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2022 DIGILAW 101 (GAU)

Paktum Basar v. Lingdum Taki

2022-02-02

KALYAN RAI SURANA, ROBIN PHUKAN

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JUDGMENT : R.Phukan, J 1. These six intra-Court appeals are directed against the common judgment and order dated 24.11.2016, passed by the learned Single Judge in (i) WP (C) 417 (AP)/2016 (Lingum Taki & 2 Ors. Vs. The State of A.P. & 3 Others, (ii) WP (C) 520 (AP)/2016 (Kanpong Wangphop & 24 Ors. Vs. The State of A.P. & 4 Others, and (iii) WP(C) 606(AP)/2016, (Hibu Raju & 12 Ors. Vs. The State of A.P. & 4 Others. By the impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge had allowed the aforementioned writ petitions and set aside and quashed (i) the Cabinet Decision dated 11.05.2016, (ii) W.T. Message dated 25.07.2016, and (iii) Order dated 15.07.2016, and further directed the State respondents to ensure that a ‘Limited Departmental Examination’ (LDE for short) is conducted to fill up the vacant posts of Head Constables that arose from 2010 onward and which are to be filled up by LDE as per Head Constables of Police (Group-‘C’ Posts) Recruitment Rules of 2010, (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 2010”) and further directed that writ petitioners (i.e. the private respondents herein) should also be allowed to take part in selection process, as permitted by Rules of 2010. 2. As common issues are involved in all the six appeals, at the instance of the learned Senior Addl. Advocate General, Senior Advocate and Advocate(s) for the parties, these appeals were heard and decided by this common judgment and order. The Factual Matrix:- 3. The contentious issues in these appeals relate to promotion of Constables to the next higher post of Head Constables in Police Department of Arunachal Pradesh. In order to fill up the vacant posts of Head Constables, the Police Department had initiated the process of promotion in the year 2008 as per the Head Constables of Police (Group-‘C’ Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 1987”). As per the Rule, 50% of the posts of Head Constables were to be filled up by way of promotion from amongst the Constables having minimum 3 (three) years of satisfactory service in the grade on the basis of merit which is to be assessed by holding departmental examination and the remaining 50% by promotion from amongst the Constables having minimum 5 (five) years of satisfactory service in the grade on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. 4. 4. The said Rules of 1987, however, did not provide for any gender based reservation. But, vide letter dated 02.01.2007, the Director General of Police (DGP for short) forwarded a proposal to the State Government for earmarking 10% of the sanctioned strength in the cadre of Sub-Inspector (SI for short) and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI for short) and Head Constable for women in the State Civil Police. The said proposal was approved by the Government and vide letter dated 01.02.2007 and the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Department of Home conveyed the approval of the Government and urged the DGP to move a proposal for amendment of the Recruitment Rules. 5. But, before amendment of the Rules, the Asstt. Inspector General of Police (AIGP for short) by a WT Message dated 06.12.2007, proposed to conduct a selection process for preparation of a panel for promotion of Constables to Head Constables, and from Head Constables to ASI, against the existing and anticipated vacancies and willingness of the candidates was sought for from the eligible candidates, who had completed 3 (three) years of service as on 01.01.2008, for merit Examination for promotion of Constable to Head Constables. 6. Thereafter, LDE was conducted on 02.04.2008 in terms of the Government order dated 27.03.2008. Out of 481 Constables, 272 male Constables and 14 female Constables were found qualified and two separate select lists were prepared. Thereafter, on 20.12.2008 one Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC for short) was conducted and the said DPC had recommended the names of 64 Constables for promotion to Head Constables and the names of 13 others were kept in the wait list. Although the names of female Constables did not figure in the merit list, but the DPC had recommended 6 (six) female Arunachal Pradesh Schedule Tribes (APST for short) Constables for promotion to Head Constables against the roaster point 56 to 62. Thereafter, from 13.01.2009 to 28.04.2010, the names of 75 male Constables and 9 (nine) lady Constables were recommended for promotion to the next higher post of Head Constables by the DPC. 7. Subsequently, the Rules of 2010 was notified on 30.08.2010. Thereafter, from 13.01.2009 to 28.04.2010, the names of 75 male Constables and 9 (nine) lady Constables were recommended for promotion to the next higher post of Head Constables by the DPC. 7. Subsequently, the Rules of 2010 was notified on 30.08.2010. Under the new Rules, 60% of the posts of Head Constables were to be filled up by promotion from Constables with three years of regular service in grade based on seniority-cum-merit and 40% of the posts were to be filled up by holding LDE from amongst the Constables who had completed 2 (two) years of regular service in the grade on the basis of written test, physical test and viva-voce. Promotion of 9 (nine) lady Constables and the challenge thereof:- 8. The promotion of 9 (nine) lady Constables by the DPC had evoked a lot of controversy and resentment amongst the Constables and 9 (nine) writ petitioners carried the controversy to this Court by filing a writ petition, which was numbered as W.P.(C) No. 61(AP)/2014, thereby challenging such promotion. The writ petitioners contended, inter alia, that their names were placed in higher position in the merit/select list than the 9 promoted lady Constables and as such they were denied promotion unfairly. Thereafter, three other writ petitioners also challenged promotion of lady Constables from the post of Head Constables to the post of ASI by filing writ petition, being WP(C) No. 329(AP)/2014. 9. By a common judgment and order dated 20.11.2014, the learned single Judge was pleased to allow WP(C)No. 61(AP)/2014 and directed the State Respondents to promote the writ petitioners to the post of Head Constables against vacancies which had arisen during the period between 2008 to 2010, with retrospective effect, however, without the benefit of service seniority. However, WP(C) No. 329(AP)/2014 was dismissed on the ground that the writ petitioners cannot challenge further promotion of lady constables to the ASI. Fallout of the judgment and order of the ld. Single Judge, dated 20.11.2014:- 10. Pursuant to the said judgment and order dated 20.11.2014, the State Respondents had constituted a fresh DPC and the said DPC, in its meeting held on 09.01.2015, had recommended the names of 10 Constables, out of which 8 (eight) persons were the writ petitioners of WP(C) No. 61(AP)/2014, and the names of two non-APST Constables were also recommended for promotion the post of Head Constables. Accordingly, the respondent authorities had promoted them. 11. Accordingly, the respondent authorities had promoted them. 11. Thereafter, another writ petition, being WP(C) 558(AP)/2015 was filed by 5 (five) writ petitioners, and projected that their names were placed at serial No. 92, 93, 94, 71 and 72 in the select/merit list prepared in the year 2008, but the DPC conducted 09.01.2015, had recommended the names of the petitioners of WP(C) No 61(AP)/2014 and two non-APST Constables for promotion to Head Constables against 16 numbers of vacancies that arose in the year 2010. By order dated 28.01.2016, the said WP(C) No. 558(AP)/2015, was disposed of by directing the writ petitioners to prefer one representation before the Principal Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Home Department within a period of two weeks and also directed the said authority to dispose of the same by a speaking order within further period of two months from the date of receipt of representation. As the said authority could not complete the process within time, an interlocutory application was filed for seeking extension of time. In the meanwhile the writ petitioners had filed a contempt case, being Cont. Case (C) No. 26(AP)/2016, wherein notices were issued by this court. 12. Thereafter, another 146 Constables, whose names had figured in the merit list dated 27.03.2008, including the appellants in W.A. 19(AP)/2019, W.A. 20(AP)/2019 and W.A. 21(AP)/2019, by claiming to have obtained more marks than the 9 (nine) lady Constables, had also submitted their representation before the competent authorities for consideration of their case promotion. Peculiar situation and the Government’s Policy Decision to wriggle out of it 13. In order to deal with the peculiar situation, that arose out of the judgment and order dated 20.11.2014, in the WP(C) No. 61(AP)/2014, and No. 329(AP)/2014, and order dated 22.01.2016, in WP(C) 558(AP)/2015, and also to deal with the representation filed by 146 Constables who have secured more marks than that of 9 (nine) lady Constables, the matter came to be placed before the State Cabinet and accordingly, the State Cabinet in its meeting held on 11.07.2016, had taken a policy decision and thereby extended the terms of the Select List dated 27.03.2008 and further approved filling up of 146 post of Head Constables by promotion as a one-time measure and approval was also granted for amendment of the Rules of 1987 for paving the way of reservation of 10% of posts for lady Constables. Pursuant to the aforesaid Cabinet Decision, the Home Department had issued an order dated 15.07.2016, and extended the validity of the select list dated 27.03.2008. 14. Thereafter, the AIGP(E) by a WT message dated 25.07.2016, directed the Superintendent of Police of Districts and other concerned officials to ask 151 numbers of Constables named therein to submit their particulars for consideration of their case for promotion. It may be mentioned here that the select list dated 27.03.2008 contained 272 names. It was submitted at the Bar that 151 names were inclusive of 146 Constables who had submitted representation, as well as 5 (five) petitioners in WP(C) 558(AP)/ 2015. 15. Being highly aggrieved by the (i) Cabinet decision dated 11.07.2016, (ii) order dated 15.07.2016, and (iii) W.T. Message dated 25.07.2016, the private respondents in these three writ appeals had filed writ petitions before this Court, which was registered and numbered as W.P.(C) 417(AP)/2016, W.P.(C) 520(AP)/2016 and W.P.(C) 606 (AP)/2015. It may be mentioned here that the appellants herein were arrayed as respondents in all the said three writ petitions. It was urged in these writ petitions that the decision to promote 146 Constables to the post of Head Constables was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as well as violation of the Rules of 1987, as amended. Impugned common judgment and order dated 24.11.2016:- 16. The learned Single Judge, vide impugned common judgment and order dated 24.11.2016, passed in W.P.(C) 417(AP)/2016, W.P.(C) 520(AP)/2016 and W.P.(C) 606 (AP)/2015, allowed the said writ petitions and quashed and set aside the (i) Cabinet decision dated 11.07.2016, (ii) order dated 15.07.2016, and (iii) W.T. Message dated 25.07.2016, and further directed the State respondents to ensure that a LDE is conducted to fill up the vacant posts of Head Constables that arose from 2010 onward and which were to be filled up by LDE as per Rules of 2010 and further directed that writ petitioners (i.e. private respondents herein) should also be allowed to take part in selection process, as permitted by Rules of 2010. 17. Being highly aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2016, the present writ appeals had been filed by the appellants before the Principal Seat. In course of time these intra-Court appeals were transferred to this Bench for disposal. 17. Being highly aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2016, the present writ appeals had been filed by the appellants before the Principal Seat. In course of time these intra-Court appeals were transferred to this Bench for disposal. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeals, W.A. No.29/2019, W.A. No.02/2019 and W.A. No. 51/2019 had also been filed for assailing the said judgment and order dated 24.11.2016. 18. Heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. N. Ratan, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. K. Ete, learned Senior Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Mr. D. Soki, learned Senior Government Advocate for the State Respondents, and Mr. K. Tama learned Advocate for the private respondents. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants had submitted that ordinarily, though a select list remains in force for a period of one year, yet for valid reasons its validity can be extended beyond the period of one year. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on the following decisions, viz., (i) Man Singh Vs. Commissioner, Garowal Mandal, Pauri & Others, (2009) 11 SCC 448 ; (ii) Rakhi Roy & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 637 ; (iii) State of Orissa Vs. Rajkishor Nanda & others, (2010) 6 SCC 777 ; (iv) State of Rajasthan Vs. Jagadish Chopra, (2007) 8 SCC 161 ; and (v) Giridhar Kr. Dadhichi Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 2 SCC 709. 20. It was further submitted that in the case in hand the Government itself had come forward and to wriggle out from the peculiar situation that had arisen because of the herein before referred judgment and order dated 20.11.2014 in W.P.(C) 61(AP)/2014 and W.P.(C) 329(AP)/2014, and judgment and order dated 28.01.2016 in W.P.(C) 558(AP)/2015. Accordingly, a Policy Decision was adopted in the Cabinet Decision dated 11.05.2016 and resultantly, by an order dated 15.07.2016, the tenure of the select list was extended. Thus, it has been submitted that the impugned judgment and order of the learned single Judge suffers from manifest illegality which requires interference of this Court. It has further been submitted that the life of a select list/panel is deemed to be kept alive when even one appointment is given from such panel after the alleged expiry. In this regard, by referring to the decision rendered in the cases of (i) Prassanna Kr. Nayak Vs. It has further been submitted that the life of a select list/panel is deemed to be kept alive when even one appointment is given from such panel after the alleged expiry. In this regard, by referring to the decision rendered in the cases of (i) Prassanna Kr. Nayak Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., (1992) 0 Supreme (Ori) 328; and (ii) Deb Narayan Chatterjee Vs. Union of India, (1997) 0 Supreme(Cal) 245, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that it is well settled that when the State continues to make appointment from the panel much after its expiry, it is prevented by principle of estoppel by conduct from denying appointment to those who are similarly situated. We also take note of the submissions that the learned Single Judge had authored the judgment passed in W.P.(C) 558/2015. Therefore, it is contended that these appeals be allowed. 21. Mr. N. Ratan, the learned counsel for the appellants has also advanced his submissions, which are similar to that made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants. 22. The learned Addl. Advocate General for the State has questioned the locus of the respondents to file the writ petition on the ground that they were not the “persons aggrieved”. it is also submitted that though the validity of the select list is ordinarily for one year, yet the validity can be extended for a good reason as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Roy& Ors.(supra). It is further submitted that the Govt. had taken a well considered and conscious policy decision to extend the validity of the list as such the Court ought not to have exercised power of judicial review over the policy decision of the State. It has also been submitted that the impugned judgment is the outcome of selective reading of the cases cited at the Bar. Thus, the learned Senior Addl. Advocate General has made his submissions in support of the Cabinet Decision and the Departmental orders. 23. Per contra, the learned counsel for the private respondents had submitted that there was no rationale behind extending of the tenure or validity of the select list beyond one year. Hence, it was submitted that rationality had to be looked into under the fact and circumstances of the case. It was further submitted that such rationale was ignored while taking the Cabinet decision. Hence, it was submitted that rationality had to be looked into under the fact and circumstances of the case. It was further submitted that such rationale was ignored while taking the Cabinet decision. Thus, in support of the impugned judgment and order, it has been submitted that the Cabinet decision and the subsequent departmental orders were arbitrary and illegal and the same cannot be perpetuated. It was further submitted that it is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality and that if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the appellants to get the same relief and as such it was submitted that the impugned judgment and order did not suffer from any illegality and did call for any interference in these appeals. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the private respondents had placed reliance on the following cases, viz., (i) Rakhi Roy & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 637 ; (ii) State of Orissa Vs. Mamta Mahanti, (2011) 3 SCC 436 ; (iii) Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 ; (iv) Anup Das & Anr. Vs. State of Assam: (2012) 5 SCC 559 ; and (v) State of Orissa Vs. Anup Kr. Senapati, (2019) 19 SCC 626 . 24. The submissions, so advanced by the Advocates of the concerned parties, have been considered in the light of facts and circumstances on the record. We find that there is substance in the submissions of the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel for the appellants, as well as the learned Addl. Advocate General. Their respective submissions stand fortified by the case laws so referred. Having carefully gone through the referred case laws, we have no doubt in our mind about the proposition that validity of the select list is usually for a year. But, under certain facts and circumstances, it is permissible for the Government to extend the validity of the select/ merit list for more than one year. Our view appears to be supported by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Man Singh (supra), and Giridhar Kr. But, under certain facts and circumstances, it is permissible for the Government to extend the validity of the select/ merit list for more than one year. Our view appears to be supported by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Man Singh (supra), and Giridhar Kr. Dadhichi (supra), where the extension of the validity of the select list beyond one year for a good reason was approved. We also find support from the case of Rakhi Roy & Ors. (supra), and Rajkishor Nanda (supra), where the Supreme Court of India has held to the effect that only in rare and exceptional circumstances and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale. In the case of Jagadish Chopra (supra), the ratio laid down in the case of State of Bihar vs. Amarendra Kumar Mishra, (2006) 12 SCC 561 , was referred to and it was held that “… Even otherwise, in absence of any rule ordinary period of validity of select list would be one year.” Be it mentioned herein that in the case of Amarendra Kumar Mishra (supra), the Supreme Court of India had held that “… In the aforementioned situation, in our opinion, he did not have any legal right to be appointed. Life of a panel, it is well known, remains valid for a year. Once it is lapses unless an appropriate order is issued by the State, no appointment could be made out of the said panel.” 25. In the case in hand the appellants as well as the State have been able to demonstrate that the State Government had considered all aspects of the matter and had adopted a “policy decision” by way of a Cabinet decision and consequently, had passed an appropriate order bearing No. HMB(A)-3/2016 dated 15.07.2016. The said order is extracted below:- “Government of Arunachal Pradesh Home Department Itanagar NO.HMB(A)-3/2016 Dated, Itanagar, the 15th July, 2016 ORDER: In pursuance to the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court, Itanagar Permanent Bench, Naharlagun, Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2014, passed in two Writ Petitions numbered WP(C) 61(AP)/2014, Ct. Sowai Ingtong & Ors Vs. State of AP 7 Ors. And in WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, in Ct. Danny Sarke and Ors Vs. Sowai Ingtong & Ors Vs. State of AP 7 Ors. And in WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, in Ct. Danny Sarke and Ors Vs. State of AP & Ors and Cabinet Decision dated 11th July, 2016, the Governor of AP is pleased to extend the validity period of the merit list in respect of the promotion to the post of Head Constable as notified in pursuant to the departmental merit test conducted vide order No. PHQ/Estt-A/05/2008, dated 27.3.2008, for enabling the consideration the case of promotions from the post of Constable to the Head Constable in respect of two Writ Petitioners and other similarly situated candidates as one time measure. Sd/- Shakuntala D. Gamlin, IAS Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar 26. A cursory perusal of the said order reveals that the Government had adopted the said policy decision on the basis of two judgments and orders passed by this court in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014, (Ct. Sowai Ingtong & Ors Vs. State of AP 7 Ors.) and in WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, (Ct. Danny Sarke and Ors Vs. State of AP & Ors), and had extended the validity of select list dated 27.03.2008. Background of the proposal is found to have been discussed in details in the note of the Cabinet, a copy of which is also available in the case file (Annexure-I in WA No. 19/2017). It is also apparent from the said note that in order to comply with the judgment and order of this Court dated 20.11.2014, passed in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014, and in WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, the proposal was made to the Cabinet, and accordingly, the same was approved by the Cabinet. 27. It is to be mentioned here that in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014, it has been held by this Court in paragraph No.11 that “… In view of the above circumstances and in order to give complete justice to the petitioners as well as private respondents, above mentioned, it is directed that respondent authorities shall promote the petitioners, altogether 9 (nine) in nos., to the post of Head Constables against the available vacancies which arose during 2008 to 2010, immediately with retrospective effect”. The other writ petition, i.e. WP(C) No. 329(AP)/2014, was however dismissed on the ground that the petitioners, who are 3 in numbers and serving as constables ought to have been promoted first to the post of Head Constables to be in the same cadre, to challenge the promotion of the private respondents, as ASI. 28. As a matter of fact, the common judgment and order dated 20.11.2014 in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014 and WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, and judgment dated 28.01.20186 in WP(C) 558/2015, having attained finality, a contrary view and/or diametrically opposite stand taken in the common judgment and order dated 24.11.2016 is not found sustainable on facts and in law. The learned counsel for the private respondents has not been able to show any authority on the point that a coordinate Bench is not bound by the view of another co-ordinate Bench. Therefore, we are unable to countenance a view which dislodges uniformity and certainty in judicial decisions. In this context, with profit we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Sant Lal Gupta vs. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited, (2010) 13 SCC 336 , where it has been held that:- “A Coordinate bench cannot comment upon the discretion exercised or judgment rendered by another coordinate bench of the same court. The rule of precedent is binding for the reason that there is a desire to secure uniformity and certainty in law. Thus in judicial administration precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of the administration of justice under our system. Therefore, it has always been insisted that the decision of a coordinate bench must be followed.” 29. In the impugned judgment it was held that the order dated 15.07.2016, W.T. Message dated 25.07.2016, as well as the Cabinet decision were arbitrary. However, we are unable adopt the same view because it would render the judgment and order dated 20.11.2014 in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014 and WP(C) 329(AP)/2014, and judgment dated 28.01.2016 in WP(C) 558/2015, which had attained finality as otiose and un-implementable. The learned counsel for the private respondents has not been able to negate the fact that the decision of the Cabinet to extend the validity of the select/merit list and subsequent order dated 15.07.2016, was taken to comply with the direction of this Court in the two herein before referred judgments of this Court. The learned counsel for the private respondents has not been able to negate the fact that the decision of the Cabinet to extend the validity of the select/merit list and subsequent order dated 15.07.2016, was taken to comply with the direction of this Court in the two herein before referred judgments of this Court. But, while setting aside the impugned cabinet decision and subsequent order, what eschewed consideration of the learned single Judge is the said two herein before referred judgment and orders of this Court, which we reiterate at the cost of repetition that they had attained finality. Thus, the impugned judgment, by which the Cabinet decision and consequential Government orders were set aside by holding that the Cabinet decision was arbitrary Rules of 2010, as indicated above, are not found sustainable. The learned senior counsel for the appellants has been able to demonstrate that the learned single Judge had relied on the case of Union of India Vs. Dinesh Engineering Corporation and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 491 , wherein it was held that a policy decision if taken without considering the relevant facts can only be termed as an arbitrary decision and it was further held that if the policy decision is arbitrary, the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and it was further demonstrated that the learned single Judge had failed to appreciate that the Cabinet decision to comply with the judgment and order dated 20.11.2014 in WP(C) 61(AP)/2014 and WP(C) 329(AP)/2014 and judgment dated 28.01.2016 in WP(C) 558(AP)/ 2016, constituted “relevant facts”. For the said reason, we are unable to concur with the decision of the learned Single Judge that the Cabinet decision was arbitrary. Policy Decision of Government and Judicial Interference:- 30. Making policies and executing them comes within the sphere of activities of the Executive. It is not within the power of the judiciary. Moreover, the judiciary does not have the expertise and the domain knowledge to make policies or to amend them. On the other hand, the Executive has experts, professionals, administrators, advisors, etc., in a given field and therefore, the State through its Executive has the expertise to make policies after taking into consideration all aspects of a matter. Thus, generally, the judiciary cannot and will not interfere in the policy decisions of the Government which are in the domain of the Executive. Thus, generally, the judiciary cannot and will not interfere in the policy decisions of the Government which are in the domain of the Executive. However, if a policy decision is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, or in violation of any other express provisions of law, the Courts may interfere with such policy decisions of the Government. But in this case in hand, the appellants have been able to successfully repel that the Cabinet decision and consequential orders had curtailed any fundamental or legal rights of the private respondents. 31. In the case of Col. A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India, 1980 Supp SCC 559; AIR 1981 SC 1545 , the Supreme Court held as under (in the words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer), held as follows: “… A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, re-change it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and the imperatives of national considerations. We cannot, as court, give directives as to how the Defence Ministry should function except to state that the obligation not to act arbitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union of India because it functions under the Constitution and not over it. In this view, we agree with the submission of the Union of India that there is no bar to its changing the policy formulated in 1964 if there are good and weighty reasons for doing so. We are far from suggesting that a new policy should be made merely because of the lapse of time, nor are we inclined to suggest the manner in which such a policy should be shaped. It is entirely within the reasonable discretion of the Union of India. It may stick to the earlier policy or give it up. But one imperative of the Constitution implicit in Article 14 is that if it does change its policy, it must do so fairly and should not give the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or arbitrarily. This object is achieved if the new policy, assuming Government wants to frame a new policy, is made in the same way in which the 1964 policy was made and not only made but made known. This object is achieved if the new policy, assuming Government wants to frame a new policy, is made in the same way in which the 1964 policy was made and not only made but made known. After all, what is done in secret is often suspected of being capricious or mala fide. So, whatever policy is made should be done fairly and made known to those concerned. So, we make it clear that while the Central Government is beyond the forbiddance of the court from making or changing its policy in regard to the Directorate of Military Farms or in the choice or promotion of Brigadiers, it has to act fairly as every administrative act must be done.” 32. In the case of DDA v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672 : AIR 2008 SC 1343 , the Supreme Court of India had held as under: “64. An executive order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. Whereas the superior courts may not interfere with the nitty-gritty of the policy, or substitute one by the other but it will not be correct to contend that the court shall lay its judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that the impugned decision is a policy decision. Interference therewith on the part of the superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review. 65. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds: (a) if it is unconstitutional; (b) if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and the regulations; (c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation; (d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a larger policy.” 33. In the case of Rakhi Roy & Ors. (supra), in paragraph 9, it has been held that:- “9. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason that it amounts to improper exercise of power and only in rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a Rule can be deviated and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rational, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary.”(emphasis supplied by us). 34. 34. In the case in hand there is nothing on the record to show existence of the conditions mentioned in DDA v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, (supra) so as to subject the policy decision to judicial review. Rather, it is apparent from the order dated 15.07.2016, and also from the Cabinet note, that the Government has adopted the said policy decision to extend the validity of select list dated 27.03.2008, on the basis of two judgments and orders passed by this court in (i) WP(C) 61(AP)/2014, and (ii) WP(C) 558(AP)/2015. While the policy decision was taken to comply with the judgment and order of this Court in the aforementioned cases and while deviation of the Rule is also permissible only after adopting policy decision and on some rationale, then we are of the considered opinion that the finding, so recorded by the learned single Judge that the Cabinet decision is arbitrary as it did not consider the Rules of 2010, is not sustainable. In view of above, and in the given facts and circumstances, the ratio laid down in Dinesh Engineering Corporation and Others (supra), upon which the learned single Judge had placed reliance, to our considered opinion, would not be applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances herein this case. 35. It is to be mentioned here that the extent of duty to act fairly under Article 14 of the Constitution of India depends upon the facts of each case, as held by Supreme Court of India in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 . In the given facts and circumstances of the case, i.e. to wriggle out of the peculiar situation that had arisen out the two judgments of this Court, the decision of the Cabinet for one-time extension of the term of the select list as arbitrary, in our considered opinion, cannot be countenanced and/or approved by us. It is also to be mentioned here that the Cabinet has been enjoying a majority in the Legislature, concentrates in itself the virtual control of both the Legislative and Executive functions and the most important questions of policies are all formulated by them. In this regard, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ram Sahid Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 . 36. In this regard, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ram Sahid Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 . 36. It is also averred by the appellants that it also cannot be said that while taking the said Cabinet decision the Government has not taken into account the power to relax under Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010. It is, however, a fact that in the said Cabinet decision, it has not been mentioned that one time relaxation is granted under Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010. But, we are of the considered opinion that a mere omission to mention the relevant Rule or the provision of law would certainly not render a decision a nullity. It is a settled position of law that the authority making an order has power conferred upon it by the statute to make an order and an order is made without indicating the provision under which it is made, the order would deemed to have been made under provision enabling the making of it. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pournomi Oil Mills vs. State of Kerala, (1986) Supp. SCC 728. The Cabinet decision was taken to avoid further litigation and complicacies that had arisen out of promotion of 9 (nine) lady constables, who were promoted illegally superseding some male constables who had acquired more marks than the lady constables. The averment, so made is not disputed by the respondents, and we find substance in the same and in the given facts and circumstances we are inclined to record our imprimatur to the same. 37. Each organ of State has its own framework, under which it wields its powers. Transgression to others field is neither permissible nor desirable. Such transgression would results in complete detestation to the Constitution of India. Therefore, power to review by the judiciary should be base upon the edifice, upon which the framework of the Constitution of India is established. If the situation arises for scrutiny of policy decision of the Executive by the Judiciary, it has to be extra cautious as it amounts to intrusion into the domain of the Executive. Therefore, power to review by the judiciary should be base upon the edifice, upon which the framework of the Constitution of India is established. If the situation arises for scrutiny of policy decision of the Executive by the Judiciary, it has to be extra cautious as it amounts to intrusion into the domain of the Executive. Judicial intervention must be to uphold the rule of law and to uphold the constitutional values as mandated to it, but not to direct the Executive or the legislature about appropriateness of the action undertaken. In Premium Granites Vs. State of T.N., (1994) 2 SCC 691, the Supreme Court of India has held that:- “It is not the domain of the Court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public policy can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may be.” 38. Here in this case, we find that the background facts as highlighted by the learned senior counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Senior Addl. Advocate General appears to us to be a good ground based on which the Cabinet decision was taken. Moreover, we find force in the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Senior Addl. Advocate General that the decision of the Cabinet was a conscious decision to relax the rules, and that the decision to extend the validity of the select/merit list and make promotion taking the vacancy position up to 2015 was a conscious policy decision taken for the exigencies of administration. The herein before referred binding precedent of the decision of a co-ordinate Bench, which had attained finality also appears to us to be a good reason to disagree with the decision of the learned Single Judge. In this case, the sovereign function of the State was taken in conscious derogation of the recruitment rules and such exercise of power has been construed by the Supreme Court of India as a legitimate decision taken in relaxation of the mandatory rules, for which we may refer to the case of G.S. Lamba vs. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 604 . Thus, we are unable to concur with the opinion of the learned Single Judge that the policy decision of the State Government was arbitrary. The learned Addl. Advocate General has been able to successfully demonstrate that in course of hearing before the learned single Judge the said submission was made, but the same eschewed consideration of the learned single Judge. 39. In view of above, we find the submission of the learned Addl. Advocate General and of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants well merited and we accept the same accordingly. Also, we have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the private respondents and in view of our above discussions and finding we find the same devoid of merit, and accordingly, the same stands repudiated. We have also gone through the case laws referred by the learned counsel for the private respondents and we find that the ratio laid down therein are not applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances here in this case, except, however, the case of Rakhi Ray (supra), but instead of supporting the case of the respondents, the said decision fortifies the case of appellants, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Therefore, we do not wish to burden this judgment with discussion of the cases by the learned counsel for the private respondents. 40. In the result, we find sufficient merit in these appeals and accordingly these appeals stand allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2016 is interfered with and stands set aside. 41. The parties are left to bear their own cost.