Director of Primary Education to call upon the respondent No.5 to explain in what manner section 40(b) of the Act has been complied with. The Director of Primary Education shall also hear the teachers in this regard and take into consideration the materials and their submissions as regards the non-compliance of the provisions of section 40(b) of the Act. In the event if the Director of Primary Education, State of Gujarat comes to the conclusion that his order dated 29.11.2005 has not been complied with in true perspective, then he shall recall the order dated 29.11.2005 granting permission to the respondent No.5 for the closure of the eight classes and take appropriate steps in that regard in accordance with law so far as the service conditions of the writ applicants are concerned. Let this exercise be undertaken at the earliest and be completed within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the writ of the order. With the above, this writ application is disposed of. 29. Let this exercise be undertaken at the earliest and be completed within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the writ of the order. With the above, this writ application is disposed of. 29. So far as the connected petition is concerned, the same is filed by the petitioner who is the respondent No.5 of the Special Civil Application No.10111 of 2006. This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the legality and validity of the order passed by the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal dated 19th March, 2010 in Applications Nos.38 to 43 of 2007. 30. The issue raised before the Tribunal was one relating to the unpaid salary. The Tribunal, by the impugned order, allowed the applications filed by the teachers and directed the petitioners to make the necessary payment towards the salary. 31. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record and also keeping in mind the discussion in the connected writ application, I am of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal in passing the impugned order. 32. As a result, this petition fails and is hereby rejected. Rule is discharged. 9.1 Reading of the observations in the order dated 29.06.2016 would indicate that the court prima facie came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 40B of the Act were not followed by passing of the order dated 29.11.2005. To repeat, what the court observed is that, the Court in its order at para 24 if reiterated stated that "I also expect the Director of Primary Education to confirm whether there has been compliance of Section 40B of the Act at the end of the respondent no. 5 as directed by me in the order dated 29.11.2005."� The court further observed "Prima facie, I am convinced by the submissions of Mr. Dave that there has been no compliance of Section 40B of the Act in true perspectives." The court therefore remitted the matter to the Director of Primary Education for verification whether there had been due and proper compliance of Section 40B of the Act. This the court did in light of the decisions referred to in the judgement. 10. Dave that there has been no compliance of Section 40B of the Act in true perspectives." The court therefore remitted the matter to the Director of Primary Education for verification whether there had been due and proper compliance of Section 40B of the Act. This the court did in light of the decisions referred to in the judgement. 10. This court therefore has to adjudicate the legality of the order now impugned as to whether it is in compliance of the directions of the Court. Reading of the order indicates that the Director of Primary Education recorded the submissions of the teachers inasmuch as it was their case that the provisions of Section 40B of the Act were not followed and therefore the teachers should be treated to have been continued in service and paid their salaries. The submission of the school was that there was reduction in students' strength and therefore the school had to close eight classes; that after following the provisions of Section 40B of the Act the services of the teachers were terminated on 19.05.2004; the teachers have accepted the compensation of the amounts ranging from Rs.82,442/-which were deposited in their accounts in the years 2004, 2005 and 2007, the order of 19.05.2004 had stood the test of legality inasmuch as the same was not challenged by the teachers; the order of 29.11.2005 had therefore been followed inasmuch as the provisions of Section 40B were complied with. 10.1 The District Education Officer also made his submissions before the authority namely the Director of Primary Education reiterating the nature and events that unfolded before the passing of the order in question. The District Education Officer opined that reading the letter dated 12.05.2004 indicated that it did not talk about termination of the teachers by the communication dated 12.05.2004, however on 19.05.2004, the school had put the services of the teachers to an end, that the terminated teachers were individually paid compensation which were deposited in the bank accounts of the teachers which the teachers had accepted, the school had thereafter made a proposal for sanction of their termination to the District Education Officer. The District Education Officer had by his letter dated 08.06.2004 cancelled the communication of the school dated 12.05.2004 because it was in violation of the order of stay granted by this court in Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2000. The District Education Officer had by his letter dated 08.06.2004 cancelled the communication of the school dated 12.05.2004 because it was in violation of the order of stay granted by this court in Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2000. By the disposal of the petition on 29.09.2004 rejecting the petition, the stay was automatically lifted. The directions given by the Letters Patent Bench were followed. The order was passed on 29.11.2005 also with the condition that provisions of Section 40B of the Act ought to have been followed. It was the stand of the District Education Officer as is evident from reading para 12 of the submissions that the management had not undertaken any procedure to follow the provisions of Section 40B after the order of 29.11.2005 was passed. However, it was the stand of the school that they had followed the provisions of Section 40B and discharged the teachers with effect from 19.05.2004. 10.2 Recording these submissions, the Director of Primary Education came to the finding that on closure of eight classes, on the permission granted by the Director of Primary Education, it would directly affect the teachers in question and therefore the school will have to follow the procedure under Section 40B of the Act by granting compensation to the teachers in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It was found that without taking into consideration the order dated 27.11.2003 passed in Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2003 wherein the court had granted status quo in favour of the petitioners, the management had terminated the services of the teachers in light of the communication of the District Education Officer dated 12.05.2004. The District Education Officer had on 08.06.2004 withdrawn the letter dated 12.05.2004. The school was informed that in accordance with the provisions of Section 40B of the Act where the school should have sent a proposal so that the District Education Officer could have complied with within the period of time frame of 45 days as required under the provisions of Section 40B of the Act, however, the management did not forward a proposal to the District Education Officer and there is no evidence on record to suggest that a proposal in compliance of provisions of Section 40B was made to the District Education Officer so as to attract the deeming fiction under the Act. However, the fiction of deemed acceptance of the proposal under the provisions of Section 40B cannot be pressed into service so as to discharge the teachers in light of the fact that there was an interim stay granted by this court in Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2003. The Director of Primary Education further observed that the 7 teachers in question were addressed letters dated 19.05.2004, amounts have been deposited in the bank accounts. That while considering compliance of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act, the author of the order also considered that the directions given by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal on 14.06.2005 needed to be taken care of and then the Director of Primary Education categorically observed that there is no compliance of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act once again as is evident from what is stated hereinabove. The findings of the order dated 25.02.2019 is translated and reproduced hereinbelow: "FINDINGS: (1).The Director Of Primary Education had given permission to reduce 8 Classes. As a result thereof 7 teachers will have to be relieved after following the procedure under Section 40B of the Act and they have to be paid compensation in accordance with law. (2). The management gave a notice of termination to the Teachers on 19.11.2003 and the management in turn asked for approval from the DEO on 8.4.2004. However during this time the affected teachers had filed Special Civil Application No.16463 of 2003 and had obtained stay on 27.11.2003. Without taking into consideration the stay granted by the High Court the District Education Officer wrote a letter on 12.05.2004 to the school management which does not clarify whether permission was or was not granted to terminate the services of the Teachers. However the DEO by his letter dated 8.6.2004 cancelled the letter dated 12.05.2004. In accordance with the provisions of Section 40B(1)(b) of the Act the proposal of the school had either to be sanctioned or refused within 45 days of its receipt. There is no record to suggest that the DEO had rejected the proposal of the School Management. Hence by the deeming fiction on the authority failing to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of 45 days the proposed action is deemed to be approved by the officer. There is no record to suggest that the DEO had rejected the proposal of the School Management. Hence by the deeming fiction on the authority failing to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of 45 days the proposed action is deemed to be approved by the officer. Therefore as no decision was taken on the proposal the same has to be deemed to be approved. However what is needed to be appreciated is that there was a stay of the High Court. The School Management by addressing individual letters to the teachers had paid an amount of Rs.82,422/-which was deposited in their Bank Accounts and which was accepted by the Teachers. The management has therefore paid the amounts in accordance with law. 3.The Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 14.06.2005 in LPA 77/2005 in SCA 16463 of 2003 quashed and set aside the order of the Single Judge dated 29.09.2004 and also the order of the Director Of Primary Education dated 1.08.2003 and directed that a fresh order be passed after hearing the teachers. 4. The Director Of Primary Education by his order dated 29.11.2005 had informed the management to comply with the provisions of Section 40B of the Act and it appears that the Management has not followed the procedure of Section 40B. Decision: (1).The permission granted to the Akhandanand Vidyabhavan Trust on 29.11.2005 by the Director of Primary Education Officer has not been disturbed by the Order of the High Court. (2).As per the Order dated 29.09.2004 of the High Court the teachers and the school management were heard and permission to close the school was given on 29.11.2005 which does not change the original order dated 1.08.2003.However the school management upto the order dated 29.11.2005 will have to pay salaries and allowances upto 29.11.2005 after adjusting the amounts already paid. (3).The teachers be paid salaries according to the order dated 19.3.2010 of the Tribunal and if there is a deduction of more than Rs.400 the same shall be refunded." 11. (3).The teachers be paid salaries according to the order dated 19.3.2010 of the Tribunal and if there is a deduction of more than Rs.400 the same shall be refunded." 11. It therefore makes it abundantly clear from reading the reasonings of the order dated 25.02.2019 which is impugned in this petition that despite two repeated directions of this court, one of the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal and then by a co-ordinate bench of this court by its oral judgment dated 29.06.2016 which are extensively reproduced hereinabove, the orders of closure were passed subject to compliance of Section 40B of the Act, no such compliance was reported to have been done by the school management. The repeated stand of the school was that having addressed a letter dated 19.05.2004 and the teachers having accepted the compensation pursuant to the communication dated 19.05.2004, that was sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act. 12. Narratives as stated hereinabove and reading of the order dated 25.02.2019 would indicate that the District Education Officer clearly made a submission before the Director of Primary Education that on 12.05.2004 the communication which was addressed by the District Education Officer to the school pursuant to which the school was prompted to issue a communication dated 19.05.2004 giving compensation to the teachers was a letter of 12.05.2004 which was withdrawn by the District Education Officer on 08.06.2004 as it was found to be not in compliance and in breach of the order of stay granted by this court on 27.11.2003 in Special Civil Application No. 16463 of 2003. The District Education Officer was also of the opinion, as is recorded in the findings of the order impugned herein, that the deeming fiction of 45 days also would not come into play in the facts of the case though it would operate as the action of termination of teachers was in the period when there was a stay granted by this court on 27.11.2003. It is in light of these findings that para 4 of the impugned order opining that there is once again breach of Section 40B of the Act is accepted by the Director of Primary Education. 13. Unfortunately, this is the third order of Director of Primary Education on remand after passing two orders previously on 01.08.2003 and 29.11.2005. It is in light of these findings that para 4 of the impugned order opining that there is once again breach of Section 40B of the Act is accepted by the Director of Primary Education. 13. Unfortunately, this is the third order of Director of Primary Education on remand after passing two orders previously on 01.08.2003 and 29.11.2005. Despite having nudged and pushed into deciding whether there was violation of provisions of Section 40B of the Act though the Director does record such violation in the impugned order, the Director holds that the petitioners are entitled to compensation upto 29.11.2005. It also observes that while awarding such relief till 29.11.2005, the amounts that have been paid by the school shall be deducted. 14. Obviously, therefore, a justiciable view needs to be taken by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice. This is so particularly in light of the fact that the petitioners had to first be prompted to approach this court challenging the order dated 01.08.2003. They failed in their challenge inasmuch as their petitions were dismissed. That was round 1. Thereafter, in round 2, they succeeded inasmuch as in Letters Patent Appeal No. 77 of 2005, the Court remanded the matter for hearing before the authority. On remand, the Director of Primary Education passed an order on 29.11.2005 which was challenged before this court in Special Civil Application No. 10111 of 2006. That petition was finally disposed of on 29.06.2016 wherein this court had specifically come to the conclusion that there was violation of provisions of Section 40B of the Act. That was round 3. This is in addition to their going to the Tribunal for their salaries which was also subject matter of challenge by the management in filing Special Civil Application No. 17501 of 2011 which was dismissed. That was the fourth round of litigation that the teachers had to face. 14.1 The present is therefore round 5 which the teachers have been compelled to take as a result of the impugned order dated 25.02.2019. As recorded earlier, the author of the order impugned has come to the conclusion that there is violation of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act as recorded in the order. 15. 14.1 The present is therefore round 5 which the teachers have been compelled to take as a result of the impugned order dated 25.02.2019. As recorded earlier, the author of the order impugned has come to the conclusion that there is violation of the provisions of Section 40B of the Act as recorded in the order. 15. The question therefore is should the teachers be left high and dry once again to be sent back to decide the issue afresh. The answer to the question is an obvious "NO" so as to end the litigation here and once for all. The chain of events narrated hereinabove indicates that even as on date by the impugned order dated 25.02.2019 there is a positive finding by the Director of Primary Education that there is violation of Section 40B of the Act. 19 years have gone by since the school has closed and the petitioners are still litigating on the legality of that closure. 16. In light of this, ends of justice will be met if a direction is issued to respondent no. 5 School to pay compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs to each of the teachers - the petitioners herein within a period of ten weeks from the date of receipt of writ of copy of this order. Order accordingly. It is clarified that the respondent no. 5 school shall not be entitled to claim these compensation amounts as expenses from the grant available to it from the State. Petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.