JUDGMENT : SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM, J. 1. Though this matter is listed for admission, with consent of learned counsel on both sides, the appeal is taken up for final hearing. 2. The captioned Regular First Appeal is filed by unsuccessful plaintiffs questioning the order passed by the learned Judge on I.A. No. 2 filed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC read with Section 34 of SARFAESI Act wherein the learned Judge having accepted the objection filed by the respondent-bank has proceeded to reject the plaint by invoking provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. 3. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the Court below. 4. The facts leading to the case are as under: The plaintiffs have instituted the present suit in O.S. No. 5207/2019 seeking relief of declaration to declare the sale notice dated 18.06.2019 and consequent e-auction sale dated 17.07.2019 as illegal, null and void. The plaintiffs have specifically pleaded that plaintiff No. 1 is the principal borrower and the plaintiff No. 2 is the surety for a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- loan obtained from defendant bank. It is pleaded that due was to the tune of Rs. 33,51,891/-. The plaintiffs allege that defendant bank has imposed exorbitant interest thereby making it impossible for the plaintiffs to repay the loan and therefore would contend that the defendant bank has declared the account as non-performing asset. The plaintiffs have further pleaded that defendant bank has invoked Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of SARFAESI Act and claim that they have taken constructive possession of the mortgaged property. 5. The grievance of the plaintiffs in the present suit is that defendant bank has issued notice for sale under Rule 8(6) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 which is dated 18.06.2019. The plaintiffs have further specifically pleaded that the said notice was served on plaintiff No. 1 on 24.06.2019 along with enclosure with public notice of sale dated 18.06.2019 thereby intimating that e-auction would be held on 17.07.2019. The plaintiffs have specifically pleaded in the present suit that the action of defendant bank clearly violates that mandatory requirements of Rule 8(6) of Security Interest Rules, 2002 which contemplates a prior notice of 30 days before proceeding with auctioning of the secured assets. The plaintiffs have specifically pleaded in the present suit that the action of defendant bank clearly violates that mandatory requirements of Rule 8(6) of Security Interest Rules, 2002 which contemplates a prior notice of 30 days before proceeding with auctioning of the secured assets. On account of procedural illegality, plaintiffs claimed that there is substantial miscarriage of justice and therefore, the present suit is filed seeking relief of declaration to declare the sale notice and consequent e-auction sale as illegal, null and void. 6. The defendant bank, on receipt of summons, contested the proceedings and filed I.A. No. 2 under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 34 of SARFAESI Act by contending that the present suit is squarely hit by Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and the relief sought in the present suit cannot be entertained by the civil court as there is a express bar under the provisions of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act. 7. The learned Judge having examined the objections raised by the defendant bank in the application filed in I.A. No. 2 and also objections filed by the plaintiffs to I.A. No. 2 and having given its anxious consideration to the judgment cited by the plaintiffs and the defendant bank, has allowed the application filed in I.A. No. 2 and consequently plaint is rejected. It is against this rejection of plaint, the plaintiffs are before this Court. 8. Learned counsel appearing for plaintiffs would strenuously argue and contend before this Court that the order under challenge suffers from serious infirmities and therefore warrants interference at the hands of this Court. He would contend that the entire case of plaintiffs rest on the mandatory requirements under Rule 8(6) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for short ‘the Rules 2002’) which mandates that 30 days clear notice is required to be given to the borrower before proceeding to auction the property and therefore he would contend that all disputed question of facts are to be adjudicated by a competent civil court and not by the Tribunal and therefore, he would contend that suit is very much maintainable and the civil court has got jurisdiction to examine the procedural irregularities in regard to issuance of notice and consequent e-auction conducted by defendant bank. He would further contend that the relief of declaration sought in the instant case would not attract the provisions of Section 34 and therefore, there is no bar to seek declaratory relief before a competent civil court and the said controversy and the relief sought therein would squarely fall within the domain of civil court and DRT is not competent to adjudicate the present controversy and therefore, he would contend that the order rejecting the plaint suffers from perversity and therefore, he would contend that the learned Judge erred in rejecting the plaint at threshold without relegating the parties to a full-fledged trial. 9. To buttress his arguments, he would place reliance on the Division Bench judgment rendered by this Court in RFA No. 1947/2016. Placing reliance on the said judgment, he would contend that the borrower, if aggrieved by the action of secured creditor and if the said action involves serious disputed question of facts, civil court's jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit is not barred, more particularly when the facts involved in the lis requires to be resolved in an elaborate trial by leading evidence. He would further place reliance on the judgment cited supra and contend that the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain any suit filed before a bank takes any step for recovery of its dues in violation of the provisions of Debts Recovery Act is not barred and therefore, he would submit to this Court that the order rejecting the plaint needs to be set aside and plaintiffs have to be given an fair opportunity to seek adjudication of their valuable rights in the property before the Court below. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs referring to the provisions of Section 17 would heavily bank on the provisions of Section 17 and contend that the present action taken by the bank does not fall squarely within the provisions of Section 17. Taking this Court through the provisions of Section 17, he would contend that an appeal is provided to the aggrieved party under Section 17 and such a remedy is only against the action of secured creditor taken under Section 13(4). Taking this Court through the provisions of Section 17, he would contend that an appeal is provided to the aggrieved party under Section 17 and such a remedy is only against the action of secured creditor taken under Section 13(4). Referring to the provisions of Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, he would contend that the impugned sale notice issued under Rule 8(6) of the Rules 2002 and the specific allegation of plaintiffs that defendant bank has not followed mandatory requirements and procedure under Rule 8(6) cannot be questioned under Section 17; such a dispute is not covered under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendant bank repelling the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs borrower would however support the order under challenge and would contend that the learned Judge has rightly followed the dictum of Apex Court in catena of judgments wherein Apex Court has repeatedly issued directions to the High Courts as well as to the civil courts to desist from interfering in the matters which squarely fall within the domain of provisions of SARFAESI Act. She would further contend that the sale notice and consequent e-auction are consequent actions emanating post action taken under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act and therefore, Section 17 would include any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act and therefore, she would contend that the present suit filed before a civil court is not at all maintainable and the same is expressly barred under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act. 12. To buttress her arguments, she has placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) State Bank of India vs. Jatin Handi and Another, (2019) 1 D.R.T.C. 835 (H.P.) (2) Mithalesh Devi vs. Bank of India, (2019) 1 D.R.T.C. 859 (P.H.) (3) Gramin Bank of Aravarath and Another vs. Maa Laxmi Ice and Cold Storage and Others, (2018) 2 Bankers Journal 501 (4) Elsamma and Others vs. Kadutjurthy Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Others, (2019) 1 D.R.T.C. 645 (Ker.) (5) HDB Financial Services Ltd. vs. M/s. Remo Software Pvt. Ltd. W.A. Nos. 6330-6337 of 2017 (6) ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. Umakanth Mohapatra, Civil Appeal No. 10243-10250/2018 13. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and learned counsel appearing for the defendant bank. 6330-6337 of 2017 (6) ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. Umakanth Mohapatra, Civil Appeal No. 10243-10250/2018 13. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and learned counsel appearing for the defendant bank. I have given my anxious consideration to the pleadings averred in the plaint and also pleadings averred in I.A. No. 2 filed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC read with Section 34 of SARFAESI Act. 14. The following point would arise for consideration before this Court: “Whether the Trial Court was justified in invoking the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 43 of SARFAESI Act thereby rejecting the plaint by holding that civil court lacks jurisdiction to examine the dispute raised in the present suit?” 15. The Division Bench judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs would not come to the aid of the plaintiffs herein. The Division Bench at paragraph 23 of the judgment has referred to the judgment rendered by the Calcutta High Court and therefore, it would be useful for this Court to refer to the said paragraph which reads as under: “23. Further, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kaaiser Oils Private Limited and Others vs. Allahabad Bank and Others, 2015 SCC Online Cal. 1652, after considering the similar contentions, has observed as under: “This Court has given an anxious consideration to the decisions cited at the bar. On perusal of those decisions, it appears to us that if the amount of debt due to the Bank is more than Rs. 10 lakh, no Civil Court, in view of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, will have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or any proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine by or under the Act. However, there are some exceptions to the general principles which are as follows: (i) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory suit is not barred as the DRT is not authorized to issue any declaration relating to title of the parties etc. DRT's jurisdiction is restricted only to issuance of certificate. (ii) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit is not barred when complicated questions of disputed facts are involved in the lis which is required to be resolved by elaborate trial on evidence. DRT's jurisdiction is restricted only to issuance of certificate. (ii) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit is not barred when complicated questions of disputed facts are involved in the lis which is required to be resolved by elaborate trial on evidence. (iii) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit is not barred when ultimate decision is to be taken on the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. (iv) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain any suit filed before the Bank takes any step for recovery of its dues by following the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act or the SARFAESI Act, is not barred. (v) Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain any suit in the nature of set off or counter-claim is also not barred, particularly when any of the actions of the bank to recover its dues as per the SARFAESI Act is not challenged in the suit.” 16. On meticulous examination of the observations made by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, this Court would find that civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory suit is not barred in those cases where declaration relating to title of parties is sought. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court also held that where complicated questions of disputed facts are involved which requires a full-fledged trial is also not barred and it is well within the domain of civil court jurisdiction to adjudicate the complicated disputed question of facts. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court was also of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is not barred where serious allegations of fraud and misrepresentation are averred. In such cases, it is only the civil court which has got jurisdiction to determine the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and DRT has no competency to examine the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. If the observations made by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court is meticulously examined, this Court would find that in the present case on hand, the plaintiffs intend to question the action of the secured creditor in proceeding against the secured assets pursuant to action taken under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act. 17. Now let me examine the schemes of Sections 13 and 17 of SARFAESI Act. 17. Now let me examine the schemes of Sections 13 and 17 of SARFAESI Act. Schemes of Section 13 and 17 of SARFAESI Act Under Section 13(4), after the accounts are being declared as NPA and the representation of borrower/guarantor is rejected, the secured creditor can take recourse to any of the measures specified therein to recover its outstanding debt. This includes taking over “symbolic possession” of the mortgaged property or taking over the management of business of the borrower, as mentioned thereunder. In continuum, Sections 13(5-A), (5-B) and (5-C) encapsulates the mechanism of auctioning of mortgaged immovable property to third parties for recovery of outstanding dues. If the statutory scheme is seen holistically, it implies that taking over of symbolic possession followed by auction of the mortgaged property is part of the same proceedings, and there are series of steps towards the larger objective of recovery of outstanding loan of the bank. Section 13 is wide enough to allow the creditor to resort to any type of measures of recovery and this is the distinctive feature of SARFAESI Act, that it has vested the secured creditor with host of powers for arm-twisting the borrower or the guarantor for expeditious realization of outstanding borrowings. 18. In proceeding under Section 17, it implies the phrase “any person aggrieved by any of the measures under Section 13(4)” which implies any and every action resorted to by the bank, it is authorised to take recourse to under and in pursuance of Sections 13(4), 14, 15, so on and so forth. The section does not clearly stop at providing a remedy and decision under Section 34, but transcends to include every such measure, which all are being undertaken by the bank towards making its action under Section 13(4) fruitful and consequential. The application under Section 17 is to be preferred within a period of 45 days “from the date on which such measures has been taken.” Thus, the concept of limitation running from the last and latest action in the series of continuing events with respect to recovery of dues from the borrower/guarantor concerned is duly embodied. The application under Section 17 is to be preferred within a period of 45 days “from the date on which such measures has been taken.” Thus, the concept of limitation running from the last and latest action in the series of continuing events with respect to recovery of dues from the borrower/guarantor concerned is duly embodied. Therefore, what emerges from this provision is that Section 17 further acknowledges that the borrower/guarantor, if aggrieved by the unlawful exercise of power by the secured creditor must not be left remediless and therefore, creates a fresh starting point for the aggrieved borrower or guarantor to approach the DRT by way of an application under Section 17. 19. Pertinently, Section 17 which is currently existing has been amended by Act 44 of 2016, wherein the previously available “right to appeal” or to “prefer an appeal” against the very same set of measures by the creditor came to be substituted with the word “application.” The reasons are not too far to seek for this intentful amendment to Section 17. Post amendment, the statutory position is clear that DRT is the first stop forum for redressal of any aggrieved borrower and wide spread powers have been conferred on the DRT to undo the injustice if any of the wrong committed to the borrowers by the secured creditors in a desperate bid to recover their outstanding amount. 20. As a question is posed to this Court that the impugned sale notice and consequent e-auction would not provide a remedy to the borrower under Section 17, this Court is bound to answer the said question. The question that is raised before this Court is whether each and every action of the bank taken against the borrower towards the recovery of its dues amounts to “measures” or it is only the codified stages mentioned under Section 13 i.e., declaration of account as NPA taking over of symbolic possession; or taking over the management of business to be termed as “measures.” The said question on interpretation of “measures” arose before the Division Bench of Telangana High Court in Durga Bhavani Agro Tech Industry, Rep. by its Manager M. Sreedhar vs. Canara Bank, Rep. by its Authorized Officer and Others, 2018 SCC Online Hyd. 1981. In the said case, borrower approached the DRT challenging the first possession notice and auction notice. by its Manager M. Sreedhar vs. Canara Bank, Rep. by its Authorized Officer and Others, 2018 SCC Online Hyd. 1981. In the said case, borrower approached the DRT challenging the first possession notice and auction notice. During the pendency of the application, a fresh auction notice came to be issued, the prayer challenging which was additionally incorporated by way of amendment as a subsequent event. The Telangana High Court while addressing the said controversy has held that the word “measures” under Section 13(4) do not only constitute a continuing cause of action, but also have to be clubbed as a part of singular chain of events, intertwined and interlinked with each other. 21. In the light of above discussions, what transpires is that the borrower can knock at the doors of DRT and seek redressal of his grievances and can challenge the auction proceedings without agitating the validity of original notice under Section 13(4) and the same does not debar him from getting his application considered under Section 17. It is in this background, this Court is of the view that the present suit seeking relief of declaration questioning the impugned sale notice and consequent e-auction is not at all maintainable before the Civil Court and the said suit is squarely hit by provisions of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. The plaintiffs have an efficacious remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and therefore, they cannot maintain a suit on the premise that the impugned sale notice dated 18.06.2019 is illegal, null and void on account of infraction of rules. 22. In the light of discussion made supra, it would be useful for this Court to cull out the prayer sought in the plaint which reads as under: “(a) Declaring that the Sale Notice dated 18.06.2019 of the suit schedule property and consequent e-auction sale dated 17.07.2019 as illegal, null and void. (b) For costs and such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice and equity.” 23. (b) For costs and such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice and equity.” 23. On perusal of the prayer sought in the plaint, the plaintiffs are seeking relief of declaration questioning the e-notice on the premise that the same is issued in contravention of rules and therefore, Section 34 would not operate as a bar to seek adjudication before the competent Civil Court. The Division Bench judgment cited by the plaintiffs in RFA No. 1947/2016 would not come to the aid of the plaintiffs. Para-26 of the said judgment would clinch the issue. The Division Bench referring to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemical Limited and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 311 was of the view that mortgagor can invoke Civil Court jurisdiction provided there are serious allegations indicating that sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner which are contrary to the terms of mortgage. The Division Bench referring to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court was of the view that under limited circumstances, at the instance of mortgagor, a Civil Court can entertain a suit if plaintiff alleges fraud and the pleadings in such a suit discloses fraud on the basis of which relief is sought. 24. The prayer sought in the plaint which is culled out supra clearly indicates that plaintiffs have instituted the present suit alleging that there are serious infractions of rules in conducting auction of secured assets. The question of legality of auction and consequent sale can very well be agitated before the Tribunal. It is trite law that auction of secured creditor can very well be scrutinized by the Debts Recovery Tribunal when it relates to secured asset. Therefore, this Court is of the view that Civil Court jurisdiction is completely barred so far as ‘measures’ taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of SARFAESI Act against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the Tribunal. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing for the Bank are squarely applicable to the present case on hand. 25. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing for the Bank are squarely applicable to the present case on hand. 25. It is trite law that when a special Tribunal is invested by the Legislature with exclusive jurisdiction to determine its own authority in certain matters, the jurisdiction of Civil Court must be deemed to have been taken away to that extent. Therefore, the subject matter of the present suit falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Tribunal and therefore, excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Court. Therefore, plaintiffs under the garb that the grievances addressed in the present plaint has the characteristics of common law right cannot rush to Civil Court and maintain a suit. In that view of the matter, the point formulated by this Court is accordingly answered in the affirmative. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is in accordance with law. The Court below was justified in rejecting the plaint as expressly barred under law. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the judgment and decree of the Court below does not suffer from any infirmities. 26. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.