JUDGMENT : 1. “The sword of Damocles” was a real sword hung over the head of Damocles in the court of King Dionysius II in Sicily in the 4th century B.C. Since then, this is an idiom used by all. If the case of the Greater Cochin Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as, “GCDA”) is accepted, “the sword of Damocles” will be hanging over everyone who purchases properties from GCDA, even if they have obtained the properties through registered sale deeds. The petitioners herein are the allottees of certain plots from GCDA. The plots were assigned in the name of the petitioners by registered sale deeds. Thereafter, notices were issued by the GCDA claiming additional amount. Whether such a claim is sustainable or not is the question to be decided in these cases. Since common issue is raised in all these writ petitions, I will dispose of these writ petitions by a common judgment. 2. The 1st petitioner, George Chummar in W.P.(C.) No. 12757/2010 was allotted plot No.49 by the GCDA under the Town Planning Scheme for Thottakkattukara, Aluva (hereinafter referred to as the “scheme”) in Survey Nos. 305, 306 and 308. Ext.P1 is the registered sale deed executed in favour of the 1st petitioner on 29.3.1983. The plot No.41 of the scheme was allotted originally to one Kumari Xavier by Ext.P2 registered sale deed executed on 23.11.1982. The 2nd petitioner, Fouziya Aboobacker in the above writ petition purchased the above plot from Kumari Xavier as per Ext.P3 registered assignment deed dated 18.2.1992. Subsequent to the registered sale deeds, after several years, the petitioners are served with Ext.P4 and P5 notices by the GCDA, claiming an additional amount of Rs.4,18,664/-and Rs.3,43,971/- respectively. 3. The petitioner, K.S Abdul in W.P.(C.) No. 21468/2013 purchased plot No.51 of the scheme from GCDA as per Ext.P1 registered sale deed dated 12.10.1983. Subsequent to this after about 30 years, the petitioner is served with Ext.P2 and P4 notices by the GCDA, claiming an additional amount. In W.P. (C.) No. 27050/2011, the 2nd petitioner, K.S Gopalakrishnan died pending the writ petition. His legal heir was impleaded as additional 3rd petitioner. The 1st petitioner, M.V Cherian and the deceased 2nd petitioner were allotted plot Nos. 31 and 54 of the scheme as per Exts.P1 and P2 registered sale deeds dated 10.6.1983 and 31.7.1987. In W.P. (C.) No. 27050/2011, the 2nd petitioner, K.S Gopalakrishnan died pending the writ petition. His legal heir was impleaded as additional 3rd petitioner. The 1st petitioner, M.V Cherian and the deceased 2nd petitioner were allotted plot Nos. 31 and 54 of the scheme as per Exts.P1 and P2 registered sale deeds dated 10.6.1983 and 31.7.1987. Subsequent to this after several years the petitioners are served with Ext.P12 to P14 notices from the GCDA, claiming additional amount. The petitioner, Mary Philip in W.P.(C.) No. 16440/2013 was allotted plot No.36 of the scheme as per Ext.P1 registered sale deed dated 20.11.1982. Subsequent to this after 30 years, the petitioner was served with Ext.P3 notice by the GCDA, claiming an additional amount of Rs.3,18,576/-. The petitioner, Dr. P.S. Herbert in W.P.(C.) No. 17911/2010 was allotted plot No. 7 of the scheme. As per Ext.P1 communication, the petitioner was informed that the full cost of the plot was paid and there was an excess amount of Rs. 215.31/-paid by the petitioner and the same was refunded to the petitioner. The property was assigned to the petitioner based on a registered sale deed. Exts.P2 and P3 are the tax receipts evidencing the payment of tax in the year 1999 and 2009. Ext.P6 is the sale deed. Subsequent to this after several years, the petitioner was served with Ext.P4 notice by the GCDA, claiming an additional amount of Rs.2,80,595/-. The petitioner, G.Krishnakumari in W.P.(C.) No. 25809/2011 was allotted plot No. 37 of the scheme and the property was assigned in the name of the petitioner, as per Ext.P1 sale deed in that writ petition dated 10.12.1982. Subsequent to this, after several years, the petitioner was served with Ext.P15 notice by the GCDA, claiming an additional amount of Rs.2,71,968/-. 4. In all these cases, the grievance of the petitioners is that after executing a registered sale deed in the name of the allottees, GCDA issued notices to the allottees claiming additional amount stating that there is excess payment in connection with the land acquisition proceedings and also there is excess payment to be paid for the land by the GCDA. Aggrieved by these notices, these writ petitions are filed. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for GCDA. 6. Aggrieved by these notices, these writ petitions are filed. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for GCDA. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the plots were assigned to the allottees based on registered assignment deeds and in the sale deeds, it was clearly stated that the entire consideration is received and the title and right in the property are conveyed to the allottees. Under such circumstances, it is submitted by the petitioners that the subsequent notices issued by the GCDA claiming additional amount is unsustainable and it is to be set aside. It is also submitted by the petitioners that in similar circumstances as evident by Ext.P9 judgment produced in W.P.(C.) No. 12757/2010, this Court has set aside similar notices. The counsel also relied on the judgments of the Apex Court and other High Courts to support their contentions. The learned Standing Counsels appearing for GCDA on the other hand took me through Exts. R3 & R4 produced in W.P.(C.) No. 16440/2013 and submitted that in similar circumstances, this Court was pleased to accept the case of the GCDA and refused to quash the notices issued by the GCDA for the payment of additional amount. However, Adv.T.M.Chandran, who appeared for the petitioner in W.P.(C.)No. 25809/2011 relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited and Others v. S.N.Raj Kumar and Another [ 2018 (6) SCC 410 ] and submitted that Exts.R3 and R4 produced in W.P.(C.) No. 16440/2013 will not stand in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the above decision. 7. This Court considered the contentions of the petitioners and the GCDA. It is an admitted fact that the properties were assigned to the allottees in these cases based on the registered sale deeds. It is also an admitted fact that the notices claiming additional amount was issued to the allottees in these cases subsequent to the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the allottees. In all the registered sale deeds, there is a common clause which says that the entire consideration amount is received and the vendor (GCDA) conveyed its entire right, title and interest to the vendee (allottees) in respect of the scheduled plot. It will be better to extract the above clause in Ext.P1 sale deed produced in W.P. (C.) No. 12757/2010. In all the registered sale deeds, there is a common clause which says that the entire consideration amount is received and the vendor (GCDA) conveyed its entire right, title and interest to the vendee (allottees) in respect of the scheduled plot. It will be better to extract the above clause in Ext.P1 sale deed produced in W.P. (C.) No. 12757/2010. “1. The party of the Second Part (Vendee) has made good to the Authority (Vendor) the consideration of Rs.89,298.37 (Rupees Eighty nine thousand Two Hundred and Ninety Eight and Paise Thirty Seven only) at the rate of Rs.6511/- per cent, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and the Authority (Vendor) thus hereby conveys its entire right, title and interest to the Vendee in respect of the scheduled plot.” 8. A perusal of the above clause in the sale deed will show that the entire right, title and interest of the GCDA in respect of the scheduled plot is conveyed to the vendee (allottee) after getting the entire consideration. 9. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines ‘Sale’. As per Section 54, ‘sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. The definition of sale indicates that there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another, which was possessed by the transferor and transferred to the transferee. It is true that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 says that sale is a transfer of property in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid or part-promised. The counsel for the GCDA stressed on this part of the definition and submitted that, there can be a sale even if the entire consideration is not paid and if there is a promise to pay or part-paid or part-promised. According to the Standing Counsel for the GCDA, as per the allotment letter issued to the allottees, it is clearly stated that the allottees are bound to pay additional cost of land, development charges and miscellaneous charges, if any, that may be fixed by the Board of Greater Cochin Development Authority. The Standing Counsel appearing for the GCDA took me through Ext.R(a) produced along with the counter affidavit in WP(C) No.12757 of 2010. The Standing Counsel appearing for the GCDA took me through Ext.R(a) produced along with the counter affidavit in WP(C) No.12757 of 2010. Ext.R(a) is the tender application for allotment of housing plot under the scheme, in which the 1st petitioner in that writ petition has signed. Similar tender applications were submitted by all the allottees, is the contention of the GCDA. The Standing Counsel for GCDA took me through the last portion of Ext.R(a), which is extracted hereunder: “I hereby agree to pay the additional cost of the land, development charges and miscellaneous charges (over and above the tentative price stated in the allotment order) if any, that may be fixed by the Board of Greater Cochin Development Authority.” 10. Ext.R(a) was submitted by the 1st petitioner in WP(C) No.12757 of 2010 on 15.09.1982. Ext.R(b) produced along with the counter affidavit in the above case states the conditions of allotment of the plots. The Standing Counsel took me through clauses 8, 10, 11 and 17 of the same. It will be better to extract the same hereunder: “8. The allottee shall be liable to pay additional land value as are found necessary due to further investment for development of the land or payment of enhanced land value in pursuance of order from court or government. The decision of the Board fixing sale price of such plots will be final.” xxxxx xxxxxx xxxx 10. The sale deed, indemnity bond and the agreement as the case may be executed at the expenses of the tenderer. The draft of the agreement, sale deed and indemnity bond are available in the office of the Greater Cochin Development Authority for reference. The conditions in the agreement shall form part of the conditions of allotment of plots.” 11. The allottee is entitled to get possession of the land as soon as the agreement is executed and registered. xxxxx xxxxxx xxxx 17. If the allottee violates or fails to perform any of the conditions set forth above, the Secretary may cancel the allotment of plot and resume possession of the land, of the improvements and of the structures, erected thereon from the allottee.” 11. It is the contention of the GCDA that in the light of the above clauses in Exts.R(a) and R(b), it is submitted that the allottees are bound to pay the additional amount. It is the contention of the GCDA that in the light of the above clauses in Exts.R(a) and R(b), it is submitted that the allottees are bound to pay the additional amount. It is submitted that in the light of the tender application and conditions in allotment order and agreement, the allottees are bound to pay the amount. It is also the contention of the GCDA that the allottees are bound by these conditions irrespective of whether these conditions are incorporated in the sale deeds executed in their favour or not. According to the counsel for the GCDA, the Government has refixed the value of the Puramboku land included in the scheme and has issued GO.No.260/09/Rev dated 07.07.2009 and as per the said Government Order, the enhanced value/cost for scheme was refixed as Rs.30,526/-per cent and as per Ext.R(e) which was produced along with the counter affidavit produced in WP(C) No.12757 of 2010, the General Council reduced the enhanced land cost at the rate of Rs.21473/-per cent and based on the same, the excess amount is claimed from the allottees. It is also submitted that the total expenditure incurred by the GCDA for the scheme and to provide common facilities like roads, open spaces, park etc. and payment of decree debts in LAR cases was equally distributed by GCDA among the allottees of the scheme, by taking the scheme as a whole. Hence the notices were issued to the allottees is the case. This Court is not in a position to accept the above contentions of the GCDA. Admittedly, the registered sale deeds are executed in favour of the allottees. It is also an admitted fact that there is no clause in the registered sale deeds to the effect that the allottees are liable to pay additional costs, if there are additional expenditure to the GCDA in connection with the scheme. The clause in the registered sale deeds is clear and unambiguous. It is stated that the entire consideration is received and the GCDA conveys its entire right, title and interest to the allottees in respect of the respective schedule plots mentioned in the registered sale deeds. The clause in the registered sale deeds is clear and unambiguous. It is stated that the entire consideration is received and the GCDA conveys its entire right, title and interest to the allottees in respect of the respective schedule plots mentioned in the registered sale deeds. After executing such a registered sale deeds with a clause that the entire consideration is received and the right, title and interest is conveyed to the allottees, GCDA cannot turn around and say that there are excess expenditure and the same is to be paid by the allottees. In the light of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the sale is complete in this case. The GCDA has no case in the respective registered sale deeds that the consideration is only promised or that the consideration is part-paid or part-promised. It is the admitted case of the GCDA in the registered sale deeds that the price/consideration is received. Thus making the sale complete. Under such circumstances, the GCDA cannot rely on the definition clause of sale mentioned in Section 54 that the sale is also possible if the price is promised or part-paid and part-promised. That is applicable only if there is a clause in the sale agreement that the consideration is promised or that the consideration is part-paid or part-promised. In the case in hand, there is no such clause in the registered sale deeds to the effect that the consideration is only promised or that the consideration is part-paid or part-promised. Under such circumstances, the sale in this case is complete once the sale deed is registered with a clause that the entire consideration is received and the GCDA has conveys its right, title and interest to the allottees. As I observed earlier, there is no dispute on this aspect to the effect that there was no such a clause in the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the allottees in these cases. The Apex Court in Dahiben v. Aravind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) Thr. LRS & ORS. [ 2020 (7) SCC 366 ] considered the definition of sale defined in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Apex Court in Dahiben v. Aravind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) Thr. LRS & ORS. [ 2020 (7) SCC 366 ] considered the definition of sale defined in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It will be better to extract the relevant portion-S of the above judgment: “15.3 The Plaintiffs have made out a case of alleged non-payment of a part of the sale consideration in the Plaint, and prayed for the relief of cancellation of the Sale Deed on this ground. S.54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides as under : “54. ‘Sale’ defined.—‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and partpromised.” The definition of “sale” indicates that there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another i.e. transfer of all rights and interest in the property, which was possessed by the transferor to the transferee. The transferor cannot retain any part of the interest or right in the property, or else it would not be a sale. The definition further indicates that the transfer of ownership has to be made for a “price paid or promised or part paid and part promised”. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. (1999 KHC 1091: (1999) 3 SCC 573 ): AIR 1999 SC 1441 ) this Court held that the words “price paid or promised or part paid and part promised” indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed is not a sine qua non for completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. The nonpayment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record. In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if the averments of the Plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the entire sale consideration had not in fact been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the Sale Deed. The Plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration, but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered Sale Deed.” 12. As I observed earlier, in the registered sale deeds executed in these cases in favour of the allottees, it is clearly stated that the entire consideration is received. If that is the case, in my opinion, the sale is complete in all these cases and the entire right, title and interest has been conveyed to the allottees by the GCDA. Therefore, any claim from the part of the GCDA for additional consideration for the plots after the execution of the registered sale deeds is unsustainable. 13. The counsel for the GCDA also relied on Exts.R(a) and R(b), which are the tender applications submitted by the allottees and the conditions of allotment of plots. It is true that in Ext.R(a) tender application, which was submitted by all the allottees, there is a clause to the effect that the allottees agree to pay additional cost of land, development charges and miscellaneous charges, if any, that may be fixed by the Board of GCDA over and above the tentative price stated in the allotment order. Admittedly after this tender application, the registered sale deeds were executed in favour of the allottees. As I observed earlier, admittedly, there is no clause in the registered sale deeds to the effect that there is any consideration, which is promised to be paid or there is any part-payment and part-promise of the consideration. Admittedly after this tender application, the registered sale deeds were executed in favour of the allottees. As I observed earlier, admittedly, there is no clause in the registered sale deeds to the effect that there is any consideration, which is promised to be paid or there is any part-payment and part-promise of the consideration. As long as such a clause is not there in the registered sale deeds, the GCDA cannot rely on the prior allotment order and the applications submitted by the allottees for tender applications. In other words, the letter of allotment and the other documents submitted by the alotte will not create a legal right to the GCDA after the registered sale deed, in which, no such clause is incorporated. 14. In addition to this, Ext.P9 judgment produced in W.P. (C)No.12757/2010 is on a similar situation. Ext.P8 produced in that writ petition was the sale deed of the allottee in that case in which there was no agreement to pay additional amount after the execution of the sale deed. Therefore, this Court quashed notices issued claiming the additional compensation. It will be better to extract the judgment dated 17.12.1992 in O.P.No.6102/1988. “The petitioner who purchased a plot of land out of survey No. 305/1A and 308/6-2 in Alwaye Municipal limits from the respondent No.1, challenges the legality of the demand contained in the letter dated 12.5.1988 (Ext. P2) made by the respondent No.1 for payment of additional price. In view of the enhanced compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act. 2) The respondents have not made any affidavit in answer to the petition. The respondents claim that the petitioner has agreed to make good all the future amounts payable under the Land Acquisition Award. In view of this agreement, they have called the petitioner to pay an additional sum of Rs.31,520.34 which the respondent No.1 is now liable to pay the owner whose land was acquired and sold to the petitioner. I have gone through the sale deed, there is no such agreement by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner is not bound to pay the amount claimed by the letter dated 12.5.1988. 3) The petition is therefore allowed. The letter No.23181/400C9/87/GCDA dated 12.5.1988 is quashed.” 15. The above judgment is not challenged and it became final. I have gone through the sale deed, there is no such agreement by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner is not bound to pay the amount claimed by the letter dated 12.5.1988. 3) The petition is therefore allowed. The letter No.23181/400C9/87/GCDA dated 12.5.1988 is quashed.” 15. The above judgment is not challenged and it became final. Therefore the GCDA cannot take a different stand in the case of the allottees in these writ petitions because Ext.P9 is binding on GCDA. The GCDA then relied on Exts.R1(d) and R1(e) produced along with the counter affidavit filed in W.P. (C)No.27050/2011. Ext.R1(d) is the judgment of this Court in O.P.No.9387/1994 in which this Court observed that the sale deed executed is only a continuation of the terms of offer made by the GCDA and hence the purchaser has to pay the enhanced compensation due on the acquired property even after the execution of the sale deed. The above judgment was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court as per judgment dated 13.06.1996 in W.A.No.835/1996 which is produced as Ext.R1(e) in the counter filed in the above case. 16. However, I am not in a position to accept the dictum laid down in Exts.R1(d) and R1(e) judgments in the light of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation’s case (Supra)[ 2018 (6) SCC 410 ]. In the above case the point discussed by the Apex Court is that if a sale deed has been executed by the appellant Corporation which, results in conferring upon the respondents absolute ownership of the plots in question, whether the appellant Corporation has the power to cancel the allotment or to claim additional amount towards consideration. It will be better to extract the relevant portions of the judgment in the above case. “17. Section 55 of the Act deals with rights and liabilities of buyer and seller. As per this provision, when the buyer discharges obligations and seller passes/ conveys the ownership of the property, the contract is concluded. Thereafter, the liabilities, obligations and rights, if any, between the buyer and seller would be governed by other provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act, on the execution of the sale deed. The seller cannot unilaterally cancel the conveyance or sale. 18. Thereafter, the liabilities, obligations and rights, if any, between the buyer and seller would be governed by other provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act, on the execution of the sale deed. The seller cannot unilaterally cancel the conveyance or sale. 18. Insofar as the judgment in Indu Kakkar case is concerned, the High Court has rightly held that that would not apply to the facts of this case. On the facts of that case, the Court, in the first instance, came to the conclusion that Clause 7 of the agreement, which was entered into between the parties, was binding. As per Clause 7, construction of the building for setting up the industry, in respect of which land was given to the appellant in that case, was to start within a period of six months and the construction had to be completed within two years from the date of issue of the allotment letters. Since the appellant had failed to commence or build the construction within the stipulated time, show-cause notice has been issued as to why the plot be not resumed as per Clause 7 of the agreement. In this backdrop, the appellant had challenged the enforceability of Clause 7 of the agreement taking aid of Section 11 of the Act. This contention was repelled in the following manner: (SCC p. 43, paras 16 & 17). 16. However, the allottee has contended before the trial court that Clause 7 of the Agreement is unenforceable in view of Section 11 of the TP Act. But that contention was repelled, according to us, rightly because the deed of conveyance had not created any absolute interest in favour of the allottee in respect of the plot conveyed. For a transferee to deal with interest in the property transferred "as if there were no such direction" regarding the particular manner of enjoyment of the property, the instrument of transfer should evidence that an absolute interest in favour of the transferee has been created. This is clearly discernible from Section 11 of the TP Act. The section rests on a principle that any condition which is repugnant to the interest created is void and when property is transferred absolutely, it must be done with all its legal incidents. That apart, Section 31 of the TP Act is enough to meet the aforesaid contention. This is clearly discernible from Section 11 of the TP Act. The section rests on a principle that any condition which is repugnant to the interest created is void and when property is transferred absolutely, it must be done with all its legal incidents. That apart, Section 31 of the TP Act is enough to meet the aforesaid contention. The section provides that : 'On a transfer of property an interest therein may be created with the condition superadded that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen'. Illustration (b) to the section makes the position clear, and it reads: (b) A transfers a farm to B, provided that, if B shall not go to England within three years after the date of the transfer, his interest in the farm shall cease. B does not go to England within the term prescribed. His interest in the farm ceases." 17. All that Section 32 of the Transfer of Property Act provides is that "in order that a condition that an interest shall cease to exist may be valid, it is necessary, that the event to which it relates be one which could legally constitute the condition of the creation of an interest'. If the condition is invalid, it cannot be set up as a condition precedent for crystallisation of the interest created. The condition that the industrial unit shall be established within a specified period failing which the interest shall cease, is a valid condition. Clause 7 of the Agreement between the parties is, therefore, valid and is binding on the parties thereto." 19. This legal position is not disputed. However, in the instant case, there was no such stipulation in the agreement to sell or the sale deed. It was in the allotment letter. On the contrary, insofar as Clause 7 of the sale deeds executed is concerned, the only condition imposed is that the purchaser shall use the land for the purpose of putting up a factory or factories duly permitted by the competent authority and for no other purpose. This makes all the difference between the two cases. Here, the undisputed fact is that the agreements/sale deeds entered into between the appellant Corporation and the respondents do not contain any clause which can be construed as "condition-super-added". ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………….. 22. This makes all the difference between the two cases. Here, the undisputed fact is that the agreements/sale deeds entered into between the appellant Corporation and the respondents do not contain any clause which can be construed as "condition-super-added". ………………………………………………………………………………… ……………….. 22. In view of the above, it is not necessary to deal with the argument as to whether doctrine of proportionality is applicable in the instant case or not. It is to be borne in mind, as rightly held by the High Court, that the appellant Corporation had withdrawn the action of cancellation of the plots. Instead, it demanded 50% of the prevailing market value in lump sum towards the cost of the plots. There is no legal basis for such a demand, more so, after the registration of the sale deeds in favour of the respondents thereby transferring the ownership in these plots in their favour.” 17. The Apex Court has clearly stated that there is no legal basis for a demand made after the registration of sale deeds in favour of the respondents and thereby transferring the ownership of the plots in their favour. The above dictum is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of these cases. In the light of the above judgment, the decision relied by the GCDA as evident by Exts.R1(d) and R1(e) produced in W.P.(C)No.27050/2011 cannot be accepted. 18. The Standing counsel appearing for the GCDA in W.P. (C)No.21468/2013 took me through Clause (5) of Ext.P1 sale deed in that case in which it is stated that, the Vendee shall also be bound by the covenants contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the sale deed. In Article 3 and 4, it is stated that the sites have been offered for allotment and sale by inviting application thereof. It is also stated that the Vendee of the Second Part has applied to Vendor, the GCDA for allotment and sale of plot No.51 of the scheme which is described in the schedule mentioned. Under such circumstances, the allotment letter and conditions of allotment are applicable to the allottees is the contention raised by GCDA. I cannot agree with the above contention also. Those are only introductory clauses in the sale deed. Clause 1 of the sale deed clearly states that the Vendor received the entire consideration and conveys its entire right title and interest to the Vendee in respect of the scheduled plot. I cannot agree with the above contention also. Those are only introductory clauses in the sale deed. Clause 1 of the sale deed clearly states that the Vendor received the entire consideration and conveys its entire right title and interest to the Vendee in respect of the scheduled plot. In the light of the same, I am of the considered opinion that, simply because in Article 3 and 4 of Ext.P1 sale deed in that case it is mentioned about the allotment letter and the scheme, the clauses in the allotment letter and the conditions of allotment are not applicable as the sale deed is executed with a clause that the entire consideration is received. Hence, the prior documents has no validity at all. 19. Article 300A of the Constitution says that no person shall be deprived of his property saved by the authority of law. Once the sale deeds are registered in favour of the allottees, the allottees becames the absolute owners of the properties. The GCDA cannot issue demand notice claiming excess amount without a backing of law after the sale deeds are registered in favour of the allottees in which it is specifically stated that the entire consideration is received and the entire right and title is conveyed to the allottees. The GCDA cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point out some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. Otherwise, such actions will violates Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In my opinion, the notices were issued by the GCDA after the registered sale deed was executed in favour of the allottees in which it is specifically stated that the entire consideration is received and the right title and interest is conveyed, will hit the mandate in Article 300A of the Constitution. 20. The counsel appearing for the GCDA also relied on the judgments of this Court in W.P.(C)Nos.26230/2010 and 2192/2013. It is produced in the additional counter affidavit filed in W.P.(C)No.21468/2013. 20. The counsel appearing for the GCDA also relied on the judgments of this Court in W.P.(C)Nos.26230/2010 and 2192/2013. It is produced in the additional counter affidavit filed in W.P.(C)No.21468/2013. First of all, the judgment in W.P. (C)No.26230/2010 is not applicable to the facts of these cases because as per the recitals in the sale deed in that case, it was clearly stated that what was paid was only the tentative charges and that the petitioner had agreed to be liable to make good all further amounts, if any, payable under the final land acquisition award and future dues owing to any increase in miscellaneous and developmental charges. In these cases, there is no such clause in the sale deeds. Therefore, the judgment dated 24.06.2016 in W.P.(C)No.26230/2010 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of these cases. The judgment in W.P.(C)No. 2192/2013 is mainly relying on the judgment in O.P.No.9387/1994 which was confirmed in W.A.No.835/1996. This Court already found that the above judgments will not stand in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited's case (supra). Therefore in all these cases, the notices issued to the petitioners claiming additional amount is unsustainable. 21. Construction of a house is a dream of every citizen of this country. They spend their hard-earned money to construct their dream houses. The houses constructed by the citizens vary according to their capability. A palatial house constructed by a millioner and a small hut constructed by a coolie worker will come within the definition of a home. Both are constructed with their hard-earned money. Once the property is assigned to the allottees for the purpose of construction of house, the right of the vendors like GCDA in this case will end. There cannot be any threat for additional consideration in such situation from the GCDA like a “Damocles sword” on the head of the Vendees. In these cases, some of the lands were registered and assigned in favour of the allottees in 1982. Now 40 years have elapsed. Major portion of the life of a person will be over after 40 years. Even now the “Damocles sword” of GCDA is there on the head of the allottees in these cases. In these cases, some of the lands were registered and assigned in favour of the allottees in 1982. Now 40 years have elapsed. Major portion of the life of a person will be over after 40 years. Even now the “Damocles sword” of GCDA is there on the head of the allottees in these cases. I am of the opinion that these “Damocles sword” should be cut and removed forthwith and the allottees should be declared as absolute owners of the properties. Moreover, in my opinion, there is some laches on the part of the officials of GCDA also in these cases. Several cases are coming before this Court with same grievance. In some cases, in the sale deed, there are clauses which says that the amount of consideration is tentative. For example, in the case dealt with by this Court earlier in W.P.(C)No.26230/2010 there was a clause which says that the GCDA can claim excess amount even after the sale deed. Whether that clause is sustainable or not is a different question and I leave open that question to be decided in the appropriate cases. But in these cases, the sale deed lacks such clauses. I am surprised to see such a sale deed in which the GCDA says that even at the time of execution of sale deed, the GCDA is of the opinion that there would be some excess payment to be paid by the allottees. If that is the case, why is such a clause is not inserted in the sale deeds is a question to be investigated. I am of the opinion that, that the government must find if there is any foul play on the part of the officials of the GCDA in charge at that time. For that purpose, the Registry can be directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Local Self Government Department, State of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram who will conduct an enquiry and if it is found that there is any misconduct from the then office bearers or officials of the GCDA, the money lost by the GCDA should be recovered from those persons by resorting to the revenue recovery proceedings, after giving them an opportunity of being heard. With the above observations, these writ petitions are allowed in the following manner: i. Exts.P4 and P5 notices dated 24.02.2010 and 23.02.2010 respectively produced in W.P.(C)No.12757/2010 are quashed. ii. With the above observations, these writ petitions are allowed in the following manner: i. Exts.P4 and P5 notices dated 24.02.2010 and 23.02.2010 respectively produced in W.P.(C)No.12757/2010 are quashed. ii. Exts.P12 to P14 in W.P.(C)No.27050/2011 are quashed and the respondents are directed to issue No Objection Certificate to effect mutation in the name of the petitioners based on Exts.P1 and P2 sale deeds forthwith, if not already done. iii. Exts.P2 and P4 in W.P.(C)No.21468/2013 are quashed. iv. Ext.P3 in W.P.(C)No.16440/2013 is quashed. v. Ext.P4 in W.P.(C)No.17911/2010 is quashed. vi. Exts.P5, P8, P12 and P15 in W.P. (C)No.25809/2011 are quashed and the respondents are directed to issue No Objection Certificate to the petitioner for effecting mutation in the name of the petitioner with respect to the property included in Ext.P1 sale deed forthwith. vii. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Local Self Government Department, State of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, who will conduct an enquiry and find out whether there is any laches on the part of the then office bearers of the GCDA or the officials of the GCDA in not incorporating a clause in the sale deeds in these cases for getting the additional amount, if any. If it is found that the then office bearers or the officials of the GCDA are responsible, the amount lost by the GCDA should be recovered from them invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, after giving an opportunity of hearing to them.