JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Since common issues are involved in both these writ applications; as such both are heard together and disposed of with this common order. 2. The respective petitioners of both the writ petitions have prayed for quashing of charge-sheet dated 30.09.2013 (in both these writ applications) issued by Project Officer-cum-Disciplinary Authority and also for quashing and setting aside the order of removal from service dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure-8 in both these writ applications). The petitioners have further prayed for quashing and setting aside the respective appellate orders being order dated 15.06.2015 (Annexure-10 in W.P. (S) No. 5875 of 2015) and order dated 11.06.2015 (Annedure-10 in W.P. (S) No. 5874 of 2015). The respective petitioners have also prayed for their re-instatement after quashing of the order of removal with full back wages. 3. The facts of both the writ petitions are similar, as such, for brevity facts of W.P. (S) No. 5875 of 2015 is being referred in this order. A charge-sheet was issued under the signature of Project Officer, Kargali Washery, B&K Area, CCL alleging therein that petitioner being the dealing clerk of sales department issued loading slips in bulk to the DO holders and allowed to lift the coal rejects of Kargali Washery in huge quantity without being billed. The petitioner also failed to maintain record for issuance of loading slips and further failed to reconcile records of about 4150 MT of coal rejects valuing Rs. 85 lakh approx. Similar charges were also levelled against the petitioner of W.P. (S) No. 5874 of 2015. Pursuant to the aforesaid charge-sheet, both the petitioners replied vide Annexure-2; thereafter, enquiry officer was appointed. It is the case of the petitioners that on the same set of facts charge-sheet was earlier issued but was withdrawn subsequently (Annexure-4-B). The enquiry officer held the respective petitioners guilty and submitted report to the disciplinary authority; thereafter the second show cause notice was issued to the respective petitioners to which they duly replied. Finally, the dismissal order in respect of both the petitioners were issued and they were terminated from service. Pursuant to the termination order, respective petitioners filed appeal before the appellate authority which was also dismissed. 4. Mr. Finally, the dismissal order in respect of both the petitioners were issued and they were terminated from service. Pursuant to the termination order, respective petitioners filed appeal before the appellate authority which was also dismissed. 4. Mr. Harsh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions, apart from raising the question on jurisdictional issue with regard to competence of the disciplinary authority, had also assailed the termination order as well as the appellate order on the ground of violation of cardinal principle of natural justice. Learned counsel contended that the charge-sheet which has been issued on the basis of one investigation, however, the investigation report was never produced before the enquiry officer. As a matter of fact, during the whole departmental proceeding documents were merely tendered and not exhibited. The contents thereof were never proved by the management witness. 5. Learned counsel further contended that the management witness was a hearsay witness as he was the investigating officer who investigated the alleged theft of coal rejects. However, no other independent witness were examined. 6. Learned counsel further referred to defence document which was marked as DE-1 which is letter dated 16.04.2013 issued by Assistant Commandant CISF Unit, CCL, Kargali Washery addressed to Project Officer, Kargali, where he says that there is no report of theft/malpractice in reject sale at Kargali Washery. However, the enquiry officer has not given due credence to DE-1 and in fact, he has brushed aside the said letter on his premise and assumption by holding that the aforesaid letter was an afterthought. As a matter of fact, the enquiry officer was duty bound to go into details about the said letter by calling Assistant Commandant C.I.S.F. who said that there was no report of theft in rejects sale at the Washery. He further submits that this specific ground was taken before the enquiry officer by way of representation filed by the petitioners, however, the same was not considered. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the relevant documents sought by the respective petitioners were never provided to them which has caused serious prejudice. As a matter of fact, the disciplinary authority had also ignored the issue raised by the petitioners in their respective reply to the show-cause notices. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the relevant documents sought by the respective petitioners were never provided to them which has caused serious prejudice. As a matter of fact, the disciplinary authority had also ignored the issue raised by the petitioners in their respective reply to the show-cause notices. The petitioners have taken a specific plea that there was a survey report of Coal India Limited mentioning that there is no shortage of coal reject for the alleged period. The said ground has also been taken by the petitioners before the appellate authority but the same was never considered. Learned counsel before concluding his argument had also drawn attention of this court and submits that there is no record to suggest that 240 trucks of coal rejects has been misutilised and there is no document to suggest that there is loss of 4150 MT of coal rejects. As a matter of fact, even the amount of Rs. 85 Lakh is hypothetical. Learned counsel concluded his argument by submitting that the evidence adduced on behalf of the management does not have any nexus with the charges and it is well settled principle that the enquiry officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. He reiterated that it is a settled principle of law that merely tendering of document will not suffice the purpose to prove any charge against a delinquent employee rather the documents has to be proved and exhibited which is absent in the instant case. 8. Mr. M.B. Lal, learned counsel for the respondent mainly argued on maintainability of both the writ petitions, inasmuch as, there is alternative remedy for these petitioners to move before the Industrial Dispute Tribunal. On the question of jurisdictional issue with regard to competence of the authorities to issue charge-sheet; he referred to the clarificatory circular that the competent authority has been nominated by the Managing Director in terms of Clause 2.3 of Standing Orders. Learned counsel further submits that there is no procedural irregularity, inasmuch as; there was full-fledged enquiry and the enquiry officer had submitted adverse reports in case of both these petitioners and accepting the enquiry report the disciplinary authority after issuing second show cause notice held them guilty and imposed punishment of removal from service. 9. Learned counsel further submits that there is no procedural irregularity, inasmuch as; there was full-fledged enquiry and the enquiry officer had submitted adverse reports in case of both these petitioners and accepting the enquiry report the disciplinary authority after issuing second show cause notice held them guilty and imposed punishment of removal from service. 9. In reply to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he will be confining his prayer only on the question of non-compliance of principle of natural justice as it is a settled law in service jurisprudence that merely tendering of the documents before the authority will not be sufficient to prove the charges against the delinquent employee and as a matter of fact the contents of those document has to be proved. He further submits that since it is a case of non-compliance of principle of natural justice, writ petitions are fully maintainable and even otherwise, simply by giving liberty to the petitioners to approach Industrial Tribunal will be a futile exercise as enough time has been passed after filing of the writ application. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits and the averments made therein, it appears that charge-sheet was issued against respective petitioners alleging therein that from the period February 2012 to May 2012 petitioners being the dealing clerk of sales department issued loading slips in bulk to the DO holders and allowed to lift the coal rejects of the Kargali Washery in huge quantities without being billed. It has also been alleged that the respective petitioners failed to maintain records for issued loading slips and also failed to reconcile records of coal rejects. It further transpires that the enquiry officer was appointed and the petitioners were given opportunity in the proceedings and even after the report of enquiry officer, second show cause notice was issued to the respective petitioners to which they replied and finally order of termination was issued. 11. It further emerges from records that all the charges alleged against the respective petitioners is on the basis of investigation made by the MW-1. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that there was only one management witness on behalf of the respondents who was the investigating officer; however, the investigation report has not been produced during the departmental proceedings. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that there was only one management witness on behalf of the respondents who was the investigating officer; however, the investigation report has not been produced during the departmental proceedings. Had there been a case that the investigation report would have been served to the petitioners and produced during the enquiry proceedings; the petitioners would have an opportunity to rebut the same. At this stage, it is relevant to mention here that the investigation report was neither produced nor exhibited, save and except ME-8, which was also tendered. This document was prepared during investigation which was a comparative chart of ME-1, ME-2 and ME-3. The said ME-8 is also defective, inasmuch as, it does not contain particulars in regard to details of truck and cards from 15.04.2012 to 30.4.2012 and 01.05.2012 to 06.05.2012, which comes under duration of alleged misconduct. The law in this regard is very clear that merely tendering of any document is not sufficient and unless and until the content of any document is proved, proving the charge on the basis of such document which is only tendered, will be illegal and not sustainable in the eye of law. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 ; wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-18 has held as under: “18. In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. whereupon both the learned counsel relied, this court held: “26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it, it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice. (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involves two elements: (i) objective and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject-matter of the charges is wholly illegal. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances.” 12. In the case in hand the main allegation against the petitioners is that they issued loading slips (ME-10) to the DO holders which acted as a valid pass for them, to enter and collect coal rejects of Kargali Washery in huge quantities without being billed. However, the said document ME-10, which has been tendered, is only a specimen of loading slip, it neither carries the signature of the petitioner nor signifies the fact which truck went unaccounted. 13. At this stage, it is also relevant to mention that for the reason best known to the enquiry officer he did not consider the defense Exhibit No. 1 which was the letter dated 16.04.2013 issued by Assistant Commandant, CISF Units; wherein it was indicated that there is no report of theft/ mal-practice in reject sale at Kargali Washery. The enquiry officer has erroneously held that the said letter appears to be work of afterthought. Though the petitioners raised all these issues before the disciplinary authority, but the same were not considered. These lacunas in the enquiry report and also in the order passed by the disciplinary authority makes it perverse in nature. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , at paragraph 10 has held as under: “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , at paragraph 10 has held as under: “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 14. At this juncture it would not be irrelevant to mention that the only witness on behalf of the management was the investigating officer, but admittedly he was a hearsay witness and no witness who were present before the investigating officer during course of investigation prior to this proceeding were made management witness. In this regard the law is very clear that every act done or spoken which is relevant on any ground must be proved by someone who saw it with his own eyes and heard it with his own ears. The phrase hearsay witness is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. The Hon’ble Apex Court, on the hearsay witness has held in the case of Kalyan Kumar Gogoi vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 532 ; at paragraph 35 and 37 as under: “35. The term “hearsay” is used with reference to what is done or written as well as to what is spoken and in its legal sense, it denotes that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person. The word “hearsay” is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say. Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else and sometimes it is treated as nearly synonymous with irrelevant. The sayings and doings of the third person are, as a rule, irrelevant, so that no proof of them can be admitted. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say. Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else and sometimes it is treated as nearly synonymous with irrelevant. The sayings and doings of the third person are, as a rule, irrelevant, so that no proof of them can be admitted. Every act done or spoken which is relevant on any ground must be proved by someone who saw it with his own eyes and heard it with his own ears. 37. Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person, whose statement is relied upon, into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. The phrase “hearsay evidence” is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under the Indian law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than by a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatsoever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted. That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross-examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of a judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practised with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” In the case in hand as aforesaid it was only the investigating officer who has been examined on behalf of Management who himself was a hearsay witness. 15. 15. Now coming to the main contention of the respondents that the petitioners’ application is not maintainable as they are having an alternative remedy of filing appeal before the Industrial Tribunal. In this regard this Court holds that the petitioners are having jurisdiction to approach this Court under Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and also for being the order of termination and appellate order being perverse. Accordingly, interest of justice would be sufficed by remitting the case to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 16. Consequently, respective orders of punishment dated 24.12.2014 in both these writ petitions i.e. W.P. (S) No. 5875 of 2015 and W.P (S) no. 5874 of 2015 and also the respective appellate orders being order dated 15.06.2016 in W.P. (S) No. 5875 of 2015 and order dated 11.06.2015 in W.P. (S) No. 5874 of 2015, are hereby, quashed and set aside. 17. The matters are remitted back to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of enquiry itself by providing investigation report and other relied upon documents and pass fresh order following principles of natural justice in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 18. It goes without saying that the petitioners are directed to appear before the enquiry officer and/or disciplinary authority as and when asked for and they will not delay the matter. 19. It is also clarified that fresh orders in both the cases must be passed within the aforesaid stipulated period; failing which both the petitioners shall be reinstated in service. However, so far as question of back wages is concerned; the same shall be decided by the respondents only on its own merit. Pending I.A. stands disposed of.