JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The prayers in the instant writ petition seeking for writs of Habeas Corpus and Certiorari in regard to the challenge against the preventive detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti Social Activities Prevention Act 2007 KAA(P) Act, 2007 are as follows: (i) call for the records leading to Exts.P1 quash the same by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction. (ii) Issue a writ of habeas corpus commanding the respondents to produce the b0dy of the detenu viz. Adarsh Chandrasekharan, S/o.Chandrasekharan Nair, Aged 25 years, Madappilly House, Amballoor Kara, Amballoor Village, Ernakulam, the husband of the petitioner who is illegally detained in Central Prison, Kannur before this Hon’ble Court and set him at liberty forthwith. (iii) Grant such other relief as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case including the costs of this Writ Petition (Criminal). (iv) Petitioner also prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to dispense with the translation of the documents produced in the vernacular language. 2. Heard Sri.Ajesh M. Ummer, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri.E.C. Bineesh, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 3. The factual aspects necessary for the disposal of this Writ proceedings are as follows: The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu involved in this case viz, Sri.Adarsh Chandrasekhar, aged 25 years, S/o.Chandrasekharan Nair. The 4th respondent District Police Chief concerned (who is the sponsoring authority) has given report dated 17.03.2022, recommending to the 2nd respondent authorized detaining authority that in view of the factual aspects stated in the said report, it is a fit case to enable the 2nd respondent to pass orders under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act to ensure the preventive detention of the detenu as he is otherwise likely to indulge in further prejudicial anti-social activities as understood in Section 2(a) of the abovesaid Act. In the light of the said report, the 2nd respondent District Collector cum District Magistrate, Ernakulam has passed Ext.P1 order dated 29.05.2022 stating that in view of the factual aspects stated therein, the 2nd respondent is satisfied that order should be passed under Section 3(1) to preventively detain the detenu as he is likely to commit further prejudicial anti-social activities. In the light of the said report, the 2nd respondent District Collector cum District Magistrate, Ernakulam has passed Ext.P1 order dated 29.05.2022 stating that in view of the factual aspects stated therein, the 2nd respondent is satisfied that order should be passed under Section 3(1) to preventively detain the detenu as he is likely to commit further prejudicial anti-social activities. Further, Ext.P1 detention order, along with all the relevant records/documents were forthwith communicated to the Government as required in Section 3(3) of the Act. According to the respondents, Ext.P1 detention order dated 29.05.2022 was executed on 08.06.2022. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent had given the necessary proposal to the Government seeking for their approval. The first respondent State Government has issued Government order dated 17.06.2022 approving Ext.P1 detention order, which is within 12 days after excluding public holidays as envisaged in Section 3(3) of the Act. Thereafter, the 1st respondent State Government has referred the matter for the opinion of the 5th respondent Statutory Advisory Board. The Advisory Board after hearing the detenu has given their report on 05.08.2022, recommending to the Government that there is sufficient cause for preventive detention of the detenu as per Ext.P1 order. Thereafter, the 1st respondent State Government has passed Ext.P2 GO(Rt) No.2222/2022/Home dated 10.08.2022, confirming Ext.P1 detention order in terms of Section 10(4) of the Act. There is no serious dispute that the various statutory timelines, mandated in the Act like the 5 days limit for communicating the grounds of detention of the detenu under Section 7(2) for approval of the State Government within 12 days after excluding holidays as per Section 3(3), the time limit of 3 weeks from the date of detention for placing the matter before the Advisory Board, the 9 weeks time limit for the Advisory Board to give the report as per Section 10(1) etc and as well as the requirement as per Section 3(3) for forthwith communicating the detention order and the relevant records to the Government etc have been duly complied with in this case. Altogether 4 cases have been reckoned by the detaining authority out of the 6 cases reported by the sponsoring authority to enable the respondents to reckon the detenu as ‘known Rowdy’ as per Section 2p(3) read with Section 2(t) of the Act. Altogether 4 cases have been reckoned by the detaining authority out of the 6 cases reported by the sponsoring authority to enable the respondents to reckon the detenu as ‘known Rowdy’ as per Section 2p(3) read with Section 2(t) of the Act. There are no serious disputes that going by the factual details in those 4 cases, the detenu would fulfill the definitional parameters of ‘Known Rowdy’ as per Section 2p(3) read with Section 2(t) of the act. 4. The main ground urged by counsel for the petitioner is that the bail earlier granted to the detenu in one of the crimes was cancelled on 17.03.2022 and he was on remand since 19.03.2022 etc and the fact that the detenu was already under judicial remand and custody since 19.03.2022 was not known to the 2nd respondent detaining authority and the 4th respondent sponsoring authority at the time when the 2nd respondent detaining authority has passed Ext.P1 detention order dated 29.05.2022. Hence, counsel for the petitioner would submit that in view of the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court in decisions as in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, 1990 (1) SCC 746 , paragraph 21 etc and other case laws on the subject, the impugned decision making process which led to the impugned Ext.P1 detention order is vitiated and is liable for judicial interdiction as the detaining authority was not even aware that the detenu was already under judicial custody in the abovesaid case, since 19.03.2022 and hence, the detaining authority has not even considered the other consequential issues as to whether the detenu was likely to get bail in that case and if so, as to whether the detenu is likely to commit further serious prejudicial activity which warrants the extreme draconian measure of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Act etc. It is urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the basic fact that the detenu was already under remand in crime no.17/2021 of Chottanikara Police Station since 19.03.2022, would vitiate the entire decision making process etc. Learned Prosecutor would strongly oppose the said plea etc. 5. Now we would proceed to give our findings on the above said contention of the petitioner. 6. A brief reference to some of the facts relevant for consideration of the abovesaid contention would be pertinent. Learned Prosecutor would strongly oppose the said plea etc. 5. Now we would proceed to give our findings on the above said contention of the petitioner. 6. A brief reference to some of the facts relevant for consideration of the abovesaid contention would be pertinent. It is common ground that the last out of the 4 cases, viz crime no.105/2022 of Chottanikkara Police Station was in relation to a crime incident involving the detenu which is said to have occurred on 14.02.2022 and the abovesaid crime was registered on 14.02.2022. Further, the detenu was arrested and remanded to judicial custody in that case on 19.02.2022. Later, he was granted bail in crime no.105/2022 as per order of the competent criminal court rendered on 29.04.2022. However, though bail was granted in the said crime, he was not actually released on bail as his detention was necessary in another case. 7. Further, the crime incident in relation to the 3rd crime out of the 4 cases, viz, crime no. 17/2021 of Chottanikara Police Station was registered against the petitioner on 09.01.2021. He was remanded to judicial custody in that case on 10.01.2021. Later, he was granted bail in that case on 21.05.2021. However, the bail earlier granted in crime no.17/2021 was cancelled on 17.03.2022 by the competent Criminal Court on account of his involvement in the aforesaid 4th crime, viz, crime no.105/2022. Consequent to the bail cancellation order dated 17.03.2022, the detenu was remanded to judicial custody on 19.03.2022 in the said crime no.17/2021. It appears that the detenu again moved for bail in the said 3rd case which was rejected by the criminal court on 08.04.2022. It is the case of the petitioner that later the detenu was acquitted as per Ext.P3 judgment on 29.02.2022 in relation to his involvement in the said 3rd case, viz, crime no.17/2021 of Chottanikara Police Station. 8. The specific plea of the petitioner is that on account of the bail cancellation order rendered on 17.03.2022 in the 3rd case, which led to his remand since 19.03.2022 in the 3rd case, the petitioner could not even get release in the 4th case, though he secured bail order in his favour in that 4th case on 29.04.2022. 8. The specific plea of the petitioner is that on account of the bail cancellation order rendered on 17.03.2022 in the 3rd case, which led to his remand since 19.03.2022 in the 3rd case, the petitioner could not even get release in the 4th case, though he secured bail order in his favour in that 4th case on 29.04.2022. In other words, the specific plea of the petitioner is that the detenu was under judicial remand since 19.03.2022 in relation to the 3rd case, and the fact that he was under judicial remand and custody since 19.03.2022 was not even known to the detaining authority when Ext.P1 detention order was passed on 29.05.2022. It appears that the sponsoring authority's report was given on 17.03.2022. Bail granted to the detenu in crime no.17/2021 was cancelled as per order dated 17.03.2022. Hence, it appears that the sponsoring authority, when it had given the report on 17.03.2022 may not have been aware about the bail cancellation order rendered by the Criminal Court on 17.03.2022 in the 3rd crime. However, it appears that no further additional report was given by the sponsoring authority or by any other Police authorities to the detaining authority that bail granted in the 3rd case was cancelled on 17.03.2022 and that he was under judicial remand and custody since 19.03.2022. A reading of Ext.P1 detention order would make it clear that the abovesaid crucial factual aspect regarding the bail cancellation order suffered by the detenu on 17.03.2022 on account of his involvement in the 3rd crime and the consequently he was under remand and judicial custody since 19.03.2022 in the 3rd case has not even been even remotely mentioned in Ext.P1 detention order dated 29.05.2022. The legal position on this subject matter has been laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions and one of the leading decisions in that regard is the one rendered by a 3 judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, 1990 (1) SCC 746 , paragraph 21. It has been held by the Apex Court after scanning and surveying the various case laws on the subject till then, categorically in paragraph No.21 of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, 1990 (1) SCC 746 , paragraph 21. It has been held by the Apex Court after scanning and surveying the various case laws on the subject till then, categorically in paragraph No.21 of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, supra 1990 (1) SCC 746 , p.754 as follows: “The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression “compelling reasons” in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 9. A reading of paragraph 21 of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, supra would make it clear that the following parameters should be strictly adhered to in order that a preventive detention order can be validly passed against a person who is already in custody and the said parameters are as follows: 1. The detaining authority must be aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention. 2. There are compelling reasons justifying such preventive detention order, despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. 10. Compelling reasons as envisaged in paragraph No.2 supra would comprise of two crucial elements as follows, viz,. The detaining authority must be aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention. 2. There are compelling reasons justifying such preventive detention order, despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. 10. Compelling reasons as envisaged in paragraph No.2 supra would comprise of two crucial elements as follows, viz,. (a) There must be cogent materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which it has to be satisfied that the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) There must be materials before the detaining authority to be satisfied, taking into account the nature of the antencedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody, he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 11. Following the dictum laid down by the 3 judge Bench of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Vs. Union of India and Others, supra, a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik Vs Union of India & Others [ 1992 (1) SCC 1 ] paragraph 4 as follows: “4. We see no force in the first submission namely that there was no compelling necessity for passing the detention order. It is true that when the detention order was passed on November 7, 1990 the detenu was in jail and his bail application also was rejected and his passport also was seized. But the detaining authority has mentioned in the grounds that “I am aware that you are under judicial custody and possibility of your release on bail in the near future cannot be ruled out. Also nothing prevents you from moving bail application in the jurisdictional court and getting released on bail”. Therefore it cannot be said that the detaining authority did not apply his mind to this aspect. It is entirely within his subjective satisfaction whether there are such compelling circumstances or not. He has noted that though the detenu was in jail there is likelihood of his being released and therefore it is clear that he has applied his mind to this aspect also. It is entirely within his subjective satisfaction whether there are such compelling circumstances or not. He has noted that though the detenu was in jail there is likelihood of his being released and therefore it is clear that he has applied his mind to this aspect also. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a judgment of this Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India1 wherein it is observed that an order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was already in detention and there were compelling reasons justifying such detention and that there should be cogent material on the basis of which the detaining authority may be satisfied that there are compelling reasons such as that the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and the nature of the antecedents and activities of the detenu which indicate that he is likely to indulge in such activities if released and therefore it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. But we may observe that what would be the compelling reasons in the context would depend on the facts of each case. In this case the allegation is that 50 gold biscuits of foreign origin were found in either side of the handle inside the lock system of the suitcase. This itself manifests the expertise of the carrier in smuggling. The detaining authority was aware that the detenu was in custody but he was satisfied that there is every likelihood of his being released on bail and he is likely to indulge in such smuggling activities. It is mentioned in the counter-affidavit that the remand period of the detenu was to expire on November 10, 1990 and that was also a ground which impelled the detaining authority to think that he was likely to be released on bail. This was the material before the detaining authority on the basis of which he was satisfied that there were compelling reasons to pass the detention order. Having carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel we are unable to say that there were no compelling reasons. This was the material before the detaining authority on the basis of which he was satisfied that there were compelling reasons to pass the detention order. Having carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel we are unable to say that there were no compelling reasons. But we may observe that what would be the compelling reasons in the context would depend on the facts of each case. In this case the allegation is that 50 gold biscuits of foreign origin were found in either side of the handle inside the lock system of the suitcase. This itself manifests the expertise of the carrier in smuggling. The detaining authority was aware that the detenu was in custody but he was satisfied that there is every likelihood of his being released on bail and he is likely to indulge in such smuggling activities. It is mentioned in the counter-affidavit that the remand period of the detenu was to expire on November 10, 1990 and that was also a ground which impelled the detaining authority to think that he was likely to be released on bail. This was the material before the detaining authority on the basis of which he was satisfied that there were compelling reasons to pass the detention order. Having carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel we are unable to say that there were no compelling reasons.” 12. Further, the Apex Court has held as follows in a recent decision rendered in the case Union of India & Another v. Dimple Happy Dhakad ( AIR 2019 SC 3428 ), in paragraphs 31 to 37 as follows: “31. After reviewing all the decisions, the law on the point was enunciated in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India and another (1991) 1 SCC 128 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ) where the Supreme Court held as under: "13. After reviewing all the decisions, the law on the point was enunciated in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India and another (1991) 1 SCC 128 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ) where the Supreme Court held as under: "13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav (1985) 4 SCC 232 : ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. ......." 32. The same principle was reiterated in Union of India v. Paul Manickam and another (2003) 8 SCC 342 : ( AIR 2003 SC 4622 , para 12) where the Supreme Court held as under: "14. ........ Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N. (1989) 4 SCC 418 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2027 ) and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746 ) : ( AIR 1990 SC 1196 ) The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ). ......" [underlining added] 33. Whether a person in jail can be detained under the detention law has been the subject-matter for consideration before this Court time and again. In Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur and others (2012) 7 SCC 181 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2002 ), the Supreme Court referred to earlier decisions including Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1196 ) and reiterated that if the detaining authority is satisfied that taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 34. 34. In Veeramani v. State of T.N. (1994) 2 SCC 337 : (1995 AIR SCW 1730) in para (6), the Supreme Court held as under: "6. From the catena of decisions of this Court it is clear that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; if he has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released on bail and that on being so released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities and if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction the same cannot be struck down." likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 35.In the light of the well-settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority:- (i) that the detenu is in custody; (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenues have been rejected by the Court. Of course, in the detention orders, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the "detenu is likely to be released". It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the "detenue's likelihood of being released on bail" and "if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities". But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedent of the detenues and its satisfaction that detenues Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar have the high propensity to commit such offences in future. @page-SC3441 36. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedent of the detenues and its satisfaction that detenues Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar have the high propensity to commit such offences in future. @page-SC3441 36. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail and on being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. and another (2006) 5 SCC 676 : (2006 AIR SCW 4648), the Supreme Court held that the satisfaction of the authority coming to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail is the "subjective satisfaction" based on the materials and normally the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 37. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is likely to be released on bail is based on the materials. A reading of the grounds of detention clearly indicates that detenu Nisar Aliyar has been indulging in smuggling gold and operating syndicate in coordination with others and habitually committing the same unmindful of the revenue loss and the impact on the economy of the nation. Likewise, the detention order qua detenu Happy Dhakad refers to the role played by him in receiving the gold and disposing of the foreign origin smuggled gold through his multiple jewellery outlets and his relatives. The High Court, in our view, erred in quashing the detention orders merely on the ground that the detaining authority has not expressly recorded the finding that there was real possibility of the detenues being released on bail which is in violation of the principles laid down in Kamarunnisa ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ) and other judgments and Guidelines No.24. The order of the High Court quashing the detention orders on those grounds cannot be sustained.” 13. The order of the High Court quashing the detention orders on those grounds cannot be sustained.” 13. The legal position in this regard has been again reiterated by a 3 Judge Bench of the Apex Court in UOI Vs. Ankit Ashok Jalan [ 2020 (16) SCC 185 ], paragraphs 10, 11 etc. A reading of the abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court would make it clear that one of the prime requirements for validly passing a preventive detention order against a person already in custody is that the detaining authority must be aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention in some other case and further that there are compelling reasons justifying such detention, despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention, as per the other parameters mentioned in the above cited decisions. In the instant case, a reading of Ext.P1 detention order would make it clear that the basic fact that the detenu was already under judicial remand and custody since 19.03.2022 on account of the bail cancellation order suffered by him on 17.03.2022 in the 3rd case, crime no.17/2021 of Chottanikkara Police Station was not even within the knowledge of the 2nd respondent. Hence, it goes without saying that the 2nd respondent has not even assessed the condition as to whether the detenu was likely to secure bail and if so, whether he is likely to engage in further prejudicial activities which warrants the extreme measure of preventive detention etc. It is indisputable from a reading of Ext.P1 detention order that the abovesaid crucial and relevant aspect relating to the judicial remand and custody of the petitioner since 19.03.2022 on account of the bail cancellation order suffered by him in the 3rd case was not even remotely within the knowledge of the 2nd respondent detaining authority. Hence,it is only to be held that non-consideration of the said vital aspect would vitiate the decision making process. Hence it cannot be said that the impugned Ext.P1 preventive detention order has been passed validly and lawfully against the detenu who was already in judicial custody and remand since, 19.03.2022. 14. So the upshot of the above discussion is that the decision making process which lead to Ext.P1 is vitiated and would be liable for judicial interdiction in the hands of this Court exercising powers of judicial review. 14. So the upshot of the above discussion is that the decision making process which lead to Ext.P1 is vitiated and would be liable for judicial interdiction in the hands of this Court exercising powers of judicial review. We make it clear that if the abovesaid crucial aspects has been duly considered by the 2nd respondent and thereafter a view was taken in the matter one way or the other, then the scenario would have been difficult. We are specially sitting in judicial review and not in appeal over the decision making process of the 2nd respondent and hence, we are constrained to hold that the decision making process is vitiated on account of the abovesaid crucial aspects. 15. Accordingly it is ordered in the interest of justice that Ext.P1 detention order No.DCEKM/4279/2022/M7 dated 29.05.2022, issued by the 2nd respondent District Collector cum District Magistrate, Ernakulam as confirmed by the impugned Ext.P2 GO(Rt) No.2222/2022/Home dated 10.08.2022 issued by the 1st respondent State Government in the Home Department will stand quashed and set aside. Consequently it is ordered that the respondents including R6 Superintendent of Central Jail, Kannur, where the detenu is now detained will forthwith release the detenu involved in this case, viz, Adarsh Chandrasekharan, aged 25 years, son of Chandrasekharan from jail, and set him at liberty, if his detention is not required in any other case. 16. The Secretary to the office of the Advocate General will immediately forward copies of this judgment to the respondents for necessary information and immediate compliance. With these observations and directions, the above WP(Crl) will stand disposed of.