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2022 DIGILAW 1037 (AP)

D. Vykuntarao v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2022-10-17

K.SREENIVASA REDDY

body2022
ORDER : This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), is filed to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.273 of 2019 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sompeta. 2. A charge sheet has been filed as against the petitioners herein/A.2 to A.5 and another (A.1) for the offences punishable under Sections 498A IPC and 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: Marriage of A.1 with 2nd respondent was performed on 24.03.2019 at 8th Battalion Police Function Hall, Kondapur, Hyderabad as per hindu rites and customs. At the time of marriage, her parents gave Rs.6,50,000/- cash, 3 tulas gold chain and ring, silver articles 40 tulas and adapaduchu katnam of Rs.50,000/- and sarasamanu of Rs.1,00,000/- to A.1, and 8 tulas gold ornaments and one black beads chain and six pairs of ear studs to her. At the time of engagement, A.2 and A.3 were given an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- and ½ tula of gold as gifts. After the marriage, the coupled lived happily for one month. Thereafter, A.1 to A.5 harassed her physically and mentally to get additional dowry of Rs.10.00 lakhs from her parents for purchasing a car. They paid a deaf ear to the words of mediators and elders, and harassed her to abort her pregnancy and also tried to get marriage of A.1 with another girl. Unable to bear the harassment, she filed a police report on 07.06.2019 and basing on the same, police registered a case in crime No.49 of 2019 of Sompeta police station, and after completion of investigation, laid the charge sheet. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that 2nd petitioner is totally blind and 3rd petitioner was studying at IIT, Mumbai during the alleged period of harassment. It is further contended that no particulars of harassment have been stated in the complaint except vague and bald allegations that there was a demand for additional dowry. Learned counsel for the petitioners also filed a Certificate issued by the IIT, Mumbai in favour of 3rd petitioner. He also filed certain certificates/documents pertaining to 1st petitioner and prays this Court to quash the impugned proceedings on the above additional material that has been filed before this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners also filed a Certificate issued by the IIT, Mumbai in favour of 3rd petitioner. He also filed certain certificates/documents pertaining to 1st petitioner and prays this Court to quash the impugned proceedings on the above additional material that has been filed before this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 and Anil Khandkiwala v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, Judgment dated 30.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1157 of 2019 and, in support of his contentions. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for 2nd respondent contended that the present Criminal Petition is not maintainable for the reason that it amounts to second quash petition without there being any change in circumstances and all the contentions that have been raised by the petitioners were already raised in the earlier quash petition in Criminal Petition No.7190 of 2019 and having considered all the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court was pleased to dispose of the earlier Criminal Petition. It is his further submission that authenticity of the documents sought to be relied on, by the petitioners is to be decided during the course of trial and these are all disputed questions of fact, which cannot be decided in a petition under Section 482 CrPC. 6. Admittedly, earlier, the petitioners herein filed Criminal Petition No.7190 of 2019 before this Court seeking to quash the proceedings in the aforesaid Calendar Case, and by an order dated 26.11.2019, this Court disposed of the Criminal Petition, holding that there is no material available to quash the entire proceedings, however this Court dispensed with appearance of the petitioners for all routine and normal adjournments and directing the petitioners to appear before the trial Court whenever their presence is necessary or when the Court directs them to appear. Notwithstanding the same, the petitioners once again filed the present Criminal Petition, without there being any change in circumstances. 7. Notwithstanding the same, the petitioners once again filed the present Criminal Petition, without there being any change in circumstances. 7. It is the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that the allegations are vague and bald and that 2nd petitioner is totally blind and 3rd petitioner was studying at IIT, Mumbai during the alleged period of harassment, and filed a Certificate issued by the IIT, Mumbai in favour of 3rd petitioner and certain certificates/documents pertaining to 1st petitioner, and prays this Court to quash the impugned proceedings on the above additional material. 8. In Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor case (1 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: (paragraph 30). “30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 9. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 9. In Anil Khandkiwala v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another case (2 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: (paragraphs 7 and 8) “7. The complaint filed by Respondent 2 alleges issuance of the cheques by the appellant as Director on 15-2-2001 and 28-2-2001. The appellant in his reply dated 31-8-2001, to the statutory notice, had denied answerability in view of his resignation on 20-1-2001. This fact does not find mention in the complaint. There is no allegation in the complaint that the cheques were post-dated. Even otherwise, the appellant had taken a specific objection in his earlier application under Section 482 CrPC that he had resigned from the Company on 20-1-2001 and which had been accepted. From the tenor of the order of the High Court on the earlier occasion it does not appear that Form 32 issued by the Registrar of Companies was brought on record in support of the resignation. The High Court dismissed the quashing application without considering the contention of the appellant that he had resigned from the post of the Director of the Company prior to the issuance of the cheques and the effect thereof in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court in the fresh application under Section 482 CrPC initially was therefore satisfied to issue notice in the matter after noticing the Form 32 certificate. Naturally there was a difference between the earlier application and the subsequent one, inasmuch as the statutory Form 32 did not fall for consideration by the Court earlier. The factum of resignation is not in dispute between the parties. The subsequent application, strictly speaking, therefore cannot be said to a repeat application squarely on the same facts and circumstances. 8. In Mohan Singh [Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156 : AIR 1975 SC 1002 ], it was held that a successive application under Section 482 CrPC under changed circumstances was maintainable and the dismissal of the earlier application was no bar to the same, observing : (SCC pp. In Mohan Singh [Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156 : AIR 1975 SC 1002 ], it was held that a successive application under Section 482 CrPC under changed circumstances was maintainable and the dismissal of the earlier application was no bar to the same, observing : (SCC pp. 709-10, para 2) “2. … Here, the situation is wholly different. The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one-and-a-half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that Respondents 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances, it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one-and-a-half years.” The case in the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court pertains to an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 wherein a second quash petition was filed on the ground that on earlier occasion, it does not appear that Form-32 was brought on record in support of resignation of the Director. The High Court dismissed the quash petition without considering the contention of the appellant that he resigned from the post of the Director of the company prior to the issuance of the cheques in question. On the said ground, the Hon’ble Apex Court had come to the conclusion that when there is change in circumstances, the second application for quashing of the complaint is maintainable. 10. In the case on hand, the documents supplied by the petitioners herein are disputed documents. The same cannot be taken as a gospel truth. The documents produced by the petitioners herein are to be marked and confronted in the trial. In the absence of following the procedure contemplated as per the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this Court would not be in a position to take the documents on file and pass an order to that extent. The documents supplied by the petitioners herein are not public documents, whereas, in the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anil Khandkiwala v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another case (2 supra), the document produced in the said case was Form 32, which is a public document and the same is not disputed by both the parties thereto. In the case on hand, there is a dispute with regard to the abovesaid documents and unless and until the same are marked, the authenticity of the documents cannot be proved. 11. In Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor case (1 supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that the material relied upon by the petitioners has to be sound, reasonable and indubitable. The documents, on which the petitioners are relying, should be sterling and of impeccable quality. It is also observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that where the material relied upon by the petitioners were not refuted by the prosecution/complainant and the material is to be of such a nature where it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant. 12. In the case on hand, the documents relied on by the petitioners are to be adjudicated by marking the same before the trial Court in the course of trial. There is a procedure contemplated under the Code for marking the documents. Unless and until those steps are being adhered to, this Court would not be in a position to judge basing on the material placed by the petitioners herein. 13. Going by the averments contained in the charge sheet, there are accusations which have to be decided in the course of trial. Since this Court has already formed an opinion and passed order to that extent in the earlier Criminal Petition, the present application for quashing the self-same proceedings filed by the petitioners would amount to abuse of process of Court. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned proceedings. 14. The Criminal Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, including I.A.No.1 of 2022, in the Criminal Petition shall stand closed.