JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited is in appeal against the order dated 10th March 2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(S) No. 5775 of 2016. 2. In WP(S) No. 5775 of 2016, the learned Single Judge held that age of the writ petitioner mentioned in the Service Sheet excerpts of his father cannot be considered to be full proof for judging the age. The learned Single Judge further held that the claim of the writ petitioner for compassionate appointment cannot be denied because there is always a possibility of error of ''two years plus/minus''. 3. Tirath Mahto who is the writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent”) made an application for compassionate appointment on 15th July 2014 before the Project Officer, Kuju Colliery. His father Ghanua Mahto was appointed on 29th October 1979 and employed as Pump Khalasi Cat-II in Kuju Colliery, Kuju Area. He had died on 22nd May 2014 while in service under M/s. Central Coalfields Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'CCL') and after his death the mother of the respondent who was not keeping good health nominated him for employment under Clause 9.3.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 'NCWA'). His application was processed by CCL and he was directed by the Deputy Manager (Personnel), Kuju Area vide letter dated 19th January 2016 to appear before the Medical Board, Gandhi Nagar Hospital, Ranchi for age assessment. On the basis of the radiological and physical examination of the respondent by a Medical Board consisting of six doctors, the age of the respondent was assessed between 35-40 years as on 20th January 2016, that is, the date of his examination by the Medical Board, and vide letter dated 25th April 2016 the Manager (P/MP) informed the staff officer (P&A), Kuju Area that claim of Tirath Mahto for compassionate appointment was rejected because he had crossed the age of 35 years as on 2nd September 2014. 4. Before the writ Court, the respondent placed reliance on his Aadhaar Card and the School Transfer Certificate which record the date of his birth on 16th June 1986, and a reference was made to a declaration by him in the affidavit dated 24th August 2015 to the effect that he was born on 16th June 1986. 4. Before the writ Court, the respondent placed reliance on his Aadhaar Card and the School Transfer Certificate which record the date of his birth on 16th June 1986, and a reference was made to a declaration by him in the affidavit dated 24th August 2015 to the effect that he was born on 16th June 1986. The orders passed in LPA No. 117 of 2010 and WP(S) No.7576 of 2006 were also pressed before the writ Court on behalf of the respondent. 5. The stand taken by CCL was that on the basis of the Service Sheet excerpts, LTC and Form-A as well as PS-3 which were filled up on different dates at the instance of the father of the respondent the date of birth of the respondent was arrived at 20th July 1978 as per the company’s prevalent norms and procedure, and his having already crossed the maximum age limit for appointment as on the date of the application for compassionate appointment his claim was rejected. 6. The learned writ Court in WP(S) No. 5775 of 2016 has held as under : “5. Having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner deserves reconsideration for appointment on compassionate ground. The respondents are relying on the assessment of the Medical Board and that of the age mentioned in the service excerpts, cannot be considered to be full proof entered into realm of judging the age of applicant. In my considered opinion, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion of definite nature when age can be considered by the nature which is required to be established. There is always possibility of error of two years plus/minus. In that view of the matter, the claim of the petitioner cannot be denied for appointment on compassionate ground. In my considered opinion, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion of definite nature when age can be considered by the nature which is required to be established. There is always possibility of error of two years plus/minus. In that view of the matter, the claim of the petitioner cannot be denied for appointment on compassionate ground. From the records of the case, I find that different age of the petitioner at the instance of his father was recorded at different point of time which itself suggest that age recorded in the document of the employer must not have been based on any document showing age of the petitioner, rather whatever would have been disclosed by the father of the petitioner, an illiterate person that was recorded in those documents and, therefore, entry made in those documents relating to age of the petitioner cannot be taken to be conclusive proof. In that event and also keeping in view the fact that the determination of age by the Medical Board was between 35-40 years on 20.01.2016. It is settled principle of law that in case of determination of the age by the Medical Board the minimum age is to be taken into consideration not the maximum age. Therefore, fact remains that on the date of making application the petitioner was 35 years of age and therefore the case of the petitioner ought not to have been rejected on the ground of radiological examination that his age was assessed to be more than 35 years.” 7. The impugned communication dated 25th April 2016 which was appended at Annexure-10 in the paper book of the writ petition was quashed by the learned writ Court and a direction was issued to CCL to consider the case of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground within a period of six weeks. 8. By the order dated 21st March 2018, the aforesaid direction issued by the writ Court has been stayed by the Division Bench. 9. 8. By the order dated 21st March 2018, the aforesaid direction issued by the writ Court has been stayed by the Division Bench. 9. The present appeal is premised on two grounds: (i) in a writ proceeding determination of the age of an applicant by the employer cannot be challenged, and (ii) entries made in the Service Sheet excerpts of an employee are normally taken as true and unless it is established by producing indisputable document that the entries made therein were not correct, the writ Court would accept the same binding on the parties. 10. At the outset we may indicate that every claim for compassionate appointment must be examined within four corners of the scheme/ rules framed for compassionate appointment. Such appointments made under the scheme/ rules do not strictly conform to the requirements of equality clauses in the Constitution of India and, therefore, the Courts cannot modify the scheme/ rules to the benefit of an applicant. Framing of the scheme/ rules for compassionate appointment by the employer is in recognition of the past services rendered by an employee whose sudden death while in service has brought sudden crisis in the family. 11. In “Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana” (1994) 4 SCC 138 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “2……The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.” 12. The procedure for appointment of the dependant of an employee who dies in harness while working under CCL has been laid down under Clause 9.3.4 of NCWA, which came into existence pursuant to an agreement between the Central Government, Coal Companies and Union of the employees. In “Mohan Mahto v. Central Coalfields Limited & others” (2007) 8 SCC 549 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the agreement under NCWA is binding on the parties and the same has attained statutory force. 13. Different clauses under paragraph No. 9.3.0 of NCWA-VI read as under : “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” 14. As we read from the aforesaid, under Clause 9.3.4 the age of the dependant of a deceased employee should not be more than 35 years. Clause 9.5.0 provides that the female spouse should not have crossed the age of 45 years whereas no age limit is provided for employment of a male spouse. 15. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, the learned counsel for the respondent, has referred to an order passed in LPA No. 307 of 2018 to submit that rejection of the claim of the respondent was unsustainable because CCL held him ineligible as on the date of application whereas in view of the order passed in LPA No. 307 of 2018 the respondent's eligibility should have been considered as on the date of death of his father. 16. We are informed that by an order dated 23rd August 2021, Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 12648 of 2021 challenging the order passed in LPA No. 307 of 2018 was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The order dated 23rd August 2021 in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 12648 of 2021 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as under : “UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of. However, the question of law is left open.” 18. Mr. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of. However, the question of law is left open.” 18. Mr. A.K. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, has controverted that the issue decided in LPA No. 307 of 2018 was similar to the issue raised by CCL in the present appeal. The learned counsel would submit that there was no dispute as regards date of birth of the applicant/dependant in the said case whereas, in the present case, the documents produced before the writ Court disclosed that there were wide variations in the age of the respondent recorded in different documents. 19. LPA No. 307 of 2018 arose from an order passed by one of us (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) in WP(S) No. 1264 of 2011 wherein the writ Court was engaged with the issue regarding the initial point for calculating the age of an applicant – whether it should be the date of death of the employee or the date of application for compassionate appointment. The writ Court observed as under : “5. In “Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. And Others” reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549 , it has been held that National Coal Wage Agreement, which is culmination of an agreement between the Central Government, Coal Companies and the Union is binding on the parties and it has attained statutory force. Clause 9.3.4 provides that a claimant should not have crossed the age of 35 years and as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner it does not provide that as on the date of application the claimant should not have attained the age of 35 years. The petitioner had not attained the age of 35 years on 21.01.2008, when his father died in harness. The service-excerpts records age of the claimant as 14 years as on 01.04.1987. The respondent-Central Coalfields Limited has issued instructions whereunder an application can be submitted within 18 months of the death of the deceased employee. It is not in dispute that for compassionate appointment, a claimant is not required to undergo the regular appointment exercise. Now if a claimant can submit an application within 18 months and his age is reckoned as on the date of the application, the whole object for providing compassionate appointment may be frustrated. Present is a case of such nature. It is not in dispute that for compassionate appointment, a claimant is not required to undergo the regular appointment exercise. Now if a claimant can submit an application within 18 months and his age is reckoned as on the date of the application, the whole object for providing compassionate appointment may be frustrated. Present is a case of such nature. The claimant who was within the prescribed age limit when his father died on 21.01.2008, has been denied compassionate appointment on the ground that he had crossed the age of 35 years as on date of application. The application was submitted more than 05 months after the death of the employee. In a matter of this nature in which each day counts, such a flaw in the procedure adopted by the respondents has rendered the letter dated 17.01.2011 whereby the petitioner was communicated decision of the competent authority declining compassionate appointment to her son, unsustainable. The procedure adopted by the respondent-Central Coalfields Limited is faulty and it cannot be countenanced in law. Order contained in the impugned letter dated 17.01.2011 suffers from serious infirmity.” 20. In LPA No. 307 of 2018, a Division Bench of this Court has held as under : “11. Apart from the above, let it be noted that the agreement is definitely having a statutory fervor as it is either under Section 18(1) or Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is a benevolent or beneficial provision. In such a case, there could be another method of reading the terms and conditions of the concerned agreement, in particular, when Clause 9.3.4 does not disclose that actually what would be the date on which the age should be considered rather it simply says that on the date of death of the employee, employment has to be offered to the person who has not crossed the age of 35 years. In such a situation, it can also be read that in case the applicant was minor on the date of death of the employee but had attained majority within the period of 18 months, i.e., the period of limitation, such benefit would have to be given to him for making an application for employment under the compassionate ground but in case such person was 35 years of age or less than 35 years of age on the date of death of the employee then even if he had crossed the age barrier of 35 years on the date of application but of 35 years or less in age on the date when the period of limitation of 18 months commenced on account of death of worker, in such case the benefit would again have to be given to him. Any other interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement being a beneficial provision having statutory fervor, would negate its very object. A reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Textile Workers’ Union etc. Vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan and others ( AIR 1983 SC 75 ) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down the ratio to the effect that the benevolent provisions should be construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the Statute, intention of Legislature and underlying policy. In another judgment rendered in Madan Singh Shekhawat Vs. Union of India and others [ (1999)6 SCC 459 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it would be the duty of the Court to interpret the provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the rule. It is not in dispute that the relevant provision under the agreement known as ‘National Coal Wage Agreement’ is for the benefit and welfare of the dependant of the workman and the agreement itself is under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The compassionate appointment in compliance of the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement would be different from offering compassionate appointments in the Government offices or public sector undertakings on the basis of executive instructions because it is a byproduct of a settlement between the parties binding the parties for the terms thereof and has statutory fervor. The compassionate appointment in compliance of the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement would be different from offering compassionate appointments in the Government offices or public sector undertakings on the basis of executive instructions because it is a byproduct of a settlement between the parties binding the parties for the terms thereof and has statutory fervor. In such a situation, when the goal is benevolent, when the provision is beneficial, any other interpretation would destroy the very foundation of such provision.” 21. The age of the respondent was recorded 9 years in the Service Sheet excerpts of his father. This entry was made on 5th April 1987. In LTC Form-A, the respondent was shown aged about 33 years as on 4th August 2011 and the entry in PS-3 records his age 20 years as on 6th August 1998. On the basis of the aforesaid entries in the Service Sheet excerpts, LTC Form-A as well as PS-3 which also indicate that he was born in the year 1978, the date of birth of the respondent was fixed on 1st April 1978. 22. The aforesaid entries made in the service records of Late Ghanua Mahto were not challenged by the respondent. However, the respondent produced a copy of Aadhaar Card and School Transfer Certificate to take a stand that his date of birth was 16th June 1986 and not 1st April 1978 as assessed by CCL. The learned writ Court held that the different documents regarding date of birth/age of the respondent were prepared at different point in time at the instance of his father but disclose different dates of birth/age of the respondent and, therefore, the same cannot be accepted as conclusive proof as regards age of the respondent. 23. We are unable to support the aforesaid findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The age of the respondent was assessed by CCL in terms of the procedure which was uniformly applied by it in every case. In a writ proceeding it is not open to the High Court to rewrite the terms of policy and prescribe a new yardstick. The father of the writ petitioner died on 25th May 2014 and a representation for appointment on compassionate ground was made on 2nd September 2014. In a writ proceeding it is not open to the High Court to rewrite the terms of policy and prescribe a new yardstick. The father of the writ petitioner died on 25th May 2014 and a representation for appointment on compassionate ground was made on 2nd September 2014. The age of the petitioner was assessed more than 36 years as on 2nd September 2014 and even taking the date of death of his father as the initial point for calculating the outer age the respondent by that time had crossed the age of 35 years and was thus rendered ineligible for appointment under CCL. A wholly unmerited claim of the respondent was taken up by the writ Court and the impugned directions were issued for compassionate appointment. 24. In “State of M.P. v. Amit Shrivas” (2020) 10 SCC 496 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus : “16. It is trite to say that there cannot be any inherent right to compassionate appointment but rather, it is a right based on certain criteria, especially to provide succour to a needy family. This has to be in terms of the applicable policy as existing on the date of demise, unless a subsequent policy is made applicable retrospectively…” 25. On age determination of the respondent by the Medical Board, the learned Single Judge held that in case of determination of age by the Medical Board the minimum age is to be taken into consideration and not the maximum age. The learned Single Judge further held that on the date of application the writ petitioner was 35 years of age and therefore on the basis of radiological examination which disclosed his age more than 35 years his claim for compassionate appointment ought not have to be rejected. 26. We may indicate that M/s. Coal India Limited has laid down procedure for determination of age on the basis of recommendation of the Age Assessment Committee as contained in letter dated 7th July 1992 which reads as under : “Coal India Limited "Coal Bhawan” 10 Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta-700001. No.-CIL/C-5B/MP/ADVA/2704 dated 7-7-1992. To, (1) Director (Personnel), ECL/BCCL/CCL/WCL/SECL (2) Director-in-Charge, MCL. (3) Chief General Manager (P), NCL. (4) Chief General Manager, NEC/ Dankuni Coal Complex. No.-CIL/C-5B/MP/ADVA/2704 dated 7-7-1992. To, (1) Director (Personnel), ECL/BCCL/CCL/WCL/SECL (2) Director-in-Charge, MCL. (3) Chief General Manager (P), NCL. (4) Chief General Manager, NEC/ Dankuni Coal Complex. Dear Sir, During the course of discussion held in 51st meeting of the Directors (P) on 21 06.1992 at CIL, Calcutta, the issue regarding age determination on the basis of the age range recommended by the Age Assessment Committees on the basis of medical jurisprudence was discussed and the following guidelines were evolved. (a) Where no age is recorded in respect of any employees in any statutory records, and the Medical Board/Age Assessment Committee decide an age range, the mid-point of the age range so recommended be taken as the age of the concerned employees. For instance, if the range decided is 50 and 55, the age of the employee concerned will be 52 years 6 months. (b) Where there is variation of age in the various statutory records, the nearest point of the age range as recorded in Form-B register will be accepted as the age of the employee concerned. Example :- Form-B Age recorded in other statutory records Age range fixed by the Medical Board Age to be fixed. 49 47 45 to 50 49 44 49 45 to 50 45 46 43 45 to 50 46 47 40 40 to 45 45 You are requested to decide all pending cases on the above lines. Cases already settled need not be re-opened. Yours faithfully, Sd/- General Manager (Personnel) Calcutta” 27. In the above context, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the order passed in LPA No. 687 of 2019 wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench has held as under : “Even accepting the contention of the respondent CCL that there was requirement to constitute a Medical Board and admittedly the Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ petitioner in between 35 to 40 years and respondent authorities have considered the writ petitioner to be the age of 37 1/2 years taking the midpoint of five years but the question is why the midpoint and not 35 years. 14. 14. We have already referred hereinabove about the principle to be followed in a case of beneficial legislation which is to be interpreted liberally so as to give it a wider meaning than a restrictive meaning which would indicate the very object of the Rule and admittedly the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a beneficial legislation and as such, the provisions contained therein may be construed taking the dominant purpose of the statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy. We have also referred hereinabove that the NCWA is by way of providing social security measures by entering into an agreement with the Union under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the same having the statutory fervor, the object underlying therein is to be considered. The foremost object of the said agreement is to act by way of providing social security measures to the employees and its dependant for which various provisions have been made to provide appointment …....... …..... …... The respondent CCL, however, failed to produce any decision of the authority, in case of consideration of appointment on compassionate ground, to take the midpoint of the age assessed by the Medical Board as has been done in the instant case, rather the document dated 07.07.1992 has been produced to assess the age of an employee by taking the midpoint of the age as has been assessed by the Medical Board but since it is not a case of an employee rather the case of a candidate who is seeking appointment on compassionate ground and, therefore, the said circular will not be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner and in that view of the matter, when the respondent authorities have asked the writ petitioner to go for the medical examination wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40 years and taking the midpoint the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed as 37 1/2 years of age, cannot be said to be an action to achieve the object and intent of the NCWA to provide social security measures to the dependant of the deceased employee, rather the approach of the respondent authorities ought to have been to consider the age of the writ petitioner by taking its lower point so that the object and intent of NCWA be achieved.” 28. In the first place, CCL was not required to ask the respondent to undergo fresh age assessment by the Medical Board. The dependants of the deceased employees are provided opportunity for fresh assessment of their age provided they were in possession of Aadhaar Card, Driving License, Voter ID, Ration Card, School Leaving Certificate etc. under which their age is recorded different from what were recorded in the service records of the employees. This procedure was applicable only in cases where the service records of the employee disclosed wide variation in the age of his dependants. In the present case, we do not find any such irreconcilable variation in the age of the respondent recorded in the service records of his father. In all the forms/documents filled up at the instance of his father the age of the respondent was almost the same. 29. Even then, the age of the respondent was assessed by the Medical Board and in terms of the instructions contained in letter dated 7th July 1992 the employer assessed his age at 37 1/2 years. There is wide variation of more than 8 years in the date of birth of the respondent recorded in Aadhaar Card and School Transfer Certificate compared to his age recorded in the service records of his father, for which we do not see any plausible explanation in the materials on record. 30. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order passed in LPA No. 687 of 2019 is of no avail to the respondent. 31. For the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 10th March 2017 passed in WP(S) No. 5775 of 2016 by the learned Single Judge is set-aside and, consequently, the communication contained in letter dated 25th April 2016 is approved. 32. LPA No. 275 of 2017 is allowed.