ORDER : 1. In wake of instant surge in COVID-19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in Court, for the safety of all concerned. 2. The present revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 28.02.2020 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar in Appeal No.10/2020 (CIS No.10/2020) whereby the said court has rejected and appeal and affirmed the order dated 08.01.2020 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar in Criminal Original Case No.945/2012 (CIS No.1755/2014) convicting and sentencing the petitioner for the offence under Section 279 & 304-A of IPC as under : Under Section 279 IPC 01 Month S.I. and a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo 07 days S.I. Under Section 304-A IPC Two years’ S.I. and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo One Month S.I. 3. All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the complainant jointly pray that they have entered into a compromise, as the matter pertains to an accidental death. Learned counsel for the parties referred to the following judgment :- Ramgopal & Anr. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 (4) Crimes 17 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable Under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the Accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the Accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. Having appraised the afore-stated para-meters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers Under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that: Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature; Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest; Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the Appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed; Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s); Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties; Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill-will and have no vengeance against each other; and Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more so looking at their present age.” 5. M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs. C.B.I. Bengaluru (2020) 2 SCC 768 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN REGARD TO AN APPLICATION SEEKING DISCHARGE This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz., P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 398 and discern the following principles: i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the Accused. ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court. iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the Accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, "cannot show that the Accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial". v. It is open to the Accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. vii. vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the Accused. The defence of the Accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the Accused seeks to be discharged Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (See State of J & K v. Sudershan Chakkar and Anr. AIR 1995 SC 1954 ). The expression, "the record of the case", used in Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the Accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the Accused is to be confined to the material produced by the Police (See State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi MANU/ SC/1010/2004 : AIR 2005 SC 359 ).” 6. The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kanha (2019) 3 SCC 605 wherein the following was observed:- “Several judgments of this Court have interpreted Section 307 of the Penal Code. In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28 , this Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted: 9. …To justify a conviction under this Section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the Accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the Accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes a distinction between an act of the Accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. This position in law was followed by subsequent benches of this Court. In State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554 , this Court held thus: 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction Under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the Accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an Accused charged Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366 , this Court held that to establish the commission of an offence Under Section 307, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted: 12. For the purpose of conviction Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the Accused. For the purpose of conviction Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the Accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the Accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the Accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the Accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the Accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the Accused at the time of the incident, motive of the Accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. The above judgments of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence Under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the Accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent. 7. Rambabu Vs. State of M.P. 2019 SCC OnLine MP 1554, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “In the present case, the allegations against the present appellant are that he had given a lathi blow on the head of the victim. Head is, undisputedly, a vital part of the body and any injury to the said part of the body may result in death of the victim. Head is, undisputedly, a vital part of the body and any injury to the said part of the body may result in death of the victim. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Harjeet Singh, passed on 19 February, 2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 1190 of 2009 has held as under: — 5.6 Section 307 uses the term “hurt” which has been explained in Section 319, I.P.C.; and not “grievous hurt” within the meaning of Section 320 I.P.C. If a person causes hurt with the intention or knowledge that he may cause death, it would attract Section 307. This Court in R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27 held that: “…The first blow was on a vital part, that is on the temporal region. Even though other blows were on non vital parts, that does not take away the rigor of Section 307 IPC ……. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Sections makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section.” (emphasis supplied) If the assailant acts with the intention or knowledge that such action might cause death, and hurt is caused, then the provisions of Section 307 I.P.C. would be applicable. There is no requirement for the injury to be on a “vital part” of the body, merely causing ‘hurt’ is sufficient to attract S. 307 I.P.C.[ State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mohan, (2013) 14 SCC 116 ] This Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 held that: “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the act done by the accused. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given etc.” (emphasis supplied). 8. Learned Public Prosecutor has nothing to say on the compromise. This Court, while taking into consideration the aforesaid precedent law, is inclined to accept the compromise at this stage. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the nature of the offence, the compromise is accepted. 9. In view of the above and in light of the aforequoted judgment, the present revision petition is allowed and order dated 08.01.2020 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar and order dated 28.02.2020 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly.