JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. TT Tara, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. L Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Arunachal Pradesh. 2. The present application is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing and setting aside of the charge-sheet No. 49/2016 dated 17.10.2016 under Section 354/342/506 IPC arising out of Ziro Police Station Case No. 63/2016 dated 29.07.2016. The further challenge is the order dated 17.10.2016 by the learned trial court below framing charges under Section 354A/342/506 of IPC. 3. The background fact of the present case is that a criminal proceeding was lodged by way of an FIR dated 29.07.2016 by the petitioner No. 2 in the present petition, inter-alia, alleging the following: “On 28th July, 2016 at around 13.30 to 14.00 hrs one Dr. Moli Riba, DMO Ziro call me in his office chamber for preparing some official document. Meanwhile, he abused, molested and attempts to rape me in his office chamber at day light by kissing and press my breast. Then I am fully resisted against him and shout. When I resist & tried to shout he closed my mouth and left me. Further, he also threatening me for dire consequences if I am reveals the incident to anybody. Later I received sorry message from one unknown number i.e. 8794520263 at around 3 PM.” 4. On receipt of the said FIR, the Ziro Police Station Case No. 63/2016 dated 29.07.2016 under Section 354/506/511/342/376 IPC was registered. Subsequently, after completion of investigation, the I/O laid the charge-sheet as discussed hereinabove and thereafter the learned trial court below framed charges under Section 354A/342/506 IPC. 5. During the pendency of the said criminal proceeding, the petitioners herein entered into a compromise agreement wherein the petitioner No. 1 was the first party and the petitioner No. 2 was the second party. 5. During the pendency of the said criminal proceeding, the petitioners herein entered into a compromise agreement wherein the petitioner No. 1 was the first party and the petitioner No. 2 was the second party. The relevant portion of the said agreement, for determination of present litigation is quoted hereinbelow: “Whereas, on 28.07.2016 at around 13.32 to 14 hrs the First Party who posted as DMO, Ziro and being the Head of the Office had called upon the Second Party in his Office Chamber for typing out for the advertisement of MTS and PMW and having found some mistakes in typing, the First Party was angry with her which let to scold the Second Party for mistake in typing out the advertisement as because draft copy of advertisement was sought by the Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, Lower Subansiri District, Arunachal Pradesh. As a result, a hot argument between the parties which led to pull and push and the Second Party had left the DMO, Ziro office premises immediately after the incident. Whereas, on 29.07.2016 out of anger, felt humiliated and out of frustration the Second Party had filed a complaint against the First Party before the OC, PS Ziro, Lowar Subansiri District, Arunachal Pradesh and on the receipt of the same, the OC, PS, Ziro had registered a case as Ziro P.S. case No. 63/2016 under Section 354/376/506/342 IPC. On 17.10.2016, after the completion of investigation of the said case, the Investigating Officer had submitted a charge sheet No. C/S vide ZPS C/S No. 49/2016 dated 17.10.2016 against the First Party under Section 354/342/506 IPC. As the previous registered Sections 376/511 IPC was dropped by the Investigation Officer while submitting a charge sheet, since there was no materials found established against the First Party (accused). Thereafter, the case was transferred to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia for trial of the case which was registered as GR No. 103/2016 correspond Ziro P.S. case No. 63/2016. Accordingly, on 26.05.2017, the case was listed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia for consideration of Charges against the First Party and upon hearing of the parties, the learned CJM, Yupia had framed charges against the accused (First Party) under Section 354(A)/342/506 IPC only. Therefore, instant case is at the stage of evidence of Prosecution Witnesses and is presently pending before the learned CJM, Yupia for trial” 6. Therefore, instant case is at the stage of evidence of Prosecution Witnesses and is presently pending before the learned CJM, Yupia for trial” 6. On the basis of the aforesaid settlement amongst others, the present petitioners came to a mutual term to the following effect: “4. That, appreciating this Mutual Settlement, the Second Party has agreed not to precede the charge sheet No. C/S Vide ZPS C/S No. 49/2016 dated 17.10.2016, registered under Section 354/376/506/511/342 IPC and charges framed under Section 354 (A)/ 342/506 IPC by the learned CJM, Yupia against the First Party which is pending for trial before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia as the GR case No. 103/2016.” 7. Thereafter, they have preferred this present application for quashing of the aforesaid criminal proceeding on the basis of mutual settlement. 8. In the aforesaid backdrop, this court is now to decide whether this is a fit case wherein this court can and should exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceeding initiated by GR case No. 103/2016. 9. It is by now settled that a High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can very well quash a criminal proceeding or a criminal complaint under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., but while doing so, the Court is to follow certain principles as enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh –Vs- State of Punjab and Another reported in 2012 10 SCC 303 , and in State of Madhya Pradesh –Vs- Laxmi Narayan and Others reported in 2019 5 SCC 688 . 10. For ready reference, paragraph-13 of State of Madhya Pradesh & Laxmi Narayan (Supra) is extracted herein below: “13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.” 11. Coming to the case in hand, it is apparent that both the petitioners worked in the same office, the petitioner No. 1 was the superior authority and the petitioner No. 2 was the sub-ordinate staff under the petitioner No. 1. The allegation is basically outraging of modesty. 12. Perusal of the statement recorded by the I/O under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of different staffs of the office, who were present in the office on the relevant date discloses that they have not heard any sound inside the chamber of the petitioner No. 1 nor they saw both of them inside the chamber, though in the FIR it was alleged that after the petitioner No. 1 attempted to outrage the modesty of the petitioner No. 2 had raised hue and cry. 13. From both the FIR as well as 161 statement of the petitioner No. 2/ victim discloses that the alleged incident occurred while the petitioner No. 1 asked the petitioner No. 2 to get certain things typed inasmuch as the petitioner No. 2 was working as a data entry operator. 14. The agreement discloses that due to mistake in typing the petitioner No. 1 rebuked the petitioner No. 2 and hot argument between the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 took place and same led to pull and push and in that premises the FIR was lodged. 14. The agreement discloses that due to mistake in typing the petitioner No. 1 rebuked the petitioner No. 2 and hot argument between the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 took place and same led to pull and push and in that premises the FIR was lodged. 15. In view of such clear disclosure by the petitioner No. 2 in the agreement dated 02.08.2022, this court is of the considered opinion that even if the matter proceeds and such stand is taken by the petitioner No. 2 before the learned trial court also the petitioner No. 1 cannot be convicted under Section 354A IPC. 16. Considering the aforesaid fact and nature of allegation and also taking note of the material available on record including the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the charge-sheet, this court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case where this court can exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceeding initiated by GR case No.103/2016 inasmuch as in view of the stand taken by the petitioner No. 2, the offences has become private dispute between the parties. 17. Accordingly, this petition is allowed by setting aside and quashing the charge-sheet No. 49/2016 dated 17.10.2016 under Section 354/342/506 IPC arising out of Ziro Police Station Case No. 63/2016 dated 29.07.2016.