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2022 DIGILAW 1070 (KAR)

Syed Sahil @ Krishnamurthy, S/o. Sugandraj @ Rahaman v. State by Shivamogga Rural Police Station, Rep. by State Public Prosecutor

2022-08-16

K.SOMASHEKAR, PRADEEP SINGH YERUR

body2022
JUDGMENT : This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered by the Court of the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Shivamogga, in S.C.No.141/2015 dated 03.03.2016. By the said judgment, the appellant / accused has been convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- along with default clause. 2. This appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, by urging various grounds and seeking for consideration of the grounds urged therein and to set aside the judgment of conviction rendered by the Trial Court in S.C.No.141/2015 dated 03.03.2016. 3. We have heard Smt. Priyanka S. Angadi, learned counsel for the appellant / accused and so also the learned Addl. SPP for the State. Perused the judgment of conviction and order of sentence in S.C.No.141/2015 consisting of the evidence of PW-1 to PW-11 and so also the documents at Exhibits P1 to 24 inclusive of material objects namely MO-1 to MO-6. 4. Factual matrix of the appeal is as under: It transpires from the case of the prosecution that accused namely Syed Sahil @ Krishnamurthy fell in love with deceased Seema Thasleem and married her about 7 years prior to the incident by getting himself converted from Hinduism to Islam religion. They have two children from their wedlock. It is stated that after their marriage, the accused and deceased were residing in a rented house owned by Smt. Nirmala, W/o. Ananda, situated at Indira Badavane, Gurupura, 5th Cross, Shivamogga. However, on 06.05.2015 at about 2.30 to 3.00 a.m. in the said rented house, it is stated that the accused Syed Sahil @ Krishnamurthy had committed the murder of his wife Seema Thasleema by assaulting on her head with a chopper. As a result of the assault made by the accused, it is stated that she suffered severe bleeding injuries and died. 5. On filing of a complaint by the complainant, criminal law was set into motion by registering a case in Cr.No.282/2015 for offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860. Subsequent to registration of the crime against the accused, the Investigating Officer had taken up the case for investigation and conducted investigation thoroughly and laid the charge-sheet against the accused before the Committal Court in C.C.No.613/2015. Subsequent to registration of the crime against the accused, the Investigating Officer had taken up the case for investigation and conducted investigation thoroughly and laid the charge-sheet against the accused before the Committal Court in C.C.No.613/2015. Subsequent to laying of a charge-sheet by the I.O., the Committal Court passed a committal order as contemplated under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., thereby committing the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. Subsequently, the case was assigned to the Court of the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Shivamogga in S.C.No.141/2015. Having heard the learned Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel regarding framing of charge against the accused and prima facie case having been found against the accused, charges were framed against the accused for offences under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860. However, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the plea of the accused was recorded separately. 6. Subsequent to framing of charge, the prosecution had let in evidence by subjecting to examination in all PW-1 to PW-11 and got marked several documents at Exhibits P1 to P24 and so also got marked material objects such as MO-1 to MO-6. Subsequent to closure of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the accused was subjected to examination as contemplated under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, incriminating statement was recorded whereby the accused denied the truth of the evidence of the prosecution adduced so far. Subsequent to recording incriminating statement, the accused was called upon to enter into defence evidence if any. But the accused did not come forward to adduce any defence evidence. Accordingly, it was recorded. Subsequently, the Trial Court heard the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and the defence counsel for the accused. Perused the averments made in the complaint at Exhibit P1 and so also the evidence of PW-1 / Rahamathunnisa Begum, the sister of the deceased. Similarly, PW-2 / Habibunnisa, also another sister of the deceased and PW-3 / Ashvas, brother of the deceased. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 being consistent with the averments made in the complaint at Exhibit P1 and so also fulcrum of the Inquest mahazar at Exhibit P2 and Seizure mahazar at Exhibit P4 and so also the injuries inflicted over the person of the deceased as indicated at Exhibit P8 of the PM report. PW-9 / Dr. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 being consistent with the averments made in the complaint at Exhibit P1 and so also fulcrum of the Inquest mahazar at Exhibit P2 and Seizure mahazar at Exhibit P4 and so also the injuries inflicted over the person of the deceased as indicated at Exhibit P8 of the PM report. PW-9 / Dr. Chidananda is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. Exhibit P-16 is the disclosure statement of the accused. This statement was recorded by the I.O. during the course of investigation and even based upon the disclosure statement, mahazar has been drawn by the I.O. and even drawn the mahazar at Exhibit P17 in the presence of panch witnesses. Evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 found corroborated with the evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 being the panch witnesses and the seizure mahazar at Exhibit P4. Similarly, found that they were in conformity with the evidence of PW-8 / Narasimhaiah PSI who arrested the accused during the course of investigation. PW-8 is the I.O. who investigated the case thoroughly and drew the mahazar in the presence of panch witnesses and filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the Committal Court. These are the evidence let in by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution has given much credence to the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 and so also the evidence of PW-9 Doctor who conducted post-mortem over the dead body and issued a PM report at Exhibit P8 and also convinced with the evidence of PW-11 being the I.O. who conducted thorough investigation following the requisite provisions of the Cr.P.C., and hence, after hearing the arguments advanced by the prosecution as well as the Defence counsel for the accused, has proceeded to convict the accused. But this accused is none other than the husband of the deceased Seema Thasleem and she had been blessed with two children. There was a love affair developed between accused and deceased prior to their marriage. Hence, by converting his religion from Hinduism to Islam and changing his name from Krishnamurthy to Syed Sahil, the accused married the said Seema Thasleem. Though they were blessed with two children, it is stated that the accused / appellant herein was quarrelling with his wife by suspecting her fidelity. Hence, by converting his religion from Hinduism to Islam and changing his name from Krishnamurthy to Syed Sahil, the accused married the said Seema Thasleem. Though they were blessed with two children, it is stated that the accused / appellant herein was quarrelling with his wife by suspecting her fidelity. The accused was working as a Hamali and deceased was working as a Teacher in Savinaya School. Despite of the fact of their love marriage, the accused is said to have even gone to her workplace and quarreled with her and insulted her. Due to that, the deceased Seema Thasleem even resigned her job. However, still suspecting her fidelity, the accused is said to have committed the murder of the deceased by assaulting her with a chopper marked as MO-1. PWs 1 to 3 being the sisters and brother of the deceased Seema Thasleem, had given sufficient evidence relating to the motive of the deceased to commit the murder of the accused. Further, the recovery of the chopper at MO-1 based on the voluntary statement of the accused also having proved the fact of the accused having committed the murder of the deceased, the Trial Court on examining the entire evidence on record inclusive of the material witnesses, has convicted the accused / appellant herein for the offences under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. It is this judgment which is under challenge in this appeal by urging various grounds. 7. The learned counsel Smt. Priyanka S. Angadi for the appellant / accused has taken us through the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 relating to the complaint at Exhibit P1. She contends that the Trial Court has rendered a conviction judgment without looking into the evidence let in by the prosecution. Therefore, in this appeal, it requires for intervention of the said judgment. If not, the same would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice and the accused who is the gravamen of the accusation would be the sufferer. Even on the material available on record, the Trial Court ought to have held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused in view of the fact that the evidence placed on record by the prosecution is highly insufficient and unacceptable to prove the motive of the deceased. Even on the material available on record, the Trial Court ought to have held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused in view of the fact that the evidence placed on record by the prosecution is highly insufficient and unacceptable to prove the motive of the deceased. It is further contended that the Trial Court has based its conviction on the testimony of only interested witnesses and the learned Sessions Judge ought to have discarded the evidence of those witnesses. Further, it is contended that the Trial Judge erred in not noticing the fact that there is no eye-witness to the alleged incident and further that other witnesses have also not deposed anything about the involvement of the accused / appellant in the alleged incident. Hence, it is contended that the Trial Court has erred in convicting the accused for offences under Section 302 of the IPC. 8. The second limb of arguments advanced by the learned counsel is as regards the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 who were related to the deceased. It is contended that on a close examination of these witnesses, their evidence is found to be inconsistent and also much of exaggeration is seen in their evidence though there is no overt act attributed against the accused. Hence, it is contended that the entire case is based on circumstantial evidence. On looking into the evidence of these witnesses namely PW-1 to PW-3, the Trial Court ought to have held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused by facilitating worthwhile evidence namely positive evidence which is corroborative in nature to prove the guilt against the accused. 9. Lastly, the learned counsel points out the evidence of PW-11 / R.V. Gangadharappa, the I.O who laid the charge-sheet against the accused by conducting seizure mahazar at Exhibit P4 in the presence of PW-5 and PW-6. But PW-8 / Narasimhaiah is the I.O in part who had apprehended the accused during the course of investigation. The PM report at Exhibit P8 issued by PW-9 / Dr. Chidananda who even issued Exhibit P9 report indicates the injuries inflicted over the person of the deceased. But the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused by facilitating worthwhile evidence. 10. The PM report at Exhibit P8 issued by PW-9 / Dr. Chidananda who even issued Exhibit P9 report indicates the injuries inflicted over the person of the deceased. But the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused by facilitating worthwhile evidence. 10. There is total inconsistency insofar as the statement recorded by the I.O. The inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 though goes to cut the root of the prosecution theory, but the same was not considered by the Trial Court. Therefore, in this appeal, it requires to be interfered and also requires to closely scrutinize the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 and PW-9 being the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body and issued PM report at Exhibit P1 and so also inflicted injuries using the chopper suspecting her fidelity. But no material evidence has been let in by the prosecution to prove the guilt against the accused relating to the murder of his wife. In view of the fact that the accused had converted to Islam religion and changed his name as Syed Sahil in order to marry the deceased Seema Thasleem belonging to Muslim religion, his relationship with his family members was strained. The prosecution totally examined PW-1 to PW-11 and marked documents at Exhibits P1 to P24 and material objects namely MO-1 to MO-6. PW-1 / Rehmatunnisa Begum is none other than the elder sister of the deceased. The said PW-1 in her cross-examination deposed that she did not know who murdered her sister Seema Thasleem. She has also deposed that on the date of the incident, the appellant / accused had gone to the police station along with his minor son and that she had seen him in the police station at 6.00 a.m. on the date of the incident. She has further deposed that she had submitted the complaint at Exhibit P1 when she was in her house. These inconsistent statements of PW-1 reveals that she had no first hand information about the alleged incident. 11. Further, PW-2 / Habibunnisa, being another sister of the deceased has deposed in her evidence that on the date of the incident, the police had come to her house and knocked the door and enquired about the residence of the deceased, her sister. 11. Further, PW-2 / Habibunnisa, being another sister of the deceased has deposed in her evidence that on the date of the incident, the police had come to her house and knocked the door and enquired about the residence of the deceased, her sister. She had answered that she was not in talking terms with the appellant / accused and also has deposed that she did not know for what reason the deceased was murdered. She has further deposed that she had never visited the house of the deceased and it was for the first time that she had gone to the house of the deceased on the date of the incident, along with the police. She had also deposed that she was not at all aware about the family affairs of the deceased. 12. PW-3 / Ashwash being the elder brother of the deceased has deposed that he did not know for what reason the deceased was murdered. He had also stated that the appellant himself had gone to the police station on the date of the incident. Hence, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Trial Court had failed to note that PWs 1, 2 and 3 were the sisters and brother of the deceased and were closely related to the deceased. But they did not know about the family affairs of the deceased and also they were not in talking terms with each other. Hence, the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 would not help the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. The evidence of these witnesses when read together, reveals that prior to registration of the complaint at Exhibit P1 on 06.05.2015, the police had information about the alleged incident of murder of the deceased. The complainant / PW-1 in her evidence has deposed that she handed over the complaint when she was in her house and thereafter she never visited the police station. Further, she had no first hand information about the cause of murder and who actually committed it. However, the evidence placed on record by PW-1 to PW-3 reveals that the appellant was in the police station as at 6.00 a.m. on the date of the incident, even prior to the registration of the complaint by the complainant. Further, she had no first hand information about the cause of murder and who actually committed it. However, the evidence placed on record by PW-1 to PW-3 reveals that the appellant was in the police station as at 6.00 a.m. on the date of the incident, even prior to the registration of the complaint by the complainant. The complaint at Exhibit P1 was registered at 7.00 a.m. on the same day, which reveals that the police had first hand information about the cause of murder of the deceased and who actually committed it. Hence, it is contended that the police had suppressed the truth and managed to register a false case against the accused, to suit their convenience at the instigation of the family members of the deceased. 13. In view of the fact that accused and deceased married against the wishes of their respective family members, there was a strong ill will and enmity between the family members of deceased with that of the accused. PWs 1 to 3 though were close relatives of the deceased, were inimical with the deceased. In view of the said fact, the Trial Court ought to have appreciated the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 with great caution before convicting the accused. Hence, it is contended that the Trial Judge committed a serious error in relying upon the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 to hold the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. It is also contended that PW-4 / Ramalingam and PW-7 / Sujatha who were residing by the side of the house of the deceased at Gurupura, Shivamogga, were material witnesses to the case of the prosecution. Both of them having resided nearby to the house of the deceased, they might have had knowledge about of cause of death of the deceased. However, both PW-4 and PW-7 have not deposed anything against the appellant. Further, though the 161 statement of PW-4 / Ramalingam has been recorded by the police as per Exhibit P3, he has stated that he has not at all given such a statement before the police. Even though the 161 statement of PW-7 / Sujatha has been recorded by the police as per Exhibit P5, she has as well deposed in her evidence that she has not given such a statement. Even though the 161 statement of PW-7 / Sujatha has been recorded by the police as per Exhibit P5, she has as well deposed in her evidence that she has not given such a statement. Even the landlord of the house where the deceased and accused resided namely Anand / PW-10 has not deposed anything against the appellant. Hence, it is contended that there is absolutely no evidence as regards the alleged motive to commit the homicidal murder of the deceased. Without appreciating the evidence of PWs 4, 7 and 10, the Trial Court has committed a serious error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 14. Though Recovery Panchanama namely Exhibit P4 for recovery of MO-1 / Chopper was conducted in the presence of Mohammad Rafiq / PW-5 and he had deposed in his examination-in-chief that on 6.5.2015 at 12.00 noon he had gone to the police station where the police took his signature, in the cross-examination he has deposed that he did not know the contents of the mahazar at Exhibit P4. This inconsistency has also been ignored by the Trial Court while convicting the accused. Another witness to the Recovery mahazar namely Imthiyaz Ulla / PW-6 has deposed that on 6.5.2015 when he went to the police station at 12.30 p.m., he saw PW-5 / Mohammad Rafiz in the police station. Further that he signed Exhibit P4 in the police station. However, the contents of Exhibit P4 / Recovery mahazar reveals that the same was drawn on 6.5.2015 in the house of the deceased at Gurupura Shivamogga and not at the police station. It is contended that the said circumstance shows that Exhibit P4 is a got up document created in the police station though there was no recovery at all made by the police. These discrepancies have been lost sight of by the Trial Court while rendering a conviction judgment. 15. Further, the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 reveals that on 06.05.2015, the appellant was in the custody of the police. However, the examination-in-chief of Narasimhaiah / PW-8 who is said to have registered the case as on 06.05.2015 at 7.00 am reveals that he had gone to Vidyanagar Railway Station, Shivamogga at about 10.30 a.m. where he apprehended the appellant and produced before the Inspector of Police. However, the examination-in-chief of Narasimhaiah / PW-8 who is said to have registered the case as on 06.05.2015 at 7.00 am reveals that he had gone to Vidyanagar Railway Station, Shivamogga at about 10.30 a.m. where he apprehended the appellant and produced before the Inspector of Police. Exhibit P7 is the report submitted by PW-8 for having apprehended and arrested the appellant at Vidyanagar, Shivamogga. Hence, there is no explanation for the inconsistency as regards the presence of the appellant in the police station at 7.00 a.m. and PW-8 / Narasimhaiah having apprehended the appellant at 10.30 a.m., which goes to show that the police had cooked up a false story against the accused. These inconsistencies have been totally lost sight of by the Trial Court while rendering a conviction judgment against the accused for the alleged offences. 16. Further, the Investigating Officer Sri. R.V. Gangadharappa / PW-11 who is alleged to have recovered MO-1 / Chopper had also not taken fingerprints found on the handle of the Chopper and also the fingerprints of the accused and had not sent it for comparison and examination by a fingerprint expert to prove that the accused had committed the murder. This is also a serious lacuna in the investigation which goes to the root of the matter. 17. Further, the Investigating Officer had recorded the statement of the appellant / accused wherein appellant had alleged that one Mohan doing finance business who is residing in the nearby locality must have had an affair with the deceased Seema Thasleem. Hence, the appellant had suspected that the said Mohan might have committed the murder of his wife. However, the I.O. failed to secure the presence of the said Mohan and failed to record his statement of make any enquiry to ascertain as to whether the said Mohan had any role in commission of the said offence. Hence, it is contended that the prosecution has suppressed the facts and has cooked up a false story in order to implicate the accused. Merely based on circumstantial evidence due to the fact that the accused and deceased were residing together, the prosecution has implicated the appellant / accused in the said crime and has thereby convicted him for the offences. In spite of all these glaring inconsistencies, the Trial Court has proceeded to convict the accused merely based on circumstantial evidence. Merely based on circumstantial evidence due to the fact that the accused and deceased were residing together, the prosecution has implicated the appellant / accused in the said crime and has thereby convicted him for the offences. In spite of all these glaring inconsistencies, the Trial Court has proceeded to convict the accused merely based on circumstantial evidence. Hence, the learned counsel prays to consider the grounds urged in this appeal and thereby to allow the appeal and acquit the appellant / accused from the alleged offences. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following citations : (i) Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana ( (2009) 15 SCC 635 )) (ii) Nizam and another vs. State of Rajasthan ( (2016) 1 SCC 550 )) (iii) Tarseem Kumar vs. The Delhi Administration ( AIR 1994 SC 2585 ) 18. In the case of Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to Section 304 IPC which reads thus : "304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." Further, the relevant paragraphs read thus : 14. This Court had an occasion to deal with cases of similar nature. In Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 616 , the accused had inflicted a single blow in the heat of moment in a sudden fight with blunt side of Gandhala on the head of the deceased causing his death. According to the opinion of the doctor this particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to the opinion of the doctor this particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But, according to this Court, the intention to cause such an injury was likely to cause death had not been made out. This Court altered the conviction of the accused from section 302 IPC to section 304 Part II IPC and the accused was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. 15. In Gurmail Singh & Others v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 185 , the accused had no enmity with the deceased. The accused gave one blow with the spear on the chest of the deceased causing his death. The injury was an incised wound. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life. The High Court affirmed the same. This Court, while taking into consideration the age of the accused and other circumstances, converted the conviction from section 302 IPC to one under section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. 16. In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245 , the accused, without any prior enmity or pre-meditation, on a short quarrel gave a single blow with a dagger which later proved to be fatal. This Court observed that since there was no pre-meditation, Part 3 of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code could not be attracted because it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the conviction of the accused was altered from section 302 to that under section 304 Part II IPC and the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. 17. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 342 , the accused in the spur of the moment inflicted a knife blow in the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 17. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 342 , the accused in the spur of the moment inflicted a knife blow in the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court observed that the quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. This Court altered the conviction of the appellant from section 302 IPC to section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. 18. In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration) (1990) Supp. SCC 291, the accused inflicted single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place in the spur of the moment and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court observed as under: "14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without pre-meditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither Clause I nor Clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted......" This Court while setting aside the conviction under section 302 convicted the accused under section 304 Part II and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. 19. In Abani K. Debnath & Another v. State of Tripura (2005) 13 SCC 422 , this Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, while converting the sentence from section 302 IPC to one under section 304 Part II IPC observed as under: "This leads us to consider as to under what Section of law A-1 Abani K. Debnath is liable to be convicted in a given facts of the case. The prosecution evidence clearly discloses that the dao blow dealt by A-1 is preceded by a mutual quarrel. We have already noted that there was no common intention to kill Ranjit Das. From the nature of injuries it is disclosed that A-1 dealt only one dao blow perhaps in the spur of moment. The incident had taken place on 10.8.1990 and the deceased succumbed to injury on 15.8.1990 after a lapse of 7 days. Taking the prosecution evidence and medical evidence cumulatively we are of the view that the conviction of A-1 also cannot fall under Section 34 IPC but at the most under Section 304 Part II. We accordingly convert the sentence of A-1 Abani K. Debnath under Section 34 IPC to that one under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to suffer R.I. for five years. The fine amount imposed by the trial court and Page 2091 affirmed by the High Court is maintained. It is stated at the Bar that A-1 has undergone about 18 months' imprisonment, if that is so, he will be entitled to get the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C." 20. The fine amount imposed by the trial court and Page 2091 affirmed by the High Court is maintained. It is stated at the Bar that A-1 has undergone about 18 months' imprisonment, if that is so, he will be entitled to get the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C." 20. In another case Pappu v. State of M.P. (2006) 7 SCC 391 , this Court observed as under: "......The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body it was given and several such relevant factors. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body it was given and several such relevant factors. Considering the factual background in the case at hand it will be appropriate to convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC, instead of Section 302 IPC as has been done by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Custodial sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent." 19. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nizam and another vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) when the case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, it is held thus : “8. The case of the prosecution is entirely based on the circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete, forming a chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.” This reliance is also squarely applicable to the given facts and circumstances of the case. 20. Further, in the case of Tarseem Kumar vs. The Delhi Administration (supra), as regards motive factor it is held thus : “6. The case of the prosecution solely rests on circumstantial evidence. As the case is based solely on the circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be satisfied that (i) The circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn has been fully established. (ii) All the facts so established are consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the appellant and they do not exclude any other hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. (iii) The circumstances on which reliance has been placed are conclusive in nature. (iv) The chain of the evidence in the present case is such that there is no scope for any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 8. (iii) The circumstances on which reliance has been placed are conclusive in nature. (iv) The chain of the evidence in the present case is such that there is no scope for any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 8. Normally, there is a motive behind every criminal act and that is why investigating agency as well as the Court while examining the complicity of an accused try to ascertain as to what was the motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime in question. It has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that where the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond all reasonable doubts on basis of the materials produced before the Court, the motive loses its importance. But in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the part of the accused assumes greater importance. Of course, if each of the circumstances proved on behalf of the prosecution is accepted by the Court for purpose of recording a finding that it was the accused who committed the crime in question, even in absence of proof of a motive for commission of such a crime, the accused can be convicted. But the investigating agency as well as the court should ascertain as far as possible as to what was the immediate impelling motive on the part of the accused which led him to commit the crime in question. In the present case, no motive on the part of the appellant to commit the murder of Gulshan, has been suggested or established on behalf of the prosecution.” The case cited supra also squarely applies to the facts of the present case, in view of the fact that the appellant / accused had no motive to commit the murder of his wife. Hence, it is contended by the learned counsel that the grounds urged as well as the reliances placed in support of her case may be considered and the appeal be allowed and the appellant/ accused be acquitted of the alleged offences. 21. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Addl. SPP for the State has taken us through the averments made in the complaint. 21. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Addl. SPP for the State has taken us through the averments made in the complaint. This complaint was made by PW-2 / Habibunnisa, sister of the deceased Seema Thasleem and she has given evidence consistent with the averments made in her complaint. The evidence of PW-1 is consistent with the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3. PW-11 / R.V. Gangadharappa, the I.O. has conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased as per Exhibit P2 in the presence of panch witnesses and so also recorded disclosure statements of the accused as per Exhibit P-16. Based upon his disclosure statement, mahazar has been conducted as per Exhibit P-17 in the presence of panch witnesses. PW-9 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased as per Exhibit P8 whereby two injuries have been indicated on the vital part of her head. The said injuries are said to have been inflicted by means of MO-1 / chopper. MO-2 is the bedsheet, MO-3 is the pillow, Mo4 is another pillow, MO-5 is the shirt and MO-6 is the pant which are the material objects seized by the I.O. during the course of investigation. Based on the disclosure statement made by the accused as per Exhibit P-16, MO-1 / chopper has been seized. Bloodstained clothes of the accused have been seized by the I.O. based upon the voluntary statement of the accused, which proves the motive factor as regards the offences. 22. PWs 1 to 3 in their evidence have deposed that the appellant / accused and his wife along with their son were residing together. It is contended by the learned Addl SPP that the appellant had suspected the fidelity of his wife and was quarrelling with her frequently. Even as per the evidence of PW-1, the appellant had gone to the school where deceased was working as a Teacher and had quarreled with her. She being insulted by the incident, resigned her job. It is contended by the learned Addl SPP that the appellant had suspected the fidelity of his wife and was quarrelling with her frequently. Even as per the evidence of PW-1, the appellant had gone to the school where deceased was working as a Teacher and had quarreled with her. She being insulted by the incident, resigned her job. Even in the cross-examination of PW-1, when questioned by the defence counsel whether the deceased had an illicit relationship with one Mohan and that the said Mohan had committed the murder of Seema Thasleem, PW-1 had stated that it was the appellant / accused who had an illicit relationship with some other lady as a result of which there was a misunderstanding between the accused and deceased. PW-1 had also deposed that accused was working at APMC as a Hamali. In view of the fact that the appellant / accused was ill-treating the deceased Seema Thasleem, she had thought of giving Talaq to the accused. Hence, she had also visited Women’s Association and also Masjid. But thereafter the accused had refused to give Talaq to his wife. PW-3 had also deposed that the accused was in the habit of quarrelling with his wife and hence deceased was asking the accused to give divorce in view of the fact that accused was suspecting the character of his wife. PW-3 has deposed to the effect that suspecting that Seema Thasleem was having an illicit relationship with some other, appellant had committed the murder of his wife. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 thus revealed that appellant / accused was having an ill feeling towards his wife and he also suspected that she might have illicit contact with one Mohan. The defence taken by the accused himself reflects that the accused / appellant was not happy with his wife as he was suspecting her fidelity. 23. It is further contended that in the house of the appellant, the appellant himself, his wife and his son were residing and hence, it is for the appellant to explain as to how his wife had died or as to who committed her murder. The appellant though has taken a defence that Mohan had committed the murder of his wife, there is no reason forthcoming as to why the appellant has not lodged a complaint against the said Mohan. The appellant though has taken a defence that Mohan had committed the murder of his wife, there is no reason forthcoming as to why the appellant has not lodged a complaint against the said Mohan. If really Mohan had committed her murder, nothing prevented the appellant from lodging a complaint against the said Mohan citing the circumstances. This is a grey area which is required to be explained by the appellant himself. Even while recording the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has not given any explanation in this regard. 24. Further, counsel for the appellant had contended that PWs 1 to 3 deposed that the accused surrendered before the Police Station after committing the offence. However, the prosecution theory is that the accused was arrested by the police at 10.30 a.m., which contradicts each other. Whether accused himself surrendered before the police station or he was apprehended by the police would not be material and the fact whether he had committed the murder or not would only be material in order to either convict or acquit the accused. 25. It is further contended by the learned Addl. SPP for the State that as far as the recovery of MO-1 / chopper is concerned, PWs 5 and 6 have categorically stated that on 06.06.2015, police had called him to the police station and that they saw the appellant / accused in the police station. Further, the appellant had told before the police that he would show the weapon which was used for commission of the offence. Accordingly, accused had led them to his house and produced MO-1 and the police had seized the same under a mahazar Exhibit P4. Hence, the learned Addl. SPP contends that though PW-5 in his cross-examination has totally pleaded ignorance as regards the contents of the mahazar Exhibit P4, he had very clearly in his examination-in-chief deposed relating to accused having produced MO-1 to the police and that the same was also blood-stained at the time of seizure. PW-6 had also categorically stated that accused had produced MO-1 to the police, which was blood-stained. The said recovery of MO-1 was made by the police based on the confession statement given by the appellant / accused himself. PW-6 had also categorically stated that accused had produced MO-1 to the police, which was blood-stained. The said recovery of MO-1 was made by the police based on the confession statement given by the appellant / accused himself. There being no evidence to show that the police had used coercion, undue influence or had extended threat to the accused to give a statement before them, it is contended that the recovery of MO-1 / chopper is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Further, the Doctor who had examined the said chopper also has opined that it was possible for the deceased to have sustained chop wounds and lacerated wounds noticed in Exhibit P8, through the said chopper. The death has occurred in view of the injuries which have been inflicted by the appellant / accused as disclosed in the PM report. These are the evidence which have been considered by the Trial Court in rendering a conviction judgment for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Therefore, he contends that in this appeal, it does not arise to call for interference of the conviction judgment rendered by the Trial court since there is no perversity or absurdity as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. These are the contentions made by the learned Addl. SPP for the State seeking for dismissal of this appeal as being devoid of merits by confirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Trial Court. 26. In the context of contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and so also the counter contentions advanced by the learned Addl. SPP for the State, it is relevant to refer to the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 being the sisters and brother of the deceased Seema Thasleem including the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 being the panch witnesses secured by PW-11 / I.O. who conducted the seizure mahazar as per Exhibit P4. 27. PWs 5 and 6 being the mahazar witnesses, have stated that when the police had called them to the police station, they saw the appellant / accused in the police station. Further, the appellant had told before the police that he would show the weapon which was used for commission of the offence. Accordingly, accused had led them to his house and produced MO-1 and the police had seized the same under a mahazar Exhibit P4. Further, the appellant had told before the police that he would show the weapon which was used for commission of the offence. Accordingly, accused had led them to his house and produced MO-1 and the police had seized the same under a mahazar Exhibit P4. Hence, according to the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 and even in the evidence of PW-11 / I.O., the appellant / accused had led the team to his house and produced MO-1 / chopper to the Investigating Officer. Thereby the said MO-1 / chopper was seized by the I.O. by drawing a mahazar as per Exhibit P4. PWs 5 and 6 are panch witnesses who were subjected to examination and cross-examination. PW-5 in his cross-examination has specifically stated that he did not know the contents in the mahazar Exhibit P4 whereas in the examination-in-chief, he has clearly deposed relating to accused having produced MO-1 / chopper to the I.O and that the same was also blood-stained at the time of seizure. PW-6, another panch witness had also categorically stated in his examination-in-chief that accused had produced MO-1 / chopper before the I.O., which was blood-stained. Both PW-5 and PW-6 had also identified MO-1 / chopper which was used by accused for commission of the offence. The said recovery of MO-1 was made by the I.O. based on the confession statement given by the appellant / accused himself. There being no evidence to show that the police had used coercion, undue influence or had extended threat to the accused to give a statement before them, the recovery of MO-1 / chopper is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Further, the Doctor / PW-9 who had examined the said chopper also has opined that it was possible for the deceased to have sustained chop wounds and lacerated wounds noticed in Exhibit P8, through the said chopper. The said injuries noticed are stated as under : “1. Chop wound measuring 8 cm. x 1.5 cm bone deep is present over front of top of head and forehead, vertical, situated 6 cm above inner 1/3rd of right eyebrow. Margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 2. Chop wound measuring 7 cm. x 1.5 cm bone deep is present over front of top of head and forehead, vertical, situated 6 cm. above root of nose and 2 cm away from injury No.1. Margins are abraded. 3. Margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 2. Chop wound measuring 7 cm. x 1.5 cm bone deep is present over front of top of head and forehead, vertical, situated 6 cm. above root of nose and 2 cm away from injury No.1. Margins are abraded. 3. Chop wound measuring 4 cm. x 1.5 cm. bone deep is present over front of top of head and forehead, vertical, situated 6 cm. above inner end of left eyebrow and 2.1 cm. away from injury No.2. margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 4. Laceration measuring 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm muscle deep is present across outer aspect of left eyebrow. 5. Chop wound measuring 6 cm. x 1 cm. bone deep, obliquely placed is present over right side of head, situated 7 cm. above and 3 cm. in front of top of right ear. Margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 6. Chop wound measuring 7 cm. x 1 cm bone deep is present over right side of top of head, situated 11 cm above top of right ear, seen extending from right parietal eminence towards vertex. Margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 7. Chop wound measuring 7 cm. x 1 cm. bone deep is present over right side of top of head, situated 11.5 cm. above top of right ear, inner front end merges with injury No.6 and outer back lower end is placed 1 cm. above injury No.6. Margins are abraded and the underlying bone is cut. 8. Contusion measuring 3 cm. x 2 cm. is present over left malar eminence. 9. Contusion measuring 5 cm. x 3 cm. is present over top of left shoulder blade. 10. Contusion measuring 4 cm. x 3.5 cm. is present over top of left shoulder. 11. Contusion measuring 3 cm. x 2.5 cm. is present over inner aspect of middle 1/3rd of right arm. All these injuries noticed in the PM report discloses that the deceased / Seema Thasleem has died in view of the injuries inflicted by the appellant / accused with means of MO-1 / chopper which was recovered by the I.O. in the presence of PW-5 and PW6. 28. PW-9 / Dr. Chidananda had conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and subjected to examination MO-1 / chopper and issued his Opinion Report as per Exhibit P9. 28. PW-9 / Dr. Chidananda had conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and subjected to examination MO-1 / chopper and issued his Opinion Report as per Exhibit P9. He has specifically stated that Injury Nos.1 to 3 and 5 to 7 such as laceration, injury No.4 and contusions, i.e., injuries Nos.8 to 11 and corresponding internal injuries mentioned in Exhibit P8 can be caused with the chopper / MO-1. He also issued a report as per Exhibit P-10. Even in the FSL report at Exhibit P24 issued by the FSL Authority, it is seen that Item Nos.1 to 3, and 5 to 12 were stained with human blood with ‘O’ Group blood. Item Nos.6 and 7 are the shirt and pant of the appellant / accused which were seized by the I.O. during the course of investigation. 29. Further, it is relevant to refer to the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 who are the sisters and also the brother of the deceased Seema Thasleem. PWs 1 to 3 in their evidence have deposed that the appellant / accused and his wife Seema Thasleem along with their son were residing together. However, accused was suspecting the fidelity of his wife Seema Thasleem and was quarrelling with her frequently. Even as per the evidence of PW-1, the appellant had gone to the school where deceased was working as a Teacher and had quarreled with her. She being insulted by the incident, resigned her job. Even in the cross-examination of PW-1, when questioned by the defence counsel whether the deceased had an illicit relationship with one Mohan and that the said Mohan had committed the murder of Seema Thasleem, PW-1 had stated that it was the appellant / accused who had an illicit relationship with some other lady as a result of which there was a misunderstanding between the accused and deceased. PW-1 had also deposed that accused was working at APMC as a Hamali. In view of the fact that the appellant / accused was ill-treating the deceased Seema Thasleem, she had even thought of giving Talaq to the accused. Hence, she had also visited Women’s Association and also Masjid. But thereafter the accused had refused to give Talaq to his wife. In view of the fact that the appellant / accused was ill-treating the deceased Seema Thasleem, she had even thought of giving Talaq to the accused. Hence, she had also visited Women’s Association and also Masjid. But thereafter the accused had refused to give Talaq to his wife. PW-3 had also deposed that the accused was in the habit of quarrelling with his wife and hence deceased was asking the accused to give divorce in view of the fact that accused was suspecting the character of his wife. PW-3 has also stated that suspecting that Seema Thasleem was having an illicit relationship with some other person, appellant had committed the murder of his wife. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 thus revealed that appellant / accused was having an ill feeling towards his wife and he also suspected that she might have illicit contact with one Mohan. The defence taken by the accused himself reflects that the accused / appellant was not happy with his wife as he was suspecting her fidelity. 30. Further, the appellant though has taken a defence that Mohan had committed the murder of his wife, there is no reason forthcoming as to why the appellant has not lodged a complaint against the said Mohan. If really Mohan had committed her murder, nothing prevented the appellant from lodging a complaint against the said Mohan citing the circumstances. Even in the incriminating evidence recorded by the Trial Court based upon the evidence facilitated by the prosecution under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has not given any explanation in this regard. 31. PWs 1 to 3 had deposed that the appellant / accused surrendered before the Police Station after committing the offence. However, the prosecution theory is that the accused was arrested by the Investigating Agency at around 10.30 a.m., which contradicts each other. Even there are contradictions and discrepancies insofar as the evidence of PW-11 / I.O., which contradicts the evidence of PWs 1 to 3. On a close scrutiny of the evidence, it is seen that the death had occurred in the house of the accused where the accused, deceased and their son were living under the same roof. Even there are contradictions and discrepancies insofar as the evidence of PW-11 / I.O., which contradicts the evidence of PWs 1 to 3. On a close scrutiny of the evidence, it is seen that the death had occurred in the house of the accused where the accused, deceased and their son were living under the same roof. Even assuming that the murder was committed by some other person and even if the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 is stated as exaggerated account, the appellant / accused has not been able to explain the circumstances under which some other person committed her murder and as to how her death occurred. But PWs 1 to 3 who are material witnesses, have stated in their evidence that after committing the murder of the deceased, the accused had surrendered before the police. Whether accused himself surrendered before the police station or he was apprehended by the police would not be material and the fact whether he had committed the murder or not would only be material in order to either convict or acquit the accused. 32. PW-1 / Rahamathunnisa Begum has specifically stated in her evidence that accused and deceased fell in love with each other 10 years prior to the incident and got married against the wishes of their parents. Further, the accused had converted himself from Hinduism to Islam in order to marry her sister Seema Thasleem. Both of them were residing along with their son under the same roof. Though they had two children, since their elder daughter was disabled / insane / unsound and so also being a girl, was taken care of by her grandmother. The same is seen from the evidence of PW-1. She has further stated that the accused and his wife were residing at Indira Extension, Gurupura and that for about 3 to 4 years from the date of their marriage, accused was taking care of his wife properly. However, later he developed relationship with some other woman, which was questioned by the deceased Seema Thasleem. PW-1 has further deposed that accused was not allowing his wife to visit her parental house and was always insisting her to stay with him only. Further, accused was expecting his wife to return home early from the school where she was working and used to pick up quarrel with her frequently if she was late. PW-1 has further deposed that accused was not allowing his wife to visit her parental house and was always insisting her to stay with him only. Further, accused was expecting his wife to return home early from the school where she was working and used to pick up quarrel with her frequently if she was late. He had even gone to her work place and quarreled with her as a result of which she was insulted and even left the job. Hence, accused was always extending some torture in terms of physical as well as mental harassment to his wife. In view of that reason she even thought of giving talaq to her husband as per the customs prevailing in their society. However, the accused refused to give talaq to her. But on the fateful day, PW-1 received telephonic information from her sister Habibunnisa PW-2 in the morning that police visited her house and called her. Hence, when she went along with the police to the house of the accused, she found her sister Seema Thasleem lying dead in a pool of blood. Hence, PW-1 had lodged a complaint as per Exhibit P1. 33. PW-2 / Habeebunnisa being another sister of the deceased has also stated in her evidence that the accused was looking after her sister well for a period of 3 to 4 years and thereafter started extending some sort of harassment to her and accused was also not giving money to meet her expenses and was always abusing his wife. It is thereafter that on 06.05.2015 that the police had come to her house and asked about Seema’s house wherein she had stated that Seema was residing in Gurupura. Thereafter she had accompanied the police to Gurupura and Seema’s house was closed and light was off and when she peeped through the window, she noticed that Seema was murdered. She also deposed that the accused after committing her murder, had gone to the police station. However, she had deposed that she did not know for what reason accused had committed her murder. 34. PW-3 / Ashwas being the brother of the deceased has deposed in his evidence that about 6 months back, accused had committed the murder of his sister Seema and surrendered to the police station. But that he did not know the reason as to why accused murdered Seema Thasleem. 34. PW-3 / Ashwas being the brother of the deceased has deposed in his evidence that about 6 months back, accused had committed the murder of his sister Seema and surrendered to the police station. But that he did not know the reason as to why accused murdered Seema Thasleem. He has deposed that he saw the dead body of his sister. Further he had deposed that the accused was always quarrelling with his wife and was beating her in order to get money. Seema had demanded divorce from him, but accused refused to give her divorce. He has further deposed that the accused suspected the fidelity of his wife and thus has committed her murder. 35. PW-8 / Narasimhaiah being the I.O. in part received the complaint at Exhibit P1 and based upon the complaint made by the complainant, criminal law was set into motion by registering a case in Cr.No.282/2015 and recorded the FIR as per Exhibit P6. As per the direction issued by the Investigating Officer, the I.O. along with other staff had gone to trace the accused and at about 10.30 a.m. he had traced the accused in the Railway Station at Vidyanagar and thereafter they had produced the appellant / accused before the I.O. along with the report as per Exhibit P7. 36. On scrutiny of the evidence of PW-8 / I.O. in part on receipt of a complaint at Exhibit P1 and recording an FIR as per Exhibit P6, later on the I.O. / PW-11 has conducted investigation and dead body of the deceased was sent for PM. Accordingly, PW-9 / Dr. Chidanand conducted autopsy over the dead body and issued the PM report. PW-11 / I.O. laid a charge-sheet against the accused and he conducted inquest mahazar as per Exhibit P4 and recorded the voluntary statement of the accused and seized MO-1 / chopper alleged to have been used by the accused. 37. On a close scrutiny of the evidence of PW-8 and PW-11 relating to tracing of the accused and drawing a mahazar as per Exhibit P4 by PW-11, it is relevant to refer to Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relating to appreciation of evidence. 38. Appreciation of evidence is an important domain vested with the Trial Court. 37. On a close scrutiny of the evidence of PW-8 and PW-11 relating to tracing of the accused and drawing a mahazar as per Exhibit P4 by PW-11, it is relevant to refer to Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relating to appreciation of evidence. 38. Appreciation of evidence is an important domain vested with the Trial Court. But in the instant case, the entire case revolves around the circumstantial evidence and so also last seen theory whereby the accused and his wife were last seen staying in the same house. But last seen theory requires corroboration. But accused person cannot be convicted solely on the evidence of last seen together with the deceased. Therefore, in the instant case, it is required to refer to the reliance in the case of Navaneethakrishnan vs. State by Inspector of Police ( AIR 2018 SC 2027 )). 39. In case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. This issue has been addressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sahadevan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 2012 SC 2435 ). Further, the principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence is that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This was addressed in a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wakkar vs. State of U.P. (2011) 3 SCC 306 . 40. The domain is vested with the trial court to scrutinize the evidence. It is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the evidence carefully and see that acceptable evidence is accepted. The Court should adopt cautious approach for basing conviction on circumstantial evidence. 41. Further, minor contradictions and inconsistencies in testimony of injured eye-witness does not make him untrustworthy and unreliable witness (See Mukesh vs. State of NCT of Delhi ( AIR 2017 SC 2161 ). 42. Further, it is relevant to refer to Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. 42. Further, it is relevant to refer to Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. It is well-known principle of law that reliance can be based on the solitary statement of a witness if the court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is the true and correct version of the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the domain is vested with the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused by facilitating worthwhile evidence, which should not give any room for doubt in the theory put forth by the prosecution for convicting the accused. 43. It is further relevant to refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 , wherein paragraph 152, reads thus : "152. … “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground far a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra(') where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 44. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Niwas vs. State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2012) has held that, there has to be a chain of evidence so complete, so as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. It has been held that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. This Court has held that the circumstances should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. Further, has been held that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty before a Court can convict the accused. It is settled position of law that the suspicion howsoever strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion no matter how strong it is. It is settled position of law that the suspicion howsoever strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion no matter how strong it is. Further, an accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This reliance is also applicable to the present case on hand as regards the involvement of the accused and so also the accused alone has committed the murder of his wife suspecting her fidelity. There was a quarrel between the deceased and the accused due to some family affairs and there was no conducive atmosphere in between the deceased and accused. The same is clear from the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3. PWs 1 to 3 are none other than sisters of the deceased and brother and they have stated in their evidence that there was no conducive family atmosphere in between the deceased and the accused. On the fateful day night hours, the deceased was murdered by the accused as alleged and the complainant filed a complaint against the accused that the accused / appellant herein has committed her murder by assaulting her with means of MO-1 / chopper. Keeping in view the concept of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, merit of a statement is important. It is well-known principle of law that reliance can be based upon even solitary statement of witness if the Court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is the true and correct version of the case of the prosecution. This issue has been extensively addressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja v. State (1997) 2 Crimes 175 (Del). 45. Further in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kishanpal, 2008 (8) JT 650 it is held that credentiality must be given to the quality of evidence. It is the quality of evidence and not quantity which is required to be judged by the court to place credence on the statement of witnesses. Further regarding plurality of witnesses in the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement in law of evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. Further regarding plurality of witnesses in the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement in law of evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle, that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of trust, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by each witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity, which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The same has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmibai (Dead) through LRs vs. Bhagwantbura (Dead) through LRs reported in AIR 2013 SC 1204 . 46. In the instant case, the accused who is none other than husband of the deceased, has done to death his wife Seema Thasleem by assaulting her on the vital part of her head with means of MO-1 / chopper. Therefore, the prosecution has banked upon the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and the Trial Court has given great credibility to the aforesaid evidence, they being the close relatives of Seema Thasleem. Suspecting the fidelity of his wife, the accused / appellant had meted her to cruelty which had thereby led to the appellant committing the murder of his wife as aforesaid. 47. Keeping in view Section 300 of the IPC, Explanation 4 of Section 300 IPC, reads thus : “If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 48. 48. Further, Section 304 Part I and Section 304 Part II of the IPC, reads thus : “Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” 49. To make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Code, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. (See State vs. Sanjeev Nanda ( AIR 2012 SC 3104 ). 50. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the death of the deceased by infliction of injuries over Seema Thasleem, his wife. The injuries were of such a nature likely to cause her death and there is no doubt that the accused had caused the said injuries. Therefore, he is liable to be punished under the aforesaid Part II of Section 304 of the IPC. Section 304 Part II IPC relates to punishment but without any intention to cause death. In the instant case, the appellant / accused being the husband of the deceased Seema Thasleem was in incarceration for almost all 6 years 11 months and 26 days. But the Trial Court has convicted him for offences under Section 302 IPC based upon the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, the relatives of the deceased and so also based on the evidence of PW-8 / PSI and on the evidence of PW-11 / I.O. who had taken up the case for investigation and drew a mahazar in the presence of panch witnesses and secured the PM report at Exhibit P8 and thereafter laid a charge-sheet against the accused. Hence, ingredients of Section 302 of the IPC as regards the offence relating to murder have been constituted, but in the instant case, the prosecution has not specifically proved the guilt against the accused relating to the ingredients of Section 302 of the IPC. On examining the material on record carefully, it is seen that the act of the appellant / accused constitutes an offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In view of the aforesaid reasons and findings, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court has convicted the accused for offence under Section 302 of the IPC without any specific evidence facilitated by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. Hence, we are of the opinion that having regard to the gravity of the offence committed by the appellant / accused, it would attract an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following : ORDER The appeal preferred by appellant / accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed in part. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.03.2016 rendered by the Trial Court in S.C.No.141/2015 is hereby modified convicting the appellant/accused for the offence under Section 304 Part II of IPC instead of Section 302 of IPC. The appellant/accused is sentenced to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- by the Trial Court, which shall remain intact. The accused is in incarceration for a period of almost 6 years 11 months 26 days. Therefore, the period of incarceration undergone by the accused shall be termed as service of sentence for the offence under Section 304 Part II of IPC, to meet the ends of justice. Further, the period of detention undergone by the appellant / accused shall be set off against the sentence of imprisonment, under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. In pursuance of the order passed in this judgment, the accused shall deposit total fine amount of Rs.10,000/- before the trial court, in accordance with law. Registry of this Court is directed to forward a copy of the operative portion of the judgment to the Superintendent of Jail Authority, Gulbarga where the appellant / Syed Sahil @ Krishnamurthy is housed with a direction to set him at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Registry of this Court is directed to forward a copy of the operative portion of the judgment to the Superintendent of Jail Authority, Gulbarga where the appellant / Syed Sahil @ Krishnamurthy is housed with a direction to set him at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Further, the Superintendent of Jail Authority, Gulbarga is also directed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of law as regards deposit of the fine amount as held by the Trial Court. Ordered accordingly.