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2022 DIGILAW 1053 (JHR)

Raska Tudu v. Vitiyo Soren W/o Late Shyam Murmu

2022-08-22

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

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JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 22.05.2009 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Rajmahal, in Title Appeal No. 24 of 2007 by which in the judgment of reversal, the learned first appellate court has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court being the Court of Sub-Judge II, Rajmahal in Title Suit No. 41 of 2001. 3. The case of the plaintiffs in brief is that the plaintiffs are the heirs and successors of Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu. They also admitted that Poma Tudu is the daughter of recorded tenant-Huka Tudu. The further case of the plaintiff is that Poma Tudu was given in marriage with Sufal Soren in ordinary form of marriage. The daughter of Poma Tudu namely Mongli Soren was also given in marriage in ordinary form of marriage. Out of the two marriages of Mongli Soren, her first marriage was with Singrai Murmu and after his death she married with Bolai Murmu whom she married by way of “Lapang Marriage.” The plaintiff contended that in the last settlement before filing the suit, vide M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995, the suit land was illegally recorded in the name of defendant being the heir and successor of the recorded tenant-Huka Tudu. The defendant claimed title over the suit land on the basis of the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (A.S.O.) in M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant obtained the said order from the Assistant Settlement Officer in M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 fraudulently. Hence, the same is null and void under Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. The plaintiffs prayed for the following reliefs: (i) It be declared that the plaintiffs are the rightful owner and heir of Late Huka Tudu and defendant/first party is not the heir of Late Huka Tudu. (ii) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant/first party from claiming himself as lawful heir in the property of Late Huka Tudu. The plaintiffs prayed for the following reliefs: (i) It be declared that the plaintiffs are the rightful owner and heir of Late Huka Tudu and defendant/first party is not the heir of Late Huka Tudu. (ii) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant/first party from claiming himself as lawful heir in the property of Late Huka Tudu. (iii) Confirmation of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land and if the court finds that the defendant/first party is in possession or the defendant/first party comes in possession of the suit land then the possession of the same through court. 4. Perusal of the record reveals that after notice, the defendants appeared in the suit on 20.05.2002 but neither did immediately file the written statement nor prayed for time to file the written statement. On 13.06.2002, the suit was fixed for filing the written statement of the defendants but as the defendants did not file the written statement till 13.11.2002, hence, the defendants were debarred from filing the written statement but subsequently on 12.05.2004, the defendants filed the written statement but as the same was not moved, the written statement was kept in the record. The defendants were allowed to cross-examine the witnesses of the plaintiffs and from the cross-examination of the witnesses by the defendants, the claim of the defendants appeared to be that of Poma Tudu was the sister of the recorded tenant-Huka Tudu son of Lachhu Tudu. Poma Tudu married Sufal Soren in ‘Gharjamai’ form of marriage and thereafter she was blessed with two daughters namely Bihia Soren and Mongli Soren. Mongli Soren was married with Bolai Murmu and blessed with Shyam Murmu who is the defendant/first party in the suit. 5. In support of their case, the plaintiffs proved the documents which were marked Ext.1 to 4/d. Ext.4/b is the ‘purcha’ relating to the suit property which was earlier in the name of Huka Tudu son of Lacchu Tudu but in the same, the name of Huka Tudu son of Lachhu Tudu has been score cut and the name of Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu has been mentioned who is the father of the plaintiffs. Ext.3 is the Genealogical Certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Taljhari to the effect that the father of the plaintiffs Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu is the sole legal heir of Huka Tudu son of Lachhu Tudu and there is no other male heir or successor of Huka Tudu son of Lachhu Tudu. Ext.2 is the order of M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer, Dumka by which the name of the defendant Shyam Murmu has been inserted in the Khatiyan of the said Khata Number of the suit land and deleted the name of the father of the plaintiffs from the name of raiyat of the suit land on the basis of possession as well as oral testimony of the local persons. The plaintiffs after coming to know about the said order on 09.11.2000, filed the present suit. 6. Besides, the documentary evidence, the plaintiffs also examined four witnesses. 7. The learned trial court found that Ext.4/b shows that the plaintiffs are the descendants of Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu and the order of M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 discloses that the marriage of Mongli Soren occurred in the year 1945 and at that time, the recorded tenant Huka Tudu died and as such, the plaintiffs are the rightful owner of the suit property. The trial court further observed that the plaintiffs have proved that there is no proof in the record that the marriage of Poma Tudu was in ‘Gharjamai’ form of marriage but the trial court observed that only the male member is permissible to inherit the property as per Santhal customs and female is permissible to inherit the property only if her marriage is in the form of ‘Gharjamai’ and as Poma Tudu became widow and her daughter Mongli Soren has claimed marriage with the father of the defendant/first party-Shyam Murmu but there is no proof that Poma Tudu and Mongli Soren solemnized marriage in ‘Gharjamai’ form of marriage. Hence, the marriage of Mongli Soren in ‘Gharjamai’ form as claimed by her is against the customary law of Santhal according to which a widow cannot in any circumstance create a “Gharjamai.” 8. Hence, the marriage of Mongli Soren in ‘Gharjamai’ form as claimed by her is against the customary law of Santhal according to which a widow cannot in any circumstance create a “Gharjamai.” 8. The learned trial court further observed that as the Ext.2 supports the fact that marriage of Mongli Soren occurred after the death of Poma Tudu and went on to observe that the case of the plaintiffs got full proof which confirms that the plaintiffs are the rightful owner of the suit property being the legal heirs and successor of recorded tenant-Huka Tudu and the order of Assistant Settlement Officer, Dumka passed in M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 is illegal and nullity as the Assistant Settlement Officer has not considered the available important documents of the suit property such as original ‘purcha’ issued after settlements in the name of the father of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge-II, Rajmahal in Title Suit No. 41 of 2001, the defendant filed Title Appeal No. 24 of 2007 in the court of District Judge, Sahebganj but the same was ultimately heard and disposed of by the learned first appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree. 10. The learned first appellate court framed the following sole point for determination: “Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned court below is bad in law and is thus, liable to be set aside?” 11. The learned first appellate court made independent appreciation of the evidence in the record and considered that the PW-1 in his deposition admitted that the defendant is the son of Bolai Murmu and in Para-36, the PW-1 Raska Tudu who is the plaintiff has admitted that over the suit land, the house of defendant-Shyam Murmu is there and by the side of the house of Shyam Murmu a well has been dug by the Government. The PW-1 also admitted in Para-37 that the house of defendant-Shyam Murmu is on the suit land which was built by Huka Tudu in which the defendant Shyam Murmu resides and the PW-1 plaintiff also admitted that he has no house over the suit land. The PW-1 also admitted in Para-37 that the house of defendant-Shyam Murmu is on the suit land which was built by Huka Tudu in which the defendant Shyam Murmu resides and the PW-1 plaintiff also admitted that he has no house over the suit land. Thus, the first appellate court considered that the admission of the plaintiffs about the long and continuous possession of the defendant over the suit land and went on to observe that the same disproves the entire case of the plaintiffs. In view of the admission of the plaintiffs-PW-1 that the defendant has been in continuous and long possession of the suit land, there is no way the plaintiffs could have been entitled to the prayer for confirmation of possession and nowhere the plaintiff-PW-1 has stated that he has been dispossessed from the suit land. 12. The first appellate court considered the testimony of PW-1 in Para-11 that he has no house in the Mouza of the suit land and in Para-12, the PW-1 has stated that he does not know Lachchu Tudu who is the father of the original recorded tenant-Huka Tudu. Similarly, the first appellate court considered that the PW-2 Jami Murmu has stated in paragraph-7 that the suit land is in possession of the heirs of the Khatiyani raiyat. The first appellate court also considered that Ext.2 manifests very clearly that there was a litigation between the defendant and the father of the plaintiffs before the Assistant Settlement Officer vide M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 and consequently the said Order in M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995 was passed. The first appellate court also observed that Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu is the father of the plaintiffs and he has no connection with Huka Tudu son of Lachchu Tudu who is the original recorded tenant in the ‘parcha’ of the suit land. The first appellate court also observed that though there is no prayer for declaring the Ext.2 to be null and void, the trial court erred by giving relief much more than that has been sought for by the plaintiffs. 13. The first appellate court further observed that as no appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide Ext.2, the same has reached finality. 13. The first appellate court further observed that as no appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide Ext.2, the same has reached finality. The first appellate court next observed that the Ext.3 being the genealogical table issued by the Circle Officer, Taljhari to the effect that father of plaintiffs Bhuka Tudu son of Raska Tudu is the only legal heir and successor of recorded tenant-Late Huka Tudu son of Lachhu Tudu having based on the report of Halka Karmchari but neither the Halka Karmchari has been examined in the suit nor the Circle Officer has been examined as witness nor the report on the basis of which the Ext.3 has been prepared has having been brought on record hence the same is of not much consequence and went on to observe that the plaintiff has failed to prove his case. Therefore the first appellate court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge-II, Rajmahal in Title Suit No. 41 of 2004 and allowed the appeal. 14. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following three substantial questions of law were framed: (i) Whether long and continued possession of a party to a suit over the suit land is sufficient to disprove the claim of the title of other party? (ii) Whether the appellate court was right on relying upon the Exhibit 2, which in no uncertain term was held illegal and nullity by the trial court, without reversing such finding of the trial court that Exhibit 2 was illegal and nullity? (iii) Whether a court can grant a relief different from what has been prayed for in the plaint? 15. Mr. Gautam Kumar learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned first appellate court committed grave error of law by not considering the evidence in the record in its proper perspective and illegally reversed the finding of the trial court in regard to the ‘Gharjamai’ form of marriage of Poma Tudu. Hence, it is submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court be set aside. 16. Mr. Hence, it is submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court be set aside. 16. Mr. Din Dayal Saha learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and decree and submitted that there is no merit in the claim of the plaintiffs as the plaintiffs have no title and the only claim of the plaintiffs over the suit land is based on an entry made in the ‘parcha’ of the land made subsequent to the issue of the ‘parcha’ in favour of the ancestor of the defendant in the settlement operation which was subsequently revoked vide Annexure-2 and as there is no appeal against the same, the same has reached finality. It is further submitted by Mr. Saha that though the plaintiffs have pleaded that the Ext.2 was obtained fraudulently but the plaintiffs have failed to prove as to in what manner the fraud has been committed and in the absence of the details regarding the fraud, if any, committed by the defendant or his father and in the absence of any prayer to declare the Ext.2 to be null and void, the same cannot have been declared null and void by the learned trial court which has been rightly set at right by the first appellate court. It is further submitted by Mr. Saha that the trial court itself has committed an error as though it relied upon the contents of Ext.2 in the judgment but later on it went on to declare the same to be null and void in the same judgment which is an illegality. It is next submitted by Mr. Saha that as has been admitted by PW-1 being the plaintiff himself that the defendants have been in long continuous possession of the suit land and there is absolutely no pleading of the plaintiffs that the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court by just mentioning that the suit be and the same is decreed, without specifying as to whether the decree of confirmation of possession is made or recovery of possession is made or that as to which of the parties is in possession of the suit land is not sustainable in law and the same having rightly been dismissed by the first appellate court, this appeal, being without any merit, be dismissed. 17. 17. Having heard the submissions made at the bar and after carefully going through the materials in the record, coming to the first substantial question of law as to whether long and continued possession of a party to a suit over the suit land is sufficient to disprove the claim of the title of other party is concerned, the continuous possession of a party unless it is adverse to the real owner, can neither confer any title on a party merely on the basis of its possession nor can it extinguish the title of any other party. But the facts of this case go to show that the plaintiffs failed to establish their title by way of cogent evidences. The plaintiffs claim ownership over the suit land on the basis of a revenue entry made in the ‘parcha’ vide Ext.4/b in which entry in the original ‘parcha’ which earlier stood recorded in the name of Huka Tudu son of Lachchu Tudu has been corrected as Huka Tudu son of Raska Tudu apparently on the basis of Ext.3 which is a Genealogical Certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Taljhari on 09.06.1994 which entry was subsequently revoked by Ext.2 by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide his order dated 08.11.2000 passed in M.P. Case No. 140 of 1995. It is a settled principle of law that a person seeking relief on the ground of fraud has to plead the specific particulars of the fraud. General allegations of fraud are insufficient to establish fraud. In this case, the plaintiffs have taken the general plea that the Ext.2 was obtained fraudulently but it has not been mentioned as to in what exact fraudulent activity was committed by the father of the defendant or the defendant in passing of the said Ext.2. Further, there is no specific prayer made in the plaint by the plaintiffs as to who is in possession of the suit land. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land rather the defendant is in possession of the suit land. Further, there is no specific prayer made in the plaint by the plaintiffs as to who is in possession of the suit land. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land rather the defendant is in possession of the suit land. It is a settled principle of law that documents prepared for revenue collection can at best indicate the possession of a party over the land in question but certainly this cannot confer or extinguish any title of the parties, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Suraj Bhan vs. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 Para-9 of which reads as under: “9...........It is well settled that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court [vide Jattu Ram vs. Hakam Singh].......” At best it may show the possession of the person whose name has been entered in the revenue record but in this case the PW-1 the plaintiff has admitted in his deposition that the defendants are not in possession of the suit land, hence under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish his claim of ownership in respect of the suit land. The first substantial question of law as to whether long and continued possession of a party to a suit over the suit land is sufficient to disprove the claim of the title of other party is answered in the negative. 18. So far as the second substantial question of law as to whether the appellate court was right on relying upon Exhibit 2, which in no uncertain term was held illegal and nullity by the trial court, without reversing such finding of the trial court that Exhibit 2 was illegal and nullity, is concerned, the first appellate court has mentioned that the plaintiffs never made the prayer for declaring the Ext.2 to be null and void and the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so. Ext.2 is the order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction being the Assistant Settlement Officer. Undisputedly, the said order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide Ext.2 has not been challenged before the competent authority and the same has reached finality. The trial court had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide Ext.2. The plaintiff in the plaint made a bald averment that the Ext.2 is bad for having been obtained fraudulently but as already mentioned above no details of the fraudulent activity, if any, has been mentioned. Perusal of the judgment of the trial court reveals that trial court acted as if sitting on appeal over Ext.2, because it came to a conclusion on the basis of the pleadings and evidence in the suit put forth by the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are the rightful owner of the suit land. The Assistant Settlement Officer in Ext.2 has not decided the title of the defendant or his ancestors over the suit property. The trial court was vested with the power to decide the title of the plaintiff but certainly it does not have the power to sit in appeal over the Ext.2. The trial court has also committed an error by relying upon the contents of Ext.2 which was later part of the same judgment declared by it as null and void. Under such circumstances, this Court does not find any error on the part of the first appellate court on relying upon the Ext.2 and as there was no independent finding of the trial court based on any evidence as to why the Ext.2 is null and void and as no issues were framed by trial court in this respect either, so, certainly it was not incumbent upon the first appellate court to record any specific finding of reversing a particular observation made by the trial court that the Ext.2 is null and void. The second substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 19. So far as the third substantial question of law as to whether a court can grant a relief different from what has been prayed for in the plaint is concerned, it is a settled principle of law as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Messrs Trojan and Co. vs. Rm. 19. So far as the third substantial question of law as to whether a court can grant a relief different from what has been prayed for in the plaint is concerned, it is a settled principle of law as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Messrs Trojan and Co. vs. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 that it is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on the grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and that it is the case pleaded that has to be found. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that without an amendment of the plaint, a court is not entitled to grant the relief not asked for, when no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case; as has been observed in Para-22 of the said judgment which reads as under: “22...........It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.......” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the said principle of law in the case of Krishna Priya Ganguly vs. University of Lucknow and Others, AIR 1984 SC 186 and Om Prakash and Others vs. Ram Kumar and Others, AIR 1991 SC 409 by observing that a party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed in Para-4 which reads as under: “4...........A party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed, if the circumstances of the case are such that the granting of such relief would result in serious prejudice to the interested party and deprive him of the valuable rights under the statute.......” 21. Dealing with the same issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi and Others, AIR 2010 SC 475 held as under in Para-14: “14...........Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court, however, cannot ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.......” 22. In the case of Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. and Another vs. Sarat Chandra Rath and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2744 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in para-25 summarized the law that the court cannot grant a relief which has not been specifically prayed for by the parties which reads as under: “25. There is also considerable force in the contention of Sh. V.R. Reddy, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the appellants, that the High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for inasmuch as relief prayed for in the writ petition was only with regard to the adjustment of the personal pay against the incremental benefits. But as the case had been argued at length on the points decided by the High Court, we need not advert further on this aspect.” 23. In the case of Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal and Another, (2008) 17 SCC 491 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs-13 and 16: “13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief. 16. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Ram Sarup Gupta vs. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555 : AIR 1987 SC 1242 : (SCC pp. 562-563, Para 6) “6...........It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India also observed in the case of Akella Lalitha vs. Konda Hanumantha Rao and Another, 2022 SCC Online 928, paragraph-17 and 18 of which read as under: “17. In the case of Trojan and Co. Ltd. vs. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as under: “It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.” 18. In the case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234 : AIR 2010 SC 475 , held: “Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.” 25. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that a court cannot grant a relief that has not been prayed for in the plaint. 26. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that a court cannot grant a relief that has not been prayed for in the plaint. 26. In the case of Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan vs. Hari Prasad Bhuyan and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 197 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that an obligation is cast on the court that in the event of the suit having been decreed by the trial court, the judgment must specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being raised, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the later agrees with the former or in conformity therewith. Para-10 of the said judgment reads as under: “10. Certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be noticed. Order VII Rule 1 CPC requires the plaintiff to give sufficient particulars of the relief, which the plaintiff claims. Order XX requires a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons therefor. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter-alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid. Rules 9 to 19 of Order XX are illustrative of contents of decrees in certain specified categories of suits. The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obligation on the part of the author of the judgment to clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his opinion, has been found entitled to enable decree being framed in such a manner that it agrees with the judgment and specifies clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith. A self-contained decree drawn up in conformity with the judgment would exclude objections and complexities arising at the stage of execution.” 27. As it is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant is in possession of the suit land regarding which there is no averment in the pleadings but which has come during the evidence nor any specific pleading of the plaintiffs that they are in possession of the suit land. So, it was incumbent upon the trial court to specifically give a determination as to whether the plaintiffs or the defendant is in possession of the suit land and in case the defendant was found to be in possession of the suit land and the plaintiffs were having title or ownership, the trial court could have passed the decree for recovery of possession. But having not done so, the judgment of the trial court is also not proper. The third substantial question of law is answered in the negative that a court cannot grant a relief different from what has been prayed for in the plaint. 28. In view of the answers given to the three substantial questions of law, this Court has no hesitation in holding that this appeal, has no merit and accordingly the same is dismissed but under the circumstances without any cost. 29. Let a copy of this judgment along with the lower court records be sent back to the learned concerned courts below forthwith.