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2022 DIGILAW 1060 (JHR)

Sumit Bajla v. State of Jharkhand

2022-08-23

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

body2022
JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned GA-III for the State and Mr. Rahul Kumar Das, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings including the First Information Report, in connection with Dhurwa (T) P.S. Case No. 109 of 2021, registered for the offences under Sections 403, 406, 420, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi. 3. The FIR was lodged upon the written report of the informant inter-alia alleging that informant happens to be the Executive in M/s Maa Chinmastika Cement and Ispat Private Limited and the company of the informant has a Sponge Iron Plant and for that iron ore is being used as raw material. It is alleged that the accused persons are dealing in the business of iron ore in the name of company called M/s Taurian Iron and Steel Private Limited. It is stated in the FIR that on 20.05.2014, accused persons have made a proposal for selling iron ore of specification 10-40 mm for their crusher plant, Badajamda. It is further alleged that on the basis of the proposal and assurance made by the accused persons, MCCIPL has placed an order for supply of four railway rakes of iron ore on 20.05.2014. It is alleged that the above order has been made with the specification of 10-40 MM iron ore, Grade + 60% - 62% at Rs. 5200/- per ton. It is further alleged that the above supply was to be made from the crusher plant of the accused persons to Barkakana Railway Siding. Thereafter, the accused person have assured to get the site of railway rake immediately and for one rake of iron ore, they have demanded payment of advance amount and on the said request, MCCIPL has paid Rs. 1.5 Crore on 21.05.2014 and Rs. 50 lakhs on 22.05.2014, both by way of RTGS to the company. It is further alleged that besides the aforesaid order and advance payment made for supply through railway rake, the informant’s company has also paid Rs. 3,87,30,215/- on different dates for supply to be made through road transport. It is further alleged that the informant’s company has made payment of altogether Rs. It is further alleged that besides the aforesaid order and advance payment made for supply through railway rake, the informant’s company has also paid Rs. 3,87,30,215/- on different dates for supply to be made through road transport. It is further alleged that the informant’s company has made payment of altogether Rs. 5,87,30,215/- and the TISCPL has supplied the iron ore of Rs. 3,01,63,526/- through trucks. It is alleged that the informant got an information from the accused persons that they have got one railway rake indent, but subsequently, informant came to know that accused persons have cancelled the same. As such, the accused persons have cheated the company of the informant and embezzled huge amount to the tune of Rs. 2,85,66,889/-. The informant’s company has time and again has requested the accused person for refund of the said amount but they have evaded their request on one pretext or another. It is stated in the FIR that the reason for not refunding the amount is that while making conspiracy, accused person have misappropriated the assets and properties of TISCPL and they have liquidated TISCPL. It is alleged that on demanding the payment made by the company, accused persons threatened them saying to recover the amount from the liquidator. In view of said allegations and made in the FIR, the present case has been registered. 4. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in the FIR, the date of occurrence is shown as 20.05.2014 to 21.05.2014 and the FIR was lodged on 16.06.2021 and no plausible explanation has been explained for such inordinate delay in filing the FIR. He submits that in the entire case, allegation is with regard to commercial transaction and it has been alleged that a sum of Rs. 2,85,66,889/- has not been returned with regard to an agreement for supply of iron rod by these petitioners. He further submits that for recovery of the said amount, the O.P. No. 2 has filed the money suit, which was numbered as Money Suit No. 14 of 2016 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Ramgarh. 2,85,66,889/- has not been returned with regard to an agreement for supply of iron rod by these petitioners. He further submits that for recovery of the said amount, the O.P. No. 2 has filed the money suit, which was numbered as Money Suit No. 14 of 2016 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Ramgarh. He further submits that in the meantime, M/s Gagan Ferrotech Limited has filed a company petition, being Company Petition No. 314 of 2016, before the Bombay High Court against the petitioners, wherein the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, by terms of order dated 13.07.2018, has allowed the said petition with a direction to wind up the company of the petitioners. He further submits that in view of the order of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, later on, a petition has been filed by the O.P. No. 2 on 18.06.2019, in the Money Suit No. 14 of 2016 stating therein that the official liquidator has been appointed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Company Petition No. 314 of 2016, vide order dated 13.07.2018 and also prayed for withdrawal of the case and later on the said suit was permitted to be withdrawn, in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Learned senior counsel further submits that the O.P. No. 2 again filed a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankcruptcy Code, 2016 before the NCLT, Mumbai and subsequently prayer has been made to withdraw the same and the said petition has been permitted to be withdrawn by the NCLT, Mumbai by order dated 04.12.2018. He submits that this FIR has been lodged belatedly when all proceedings have already been come to an end for recovery of the said amount. He further submits that supply was made by M/s Taurian Iron and Steel Company Private Limited (TISCPL). He further submits that the petitioners are the Managing Director and the Director of the said company and the company has not been made accused. He submits that in absence of the company, vicarious liability cannot be fastened against the Managing Director and the Director of the company. 5. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. C.B.I. (2015) 4 SCC 609 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-42 to 44 held as follows: “42. He submits that in absence of the company, vicarious liability cannot be fastened against the Managing Director and the Director of the company. 5. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. C.B.I. (2015) 4 SCC 609 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-42 to 44 held as follows: “42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241, the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego” was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego” was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company.” 6. Relying on this, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the legal proposition is well settled and filing of the FIR is an abuse of the process of the Court. 7. Learned senior counsel further submits that there is no intention of cheating from the very beginning and in that view of the matter, cheating sections are not attracted. He submits that iron rod of rupees three crores and above have already been supplied and in course of Covid-19 Pandemic and also due to exigency, the further iron rods were not supplied. As such, it appears that there is no intention from the very beginning to cheat the O.P. No. 2. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case of Sushil Shethi and Another vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Another, (2020) 3 SCC 240 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paras-6 and 8.2 held as follows: “6. Considering the averments and the allegations in the FIR and even the charge-sheet the main allegations are that the company, namely, M/s SPML Infra Limited supplied substandard materials-runner bucket turbines and the supplied runner bucket turbines were not as per the technical specifications. It is also required to be noted that there is no FIR/complaint/charge-sheet against the company-M/s SPML Infra Limited and the appellants are arrayed as an accused as the Managing Director and Director of M/s SPML Infra Limited respectively. From a bare reading of the FIR and even the charge-sheet, there are no allegations that there was a fraudulent and dishonest intention to cheat the Government from the very beginning of the transaction. Even there are no specific allegations and averments in the FIR/charge-sheet that the appellants were in-charge of administration and management of the company and thereby vicariously liable. Even there are no specific allegations and averments in the FIR/charge-sheet that the appellants were in-charge of administration and management of the company and thereby vicariously liable. In light of the aforesaid, the prayer of the appellants to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants for the offence under Section 420 IPC is required to be considered. 8.2. It is also required to be noted that the main allegations can be said to be against the company. The company has not been made a party. The allegations are restricted to the Managing Director and the Director of the company respectively. There are no specific allegations against the Managing Director or even the Director. There are no allegations to constitute the vicarious liability. In Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692, it is observed and held by this Court that the Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the company when the accused is the company. It is further observed and held that the vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. It is further observed that the statute indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. It is further observed that even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability. In the present case, there are no such specific allegations against the appellants being Managing Director or the Director of the company respectively. Under the circumstances also, the impugned criminal proceedings are required to be quashed and set aside.” 8. On the point of vicarious liability of the Director, he relied in the case of Ravindra Nath Bajpe vs. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Others, (2021) SCC Online SC 806, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-27 and 28 held as follows: “27. On the point of vicarious liability of the Director, he relied in the case of Ravindra Nath Bajpe vs. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Others, (2021) SCC Online SC 806, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-27 and 28 held as follows: “27. As held by this Court in the case of India Infoline Limited (supra), in the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction about a prima facie case against the accused who are Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the Directors of the Company and the role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them. Looking to the averments and the allegations in the complaint, there are no specific allegations and/or averments with respect to role played by them in their capacity as Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Director, Deputy General Manager and Planner & Executor. Merely because they are Chairman, Managing Director/Executive Director and/or Deputy General Manager and/or Planner/Supervisor of A1 & A6, without any specific role attributed and the role played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences committed by A1 & A6. 28. From the order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing the process against the respondents herein – accused nos. 1 to 8, there does not appear that the learned Magistrate has recorded his satisfaction about a prima-facie case against respondent nos. 2 to 5 and 7 & 8. Merely because respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 & 8 are the Chairman/Managing Director/Executive Director/Deputy General Manager/Planner & Executor, automatically they cannot be held vicariously liable, unless, as observed hereinabove, there are specific allegations and averments against them with respect to their individual role. Under the circumstances, the High Court has rightly dismissed the revision applications and has rightly confirmed the order passed by the learned Sessions Court quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing process against respondent nos. 1 to 8 herein – original accused nos. 1 to 8 for the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC.” 9. 1 to 8 herein – original accused nos. 1 to 8 for the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC.” 9. Relying on this judgment, learned senior counsel submits that the FIR has maliciously been filed and no case is made out and this Court may exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 10. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 submits that offences have been made out and that has been admitted by the petitioners in Para-4 of the petition. He submits that they are admitting their allegation, as such there is no question of quashing of the FIR and the investigation is still going on. He further submits that in light of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the delay in lodging the FIR will be considered by the Trial Court only. He also submits that there are parameters of quashing of the proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He submits that it is well settled that the every words of ingredients of any Sections is not required to be disclosed in its entirety in the complaint petition or in the FIR. He relied in the case of Rajesh Bajaj vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1216 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-9 and 11 held as follows: “9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder: “We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 11. He further submits that it is well settled that if the criminality is there, the criminal case as well as civil both can go simultaneously. He relied in the case of Lalmuni Devi vs. State of Bihar and Others, 2001 AIR SCW 2504, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-8 held as follows: “8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed.” 12. Learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 further submits that the offence is disclosed and the case is registered, the person is required to book and must be punished and the court does not interfere in the investigation. Learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 further submits that the offence is disclosed and the case is registered, the person is required to book and must be punished and the court does not interfere in the investigation. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Sanchaita Investments and Others, AIR 1982 SC 949 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-64 thereof has held as follows: “64. In my opinion, the legal position is well-settled. The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. The observations of the Judicial Committee and the observations of this Court in the various decisions which I have earlier quoted, make this position abundantly clear. The prepositions enunciated by the Judicial Committee and this Court in the various decisions which I have earlier noted, are based on sound principles of justice. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them. An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interest of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the deteriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious deteriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. The decision on which Mr. Chatterjee has relied are based on this sound principle, and in all these cases, an offence had been disclosed. Relying on the well-settled and sound principle that the Court should not interfere with an investigation into an offence at the stage of investigation and should allow the investigation to be completed, this Court had made the observations in the said decisions which I have earlier quoted reiterating and reaffirming the sound principles of justice. The decisions relied on by Mr. Chatterjee, do not lay down, as it cannot possibly be laid down as a broad proposition of law, that an investigation must necessarily be permitted to continue and will not be prevented by the Court at the stage of investigation even if no offence is disclosed. While adverting to this specific question as to whether an investigation can go on even if no offence is disclosed, the judicial Committee in the case of King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nizam Ahmed (supra) and this Court in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (supra), Jehan Singh vs. Delhi Administration (supra), S.N. Sharma vs. Bipin Kumar Tiwari (supra) have clearly laid down that no investigation can be permitted and have made the observations which I have earlier quoted and which were relied on by Mr. Sen. As I have earlier observed this proposition is not only based on sound logic but is also based on fundamental principles of justice as a person against whom no offence is disclosed, cannot be put to any harassment by the process of investigation which is likely to put his personal liberty and also property which are considered sacred and sacrosanct into peril and jeopardy.” 13. On these grounds, he submits that the FIR is required to be investigated and at this stage this Court may not exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 14. Mr. On these grounds, he submits that the FIR is required to be investigated and at this stage this Court may not exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 14. Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned GA-III appearing for the State submits that the Bombay High Court has passed the order of winding up in the liquidation proceeding and the petition filed under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the NCLT, Mumbai has also been withdrawn by the O.P. No. 2. He submits that there is no bar of criminal proceeding even in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. On this ground, he submits that this Court may not interfere in the matter under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. In the light of the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the court has gone through the materials available on record and upon going through the contents of the FIR, it is an admitted position that for supply of iron rod, an agreement was there between the company of the petitioners and the O.P. No. 2 and iron rods of rupees three crores and above have already been supplied to the O.P. No. 2 and thereafter it has been alleged that the iron rods amounting to Rs. 2,85,66,889/- has not been supplied. Thus, it shows that the intention of cheating was not found from the very beginning, which is one of the ingredients to make out a case of cheating. Admittedly, the occurrence took place on 20.05.2014 to 21.05.2014 and the FIR was lodged on 16.06.2021 and no plausible explanation has been explained for such inordinate delay in filing the FIR and the O.P. No. 2 has filed Money Suit No. 14 of 2016 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Ramgarh for recovery of the amount in question. In the meantime, the liquidation proceeding started in Bombay High Court in Company Petition No. 314 of 2016, wherein by order dated 13.07.2018, the Bombay High Court has directed to liquidate the company. After the order of the Bombay High Court, the O.P. No. 2 filed a petition before the learned Court, who was ceased with the money suit informing about the order passed by the Bombay High Court and requesting to dispose of the petition, subsequently, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by the concerned court by order dated 18.06.2019. After the order of the Bombay High Court, the O.P. No. 2 filed a petition before the learned Court, who was ceased with the money suit informing about the order passed by the Bombay High Court and requesting to dispose of the petition, subsequently, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by the concerned court by order dated 18.06.2019. Thereafter the O.P. No. 2 filed a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the NCLT, Mumbai, however, the same was subsequently withdrawn. Thus, it appears that these are the proceedings, in which, the O.P. No. 2 has taken steps and subsequently withdrawn the same and after these proceedings and particularly after withdrawing the same, the O.P. No. 2 has filed the present FIR against the petitioner. Moreover, if the transaction is between the company and the O.P. No. 2, as such the company is required to make an accused in the proceeding, which is lacking in the case in hand. 16. In view of the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sunil Bharti Mittal (Supra) and Sushil Shethi and Another (Supra), company is required to be made an accused. 17. The judgment relied by Mr. Rahul Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 in the case of Rajesh Bajaj (Supra), the facts were different, as in the said case commercial transaction and money transaction may not be considered to have elude the factum of cheating, it is not necessary that the complaint should explain or enumerate all the ingredients of offence, however, the facts of the present case is different from that case. It is also not in dispute that the FIR is not an encyclopedia and each and every ingredients are not required to be disclosed in the FIR, thus the judgment relied by Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 in the case of Lalmuni Devi (Supra) is also not in dispute, as criminal proceedings and civil proceedings can go on simultaneously, if there are allegations of criminality and it is proved, both the cases can go simultaneously, however, it is well settled that if the criminality is not made out, the continuation of criminal case will amount to an abuse of the process of law, however, in the case in hand, the facts are different. Thus, the judgment, relied by learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 are not helping the O.P. No. 2. 18. The judgment relied by Mr. Das in the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Sanchaita Investments and Others (Supra), is also not in dispute and it is well settled that if a case is made out, investigation is not required to be stopped by the Court and the investigation is required to be concluded and in the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If on other hand, the court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for any unnecessary harassment to an individual. 19. Thus, in exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. there is no dispute with regard to parameters of taking a decision and the argument of Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the State that even after withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the criminal proceeding can be maintained is not accepted by the court. 20. In view of the facts, as discussed hereinabove, the ingredients of cheating is not made out, as intention of cheating from the very beginning is not there. The date of occurrence is shown as 20.05.2014 to 21.05.2014 and the FIR was lodged on 16.06.2021 after taking steps by way of filing the money suit and a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, which were subsequently withdrawn and the company has not been made an accused, ingredients of cheating is not made out. Law is well settled that if a wrong has been done by a company, the representative of the wrong doer can be proceeded with, where the company is made a party, which is lacking in the case in hand. 21. Law is well settled that if a wrong has been done by a company, the representative of the wrong doer can be proceeded with, where the company is made a party, which is lacking in the case in hand. 21. In view of the above facts and in the entire totality of the matter, considering the arguments of both the sides and for the reasons and analysis, it is a fit case to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 22. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings including the First Information Report, in connection with Dhurwa (T) P.S. Case No. 109 of 2021, registered for the offences under Sections 403, 406, 420, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi, is hereby, quashed. 23. As such, this petition is allowed and disposed of. Pending interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of.