JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Kurven Desai, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule for the respondents. 2. Even in two rounds today, Mr. M.R. Vyas, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 remained absent. Though served, nobody appears for respondent No.3. Mr. Kurven Desai, learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared for and on behalf of respondent No.4. 3. Heard Mr. R. R. Marshall, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Savan Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No.8184 of 2019 and Ms. Yogini V. Parikh, learned advocate in Special Civil Application No.14336 of 2019. 4. When these petitions were listed for hearing on 30.08.2022, this Court passed the following order: "Heard Mr. Rustom Marshall, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Savan Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 8184 of 2019 and Ms. Yogini Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 14336 of 2019. Mr. M.R. Vyas, learned advocate for respondents is not present. The order dated 30.04.2019 indicates that notice for final disposal has already been issued. Stand over to 12.09.2022. On that date, the matter shall be taken up for final hearing even if learned advocate for the respondents is not present." 5. These petitions are filed by retired teachers of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 - Institutions praying for the benefit of the Government Resolution dated 07.09.1998 by which the State Government for the Private Primary Schools, revised the pay-scales in line with the Gujarat Civil Services Pay Rules, 1996. 6. Mr. R. R. Marshall, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the petitioner of Special Civil Application No.8184 of 2019 was serving with the institution from 1974 and retired on superannuation with effect from 03.05.2006. Mr. Marshall would further submit that the petitioner was already drawing pay-scale of Rs.950-1050/- and pursuant to the Resolution of the State, the petitioner would be entitled to the pay-scale of Rs.3050-4590/- with effect from 01.01.1996 and consequential revisions of pay till he retired on superannuation. 7. As far as the facts of Special Civil Application No.14336 of 2019 are concerned, the petitioner had worked for a period of 23 years and retired on superannuation on 03.06.2008. 8. 7. As far as the facts of Special Civil Application No.14336 of 2019 are concerned, the petitioner had worked for a period of 23 years and retired on superannuation on 03.06.2008. 8. It is their case that they were entitled to the revision of pay-scales in the pay-scales as aforesaid automatically on coming into force Pay Rules of 1996 so accepted by the State Government vide Resolution dated 07.09.1998. 9. Reliance was placed on an order dated 01.09.2005 passed in Special Civil Application Nos.7119 and 7120 of 2005 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, wherein, the Tribunal in case of two other employees of the same respondent - institution had allowed the applications which were challenged by the Management and the orders of the Tribunal were confirmed. 10. Mr. R. R. Marshall, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the petitioner of Special Civil Application No.8184 of 2019 approached the Tribunal by filing Application No.674 of 2014 which was dismissed by the Gujarat Education Services Tribunal by the order dated 05.09.2018 only on the ground of delay. 11. Ms. Yogini V. Parikh, learned counsel for the petitioner of Special Civil Application No.14336 of 2019 would also submit that the petitioner too was an applicant / petitioner before the Tribunal in the same proceedings. 12. Mr. Marshall, learned Senior Counsel relying on ground ‘F' on page No.8 of the petition would submit that earlier request was made before the Management for fixing the salary as per Government Resolution, however, the respondents did not heed to such request at all. The petitioner apprehended that if assertion was made for rights, she would have been terminated from private management. 13. Perusal of the Resolution dated 07.09.1998 indicates that employees of the Primary Schools run by the Private Management were entitled to their pay being revised with effect from 01.01.1996. In other words, irrespective of an employee approaching for assertion of his / her rights, the Management was bound to extend the Revision of Pay based on this GR. 14. When similarly situated teachers working under the same institution namely; respondent Nos.2 and 3 had approached the Tribunal after retirement and had succeeded, on challenge to those orders by the Management failed inasmuch as, their petitions namely; Special Civil Application Nos.7119 and 7120 of 2005 were dismissed on 01.09.2005. 14. When similarly situated teachers working under the same institution namely; respondent Nos.2 and 3 had approached the Tribunal after retirement and had succeeded, on challenge to those orders by the Management failed inasmuch as, their petitions namely; Special Civil Application Nos.7119 and 7120 of 2005 were dismissed on 01.09.2005. While doing so, the Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under: "I am afraid, I am unable to agree with Mr.Nanavati. Be it noted that the pay-scales were revised by the State Government under Resolution dated 7th September, 1998 with effect from 1st January, 1996. The Trust was required to revised the pay-scales of its teachers in consonance with the said Resolution dated 7th September, 1998. The cause of action, therefore, arose on 7th September, 1998. Applications made within three years from the date of the cause of action cannot be held to be time-barred. As such, no period of limitation has been prescribed in case of claims made before the Tribunal. "Reasonable time", therefore, should be the yard stick. Even for a civil suit the period of limitation would have been three years. The applications made within three years from the date of the cause of action cannot be held to be time-barred or grossly belated as urged by Mr.Nanavati. No ground for interference is made out. The petitions are summarily rejected. Registry shall maintain copy of this order in each petition." 15. The only modification that the Division Bench of this Court in an appeal at the behest of the Management was to restrict the actual benefits and ordered notional benefits for the period from 01.01.1996 to 31.12.1998. Relevant portion or order dated 23.08.2006 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.257 of 2006 reads as under: "12. In view of the peculiar facts of the case and in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Swaminarayan Education Trust vs. State of Gujarat, 1993(2) GLR 1713 , referred to hereinabove and the fact that the teachers have put in 32 to 34 years of service, though the resolution provides that cash payment be given from 1.4.1997, we direct that the school authority will give the petitioners the "notional benefit" as per the resolution dated 7.9.1998 from 1.1.1996 to 31.12.1998, but make the actual payment of arrears of salary from 1.1.1999 as the original petitioners had made representations in December, 1998." 16. Perusal of the order of the Tribunal under challenge in both these petitions indicates that the petitioners had approached the Management in the years 2008, 2009 and 2011 for settlement of their grievances. As far as revision of pay is concerned, the Management did not heed to the request and the petitioners, therefore only approached the Tribunal post their retirement in the years 2006-2008 respectively. 17. This Court in a decision rendered in a decision rendered in the case of Vipul Atmaram Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 2009(5) GLR 3914 held as under: "9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the objection raised by the respondent No.3 that while granting the benefit of higher pay scale on completion of 9 years service/seniority prior to the request transfer is not required to be counted is not sustainable in view of the many decisions of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judges of this Court. Even, the controversy in question is now not res integra in view of the the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Vishun Pawar (supra). All the decisions have been considered by this Court in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Naynaben Manubhai Vyas & Others(supra) dated 12.3.2009 in Special Civil Application No.1446 of 1994 and other allied matters. In spite of the above decisions of this Court, since long the office of the respondent No.3 is raising same and similar objection driving the employee to the Court and to obtain the similar order. If, on a particular point there is a decision of this Court every authority of the State Government is bound to follow the same unless it is upset by the higher forum. The authority has to apply its mind before raising objection and grant the benefit accordingly and shall not compel the employee to obtain similar order from the Court. To raise the objections again and again which are overruled by the Court by decision would not only compelling the employee to incur the expenditure towards the legal proceedings but it will also increase the litigation and burden to the Courts, which are otherwise today heavy burdened due to backlog of cases and Courts are trying their best to get out of the backlog. In the case of (Smt) Dhanlakshmiben Liladhar Suchak (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court as far as back in the year 1992 has observed that the Government should be model employer. The model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee and employees on any technical ground. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee/employees. It is further observed that once it is found that an employee is similarly situated the benefits flowing from a judgment in a case of other similarly situated employee, it should be given to other similarly situated employee and employee should not be driven to the Court for addressing just grievances. Even in the case of Secretary, Labour, Social Welfare & Tribunal Development Department & Anr. (Supra), the Full Bench of this Court in para 9 and 10 has observed and held as under: "9. The legal position regarding the binding nature of judgments delivered by High Courts was clearly explained as far back as 1962 by the Supreme Court. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. V. Collector of Customs, Calcuttam A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1893, Subba Rao. J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Mudholkar J., has explained though A.K. Sarkar J. who was the legal position, the legal position in paragraph 29 of the report as follows: This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art: 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working: otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer, We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority, signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction." The position was reiterated in Makhan Lal Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2206. It was the context of the law declared by the Supreme Court that the decision laid down to that effect so far as Article 141 of the Constitution was concerned, but what has been observed in paragraph 5 at page 2209 by Grover J. speaking for the Supreme Court has equal application so far as pronouncements by the High Courts are concerned. Grover J. observed at page 2209: "The Judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the writ petition filed at the previous stage as unconstitutional but also laid down in clear and unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments, posts or promotions made in implementation of the communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Article 16. The law so declared by this court was binding on the respondent State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether a majority of the present respondents were parties or not to the previous petition." It cannot, therefore, be contended by anyone, that since Acharya, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2215 of 1979, was not a party to Special Civil Application No. 806 of 1975, that the law laid down by D.A. Desai, J. in his judgment in that case on August 7, 1975 was not applicable to the case of Acharya. Whether the law is declared by the Supreme Court or whether the law is declared by the High Court, the legal position as regards authorities and tribunals subordinate to the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively is the same as pointed out by Subba Rao J. in East India Commercial Co.s case (supra). 10. In Shri Baradakanta Mishtra V. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2466, the legal position regarding binding nature of the High Court's decision was once again reiterated by the Supreme Court and after quoting the above passage which we have extracted from the judgment of Subba Rao J. in East India Commercial Co. s case (supra) in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, Dwiveid J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed at page 2169: "The conduct of the appellant in following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior court's disobedience to the specific order of a superior court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law." In Hashmukhlal C. Shah V. State of Gujarat, 19 G.L.R. 378, a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of J.B. Mehta and P.D. Desai JJ. after examining several decisions on the point, observed: "... in a Government which is ruled by laws, there must be complete awareness to carry out faithfully and honestly lawful orders passed by a Court of law after impartial adjudication. Then only will private individuals, organizations and institutions learn to respect the decisions of Court. In absence of such attitude on the part of all concerned, chaotic conditions might arise and the function assigned to the Courts of law under the Constitution might be rendered a futile exercise." From these four decisions, the following propositions emerges: (1). It is immaterial that in a previous litigation the particular petitioner before the Court was or was not a party, but if law on a particular point has been laid down by the High Court, it must be followed by all authorities and tribunals in the State. (2).The law laid down by the High Court must be followed by all authorities and subordinate tribunals when it has been declared by the highest Court in the State and they cannot ignore it either in initiating proceeding of deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. (3).If in spite of the earlier exposition of law by the High Court having been pointed out and attention being pointedly drawn to that legal position in utter disregard of that position proceedings are initiated, it must be held to be a wilful disregard of the law laid down by the High Court and would amount to civil contempt as defined in section 2(b) of the Contempt Courts Act, 1971." Thus, even the Division Bench has held that not following the law laid down by the High Court and disregarding the same would amount to Civil Contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the concerned officer, which is accepted, no further order is passed. 10. In view of the above, the action of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 and more particularly, respondent No.3 i.e. office of the Local Fund raising the same/ similar objection again and again while considering the grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale is highly deprecated. As such it is not believable that the respondent No.3 was not aware of the decision of this Court. In fact, in the communication from the office of the respondent No.2 there is a reference to the decision of this court , therefore, the submission on behalf of the respondent No.3 that he was not aware of the decision of this Court cannot be accepted. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent No.3 and assurance to this Court that in future respondent No.3 and its Office shall take care and that it was not his intention to disregard and / or disrespect the orders passed by this Court, unconditional apology is accepted. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3, more particularly respondent No.3 and its Officers are warned that as and when not only in the case of grant of higher pay scale but in any other cases as and when it is brought to their knowledge the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and / or this Court in other similar case they will apply their mind and grant the benefit without insisting for individual orders from the Court. All the authorities under the State are bound to consider the decisions of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court even if the decisions are with respect to other similarly situated employees. The same would avoid the further litigation and decrease the burden of the Court and also similarly situated employee may not have to incur expenditure on the legal proceedings. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. The Secretary Legal Department as well as Secretary General Administrative Department are hereby directed to issue necessary circular to all the departments accordingly not to insist for individual order when the controversy is concerned by the decision in other employees case. 11. Now, so far as the present petition is concerned, in view of the statement made by Ms. Calla, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 recorded herein above and that the respondent No.3 is now withdrawing the objection raised by him with respect to grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale to the respective petitioners, on return of case papers of the respective petitioners by the respondent No.2 to the respondent No.3, the respondent No.3 is directed to pass an appropriate order with respect to grant of the benefit of higher grade scale in accordance with the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 of the Finance Department considering the seniority/service of the respective petitioners from the date of their first appointment as an Assistant (Junior Clerk) i.e. inclusive of seniority/service prior to their request transfer within a period of 3 weeks from the date of the receipt of the case papers from the office of the respondent No.2 and pay the arrears within a period of 4 weeks thereafter without fail. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs." 18. The Court specifically observed that a model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee on any technical ground. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee. Once an employee is found to be similarly situated, the benefits flowing from a judgment in a case of other similarly situated employees should be given to the other employees. 19. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee. Once an employee is found to be similarly situated, the benefits flowing from a judgment in a case of other similarly situated employees should be given to the other employees. 19. It is to be noted in the facts of this case that once the Tribunal in case of similarly situated employees had in Application Nos.32 and 33 of 2001 passed the Judgment and Orders on 13.12.2004 and such Judgments were confirmed by this Court by an order dated 01.09.2005 in Special Civil Application Nos.7119 and 7120 of 2005, the Management on its own, without waiting for the petitioners to approach the Tribunal, should have granted such benefits. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.L. Patil (dead) Through LRs v. State of Goa and another reported in 2022 SCC Online 685 had held that pension is a continuous cause of action and cannot be denied on the ground of delay. 21. Here is a case where the employees who retired from the respondent - Institution in the years 2006 and 2008 expected the Management to act fairly and extend the benefits of the pay revisions that they were entitled to in light of Government Resolution dated 07.09.1998. This not having been done, they approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal on the ground of limitation rejected their applications. 22. In light of what is stated hereinabove, the order dated 05.09.2018 passed by the respondent - Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to pay the benefits of the Revision of Pay Scales of Rs.3,050- 4,500/- and other consequential benefits to the petitioners from the date they were entitled to by virtue of GR dated 07.09.1998. Such exercise shall be carried out within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 23. Both these petitions are allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct Service is permitted. No costs.