JUDGMENT : RAJENDRA M.SAREEN, J. 1. Present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the appellant - State of Gujarat under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 20/06/1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.7, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No.302 of 1991 acquitting the respondent - original accused from the offence punishable under sections 307 of Indian Penal Code and under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 2. The case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is as under:- Unarmed Police Constable Ganpatsinh Fatehsinh Parmar and Ramanbhai Devjibhai attached to Bapunagar Police Station were on patrolling duty on 11/12/1990 near Navi Masjid, Indira Garibnagar area. They were on scooter which was driven by said Ganpatsinh. While they were passing near Navi Masjid, somebody hurt Ramanbhai on his back with knife. As he shouted, Ganpatsinh got down from his scooter and followed the person who caused injury to Ramanbhai. That person was caught by him along with Rampuri knife. On being asked, he disclosed his name as Roshanbhai Fakirbhai Shaikh of Rakhiyal, Ahmedabad. The said accused Roshanbhai was brought by both of them to Bapunagar Police Station and Ramanbhai was sent to Shardaben hospital for having treatment. FIR was lodged by said Ganpatsinh and offence was registered as CR.No.I-421 of 1990 before the Bapunagar Police station. 3. On the basis of the said complaint, investigation was started, panchnama of the condition of the accused along with the knife and panchnama in respect to blood sustained clothes of the injured were prepared. Panchnama of the scene of offence was drawn. Statements of the injured Ramanbhai and others were recorded. Weapons and clothes were forwarded to FSL for scientific examination After through investigation, as there was sufficient evidence against the respondent - accused, Chargesheet was filed before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. As the offence committed by the accused was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, as per the provisions of Section 209 of Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge was pleased to commit the case to the Court of Sessions and the case was transferred and placed for trial in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, which has been numbered as Sessions Case No.302 of 1991. Thereafter, Charge was framed against the accused for the offence punishable under section 307 of Indian Penal Code and under section 135 of Bombay Police Act. The accused pleaded not guilty to the Charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, therefore, laid evidence, oral as well as documentary. After the evidence was over, Further Statement of the respondent - accused was recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and arguments were heard. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was pleased to acquit the respondent accused for the charges levelled against him. Hence, the appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred the present Criminal Appeal challenging the judgment and order of acquittal. 4. Heard Ms.C.M. Shah, learned APP for the State and Mr.Pratik Barot, learned advocate for the respondent accused. 5. Ms.C.M. Shah, learned APP for the appellant State has vehemently argued that the Sessions Judge has wrongly acquitted the accused of the offences for which he was charged and the acquittal order is against the law and evidence on record. There is no proper appreciation of evidence done by the trial court. She has further argued that the Sessions Judge has committed a grave error in not believing the deposition of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, more particularly Ganpatsinh and injured Raman, though they have supported the case of the prosecution and evidence adduced by the prosecution. It is further submitted that the Sessions Judge has erred in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. It is further argued that the prosecution has proved that the respondent accused has committed offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code and under section 135 of Bombay Police Act. It is further submitted that Sessions Judge has acquitted the respondent merely on some minor contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is further argued that the Sessions Judge has erred in not believing the evidence of the investigating officer and complainant who had no reason to implicate the accused falsely in the case. It is further argued that the offence punishable under section 307 of Indian Penal Code and under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, is made out, however, the same is not believed by the Sessions Judge. It is further argued that the offence punishable under section 307 of Indian Penal Code and under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, is made out, however, the same is not believed by the Sessions Judge. It is further argued that though the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, the Sessions Judge erroneously not believed their evidence and acquitted the accused. It is further argued that the Sessions Court has erroneously held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. She has submitted that as such, the trial court has erred in not appreciating the evidence on record in its true spirit and has given wrongly acquittal to the respondent accused which cannot sustain at the scrutiny of this Court and has requested to allow the present appeal. 6. Mr.Pratik Barot, learned advocate for the respondent has submitted that the accused, as per the case of the prosecution, is alleged to have inflicted injury over the back portion of the injured and it is found to be single injury over the back side of the chest. As per the evidence of the Doctor and as per the opinion of the Doctor, the injury is simple injury in nature and therefore, charge under section 307 is misconceived. It is further submitted that injured Ramanbhai as per his evidence had known to the assailant when he was taken to the police station but he has not named the assailant in the history before the Doctor and stated to be unidentified person. There was no reason for non-disclosure of the assailant when he was knowing the assailant prior to taking him to the hospital. This aspect creates doubt upon the action of the police to implicate an unidentified person as an accused and naming him as present respondent. It is further submitted that the evidence of injured witness Ramanbhai and first informant Ganpatbhai, who are the main witnesses as per the case of the prosecution, does not inspire confidence. It is further submitted that as per the evidence of the injured witness Ramanbhai and as per his cross-examination, after the injury was inflicted, he screamed and scooter was stopped and the accused was napped and as such, he being pillion rider has not seen the present respondent accused as it was night and darkness at the scene of offence. It is further submitted that as per the evidence of the injured witness Ramanbhai and as per his cross-examination, after the injury was inflicted, he screamed and scooter was stopped and the accused was napped and as such, he being pillion rider has not seen the present respondent accused as it was night and darkness at the scene of offence. In fact, the assailant, who inflicted injury, was in process of running. Therefore, the say of the Ramanbhai that he had seen the respondent accused does not inspsire any confidence. It is further submitted that the complainant has also not seen the respondent accused inflicting injuries and after the injured screamed, he came to know that somebody inflicted injury and he came to action and napped the accused. As such it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent accused alone has inflicted injury. It is further submitted that the place of incident is crowded locality and public having mosque and having SRP Point 20 to 25 feet away from the place of incident. There are tea lorry, Pan lorry on the road. Therefore, naturally there must be many public. However, not a single witness has been examined. It is further submitted that as per the case of the prosecution, the complainant and injured were on patrolling wearing police uniform at the time of incident. But it has come on record that no police uniform of the injured has been recovered and instead of police uniform, shirt has been recovered, which creates doubt about the veracity of the incident. It is further submitted that so far as recovery of the muddamal knife is concerned, the same cannot be said to be recovery because Panch Witness PW No.3 of recovery panchnama has stated that when he was called by police and he reached at the police station, knife was lying on the table. It has also come on record that the panch was having access to Bapunagar Police Station for variety of reasons and he was helping the police on and often. As such, the panch witness is not independent witness and trustworthy and no reliance can be placed on the evidence of such witness. It is further submitted that the blood on the weapon is not conclusive proof as the panch of recovery of muddamal knife is under cloud and doubt. As such, the panch witness is not independent witness and trustworthy and no reliance can be placed on the evidence of such witness. It is further submitted that the blood on the weapon is not conclusive proof as the panch of recovery of muddamal knife is under cloud and doubt. As such, the FSL Report is also not conclusively supporting the case of the prosecution. It is submitted that considering the totality of the evidence on record, there is absence of substantive piece of evidence and also corroborative piece of evidence, the evidence of the prosecution is under shadow and doubt and there is no cogent evidence to bring home the guilt of the respondent accused. Mr.Barot, learned advocate has further submitted that there is hardly any substance in the submissions of learned APP. There is no admissible evidence on record connecting the respondent with the commission of the offence. There are material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. No error or illegality has been committed by the trial court in acquitting the respondent. He has requested to dismiss the present appeal. 7. Heard the leaned advocates for the respective parties at length and perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court as well as the entire record and proceedings. 8. It would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in Acquittal Appeals. It is well settled by is catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full Power to review, reappreciate and consider the Evidence upon which the Order of Acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of Acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the Accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the Fundamental Principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of Law. Secondly, the Accused having secured his Acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 9. We have gone through the entire record and proceedings. We have re-appreciated the evidence on record. On re-appreciation of the evidence, it appears that as per the case of the complainant, on 11/10/1990 at about 20- 45 hours Ganpatsinh Fatesinh and Ramanbhai were patrolling in Bapunagar Area. 9. We have gone through the entire record and proceedings. We have re-appreciated the evidence on record. On re-appreciation of the evidence, it appears that as per the case of the complainant, on 11/10/1990 at about 20- 45 hours Ganpatsinh Fatesinh and Ramanbhai were patrolling in Bapunagar Area. They were on scooter. Ramanbhai was pillion rider. At about 20-45 hours, while they were near New Masjid, they had to slow down scooter due to kachcha road. At that relevant time, Ramanbhai told to Ganpatsinh that he was hurt on his back and therefore, Ganpatsinh threw his scooter and ran after the assailant (accused). Ganpatsinh caught the assailant with Rampuri knife and he was taken to Bapunagar Police Station. Injured police constable Ramanbhai was bleeding and he went to Shardaben hospital along with Ramanbhai after handing over the accused to police station. On being asked, the accused disclosed his name. 10. The prosecution has examined complainant Ganpatsinh Fatesinh PW No.1 at Ex.8 and injured Ramanbhai Davjibhai PW No.2 Ex.9. From their evidence, the following aspects are admitted :- The place of incident i.e. Navi Masjid is on the main road and cross road and there is SRP Point at the distance of 25' to 30' feet from the Navi Masjid. There was no curfew in Navi Masjid area. There was communal riot in the city when the incident occurred. During the night there were few people used to move. Navi Masjid is surrounded by population of Muslim community and opposite to Masjid, there is population of Hindu community. It was darkness when the incident occurred. 11. It is alleged that the accused inflicted a blow with Rampuri knife on the back of injured witness Ramanbhai. However, Dr.N.D. Panchotiya PW No.6 Ex.23, who treated the Ramanbhai, has deposed in his evidence that no injury or fracture was seen from X-ray. According to him the injury was simple and the patient was conscious all the time. He specifically stated that injury is possible with pointed double edged weapon. He has stated that the injury is possible by muddamal knife. However, in cross examination he has stated that the injury of both ends had sharp edges. After seeing muddamal article No.3 knife, he deposed that one side of the blade is sharp and other side is blunt. He further deposed that the injury caused to the patient cannot be caused by said muddamal knife. However, in cross examination he has stated that the injury of both ends had sharp edges. After seeing muddamal article No.3 knife, he deposed that one side of the blade is sharp and other side is blunt. He further deposed that the injury caused to the patient cannot be caused by said muddamal knife. He deposed that the injury can be caused by Gupti. It is pertinent to note that the muddamal weapon in the present case is knife. Gupti and knife both are different weapons. He admitted that such injury is possible if a person is pillion rider on scooter and accidentally fell down and got struck dashed with sharp tinsheet or portion of scooter. 12. The prosecution has examined complainant Ganpatsinh Fatesinh PW No.1 at Ex.8 and injured Ramanbhai Davjibhai PW No.2 Ex.9, whose evidence suffer from contradictions and improvements. There is delay in filing FIR and same is material considering the nature of incident and witnesses involved. It does suggest that the case has been foisted upon the accused. According to Dr.Nayan Panchotiya PW No.6 Ex.23, the injured police constable Ramanbhai had gone to the hospital and gave history that he was assaulted by some unknown person, however, according to the prosecution case, complainant Ganpatbhai and injured Ramanbhai could know the name of assailant - accused on the spot from where he was caught along with knife. If the assailant was present accused, naturally Ramanbhai would have disclosed his name before the Doctor Nayan Panchotiya. 13. There is contradictory statement between the injured Ramanbhai and Investigating officer Shri Arjunsinh Dabhi PW No.5 Ex.15 with respect to the date and time of recording of statement of Ramanbhai. It has come on record that just adjacent to scene of offence, there was SRP Point and at the relevant time, there was no curfew in the area. However, no independent witness has been examined nor statement of independent witness has been recorded by the investigating officer. Eye witness Shankarbhai who took the injured to the hospital has not been examined. Both the panchas are thickly connected to Bapunagar Police Station and therefore, they are not trustworthy and no reliance can be placed on their evidence. As such, there is no eye witness to the incident. Eye witness Shankarbhai who took the injured to the hospital has not been examined. Both the panchas are thickly connected to Bapunagar Police Station and therefore, they are not trustworthy and no reliance can be placed on their evidence. As such, there is no eye witness to the incident. The defence of the accused is that the accused was white-wash labourer and returning from his job was arrested by police in the alleged incident due to communal riots prevailing in the area at the relevant time. No investigation has been carried out by the investigating officer to find out the veracity of the defence of the accused and in light of no investigation by the investigating officer and the prevailing circumstances at the time of incident, the defence of the accused seems to be genuine. 14. The accused has been charged for the offence u/s 307 of Indian Penal Code but as per the evidence of the Doctor and Injury Certificate Ex.24, the injury is simple and possible by falling from the scooter. As per the Doctor, the injury is not possible by muddamal knife but possible by Gupti. Hence also no case is made out u/s 307 of IPC. 15. According to the injured eye witness Ramanbhai, who was a pillion rider on scooter at the relevant time, had not seen the accused while he inflicted a knife blow. Identical case is with Ganpatbhai. According to both the witnesses, both constables were in their police uniform while they were on patrolling duty at the relevant time. However, muddamal article No.1 bushirt is not a shirt of police uniform. As such it is a civil dress. If concession is given to such lapse of memory, according to police constable Ganpatsinh he accompanied injured police constable Ramanbhai on way to hospital. His FIR Ex.16 speaks otherwise, that as there was bleeding injured Ramanbhai was sent to hospital in the company of police constable Shankerbhai Revabhai for having treatment. The same has been reiterated by investigating officer Mr.Dabhi. As stated above, according to prosecution, accused was caught red-handed along with knife and on being interrogated, he disclosed his name. Thus, it can be said that accused had revealed his name in presence of both the witnesses at the place of offence itself, however, the injured Ramanbhai, who had gone to the hospital had not given name of the accused at the hospital. Thus, it can be said that accused had revealed his name in presence of both the witnesses at the place of offence itself, however, the injured Ramanbhai, who had gone to the hospital had not given name of the accused at the hospital. 16. As observed by the Sessions Court, even looking to the age of 18 to 19 years and physical structure of accused, it creates doubt as to whether he could plunge knife into the police constable who was accompanied by another police constable and as alleged, and when both the police officers were in police uniform. 17. The evidence of the prosecution is not cogent and convincing. There are material discrepancy on the vital point is not expected from the police constables. Generally, injured witness is natural witness. But in the case on hand, the injured witness Ramanbhai had not seen the accused while inflicting blow. Likewise complainant has also not seen the accused at the relevant time. He could know only while he was informed by injured that somebody had caused him injury on his back. 18. Anil Ambalal Patel, Panch Ex.12 witness of recovery of panchnama of muddamal weapon - knife has stated that panchnama was prepared in his presence and he put his signature on the slip Ex.11. He is social worker and Ward President of BJP and he used to attend the police station and hence no reliance can be placed on his evidence also. 19. Considering the entire evidence on record oral as well as documentary, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused by leading cogent and convincing evidence. The judgment delivered by the Sessions Judge is sound on the aspect of law and facts. The evidence brought on record by the prosecution before the trial court has been rightly appreciated by the trial court. No apparent error on the face of the record is found from the judgment. The judgment does not suffer any material defect or cannot be said to be contrary to the evidence recorded. 20. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. 20. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- "6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : "8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: 27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." "9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the noninterference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: "36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law." 21. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 22. Scope of appeal against acquittal is well laid down in case of Chandrappa and ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it was observed: "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 23. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 23. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 24. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present Criminal Appeal deserve to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.