JUDGMENT : S.K. MISHRA, J. 1. The appellant, having been convicted by the learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Fast Track Court/Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital under Sections 376(2)(i), 506 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “Penal Code” for brevity), and Section 5(m)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the “POCSO Act” for brevity), has assailed his conviction. He has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twelve years for the offence under Section 376(2)(i) of the Penal Code, and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo two months’ additional simple imprisonment. He has further been sentenced to undergo two years’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 506 of the Penal Code, and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo two months’ additional simple imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that the father of the victim (name withheld) presented a report before the Revenue Officer, Patti Patliya, District Nainital on 11.02.2015 that, after coming back from the school, his daughter went to the forest in the evening at about 04:00 P.M. along with a girl residing in her neighbour for collection of the firewood. The F.I.R. further reveals that when they were going on the road leading to Village Nai, a boy came and pointed a gun at the victim girl and forcefully committed rape upon her. As a result of the incident, the victim girl became senseless. The appellant gave threat to the victim girl and her companion that he will commit their murder if this fact is revealed before anybody. 3. The complainant further mentioned in the F.I.R. that the said boy belongs to Village Bhumka and is aged about 20-28 years. After the incident, the victim girl narrated this incident before the complainant and his wife. Thereafter, the F.I.R. has been lodged. After receipt of the F.I.R. a criminal case was registered in the Mukteshwar Police Station, and investigation of the case was taken up by the Investigating Officer. The statements of the complainant and other witnesses, including the victim girl and her companion, were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Code” for brevity). The statements of the complainant and other witnesses, including the victim girl and her companion, were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Code” for brevity). The culprit was identified by the Investigating Officer and he was arrested and brought to the Court. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted for the aforesaid offences. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined ten witnesses. PW-7 (name withheld) is the prosecutrix. PW-6 (also name withheld) is the eyewitness to the occurrence, who was accompanying the prosecutrix to the forest for collection of the firewood. PW-1 (name withheld) is the father of the prosecutrix as well as the complainant in this case. Rest of the witnesses are either official witnesses or formal witnesses, including the Investigating Officer and the Doctor, who has examined the victim girl. 5. The learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Fast Track Court/Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital, mainly relying upon the evidence of the prosecutrix which is supported by PW-6, has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, proceeded to convict the appellant for the offences as mentioned above. However, while inflicting sentence, the learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Fast Track Court/Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital, by resorting to Section 42 of the POCSO Act, sentenced the appellant under Section 376(2)(i) of the Penal Code, as it prescribed a higher punishment than the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act as mentioned earlier in this case. 6. In assailing the findings of fact recorded by the learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Fast Track Court/Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital, Ms. Manisha Bhandari, the learned counsel for the appellant, would argue that the case of the prosecution has to be viewed to be suspicious for the following reasons: (i) That in the body of the statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code the date is 20.02.2015, whereas, the learned Magistrate has signed it as 20.12.2015. (ii) The medical evidence in this case do not support the case of the prosecution as the Doctor, examining the victim girl, did not find any injury either on her body or on her private parts, and that he gave a definite opinion that the hymen of the victim girl was intact. (ii) The medical evidence in this case do not support the case of the prosecution as the Doctor, examining the victim girl, did not find any injury either on her body or on her private parts, and that he gave a definite opinion that the hymen of the victim girl was intact. (iii) The identification of the appellant in this case is suspicious in view of the fact that three different Investigating Officers have stated before the Court three different sources of identification of the appellant, and that no Test Identification Parade was conducted by the Investigating Agency to confirm the identity of the appellant. (iv) There is no scientific corroboration of the FSL report in the sense that the chemical report submitted by the State Forensic Science Laboratory did not support the case of the prosecution. 7. Mr. J.S. Virk, the learned Deputy Advocate General, on the other hand, would argue that whatever may be the mistakes or errors committed by the Investigating Officer, it cannot be given much weightage as the prosecutrix has supported the case of the prosecution, and there is no contradiction in her statement. Moreover, her statement is corroborated in this case by another eye-witness, who is also a young girl who was accompanying the prosecutrix to the forest to collect the firewood. The learned Deputy Advocate General would, therefore, argue that there is no merit in this Criminal Jail Appeal. Hence, the same is liable to be dismissed. 8. A reference to the evidence of victim girl (PW-7) would reveal that, after stating about her return from the school, she stated that she went to the forest for collection of the firewood. At that time, a boy came and committed rape upon her. This statement finds corroboration from PW-6, who was accompanying the victim girl at the time of the occurrence. We have carefully examined the evidences of PW-6 and PW-7. We do not find any substantial contradictions with respect to their previous statement recorded under Section 161 and 164 of the Code. This statement finds corroboration from PW-6, who was accompanying the victim girl at the time of the occurrence. We have carefully examined the evidences of PW-6 and PW-7. We do not find any substantial contradictions with respect to their previous statement recorded under Section 161 and 164 of the Code. In appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, as corroborated by her friend PW-6, we take into consideration the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said that in the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held, is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyze the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the western world. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that it is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian society, and its profile. 9. In sum and substance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid reported case, has held that the solitary statement of a victim girl of sexual assault, even without corroboration, can be accepted and form the basis of conviction of the accused for committing the offences alleged. 10. 9. In sum and substance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid reported case, has held that the solitary statement of a victim girl of sexual assault, even without corroboration, can be accepted and form the basis of conviction of the accused for committing the offences alleged. 10. In this case, there is an independent corroboration in the shape of testimony of PW-6. It is apparent from the records that the dates mentioned in the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code by the learned Magistrate reveals that the statement has been recorded on 20.02.2015, but the learned Magistrate has signed and put the date 20.12.2015. But, this fact itself will not make the case of the prosecution suspicious. Even if we ignore the previous statements, then also, there is enough material on record to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 11. When an eye-witness has stated in favour of the prosecution that the appellant committed rape upon the victim girl, the medical evidence may not be of much importance as, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the evidence of a Doctor is only an opinion and it cannot outweigh the testimony of two eyewitnesses, one being the victim itself and the other being her friend, who was present at the spot when the offence was being committed. So, keeping in view this aspect of the case, we are of the opinion that even if the medical as well as the forensic report did not support the case of the prosecution, then also there is enough material on record in the shape of testimony of the two eye-witnesses to uphold the conviction. 12. Moreover, the testimony of the victim girl received some corroboration from the report of the SFSL in the sense that the semen stains were found on the salwar and the vulva of the victim. Thus, it is clear that the victim girl has been raped and when she stated before the Court that the appellant committed the rape, there is no plausible reason to disbelieve her, and to upset the judgment of conviction. 13. As far as the identity of the appellant is concerned, it is true that no Test Identification Parade has been conducted in this case. 13. As far as the identity of the appellant is concerned, it is true that no Test Identification Parade has been conducted in this case. But, it is well known that a victim of sexual assault can never forget the face of the rapist. In other words, the woman, who has been raped, can never forget the face of the man, who ravished her. This being the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence, we are of the opinion that even if Test Identification Parade has not been conducted in this case, keeping in view the facts of the case, the same is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, and on that ground, the judgment of conviction cannot be upset disbelieving the evidences of PW-6 and PW-7. 14. The other aspect raised by Ms. Manisha Bhandari, the learned counsel, is that on three different occasions, three different Police Officers have stated about three different sources of identification of the appellant. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the identification of the accused in the Court is a substantive piece of evidence. Earlier identification in a Test Identification Parade by the Investigating Officer is a part of the investigation and it will not rule the roost. The ultimate decision in a criminal case rests on the shoulder of the Court, and it cannot be held that the investigation is the sole probity in determining a criminal case. 15. In that view of the matter, we find that, though the arguments of Ms. Manish Bhandari, the learned counsel, are very attractive, it does not hold any water. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that this appeal sans any merit and, therefore, it should be dismissed. 16. Alternatively, it is argued by Ms. Manisha Bhandari, the learned counsel, that as the law stood after the amendment of 2013, but before the amendment of 2018, the offence under Section 376(2)(i) of the Penal Code was punishable with a minimum punishment of ten years and a maximum punishment of imprisonment for life. The learned counsel would argue that the appellant, at the time of commission of the offence, was only twenty-two years old and, in the meantime, he has already undergone more than seven years’ imprisonment. The learned counsel would argue that the appellant, at the time of commission of the offence, was only twenty-two years old and, in the meantime, he has already undergone more than seven years’ imprisonment. She would also point out that there is no criminal antecedent against the appellant and no adverse report regarding his behavior has been received by this Court; the appellant belongs to a very humble walk of life and that he never had enough resources to afford a lawyer of his own and this Appeal is also defended by an Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. Therefore, the learned counsel would argue that this Court be pleased to direct this reduction of sentence to the period already undergone. 17. However, we find that the minimum sentence for the offence under Section 376(2)(i) of the Penal Code, as it stood at the time of the occurrence, is ten years along with fine. We are of the opinion that this is a fit case to reduce the sentence of twelve years rigorous imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment. 18. Hence, this Criminal Jail Appeal is dismissed with a modification of sentence. The sentence of twelve years rigorous imprisonment is, hereby, reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment. Keeping in view the financial condition of the appellant and the fact that he belongs to a very humble walk of life, we are not inclined to impose any fine. The fine imposed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Fast Track Court/Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital for both the offences under Section 376(2)(i) and Section 506 of the Penal Code is, hereby set-aside. We may also record here that the appellant has not been given any separate sentence for the offence committed under the POCSO Act. Sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 376(2)(i) of the Penal Code and two years’ rigorous punishment under Section 506 of the Penal Code, would run concurrently. 19. With the aforesaid modification, this Criminal Jail Appeal is, hereby, dismissed. 20. In sequel thereto, all pending applications also stand disposed of. 21. Trial Court Records be sent back forthwith.