ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. M/s Chandwa Ceramic Works along with its proprietor and guarantor approached the writ Court challenging the order dated 14th November 2017 passed by the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi in RP Case No. 338 of 2016. 2. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel, assisted by Mrs. Sunita Ojha, the learned counsel, appears for the Bank of India. 3. Mr. Shashank Shekhar Prasad, the learned counsel appears for the respondent No.3 who is the successful bidder and purchaser of 2.30 acres of land, corresponding to Khewat No.3, Tauji No.1, Thana No.285, Khata No.140, Jamabandi, Holding No.15, Plot No.993, Thana: Chandwa, District: Latehar, Jharkhand, which was the secured property mortgaged with the Bank. 4. By an order dated 12th March 2018, the writ Court declined to entertain challenge laid by the writ petitioners, who are appellants before us, to the reserve price for the mortgaged properties and held the writ petition not maintainable in view of the judgment in “Authorized Officer, State Bank Of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C.” reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 . 5. The writ Court vide order dated 12th March 2018 passed in WP(C) No. 806 of 2018 dismissed the writ petition, holding as under : “6. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and on going through the relevant documents placed on record and the laws applicable in this regard, it appears that admittedly, the petitioner has not filed any appeal against the order passed by the respondent no.2 in R.P. Case No. 338 of 2016. Under the said factual background, the provisions of the Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder are required to be considered. 7. Section 30 of the Act reads as under:- “30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such enquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive).” 8. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such enquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive).” 8. On plain reading of Section 30 of the Act, 1993, it would be evident that any person being aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer passed under the Act, 1993 can prefer appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993. 9. The Hon?ble Supreme Court while discussing the scope of judicial intervention in such matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a recent judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 (Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C.) has held as under: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of exparte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v.Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant 5 parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 10. Considering the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another (supra), I am not inclined to exercise the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable at this stage. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take appropriate recourse against the action of the respondents, if so advised, in accordance with law.” 6. From the records, it further appears that the appellants sought a direction from the writ Court upon the respondent Bank of India for considering proposal of M/s Chandwa Ceramic Works under One Time Settlement Scheme circulated vide letter dated 15th November 2017. 7. From the records, it further appears that the appellants sought a direction from the writ Court upon the respondent Bank of India for considering proposal of M/s Chandwa Ceramic Works under One Time Settlement Scheme circulated vide letter dated 15th November 2017. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the movable properties standing over the land were not mortgaged with the Bank of India and, therefore, could not have been put on auction and, that too, at a thrown away price. 8. Several affidavits have been filed in the present proceeding and the Bank of India is on affidavit stating that only the properties which were mortgaged by the proprietor of the Company through deposit of title deeds were put on auction for realizing outstanding dues from the Company. 9. Mr. Ashok Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellants would, however, try to persuade this Court not to act upon the letter dated 21st April 2018 at page No. 19. This document has been filed along with counter affidavit dated 11th August 2022 of the respondent No.3 in which details of the properties which were furnished as security for the loan availed by the Company has been described. The stand taken by Mr. Ashok Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellants is that the letter dated 21st April 2018 has not been signed by the proprietor of the Company. We are not inclined to take note of such objections which apparently are made in desperation. Moreover, such factual dispute can be examined by the appellate authority. 10. On the question of availability of appeal under section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, Mr. Ashok Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellants refers to the judgment in “International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. v. The Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and others” (2017) 16 SCC 137 , to submit that the appeal as provided under section 30 of 1993 Act would be barred by limitation as the period of 30 days for filing the appeal cannot be extended and, therefore, the appellants cannot avail the appeal remedy on the ground of which the writ petition was dismissed. 11. A glance at the judgment in “International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd.” would reveal that Mr. 11. A glance at the judgment in “International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd.” would reveal that Mr. Ashok Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellants has made the aforesaid submission on a misreading of the said judgment. This judgment proceeds on the premise that the Debts Recovery Tribunal is not constituted as a Court which shall have powers to condone the delay in an application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Such limitations definitely are not attracted where the writ Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India relegates an applicant to alternative remedy as available under the Statute. 12. In “International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd.” the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “13. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The Appellate Tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery Officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express. The application. of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the insistence by the learned counsel for the appellants on prosecuting the present Letters Patent Appeal on merits is not accepted. We do not find any reason to disagree with the opinion expressed by the writ Court relegating the appellants to avail remedy under section 30 of the Act 1993. 14. There is another reason why we are not inclined to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal and approve the view taken by the writ Court. We do not find any reason to disagree with the opinion expressed by the writ Court relegating the appellants to avail remedy under section 30 of the Act 1993. 14. There is another reason why we are not inclined to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal and approve the view taken by the writ Court. Section 30 of 1993 Act gives wide powers to the appellate authority. It provides that the appellate authority after giving an opportunity to both sides may make an order confirming, modifying or setting aside the order of the Recovery Officer. Evidently, the appellate authority shall have an opportunity to examine the original records and, as noticed above, the appellants shall also have a better opportunity to raise all grounds in law as well as on facts as are available to them. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, this Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed. The appellants may prefer an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. We must, however, indicate that we have not examined merits of the matter and any observation by the writ Court shall not be construed by the appellate authority an expression of opinion by the Court on merits of the matter. 16. IA No. 2447 of 2018 stands disposed of.