JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has preferred the instant Cr.M.P. under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the order dated 10.11.2016 passed by learned Special Judge, (ACB), Ranchi in connection with Vigilance Case No.01 of 2016 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No.76 of 2015 whereby and whereunder, cognizance of offence under Sections 409, 120B, 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Hereinafter called P.C. Act.) and Sections 41/42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 has been taken against the petitioner. 2. Vigilance P.S. Case No.76 of 2015 was registered on 25.12.2015 under Sections 379/34/120B and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the basis of written report of Indu Bhushan Ojha, Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hazaribag, against the Circle Officer, Jeevan Ram-Retired Circle Inspector, Krishna Verma-Body Guard of Deputy Commissioner, Dinesh Turi-Computer Operator, Markacho Police Station and 5-6 other unknown persons. 3. As per the prosecution case vide office Memo No. 12765/15 dated 23.12.2015 of the Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and letter number 2618 dated 22.12.2015 of the Vigilance Department, Ranchi, the informant was directed to receive the First Information Report being Markacho P. S. Case No.83 of 2015 dated 16.12.2015 as well as submit a verification report on the same. Accordingly, on 23/24.12.2015, he visited the Zila Parishad Dak Bangla which was found to be in a dilapidated condition and reported that one Seesam Tree and Five Sagwan Trees had been felled in the said premises. He found the remains of these trees which were marked as 01ZP, 02ZP, 03ZP, 04ZP, 05ZP, 06ZP. He then went to the Markacho Police Station and received a copy of the First Information Report being Markacho P. S. Case No.83 of 2015 dated 16.12.2015. 4. The First Information Report disclosed that on 16.12.2015, DDC-Cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Koderma, sent Letter No.745/GP to Officer in-Charge of Markacho Police Station, alleging therein, that on the evening of 15.12.2015 he received information that without obtaining permission of Competent Officer, some trees have been cut from Dakbangla of Zila Parishad, Koderma. On 16.12.2015 the DDC-Cum-Chief Executive Officer, Sudama Prasad Singh, Assistant Engineer, Ajit Kumar, Junior Engineer conducted spot verification. During enquiry, it was found that one Seesam Tree and Five Sagwan Trees had been cut. Statement of two persons, namely, Kailash Pandey and Subodh Kumar Yadav was also recorded. On 16.12.2015 the DDC-Cum-Chief Executive Officer, Sudama Prasad Singh, Assistant Engineer, Ajit Kumar, Junior Engineer conducted spot verification. During enquiry, it was found that one Seesam Tree and Five Sagwan Trees had been cut. Statement of two persons, namely, Kailash Pandey and Subodh Kumar Yadav was also recorded. On the basis of the above Markacho P.S. Case No.83 of 2015 was registered on 16.12.2015 under Sections 379/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 33/41 of Indian Forest Act, against the Circle Officer, Jeevan Ram-Retired Circle Inspector, Krishna Verma-Body Guard of Deputy Commissioner, Dinesh Turi-Computer Operator, Markacho P. S. and 5-6 other unknown persons Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Theft of the log after felling of the trees was committed and removed from there. The offence was committed in the presence of the circle officer, Krishna Verma the body guard of DC Koderma, Dinesh Turi the computer operator of Markachho P.S. Complicity of senior officer as per the FIR in the offence was not ruled out. The felling was done without any formal permission of the Circle Officer and since it fell within the jurisdiction of the DC and Jila Parishad, therefore requisite permission of these officers was required. 5. After investigation, second supplementary charge-sheet no.64/2016 dated 09.09.2016 for the offence under Section 409, 120B, 201/34 of IPC and Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act,1988 and Section 41/42 of Indian Forest Act against accused persons namely (1) Sandeep Kumar Madhesia (2) Jiwan Ram (3) Chhabi Ranjan has been submitted and cognizance of the offence is taken by order dated 10.11.2016 which is under challenge before this Court. The sanction for prosecution u/s 197(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C issued by the Govt. against Chabbi Ranjan has been issued vide order dated 23.6.2016 for offence under Sections 409,120 B,201/34 of the IPC and for offences under Section 13(2) r/w Section 13 (1)(d) of the PC Act . 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that sanction for prosecution has not been given under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter be called as P.C. Act) which is specific mandate and prerequisite for taking cognizance under Section 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that sanction for prosecution has not been given under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter be called as P.C. Act) which is specific mandate and prerequisite for taking cognizance under Section 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act. The cognizance without the sanction was not permissible in view of the ratio decided in State of Goa Vs Babu Thomas (2005) 8 SCC 130 : 12. As already noticed, the sanction order is not a mere irregularity, error or omission. The first sanction order dated 2-1-1995 was issued by an authority that was not a competent authority to have issued such order under the Rules. The second sanction order dated 7-9-1997 was also issued by an authority, which was not competent to issue the same under the relevant rules, apart from the fact that the same was issued retrospectively w.e.f. 14-9-1994, which is bad. The cognizance was taken by the Special Judge on 29-5-1995. Therefore, when the Special Judge took cognizance on 29-5-1995, there was no sanction order under the law authorising him to take cognizance. This is a fundamental error which invalidates the cognizance as without jurisdiction. State of Karnataka v. C. Nagarajaswamy, (2005) 8 SCC 370 : 15. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that the question as regards sanction may be determined at an early stage. (See Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia [1990 Supp SCC 41 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 611] and Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar [ (2000) 8 SCC 498 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 17 : JT (2000) 8 SC 248] .) Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 783 : 8. The effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the Act is of considerable significance as noted in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [ (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193]. In sub-section (3) the stress is on “failure of justice” and that too “in the opinion of the court”. In sub-section (4), the stress is on raising the plea at the appropriate time. Significantly, the “failure of justice” is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. In sub-section (3) the stress is on “failure of justice” and that too “in the opinion of the court”. In sub-section (4), the stress is on raising the plea at the appropriate time. Significantly, the “failure of justice” is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. Therefore, mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is (sic not) considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice or (sic failure of justice) has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction. Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19 reduces the rigour of prohibition. In Section 6(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the old Act”) corresponding to Section 19(2) of the Act, question relates to doubt about authority to grant sanction and not whether sanction is necessary. 10. It may be noted that Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the Code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus to the discharge of duties. Position is not so in case of Section 19 of the Act. This Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 : 10. A plain reading of Section 19(1)(supra) leaves no manner of doubt that the same is couched in mandatory terms and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 against public servants except with the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) to sub-section (1) of Section 19. The provision contained in sub-section (1) would operate in absolute terms but for the presence of sub-section (3) to Section 19 to which we shall presently turn. The provision contained in sub-section (1) would operate in absolute terms but for the presence of sub-section (3) to Section 19 to which we shall presently turn. But before we do so, we wish to emphasise that the language employed in sub-section (1) of Section 19 admits of no equivocation and operates as a complete and absolute bar to any court taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act against a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab, (2016) 8 SCC 722 : 30. The law declared by this Court emerging from the judgments referred to hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt that under Section 197 of the Code and/or sanction mandated under a special statute (as postulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) would be a necessary prerequisite before a court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance of an offence (whether under the Penal Code, or under the special statutory enactment concerned). The procedure for obtaining sanction would be governed by the provisions of the Code and/or as mandated under the special enactment. The words engaged in Section 197 of the Code are, “… no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with previous sanction…”. Likewise sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides— “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance … except with the previous sanction ….” The mandate is clear and unambiguous that a court “shall not” take cognizance without sanction. The same needs no further elaboration. Therefore, a court just cannot take cognizance without sanction by the appropriate authority. 7. Heard, learned counsel for the State-Vigilance has opposed the prayer. It is submitted that the State has accorded sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act, but admittedly no sanction for prosecution has been accorded under the PC Act. It is however contended that the absence of sanction will not amount to absence of jurisdiction as the same can be obtained at a later stage. Reliance has been placed on Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : 29. It is however contended that the absence of sanction will not amount to absence of jurisdiction as the same can be obtained at a later stage. Reliance has been placed on Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : 29. The effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the Act are of considerable significance. In sub-section (3) the stress is on “failure of justice” and that too “in the opinion of the court”. In sub-section (4), the stress is on raising the plea at the appropriate time. Significantly, the “failure of justice” is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. Therefore, mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is (sic not) considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction as observed in para 95 of Narasimha Rao case [ (1998) 4 SCC 626 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1108] . Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19 reduces the rigour of prohibition. In Section 6(2) of the old Act [Section 19(2) of the Act] question relates to doubt about authority to grant sanction and not whether sanction is necessary. In the light of the above ratio, it is submitted that mere omission in the sanction will not vitiate cognizance of offence. 8. Section 19 of the PC Act does not leave any doubt that cognizance of offence committed by a public servant under Section 11,13 and 15 of the PC Act is barred unless there is a previous sanction for prosecution. Authorities relied upon by this petitioner do not leave any doubt on this score. Admittedly the state govt has accorded sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C., but the Central Government has not given sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the P.C Act. Under the circumstance cognizance under Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act is clearly barred and is quashed accordingly. The learned Court below shall however proceed against the accused for offences under the other sections. The petition is accordingly allowed.