JUDGMENT: BANDARU SYAMSUNDER, J. 1. The first defendant in O.S. No. 617 of 1987 on the file of District Munsif, Rajahmundry is the appellant herein. The first respondent is the plaintiff and respondents 2 to 4 are defendants 2 to 4 in the suit filed by the plaintiff. 2. The first respondent/plaintiff instituted the suit against the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 for partition of plaint schedule house property bearing Dr. No. 1-60 situated in Kunavaram Agraharam, Kothaveru Central Street, Seethanagaram Mandal, Korukonda of East Godavari District, into two equal shares and allot one such share to her and to award future profits from the date of suit till the date of separate possession of her share. 3. The first respondent/plaintiff averred that herself, one Dulam Gangamma, who is mother of appellant and respondents 2 to 4 and one Kothapalli Rattamma are real sisters, who are daughters of one Vapuri Atchamma and Mr.Ganganna. She pleaded that respondents 2 to 4 are sisters of appellant/D1 and plaint schedule property is self-acquired property of her father Mr. Ganganna, who died leaving plaint schedule property and agricultural land to an extent of Ac. 1.83 cents. The first respondent/plaintiff also pleaded that her father conveyed landed property to his wife Smt. Atchamma, who is her mother, who in turn executed registered settlement deed (Ex.A1) dated 25.01.1952 conveying agricultural land to an extent of Ac. 1.83 cents and plaint schedule property to her daughters to enjoy the same in equal shares. The first respondent/plaintiff claimed that herself, Rattamma, mother of appellant and respondents 2 to 4 are only the children to her parents and she was aged about 12 years by the date of death of her mother in the year 1954, due to that herself and her sisters enjoyed plaint schedule house property jointly and after some time land of Ac. 1.83 cents divided into three equal shares. It is the contention of first respondent/plaintiff that her sister Smt. K. Rattamma died, due to that her share also divided between herself and her sister Gangamma about eight years back and thereafter both have enjoyed plaint schedule property jointly without dividing the same and she used to reside in the plaint schedule house as a joint owner along with appellant and respondents 2 to 4 even after the death of their mother. She also pleaded that she has been cultivating the land fell to her share and she used to store her produce in plaint schedule house and she also used to tether her cattle in the site situated in the plaint schedule property. The first respondent/plaintiff pleaded that she demanded the appellant/D1 for partition of plaint schedule property during the month of May 1987 for which he denied and she also issued legal notice to the appellant. Then, she filed suit for partition and separate possession and also claimed mesne profits. 4. The appellant/D1 filed written statement before the trial Court denying the claim of the first respondent/plaintiff and pleaded that he has been residing in the plaint schedule property in his own right since 20 years and he is also paying house tax, due to that first respondent/plaintiff has no right in the plaint schedule property and there is no cause of action for filing the suit. He also pleaded that he has no knowledge about alleged Ex.A1 settlement deed executed by mother of R1 and it is also not binding on him. He prays to dismiss the suit. 5. Respondents 2 to 4/D2 to D4 remained ex-parte and not chosen to contest the suit. 6. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff has any title and share in the plaint schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession? 3. To what share the plaintiff is entitled? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession? 5. To what relief? 7. The parties went to trial. First respondent/plaintiff examined herself as PW-1 and one of the villagers as PW-2 and got marked Ex.A1 to Ex.A3. On behalf of the appellant/D1, he himself examined as DW-1 and examined his villagers as DW-2 and DW-3 and got marked Ex.B1 to Ex.B9, which are house tax demand notices and receipts and certificate issued by Surpanch of the village. 8. On appreciating the material and evidence, the trial Court held that first respondent/plaintiff entitled for half share in the plaint schedule house property and also mesne profits from the date of decree and then passed preliminary decree of partition. 9. 8. On appreciating the material and evidence, the trial Court held that first respondent/plaintiff entitled for half share in the plaint schedule house property and also mesne profits from the date of decree and then passed preliminary decree of partition. 9. Against the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court, appellant/D1 herein presented A.S. No. 48 of 1996 on the file of I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District, at Rajahmundry, which was dismissed confirming the decree and judgment passed in O.S. No. 617 of 1987. 10. In these circumstances, the present second appeal is presented. 11. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “Whether or not the trial Court justified in granting mesne profits to the plaintiff/first respondent herein though the admitted case of the plaintiff is that she is in joint possession of the property along with the appellant much prior to the filing of the suit?” 12. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and there was no representation for first respondent/plaintiff. 13. Both courts gave concurrent finding that first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to seek partition and separate possession of her half share in the plaint schedule house property. The learned trial Judge as well as learned Appellate Judge after elaborately discussing the evidence adduced on both sides, came to conclusion that first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to half share in the plaint schedule house property and appellant herein also admitted in his evidence as DW-1 that originally plaint schedule property belongs to his maternal grandmother, who is mother of first respondent/plaintiff. There is no dispute with regard to relationship between the parties and trial Court held that during cross-examination of PW-1, it was not suggested denying the execution of Ex.A1 settlement deed. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions explained the scope of Section 100 CPC. In recent judgment in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and Others vs. Saraswati and Others in Civil Appeal No. NIL of 2022 and SLP (C) No. 8736 of 2016 dated 22.09.2022 held at Para 33 of judgment, which reads as under: “33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence” it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence” it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. When trial Court and first appellate Court gave concurrent findings with regard to Ex.A1 and contents of the document are not in dispute and when appellant also not disputed the relationship with first respondent/plaintiff, this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and also cannot interfere with the decision of Courts below with regard to question of fact. Learned advocate for appellant mainly contended that appellant claiming exclusive rights over the plaint schedule property basing on house tax receipts and his long standing possession, but substantial question of law involved in the present appeal is that whether the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to claim mesne profits when she claimed joint possession. He would further submits that when first respondent/plaintiff claiming to be in joint possession of plaint schedule house property and she also said to be stored her produce and tethered her cattle, she is not entitled to claim mesne profits, which erroneously granted by the Courts below. He prays to allow the second appeal. 16. The appellant/D1 is not disputing relationship with first respondent/plaintiff and source of title in respect of plaint schedule property under Ex.A1 but appellant relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B9 house tax demand notice and receipts and certificate issued by Surpanch of the village. The learned appellate Judge rightly held that entries in the Gram Panchayat records or revenue records will not establish title and basing on those entries, it cannot be said that appellant has been enjoying plaint schedule property with absolute rights. The Hon’ble Apex Court and also this Court held in catena of decisions that mutation in revenue records and municipal records will not create or extinguish rights in immovable property, due to that appellant/D1 cannot claim exclusive right over plaint schedule property when he has not denied source of his title to the property and also relationship with first respondent/plaintiff. 17. The appellant also raised in the grounds of appeal that he has been residing in the plaint schedule house and paying house tax and thereby he is the absolute owner of plaint schedule property. 17. The appellant also raised in the grounds of appeal that he has been residing in the plaint schedule house and paying house tax and thereby he is the absolute owner of plaint schedule property. It is settled law that mutation in revenue records or municipal records will not create or extinguish rights in immovable property, which rightly observed by learned appellate Judge. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jitendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 13146 of 2021, judgment dated 06.09.2021, held at Para-6, which reads as follows: “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh vs. Daulat Singh (D) by LRs. (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter. 6.1. In the case of Suraj Bhan vs. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma vs. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58 , Raqruddin vs. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12 , Rajinder Singh vs. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368 , Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad vs. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689 , T. Ravi vs. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342 , Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar vs. Arthur Import and Export Co. (2019) 3 SCC 191 , Prahlad Pradhan vs. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259 and Ajit Kaur vs. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70 .” 18. (2019) 3 SCC 191 , Prahlad Pradhan vs. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259 and Ajit Kaur vs. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70 .” 18. The appellant/D1 also cannot plead adverse possession against the joint owner of the property when he is also tracing out his title through his maternal grandmother, who is admittedly none other than the mother of first respondent/plaintiff, who claimed property under Ex.A1 registered settlement deed. 19. It is settled law that the possession of one co-sharer is possession of all co-sharers and when one sharer is claiming exclusive possession, he must clearly establish the ouster of the co-sharer as a co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also every parcel of it and possession of the joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. In Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead) through LRs. and Others vs. N. Madhava Rao and Others (Civil Appeal No. 3408 of 2019) Judgment dated 05.04.2019, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Para-17 of the judgment, which reads as under: “17. In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the suit property (which the two Courts below did not find in their favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not entitled to claim injunction against the other co sharers over the suit property. It is a settled principle of law that the possession of one co-sharer is possession of all co-sharers, it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. [See: Mohammad Baqar and Others vs. Naimun Nisa Bibi and Others, AIR 1956 SC 548 ].” 20. The trial Court as well as first appellate Court held that first respondent/plaintiff entitled to mesne profits from the date of decree, which can be decided by filing separate application. Now, it would be beneficial to extract Section 2(12) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which defines mesne profits, which reads as under: “12. The trial Court as well as first appellate Court held that first respondent/plaintiff entitled to mesne profits from the date of decree, which can be decided by filing separate application. Now, it would be beneficial to extract Section 2(12) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which defines mesne profits, which reads as under: “12. “mesne profits” of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.” 21. In view of Order XX Rule 12 CPC when suit is filed for partition and separate possession of the property, plaintiff who succeeded the suit and got preliminary decree entitled for mesne profits and Court can direct enquiry with regard to mesne profits from the date of institution of the suit until delivery of possession to the decree-holder. It is also settled law that mesne profits can be claimed by a person who is entitled to actual possession. However, a decree as regards future mesne profits for the period subsequent to the suit can entitled only after an enquiry as per Rule 12(2) CPC. In the present case, trial Court came to right conclusion that as first respondent/plaintiff also pleaded that she used to store her produce and tether cattle in the plaint schedule property, she cannot claim mesne profits prior to institution of the suit and awarded mesne profits from the date of decree. It is also the contention of the appellant that he has been in exclusive physical possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule house property wherein Courts below held that first respondent/plaintiff got half share and she is not in physical possession of plaint schedule property, due to that when appellant is in physical possession of plaint schedule property, first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to claim mesne profits as rightly held by Courts below. The High Court sitting in second appeal can only consider such questions, which are substantial in nature in terms of law but not mere such questions of law which are based on facts. 22. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in this second appeal, much less substantial question of law not as pointed out by the appellant, this second appeal has to be dismissed. 23. 22. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in this second appeal, much less substantial question of law not as pointed out by the appellant, this second appeal has to be dismissed. 23. This Court is satisfied that this is not an instance where Section 100 CPC has to be applied nor interference is warranted with the decree and judgment of the trial Court and first appellate Court. 24. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed by Courts below. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 25. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions if any, stand closed. Interim orders granted if any, stand vacated.