ORDER/JUDGMENT : – This civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the applicant (defendant No. 1) assailing the order dated 22-9-2021 passed in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2015 whereby First Civil Judge Class-I, Gadarwara has rejected his application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”). 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the applicant (defendant No. 1) and respondent No. 2 and 3 (defendants) are real brothers. The respondent No. 1 is plaintiff. The respondent No. 4 is mother of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) and the respondent No. 5 is real brother of respondent No. 1/plaintiff-Varun Anand. A civil suit has been filed by the respondent No. 1 as plaintiff before the trial Court against the petitioner (defendant No. 1) and other respondents No. 2 to 7 seeking declaration, partition and possession as also claiming one-third share, out of one-fourth share of the land of his father situated in Mouza Gadarwara, Settlement No. 119, Patwari Halka No. 18/1 and to declare the entries made in Sanshodhan Panji No. 99 order dated 30-6-2006 as null and void as also Sanshodhan Panji No. 308 order dated 20-7-2014 passed in favour of respondent No. 6/defendant No. 6 (Kapil son of present applicant) as null and void. The respondent No. 1/plaintiff also claimed to decide his share under section 54 of the Code and after partition through the competent Court final decree be passed. 3. The applicant (defendant No. 1) filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 of the Code alleging that partition of disputed land had already taken place on 30-6-2006 vide Sanshodhan Panji No. 99, which is binding on the parties because there was written partition executed on 18-9-2005 between legal heirs of Mohanlal Anand, namely, applicant and his brothers, namely, Praveshchand, Gulshan Kumar, Kuldeep Chand. They were enjoying their respective possession according to mutual partition. Thereafter, father of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) himself sold some immovable property. He had not challenged the partition during his lifetime because that partition took place with the consent of all the brothers, therefore, property cannot be partitioned again as per law. They were enjoying their respective possession according to mutual partition. Thereafter, father of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) himself sold some immovable property. He had not challenged the partition during his lifetime because that partition took place with the consent of all the brothers, therefore, property cannot be partitioned again as per law. Further, the suit is clearly time barred and in absence of any cause of action in favour of plaintiff, the suit is not maintainable, hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. Admittedly, there is a written mutual partition deed on record which is also pleaded by the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) in his plaint. He himself pleaded share of the applicants and other brothers, who are his real uncles. His mother and his own real brothers (respondents No. 4 and 5) have also not challenged the partition deed dated 18-9-2005 and Sanshodhan Panji order dated 30-6-2006, after death of father of the plaintiff, namely, Gulshan Kumar. 5. Earlier, the applicant had filed similar application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, objecting maintainability of present suit which was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 5-5-2016 (Annexure-A/4). Thereafter, the present applicant filed Civil Revision No. 241/2016 before this Hon’ble Court. This Court vide order dated 3-10-2019 (Annexure-A/5) had allowed civil revision and remanded the matter to the trial Court to decide the application afresh after considering the objection raised by applicant regarding limitation and cause of action. The trial Court again vide impugned order dated 22-9-2021 again rejected the application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. Hence, this civil revision. 6. The applicant challenged the impugned order on the ground that trial Court ought to have held that the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) admitted that in terms of partition dated 18-9-2005 the revenue authorities have also given effect and made entries in the revenue record by Sanshodhan Panji dated 30-6-2006 and the mutual partition signed by father of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff). He had not challenged it within three years as prescribed under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. On the contrary, he acted upon such partition to sell out some part of his share by registered sale deed dated 17-6-2011 (Annexure-A/7). The applicant further stated that evidence of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) has already been recorded before the trial Court and it has been closed now. On the contrary, he acted upon such partition to sell out some part of his share by registered sale deed dated 17-6-2011 (Annexure-A/7). The applicant further stated that evidence of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) has already been recorded before the trial Court and it has been closed now. From the evidence of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) it is apparently clear that suit is barred by law of limitation and he has no cause of action to file the suit. The applicant has filed a copy of statement of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) as Annexure-A/8. The applicant further stated that father of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) died on 22-2-2012. Thereafter, on 14-3-2014 the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff), his mother (respondent No. 4) and his brother (respondent No. 5) have sold the remaining part of his father’s land, which was received by his father in partition by acting upon such partition. After a long lapse of 09 years the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) filed a suit for partition or reopening of previous partition, which is not maintainable. Hence, applicant prayed to set aside the order passed by the trial Court under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code and allow the instant civil revision. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant has filed various documents in support of his case and placed reliance on the cases of Sree Surya Developers and promoters vs. N. Sailesh Prasad and others, (2022) 5 SCC 73; Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs. Manjit Kaur and others, Civil Appeal No. 7764/2014 decided by Apex Court on 31-7-2020; Chandra Kant Missir and others vs. Balakrishna Misir and others, AIR 1970 SC 1536 ; Ratnam Chettiar and others vs. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar and others, (1976) 1 SCC 214 ; Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs., Civil Appeal No. 2960/2019 decided by Apex Court on 13-3-2019; Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali and others, Civil Appeal No. 9519/2019 decided by Apex Court on 9-7-2020; Raja Ram vs. Jai Prakash Singh and others, (2019) 8 SCC 701 ; R. K. Roja vs. U. S. Raydu, (2016) 14 SCC 275 and Rav Ajay Pratap Singh Yadav vs. Gurucharan Singh, 2019(1) M.P.L.J. 641 . 8. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the contention made by learned counsel for the applicant and placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Urvashiben and another vs. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi, (2019) 13 SCC 372 ; Chhotanben and another vs. Kiritibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar and others, (2018) 6 SCC 422 . He strongly contended that for deciding whether the plaint is to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code only the averments stated in the plaint are to be considered, and merits and demerits of the case raised by the parties would be adjudicated at trial. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the record. The relationship between the parties is admitted by them. Recently, in the case of Sree Surya Developers and Promoters (supra) it has been held that it would not permit the plaintiff to make suit maintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred by law. When clever drafting of plaint has created illusion of a cause of action, Court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage. Thus, the plaint is liable to be rejected. In that case, the plaintiff sought multiple reliefs. However, such multiple reliefs could only be granted only if compromise decree in question were to be set aside. In that case compromise decree came to be passed by a Civil Judge in 2016 in terms of memorandum of compromise entered into by the father on behalf of respondent No. 1 therein, grandmother and the appellant/developer. On attaining the age of majority, the respondent No. 1 therein filed suit inter alia praying declaration of rights, title and interest over the suit schedule property and declaration of compromise decree. He also prayed for the revocation of deed as null and void. 10. In the case at hand, the applicant and respondents No. 2 and 3 are real brothers. The suit property situated at Mouza Gadarwara, bearing Khasra No. 328/4, Patwari Halka No. 18/1, Settlement No. 119, area 5.78 acres; Khasra No. 338/2 area 2.26 acres, Khasra No. 339 area 0.59 acres and Khasra No. 363 area 1.59 acres, total area 10.21 acres was the ancestral property of the father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and applicant (defendant No. 1) to respondents No. 2 and 3. In the suit itself it is pleaded that area about 0.0211 acres i.e. half dismil of land out Khasra No. 338/2 area 02.26 acres and Khasra No. 339 area 0.58 acres was sold out by the father of the respondent No. 1 and applicant and respondents No. 2 and 3 jointly Amarchand Kori by registered sale deed dated 25-3-1965. It is also admitted by the plaintiff himself in his plaint that he is bound by the aforesaid sale deed and not challenged the same. In this case he is claiming one-third share out of one-fourth share of his father which are Khasra Nos. 338/2 area 0.914 hectares, 339 area 0.235 hectares, Khasra Nos. 363 area 0.614 hectares, 328/4 area 2.169 hectares. In paragraph 7 of the plaint it is mentioned that out of suit properties the land bearing Khasra No. 328/4, area 2.169 hectares the father of plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 3 had purchase the same jointly vide sale deed dated 21-9-2007. The plaintiff has not claimed anything in respect of this sale deed. 11. Thereafter, plaintiff himself pleaded that disputed lands bearing Khasra No. 338/2 area 0.94 hectares, Khasra No. 339 area 0.25 hectares, Khasra No. 363/1 area 0.36 hectares were partitioned according to Sanshodhan Panji No. 99 vide order dated 30-6-2006, which is based on their mutual partition of the year 2006. He claimed that partition was illegal and was unequal partition. Therefore, it is not binding on him as legal heirs of his father. The plaintiff himself pleaded in paragraph 12 of the plaint that father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1, namely, Gulshan Kumar died on 22-1-2012. The partition was executed on 18-5-2006, thereafter Sanshodhan Panji came into existence on 30-6-2016. The partition deed was also on record which is also mentioned in concerned Sanshodhan Panji Order dated 30-6-2006 (Exhibit-P/2) because statement of the plaintiff is also recorded before the trial Court. In the registered sale deed dated 17-6-2011 (Annexure-A/7) father of the plaintiff, namely, Gulshan Kumar was purchaser who narrated in the sale deed about their family mutual partition. During lifetime of plaintiff’s father (Gulshan Kumar) he had not challenged the partition dated 18-9-2005 on the ground that it was forged. Further, he acted upon it and thereafter Sanshodhan Panji order dated 30-6-2006 (Exhibit-P/2) was passed. Thereafter, in the year 2011 he executed sale deed (Exhibit-A/7) and he died in the year 2012. During lifetime of plaintiff’s father (Gulshan Kumar) he had not challenged the partition dated 18-9-2005 on the ground that it was forged. Further, he acted upon it and thereafter Sanshodhan Panji order dated 30-6-2006 (Exhibit-P/2) was passed. Thereafter, in the year 2011 he executed sale deed (Exhibit-A/7) and he died in the year 2012. It is apparently clear that the suit property has already been partitioned earlier. It cannot be partitioned again as per law, as has been held in the case of Chandra Kant Misir (supra). 12. In paragraph 4 of Chandra Kant Misir (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that on the evidence it is clear that there was severance of the joint family status and the members of the family were divided in 1914 and their respective shares were since then separately enjoyed and possessed by them thereafter and were entered in the revenue records in their names. Thereafter, their names were entered in the revenue records. Three members of the family were in possession of their respective shares of the joint family which is established by a mass of evidence and the admission by Bouku and his sons and grandsons. In paragraph 13 of the plaint it is averred : – “for the sake of their convenience and meeting their expenses, some properties are in possession of their parties...xxx Although several parties to this suit have at times, mortgaged or even sold some land in the possession in time of their personal need, yet defendant No. 1 (Balakrishna son of Makund) since the death of Makund Misser, has been keeping with him the produce of considerable lands held in jointness, without dividing the proportionate share of the parties, for the expenses of the joint family xx xx” In paragraphs 10 and 11 of aforesaid judgment the Apex Court held as under : – “10. But, pursuant to the division made in 1914 the shares of the three branches were demarcated by the Commissioner and the three branches remained in separated possession of the properties alloted to them under that partition. The record of the suit No. 187 of 1914 was it was reported destroyed. But the fact will not enable the plaintiff to get any advantage because the subsequent conduct of Bouku clearly shows that he has taken possession of the properties pursuant to the award and had acted upon the award as being effective. The record of the suit No. 187 of 1914 was it was reported destroyed. But the fact will not enable the plaintiff to get any advantage because the subsequent conduct of Bouku clearly shows that he has taken possession of the properties pursuant to the award and had acted upon the award as being effective. It would be reasonable to infer that a decree binding a person would not be made unless he was duly served with the writ of summons from the Court. 11. The ground that the arbitrators had awarded to Makund a larger share cannot also invalidate the award it appears that the division was made by agreement between the parties, and Makund was given 6 annas share. Apparently Makund claimed that he was the eldest member and that some of the properties claimed as Basudeo to be joint family properties were acquired by him by his own exertion. The arbitrators apparently accepted that contention and the parties agreed to the award, 35 years after that date and after the terms of the award were carried out, it was not open to one of the parties to raise a contention that the arbitrators had acted improperly in awarding to Makund a larger share than what was awardable to him under the Hindu law relating to partition”. 13. Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratnam Chettiar (supra) wherein it has been held that a partition effected between the members of Hindu undivided family by their own volition and with their consent cannot be reopened, unless it is shown that the same is obtained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence. In such a case the Court should require a strict proof of facts because an act inter vivos cannot be lightly set aside. 14. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 in paras 11 and 12, this it has been observed as under : “11. In such a case the Court should require a strict proof of facts because an act inter vivos cannot be lightly set aside. 14. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 in paras 11 and 12, this it has been observed as under : “11. In I.T.C. Ltd. vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70 it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal (supra).” 15. In the case of Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 , this Court has observed and held as under : “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the Court should exercise power under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the Court should exercise power under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the Court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 16. In the case of Dahiben (supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph 15.8 held as under : – “15.8 The delay of over 5 and ½ years after the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was instituted on 15-12-2014, even though the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of Civil Procedure Code. Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs.15 wherein this Court held the suit would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, if it was filed beyond three years of the execution of the registered deed. 17. In the light of principles laid down in the above cases, the facts of the instant case are required to be appreciated. On account of undue influence or respect for elder brothers by the father of the plaintiff, he had not challenged their mutual partition for a long period. It is apparent from the pleadings of the plaint it is apparent that he was alive. After execution of the mutual partition i.e. from 2006 till 2012, but he has not challenged such partition and Sanshodhan Panji Order dated 30-6-2006 (Exhibit-P/2) during his life time, though he himself executed sale deed in the year 2011. The respondent No. 1/plaintiff, his mother (respondent No. 4) and brother (respondent No. 5) executed a sale deed for the same property, which was involved in the partition. Therefore, earlier partition cannot be reopened. The suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is clearly time barred. The plaintiff had no cause of action to re-open the same. The suit is time barred and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 18. On the aforesaid grounds and discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the trial Court erred in dismissing the application filed by the applicant under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the impugned order is hereby set aside. Resultantly, the revision is allowed. Consequently, the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code is allowed and the suit filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed.