JUDGMENT : Aggrieved and displeased with Ext.P1 order passed in I.A.No.3/2022 in O.S.No.4/2022 by the Court of the District Judge, Palakkad, the first defendant in the above suit has filed the original petition. The first respondent in the original petition is the plaintiff, and the respondents 2 to 13 are the defendants 2 to 13 in the suit. 2. The antecedent facts leading to Ext.P1 order, in a nutshell, are : (i) The first respondent has filed the suit, inter alia, to declare that it is the first owner of copyright in the musical work and sound record named ‘Navarasam’ composed and performed by a musical band named ‘Thaikkudam Bridge’. (ii) Along with the suit, the first respondent filed I.A.No.3/2022 against the petitioner and respondents 2 to 12 to pass an order of temporary injunction to restrain the above respondents from exhibiting, releasing on Over the Top platforms, streaming, and/or in any manner communicating to the Public in and/or through their services; the Cinematographic Film – ‘Kantara’ with the synchronised song ‘Varaha Roopam’, and pass an ad-interim order to the same effect, without notice, till the disposal of the application. (iii) The court below has restrained the respondents from exhibiting, releasing on OTT platforms, streaming, distributing or communicating to the public the film ‘Kantara’ with the synchronised song ‘Varaha Roopam’ until further orders. (iv) The petitioner is a limited liability partnership firm and is the producer of the film ‘Kantara’, which includes the song ‘Varaha Roopam’. (v) The first respondent issued to the petitioner Ext.P4 legal notice dated 19.10.2022. In response to the notice, the petitioner issued Ext.P4 limited holding response. (vi) The petitioner also filed a caveat before the District Court, Kozhikode, against the first respondent to defend its rights. However, immediately after Ext.P4 notice was received, a suit was filed by the musical band Thaikkudam Bridge before the District Court, Kozhikode, as O.S.No.14 of 2022 and an ad-interim order of injunction was passed on 28.10.2022. The said suit and the present suit are drafted by the same counsel. (vii) On 05.11.2022, the petitioner strangely received a copy of the caveat filed by Thaikkudam Bridge before this Court, pre-empting a first appeal against Ext.P.1 order. (viii) The first respondent has mala fide filed the suit before the court below to circumvent the caveat filed by the petitioner before the District Court, Kozhikode. (vii) On 05.11.2022, the petitioner strangely received a copy of the caveat filed by Thaikkudam Bridge before this Court, pre-empting a first appeal against Ext.P.1 order. (viii) The first respondent has mala fide filed the suit before the court below to circumvent the caveat filed by the petitioner before the District Court, Kozhikode. (ix) The impugned order has been passed in excess of the jurisdiction of the court below and without establishing the tenets for the grant of an ad-interim injunction. (x) The alleged deed of assignment was purportedly entered into between the musical band and the first respondent in 2015, but the song ‘Navarasam’ was published in 2017. (xi) There is no copyright infringement and/or violation of any third-party rights in the composition and use of Varaha Roopam. The District Court, Kozhikode, has passed Ext.P12 order of injunction on the basis that the musical band is the owner of the copyright in Navarasam. (xii) The suit is highly belated, and no ex-parte interim injunction ought to have been passed. The trailer of the film was released in September 2022, and the film was released on 30.09.2022. The film is being shown in 30 countries in over 6000 theatres. (xiii) The first respondent has not complied with the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 (a) of the Code. (xiv) No irreparable injury would be caused to the first respondent if no injunction order passed in the suit. (xv) The court below does not have the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the light of the Copyright Act, 1957, read with the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court Act, 2015. (xvi) The first respondent has deliberately undervalued the suit vague to forum shop and oust the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court. The court below has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (xvii) The maintainability of the suit and the application is a predominant issue. The suit is hit by the provisions of Section 10 of the Code. Hence, this Court may set aside Ext.P1 order and direct the court below to decide the maintainability of the suit. 3. The Registry marked the original petition as defective for the following reason: Ext. P1 is an order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC. The suit is hit by the provisions of Section 10 of the Code. Hence, this Court may set aside Ext.P1 order and direct the court below to decide the maintainability of the suit. 3. The Registry marked the original petition as defective for the following reason: Ext. P1 is an order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC. When sought clarification whether Ext.P1 is an appealable order under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of CPC, the counsel for the petitioner has given a reply that : “Ext. P1 order is not a final order and hence is not appealable. Therefore, O.P.(C) is the proper remedy. The court below does not have the subject matter jurisdiction, and hence O.P.(C) is the proper remedy. This is as per the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Vishal Pipes Limited v. Babia Pipes Industry and others [2022 SCC Online Delhi 1730]”. 4. Accordingly, the original petition was posted before the bench. 5. Heard; Sri. S. Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner assisted by Sri. Santhosh Mathew in the above original petition and connected cases, namely Unnumbered OP(C) Nos. (Filing Nos.2281 and 2193 of 2022) of 2022. 6. Sri. S. Sreekumar vehemently argued that the allegations in the plaint are false and fabricated. The assignment was done in 2015, whereas the song was composed only in 2017. The assignment deed was executed by the members of the music band with the first respondent and not with Thaikkudam Bridge. The duration of the assignment deed was for two years, with effect from 14.09.2015. A reading of the assignment deed shows that the cause of action for filing the suit is false. The trailer for the movie was released on 05.09.2022 on social media, and the movie was released on 30.09.2022. Thaikkudam Bridge has filed a suit for the same relief before the District Court, Kozhikode, on 28.10.2022. Subsequently, the first respondent filed the present suit on 31.10.2022. Even though the petitioner had lodged a caveat, the same was circumvented by filing the suit before the court below. The valuation in the plaint is incorrect. In view of the Copyrights Act and the Commercial Courts Act, only the Commercial Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Without looking into these pivotal aspects, the court below has passed the impugned Ext.P1 order. The valuation in the plaint is incorrect. In view of the Copyrights Act and the Commercial Courts Act, only the Commercial Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Without looking into these pivotal aspects, the court below has passed the impugned Ext.P1 order. Ext.P1 is manifestly illegal and passed by a Court lacking inherent, pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction. Hence, Ext.P1 is void ab-initio. Therefore, this court may set aside Ext.P1 order in exercise of its supervisory powers and direct the court below to consider the maintainability of the suit. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Shri Agarwal @ Ram Shri Agarwal and Anr. v. Sudheer Mohan and Ors. [2020 Live Law SC 864] to drive home his contention that the remedy available under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be taken away, and there is a distinction between the entertainability and maintainability of the original petition. He also relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ], Surya Dev Raj v. Ram Chander Raj [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ], Harbanslal Sahnia and Anr. V. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ], M/s. Magadh Sugar and Energy Ltd. v. The State of Bihar [2021 SCC Online SC 801], M/s. Radha Krishan Industries v. The State of Himachal Pradesh [ (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] and M/s. Patil Automation Private Ltd v. Rakheja Engineers Private Ltd [2022 SCC Online SC 1028] to buttress his contentions that this Court has power and jurisdiction to set aside Ext P1 order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India without relegating the petitioner to challenge the order in appeal. 7. After the original petition and connected cases were heard on 11.11.2022 and reserved for orders, the clerk of Sri. Santhosh Mathew handed over a sealed cover to this Court. Accordingly, this Court reposted the original petitions on 18.11.2022 as ‘to be spoken to’. 8. Sri. Santhosh Mathew then submitted that he had sent the sealed cover containing the copies of the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner to I.A No.3/2022 and the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code to reject the plaint on the grounds already urged before this Court. 8. Sri. Santhosh Mathew then submitted that he had sent the sealed cover containing the copies of the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner to I.A No.3/2022 and the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code to reject the plaint on the grounds already urged before this Court. Although the learned Counsel was directed to produce the said documents in the right royal way, if he so desired, he submitted, the documents were handed over only for information and the petitioner was sticking to the merits of the original petition. 9. In the light of the above submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court had directed the Registry to ascertain from the court below whether any counter affidavit has been filed in IA 3/2022 and any application has been filed in the suit. It is communicated by the court below that the petitioner has filed its counter affidavit to IA 3/2022. 10. The question that emanates for consideration in the original petitions is whether this Court is to interfere with Ext.P1 order invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. The grievance of the petitioner in the original petition is manifold; i.e., the first respondent has violated the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 (a) of the Code; the court below has no inherent, pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit; Ext P1 order is non-est as it is passed by a court lacking jurisdiction etc. Thus, the petitioner seeks to get Ext.P1 order set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. The decisions that have been relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, other than for the decision in Raj Shri Agarwal, are cases decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not Article 227. Even in the said decisions, it is held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction in view of the alternative remedy is the rule of discretion and not of compulsion. 13. The power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well-settled in a host of judicial pronouncements. Even in the said decisions, it is held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction in view of the alternative remedy is the rule of discretion and not of compulsion. 13. The power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well-settled in a host of judicial pronouncements. The earliest of the decisions on the point is the decision in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ], wherein a five Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus : “12. This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ], to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. xxx xxx xxx”. 14. In Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ], the principles in Waryam Singh have been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows : “49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] and the principles in Waryam Singh [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ], followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 15. Again, in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 15. Again, in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus : “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction — by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction — by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case”. 16. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel [ (2022) 4 SCC 181 ] has held as follows : “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69] The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed : (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 17. The above precedents lay down the broad principles to be followed by this Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. To name a few: (i) The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. (ii) The jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases with care, caution and circumspection where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act; otherwise, it will result in grave injustice. (iii) The jurisdiction is not to correct errors of law, fact, or just because another view is possible. (iv) The exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for the grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed to promote public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest. (v) The High Court shall not, at the drop of a hat, exercise its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution and interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. (vi) The power is not to be exercised like a court of appeal. (vii) In cases where there is an alternative statutory mode of redressal, the same should operate as a restraint on the exercise of power by the High Court. (viii) The High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 18. The first respondent filed the suit on 02.11.2022. 18. The first respondent filed the suit on 02.11.2022. The court below passed the impugned Ext P1 order on the same day and posted the suit to 26.11.2022 for return of notice. 19. Even before the petitioner has entered appearance in the suit and filed its counter affidavit/statement to I.A.3/2022, they rushed to this court and filed the original petition raising manifold contentions, including the lack of inherent, pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the court below, violation of the provisions of the Order 39 and Section 148 A of the Code, and seek to set aside Ext P1 order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. Ext.P1 order is undoubtedly an ad-interim order of injunction passed by the court below under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code after being satisfied that the first respondent has made out a prima facie case and sending of notice is likely to defeat the purpose of the petition. 21. An order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code. 22. The Code of Civil Procedure has explicitly laid down the procedure and the timelines to be followed by the courts while dealing with applications under Order 39 of the Code. The Code has also prescribed the hierarchy of Courts that needs to be approached for the redressal of the grievances of a litigant confronted with orders passed under the above provision. 23. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not to be exercised to inter-meddle with every ad-interim order passed by the subordinate courts. If that is the case, the Courts of original jurisdiction and appellate Courts will become defunct, and this Court will be flooded with such litigation, unsettling and dislodging the legislative framework laid down under the Code. 24. The contentions raised by the petitioner are mixed and disputed questions of fact and law, which will have to be dealt with by the Court of the first instance or the appellate court. It is not for this Court to examine each and every contention raised in the original petition, that too at the ad-interim stage, and rule upon their worthiness and correctness. If this Court carries out such an exercise, it will foreclose the statutory rights of the parties and will undoubtedly cause grave prejudice to them. 25. It is not for this Court to examine each and every contention raised in the original petition, that too at the ad-interim stage, and rule upon their worthiness and correctness. If this Court carries out such an exercise, it will foreclose the statutory rights of the parties and will undoubtedly cause grave prejudice to them. 25. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the exceptional power of superintendence is not to be exercised at the drop of a hat at the ad-interim stage, particularly when the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy provided under the Code and the special statutes. 26. This Court fails to understand why the petitioner has directly approached this Court to vacate an ad-interim order bye-passing the procedure established under law. I don’t find any ground or reason for this Court to interfere with Ext.P1 ad-interim order at this nascent stage. It is up to the petitioner to appear before the court below, file its counter statement/affidavit and raise all its contentions before the court below. In any event, this Court is not persuaded to sit in appeal over Ext.P1 ad-interim order and examine its legality on the points urged before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court is disinclined to entertain the original petition for the aforementioned reasons. In the above conspectus, the original petitions are dismissed, sustaining the objection of the Registry, which will be without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to work out its remedies in accordance with law.