JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. The afore captioned criminal appeal has been filed by the State of Kerala, represented by the investigating agency concerned, under section 21(1) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as ‘NIA Act’, for short) to challenge the impugned order dated 09.09.2020, rendered by the Sessions Court, Palakkad, on Criminal MP No.4387/2020 in Sessions Case, SC No.862/2016, whereby the respondent herein/accused has been discharged of the offences alleged against him, as per section 20 & 38 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘UAP Act’ for short) and Sec. 3 read with Sec. 25(1B) of the Arms Act. 2. Heard Sri.K.A. Anas, learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for the appellant State of Kerala and Sri.K.S. Madhusoodhanan, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent/accused. 3. The instant sessions case, in which the respondent herein has been arrayed as the sole accused, has arisen out of Crime No.99/2014 of Agali Police Station, Wayanad District. The gist of the allegations raised therein is that the accused and 10 others have committed the offences punishable under Secs.143, 147, 148 & 506(ii) read with Sec.149 of the IPC, Sec.3, Sec.25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act and Sec.20, 38 of the UAP Act. The allegation is that on 03.01.2014 at about 7.30 a.m., the accused and another person had confined the de-facto complainant, one Sri.Dhwararaj, blind folded him with a black elastic material, brought him near Cherunellipetti river side, where nine other persons, including two women, were found, and some of them were carrying guns and sought information about places and the Malleswaram temple. The allegation is that the respondent/accused herein and the other persons claimed themselves as members of a banned Maoist organisation and that, they had threatened to kill the de-facto complainant, asking him not to disclose to anybody about the incident and thereafter, allowed him to leave the place and thus, he and 10 others have committed the abovesaid offences. The First Information Statement was, in fact, lodged only on 21.02.2014. The Investigating Agency completed the investigation and had submitted the final report/charge sheet, in the above crime, and the Sessions Court concerned, has taken cognizance of the case, which led to the institution of the instant Sessions Case, S.C. No.862/2016, on the file of the Sessions Court, Palakkad. The First Information Statement was, in fact, lodged only on 21.02.2014. The Investigating Agency completed the investigation and had submitted the final report/charge sheet, in the above crime, and the Sessions Court concerned, has taken cognizance of the case, which led to the institution of the instant Sessions Case, S.C. No.862/2016, on the file of the Sessions Court, Palakkad. It is common ground that in the final report/charge sheet filed, the respondent herein is arrayed as the sole accused and none of the other persons concerned have been implicated as accused. 4. However, the Sessions Court has taken cognizance only of the offences as per Secs.20 & 38 of the UAP Act and Sec.3 read with Sec.25(1)B of the Arms Act. The Sessions Court concerned has granted relief to the respondent herein, as per the impugned order, on the main ground that the sanction given by the State Government, under Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act, for prosecuting the accused for the offences punishable under Secs.20 & 38 of the UAP Act, and further, the sanction granted by the District Magistrate for prosecuting accused for the offences, as per the Arms Act, are vitiated. 5. It is on this ground that the Sessions Court has allowed the plea of the accused and has rendered the impugned order. The main issue is as to the correctness or otherwise of the abovesaid findings of the Sessions Court as per the impugned order that the sanction order granted under Sec.45 (2) of the UAP Act and the sanction granted under Sec.39 of the Arms Act are vitiated. 6. We shall initially deal with the issue as to the sanction granted under Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act, in respect of the alleged offences, as per Secs.20 & 38 of the UAP Act. Sec.45 of the UAP Act reads as follows:- “45. Cognizance of offences.-1 [(1)] No court shall take cognizance of any offence- (i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf; (ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, and [if] such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government. [(2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.]” 7. It is common ground that the offences as per Secs.20 & 38 of the UAP Act would come within the protective ambit of Sec.45(1). The mandate of Sec.45(1) is that no court shall take cognizance of any such offence, unless previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government are obtained, etc. In the instant case, the Investigating Agency is the State Police and therefore, the competent authority to grant sanction under Sec.45 is the competent authority of the State Government. Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act further mandates that sanction for prosecution under Sec.45(1) shall be given within such time, as may be prescribed, only after the report of such authority appointed by the Government, which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of the investigation and make a recommendation within such time, as may be prescribed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government. 8. In that regard, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 has been framed under the enabling provisions contained in Sec.45(2) read with Sec.52(2)(f) of the UAP Act, 1957. The abovesaid Rules provides as follows:- “1. Short title and commencement. (1) These rules may be called the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008. (2) They shall come into force on the date 1 of their publication in the Official Gazette. 2. Definition. (1) In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) Act means the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967); (b) Authority means the Authority to be appointed by the Central Government 2 [or, as the case may be, the State Government] under sub-section (2) of section 45; (c) Code means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (2) Words and expression used herein and not defined in these rules, but defined in the Act, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Act. 3. Time limit for making a recommendation by the Authority. The Authority shall, under sub-section (2) of section 45 of the Act, make its report containing the recommendations to the Central Government 3 [or, as the case may be, the State Government] within seven working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the investigating officer under the Code. 4. Time limit for sanction of prosecution. The Central Government 4 [or, as the case may be, the State Government] shall, under sub-section (2) of section 45 of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for prosecution within seven working days after receipt of the recommendations of the Authority.” 9. A reading of Rule 2 would make it clear that, where the appropriate Government is the State Government, then the ‘Authority’, mentioned in Sec.45(2), shall be appointed by the competent authority of the State Government. Rule 3 further clearly mandates about the time limit for making recommendation by the Authority and therein, it is stipulated that the authority shall, under Sec.45(2) of the Act, make its report containing the recommendations to the Government, within 7 working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the Investigating Officer under the Code. Further, Rule 4 mandates about the time limit for sanction of prosecution and therein, further, it is mandated that the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government shall, under Sec.45(2) of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for prosecution within seven working days after receipt of the recommendations of the Authority. 10. In the instant case, as per the specific instructions furnished by the appellant-State to the learned Prosecutor, after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer had made a request for prosecution sanction, which was submitted by him (Dy. Superintendent of Police, Agali), to the District Police Chief Palakkad (Superintendent of Police), on 26.02.2016, vide letter No.154/TDR/ SMS-AGS/2016 of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Agali Sub Division. The said request for prosecution sanction was, in turn, forwarded by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, to the Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, vide letter No.D1-18721/2016 P on 08.04.2016. Superintendent of Police, Agali), to the District Police Chief Palakkad (Superintendent of Police), on 26.02.2016, vide letter No.154/TDR/ SMS-AGS/2016 of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Agali Sub Division. The said request for prosecution sanction was, in turn, forwarded by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, to the Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, vide letter No.D1-18721/2016 P on 08.04.2016. The Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, has forwarded the abovesaid prosecution sanction request to the Additional Director General of Police, North Zone Kozhikode, vide letter No.B3-5365/2016/TSR dated 18.04.2016. The Additional General of Police, North Zone Kozhikkode, in turn, had forwarded the abovesaid prosecution sanction report to the competent authority of the State Government in the Home Department (Navy), Additional Chief Secretary, Home (G) Department, vide letter No.C1-9316/2016/NZ dated 25.06.2016. So, it can be seen that the investigation in this case has been completed sometime in the 2nd /3rd week of February, 2016 and the Investigating Officer has duly forwarded the prosecution sanction request, under Sec.45(2), on 26.02.2016, to his immediate superior, namely, the District Police Chief, Palakkad (who is of the rank of Superintendent of Police). The District Police Chief, in turn, has forwarded the request to the Inspector General of Police on 08.04.2016. 11. The Inspector General of Police, further, has forwarded the request to the Additional Director General of Police on 18.04.2016, who, in turn, has forwarded the request to the Home Secretary only on 25.06.2016. The basic request for sanction is to be made by the Investigating Officer. Of course, it appears that the case is that, since the Investigating Officer is only of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, it may not be administratively proper for him to send any request for prosecution sanction directly addressed to the Home Secretary of the State Government and it has to be routed through his immediate superiors, i.e., through proper channel. It may also be noted that the request for sanction may have to be vetted and processed and then forwarded through the various proper channels and ultimately, to the State Government. It may also be noted that the request for sanction may have to be vetted and processed and then forwarded through the various proper channels and ultimately, to the State Government. However, it appears that, when the basic prosecution sanction was sent on 26.02.2016, and in view of the mandatory nature of the Act, the Rules and also in view of the provisions made in Sec.45(2) of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the request for prosecution sanction should have been dealt with as expeditiously as possible, and should have been forwarded to the Government, without any further delay. On the other hand, about more than 1½ months have elapsed when the District Police Chief forwarded the request to the Inspector General of Police, who has taken another two weeks and ultimately, the Additional Director General of Police has forwarded the same to the Home Secretary only on 25.06.2016 and there is more than two months’ delay in that regard. 12. Be that as it may, it is the admitted case of the appellant-State of Kerala that they have received the prosecution sanction request on 25.06.2016. 13. The stipulation made in Rule 3 is that the review authority, as per the Statute, will have to make their recommendations within seven working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the Investigating Officer under the Code. Of course, that provision should be read as within seven days from the date of receipt of the request of the State Government, along with all papers relating to the evidence gathered by the Investigating Officer. 14. So, the time line should be computed from the date of receipt of the papers by the reviewing authority. But, as mentioned hereinabove, that will not absolve the police authorities concerned as well as the State Government from taking timely action on the request. 15. There was no specific instruction from the appellant-State as to when the request was forwarded by the State Government to the reviewing authority and as to when the reviewing authority, in turn, had made the recommendations to the State Government, etc. Hence, we passed an order on 17.11.2022, directing the competent authority of the State Government to furnish these factual details to the learned Public Prosecutor. Hence, we passed an order on 17.11.2022, directing the competent authority of the State Government to furnish these factual details to the learned Public Prosecutor. Today, the learned Public Prosecutor has submitted, on the basis of written instructions, furnished by the State Government that the competent authority of the State Government, after receiving the prosecution sanction request from the police authorities on 26.05.2016, had, in turn, forwarded the request to the reviewing authority on 29.08.2016. Further that, the reviewing authority, under Rule 3, has, given their recommendations in the matter to the State Government on 31.08.2016 and that the State Government has received the said report, containing the recommendations of the reviewing authority, on 31.08.2016. Thereafter, the competent authority of the State Government has accorded sanction to the prosecution, under Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act, only as late as on 18.12.2016. 16. So, the timeline of seven days, prescribed in Rule 3, has been adhered to by the reviewing authority. But, the time line of seven days, mandated in Rule 4 of the Rules, has been blatantly violated by the State Government, though they have received the recommendations of the reviewing authority, as early as on 31.08.2016, the Government had accorded sanction only on 18.10.2016, by issuing G.O.(Rt) No.3106/2016/Home. 17. So, the issue to be decided is as to whether the sanction under Sec.45(2), granted by the State Government, is vitiated, on account of the violation of the statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 of the Rules. The issue is no longer res-integra and is fully covered in favour of the respondent herein (accused), as per the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Roopesh v. State of Kerala, rendered as per common judgment dated 17.03.2022, in Crl.R.P.No.732, 733 & 734 of 2019, decided on 17.03.2022 [reported in 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)]. As a matter of fact, we are apprised that the successful petitioner therein, Sri.Roopesh, is none other than the present respondent herein (accused). 18. It appears that the said cases have also raised identical issues, in which the present accused was the accused therein and the State Police was the competent Investigating Officer concerned and also the sanction given by the State Government, under Sec.45(2) of the Act, was held to be vitiated. 18. It appears that the said cases have also raised identical issues, in which the present accused was the accused therein and the State Police was the competent Investigating Officer concerned and also the sanction given by the State Government, under Sec.45(2) of the Act, was held to be vitiated. The Division Bench of this Court has held, in para No.7 of Roopesh's case supra [ 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)], that the word 'shall', appearing in Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act and Rules 3 & 4 of the abovesaid Rules, cannot be said to be merely directive, as Sec.45(2) specifically states that recommendation of the authority and sanction by the appropriate Government shall be made within such time, as prescribed. Further, it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court therein, in para No.14 thereof, that, after construing Sec.45(2) that, when sanction is statutorily mandated for taking cognizance and if cognizance is taken without sanction, or on the strength of an invalid sanction, it cannot be said to be an erroneous proceeding, taken in good faith and the act of taking cognizance itself shall vitiate and the defect, in the sanction so issued, cannot be saved under Sec.460 (e) of the Cr.P.C. It was held by the Division Bench of this Court that the Parliament, while enacting Amendment Act 35 of 2008, has consciously incorporated the provision, requiring a recommendation from an Authority and retained the requirement of sanction from the appropriate Government, as provided in Sec.45(1). It was by Sec.45(2) that an Authority was contemplated, to make recommendations, after reviewing the evidence gathered and a specific time was permitted to be prescribed by rules. The Central Government, having brought out the Rules of 2008, specifying the time within which the recommendation and sanction has to be made, the time element is sacrosanct and mandatory and it cannot at all be held that the stipulation of time is directory, nor can it be waived as a mere irregularity under S.460 (e) or under S.465 Cr.P.C. S.460 saves any erroneous proceeding, inter-alia, of taking cognizance; if done in good faith. When sanction is statutorily mandated for taking cognizance and if cognizance is taken without a sanction or on the strength of an invalid one, it cannot be said to be an erroneous proceeding taken in good faith and the act of taking cognizance itself would, then, stand vitiated and the defect is in the sanction issued, which cannot be saved under S.460(e). It has been reiterated by the Division Bench, in para No.23 thereof, that their Lordships are of the considered opinion that the provision for sanction, as per Sec.45(2), is indeed mandatory and the stipulation of time is also mandatory and sacrosanct. This, the Division Bench has rendered after noticing the legislative history of the enactments and the provisions for sanction incorporated thereunder to take cognizance of the charges, based on activities labelled and defined as unlawful, terrorist and disruptive. It has also held, in para No.24 thereof, that S.45(2) of the UAP Act makes it mandatory for the Authority to make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time, as may be prescribed, to the appropriate Government and this does not absolve the appropriate Government from applying their mind. It has also been, inter-alia, held, in para No.27 thereof, that merely because the powers under the UAP Act alone was invoked; if the order discloses consideration of the materials for the purpose of granting sanction under Sec.196 of the Cr.P.C. the same may be upheld. It may be pertinent to refer to para Nos.11, 14, 23 & 24 of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Roopesh's case supra [ 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)], which read as follows:- "para 11. The word 'shall' in the context of the UA(P)A & the Rules of 2008, cannot be said to be merely directory. Sub-Section (2) of S.45 specifically speaks of the recommendation of the authority and the sanction by the appropriate Government 'shall' (sic) be within such time as prescribed. The prescription made by the Government is available in the Rules of 2008, which subordinate legislation was brought out only to prescribe the time limit, for both the Authority and the appropriate Government, respectively to make the Crl.R.P Nos.732, 733, 734 of 2019 recommendation and issue the sanction as provided under S.45. The prescription made by the Government is available in the Rules of 2008, which subordinate legislation was brought out only to prescribe the time limit, for both the Authority and the appropriate Government, respectively to make the Crl.R.P Nos.732, 733, 734 of 2019 recommendation and issue the sanction as provided under S.45. It has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424 : 33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. ... para 14. The Parliament, in 2008, while enacting Amending Act 35 of 2008 had consciously incorporated the provision requiring a recommendation from an Authority and retained the requirement of sanction from the Crl.R.P Nos.732, 733, 734 of 2019 appropriate Government, as provided in sub-section (1). It was by sub-section (2) that an Authority was contemplated, to make recommendations after reviewing the evidence gathered and a specific time was permitted to be prescribed by rules. The Central Government having brought out the Rules of 2008 specifying the time, within which the recommendation and sanction has to be made, the time is sacrosanct and according to us, mandatory. The Central Government having brought out the Rules of 2008 specifying the time, within which the recommendation and sanction has to be made, the time is sacrosanct and according to us, mandatory. It cannot at all be held that the stipulation of time is directory, nor can it be waived as a mere irregularity under S.460 (e) or under S.465 Cr.P.C. S.460 saves any erroneous proceeding, inter-alia of taking cognizance; if done in good faith. When sanction is statutorily mandated for taking cognizance and if cognizance is taken without a sanction or on the strength of an invalid one, it cannot be said to be an erroneous proceeding taken in good faith and the act of taking cognizance itself would stand vitiated. The defect is in the sanction issued, which cannot be saved under S.460(e). As for S.465, we shall deal with it, a little later. Para 23. We are of the opinion that the provision for sanction is mandatory and the stipulation of time also is mandatory and sacrosanct. We have noticed the legislative history of the enactments and the provision for sanction incorporated thereunder, to take cognizance of charges based on activities labelled and defined as unlawful, terrorist and disruptive. It has to be found that the sanction under the UA(P)A granted after six months from the date of receipt of recommendation of the authority is Crl.R.P Nos.732, 733, 734 of 2019 not a valid sanction. It also has to be stated that the sanction orders merely speak of the Government, after careful examination of the records of investigation in detail, being fully satisfied of the accused having committed an offence punishable under Ss.20 and 38 of the UA(P)A. The sanction order merely referred to the records of investigation in the respective crimes, the letter of the State Police Chief and the recommendation of the authority constituted under S.45 of the UA(P)A. Para 24. It is to be emphasized that S.45(2) of the UA(P)A makes it mandatory for the Authority to make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time as prescribed, to the appropriate Government. This does not absolve the appropriate Government from applying its mind since otherwise there was no requirement for a further sanction from the appropriate Government. This does not absolve the appropriate Government from applying its mind since otherwise there was no requirement for a further sanction from the appropriate Government. We have seen from the precedents that sanction for prosecution is a solemn and sacrosanct act which requires the sanctioning authority to look at the facts and arrive at the satisfaction, of requirement of a prosecution. It was held in Anirudh Singhji Karan Singhji Jadeja [supra] Crl.R.P Nos.732, 733, 734 of 2019 that despite the letter of the DSP being exhaustive, the Government ought to have verified that the allegations as stated by the DSP were borne out from the records. In the case of UA(P)A despite the independent review made by the Authority constituted under S.45, the Government has to arrive at a satisfaction without merely adopting the recommendation of the Authority. The Government, it is to be emphasized, has no obligation to act in accordance with the recommendation of the Authority. The sanction is of the Government and not the Authority and the recommendation of the Authority only aids or assists the Government in arriving at the satisfaction. In the present case there is no such application of mind discernible, but for the reference to the recommendation of the Authority and the laconic statement of the Government, that details have been verified, on which satisfaction is recorded as to the offence having been committed by the accused, for which prosecution has to be initiated. We find the sanction order of the UA(P)A to be not brought out in time, as statutorily mandated and bereft of any application of mind; both vitiating the cognizance taken by the Special Court." 19. We are apprised that the State of Kerala, being aggrieved by the abovesaid common judgment dated 17.03.2022, rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, in Roopesh's case supra [ 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)], in Crl.R.P.Nos.732, 733 & 734 of 2019 [reported in 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)], had later preferred SLPs/Crl.Appeals before the Apex Court as SLP Nos.6981, 6982 & 6983 of 2022. We are also told by both sides that later, the Apex Court, as per order dated 23.09.2022, has dismissed those SLPs/Criminal Appeals bearing Nos.6981, 6982 & 6983 of 2022, preferred by the State of Kerala, as against the abovesaid common judgment, as withdrawn by the State of Kerala. 20. We are also told by both sides that later, the Apex Court, as per order dated 23.09.2022, has dismissed those SLPs/Criminal Appeals bearing Nos.6981, 6982 & 6983 of 2022, preferred by the State of Kerala, as against the abovesaid common judgment, as withdrawn by the State of Kerala. 20. After hearing both sides and after considering various aspects, we are in full concurrence with the considered views rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Roopesh's case supra [ 2022 (2) KLT 907 (DB)]. Hence, there is no necessity for us to reiterate the very same reasonings. 21. In the instant case, though the timeline under Rule 3 has been subserved by the reviewing authority, the timeline under Rule 4 has been flagrantly and blatantly violated by the State Government, as mentioned above. The timelines under both Rule 3 & Rule 4 should be both strictly observed by the reviewing authority and the State Government. Hence, in view of the abovesaid aspects, we are constrained to take the view that the sanction granted under Sec.45(2) of the UAP Act, in the instant case, as per G.O.(Rt) No.3106/2016/Home dated 18.10.2016, is clearly vitiated, as it is illegal and ultravires, for the reasons mentioned above. 22. The second issue is as to the sanction granted under Sec.39 of the Arms Act. 23. In the instant case, the other offences alleged against the petitioner in the above sessions case are those punishable under Sec.3 read with Sec.25(1 B) of the Arms Act. It is common ground that Sec.39 of the Arms Act mandates that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person, in respect of any offence under Sec.3, without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. The Punishment for the contravention envisaged under Sec.3 of the Arms Act is provided as per Sec.25 of the said Act. Sec.39 of the Arms Act deals with previous sanction of the District Magistrate and it is stipulated therein that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person, in respect of any offence under Sec.3, without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. 24. Sec.39 of the Arms Act deals with previous sanction of the District Magistrate and it is stipulated therein that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person, in respect of any offence under Sec.3, without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. 24. In the instant case, it is common ground and it can be seen from a reading of the impugned order that the Sessions court concerned had taken cognizance of the offences in this case, including those under Sec.3 read with Sec.25 (1 B) of the Arms Act, as per order dated 05.12.2016 and along with the final report, the sanction order of the District Magistrate, under Sec.39 of the Arms Act, was indeed not produced before the Sessions court. It was only thereafter, on 22.12.2016, that the investigating agency has produced the sanction order bearing No.D2-2016/33735/9 dated 16.12.2016 of the District Magistrate. The sanction order dated 16.12.2016 has been issued even as per the case of the appellant-State only much after the taking of cognizances of the offences by the Sessions court on 05.12.2016. It is trite that the relevant date to be taken into account, while deciding as to whether there is valid previous sanction or not, is the date of taking cognizance of the offence by the Court. Indisputably, sanction was given by the District Magistrate on 16.12.2016, which is 11 days after taking cognizance by the Sessions court. As a matter of fact, the sanction order dated 16.12.2016 was produced before the court only on 22.12.2016. It has been held by this Court in various decisions, including the one as per Sarath S. v. State of Kerala & another [2019 KHC 842], that the court cannot take cognizance of the offence punishable under Sec.3 read with Sec.25(1 B) of the Arms Act, if no prior sanction, as prescribed under the Act, has been obtained. What is mandated as per Sec.39 is previous sanction of the District Magistrate. Such previous sanction should have been obtained prior to the taking cognizance. Further, it is also common ground that, the so called arms in question have not been recovered and seized from the accused at all. It has been held in decisions as in Kallu v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2018 KHC 4607=2018 CriLJ NOC 640], that, sanction given by the District Magistrate, without seeing or examining the seized objects, is invalid. Further, it is also common ground that, the so called arms in question have not been recovered and seized from the accused at all. It has been held in decisions as in Kallu v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2018 KHC 4607=2018 CriLJ NOC 640], that, sanction given by the District Magistrate, without seeing or examining the seized objects, is invalid. It appears that reliance has been placed in the final report/charge sheet on the statement of CW-1, who has stated that the accused was in possession of a gun, etc., and the said CW-1 is not a ballistic expert or an expert in fire arms. So, there is nothing on record to show that the accused herein possessed/carried or used a gun and thus, committed the offence punishable under Sec.25(1 B) of the Act. These aspects on the matter have also been duly adverted to by the Sessions court concerned, as per the impugned order and we are in full concurrence with the abovesaid views of the Sessions court, in that regard. In other words, the grant of sanction under Sec.39 of the Arms Act is also vitiated. 25. None of the other offences were even taken cognizance by the Sessions court and though, allegations were made against 11 persons, including the respondent accused herein and the investigating agency has implicated only the respondent herein as the sole accused. In other words, we do not find any valid grounds to interfere with the well considered verdict of the Sessions court concerned. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the above criminal appeal will stand dismissed.