JUDGMENT : AJIT BORTHAKUR, J. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner. Also heard Mr. M. Phukan, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam for the state respondent. 2. This petition under Sec. 439 Cr. P.C. is filed by the accused Shri Rakesh Kumar Paul, the then Chairman, Assam Public Service Commission ('A.P.S.C.' for short), seeking his release on bail in connection with Special Case No. 5/2017 corresponding to Bhangagarh P.S. Case No. 159/2017 under Ss. 120B/420/468 of the IPC read with Ss. 7/13(1)(a)(b) (d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('P.C. Act' for short). 3. The Scanned copy of the case record along with the case diary and status report, as called for, is placed before the Court. Prosecution Case: 4. The factual matrix of the case is that an F.I.R. was lodged on 17/8/2017 by one Bedanta Bikash Das before the Officer-in-charge, Bhangagarh P.S., alleging, inter-alia , that in the year 2014, he appeared in the written examination for Selection to the post of Agriculture Development Officer ('A.D.O.' for short) under A.P.S.C. and after passing the written examination, he appeared for oral interview held in 2015. But, the informant alleged that he was not successful in the interview as the present accused petitioner, who was the then Chairman of A.P.S.C. through his agent demanded Rs.15.00 lakhs from him as gratification. The informant had paid Rs.50,000.00 to the accused petitioner at Satsang Vihar with the hope of getting selected in the interview, but when he sought information from A.P.S.C. through RTI, he found that one Mrigen Haloi secured 78 marks amongst 5 candidates of reserved category and that the said candidate secured 80 marks in the viva voce test. The informant suspected that the said candidate was able to pass in the examination by paying illegal gratification of Rs.15.00 lakhs to the accused petitioner and his agent. Investigation: 5. Based on the aforesaid F.I.R. Bhanga garh P.S. Case No. 159/2017, dt. 17/8/2017 was registered under Ss. 120B/420/468 of the IPC read with Ss. 7/13(1)(a)(b) (d)(III)(2) of the P.C. Act and after completion of investigation police laid a charge sheet on 9/10/2017 against the accused petitioner and another under Ss. 7/13(1)(a)(d)(III) (2) of the P.C. Act and Ss. 120B/420 of the IPC. The investigating officer submitted 6 (six) numbers of supplementary charge-sheet against co-accused persons. An Overview: 6. 7/13(1)(a)(b) (d)(III)(2) of the P.C. Act and after completion of investigation police laid a charge sheet on 9/10/2017 against the accused petitioner and another under Ss. 7/13(1)(a)(d)(III) (2) of the P.C. Act and Ss. 120B/420 of the IPC. The investigating officer submitted 6 (six) numbers of supplementary charge-sheet against co-accused persons. An Overview: 6. A Perusal of the case records prima facie reveals that the petitioner, who is arrayed as accused, had demanded an amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs as bribe from the informant, namely Sri Bedanta Bikash Das and demanded and received different amounts from other candidates, who appeared in the aforesaid A.P.S.C. written examination held for the post of A.D.O. in the year 2014 and viva voce test held in the year 2015 with an assurance to them to select for the said post. It is also revealed that the accused petitioner had accepted an amount of Rs.50,000.00 from the informant at Satsang Vihar, Bhangagarh, Guwahati and from other candidates in various places. The accused petitioner along with other Members of the A.P.S.C. had allegedly committed forgery of documents such as tabulation sheets etc. with an intention to use those documents for the purpose of selecting unqualified candidates in the aforesaid competitive examinations conducted by A.P.S.C. for selection to the post of A.D.O. Arguments: 7. Mr. D. Das, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner, submitted that the accused has been languishing in jail for a prolonged period of more than 5 years since he was shown arrested in connection with the case on 17/8/2017 despite he completed one-half term of punishment prescribed for the offence under Ss. 7/13(2) of the P.C. Act which provides for a maximum imprisonment period of 10 years. Mr. Das further submitted that the charge-sheet was filed on 9/10/2017 against the accused petitioner and another. The charges were framed on 18/12/2021 and thereafter, examination of only one prosecution witness as approver has started which is yet to be completed. It has been further submitted that there are lists of prosecution witnesses numbering more than 100 in the case calculating the number of witnesses cited in the supplementary charge-sheets filed thereafter, for which reason, it is certain, that their examination will take a couple of years to complete. Further, Mr. It has been further submitted that there are lists of prosecution witnesses numbering more than 100 in the case calculating the number of witnesses cited in the supplementary charge-sheets filed thereafter, for which reason, it is certain, that their examination will take a couple of years to complete. Further, Mr. Das submitted that as the accused petitioner has been under judicial custody for a long period and there is no possibility of timely and early justice to him, continuation of his detention indefinitely for the purpose of trial of the case will be violative of his right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Das vehemently submitted that it is well recognized principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception. As such, Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that it will be a wrong notion and against the settled principle of law that if he is released on bail, he might cause any hindrance in a fair trial of the case by reason of his high stature and possibility of tampering the witnesses. In support of his argument, Mr. Das has relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1) Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 ; 2) Ashim @ Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya @ Asim Harinath Vs. NIA, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 695 ; 3) Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40 ; 4) Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 825 and 5) Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam and Anr., reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Gau 4936. 8. Per contra, Mr. M. Phukan, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State/respondent, submitted that the accused petitioner has been detained in judicial custody on serious charges of indulging in rampant corruption while selecting candidates for the post of A.D.O. in the State of Assam through competitive examinations held in the year 2014-2015 abusing his powers and constitutional position as Chairman, A.P.S.C. in consideration of illegal gratification as well as even resorting to manipulation of answer scripts and tabulation sheets etc. of the candidates. The aforesaid multifarious illegal acts of the accused and others, Mr. of the candidates. The aforesaid multifarious illegal acts of the accused and others, Mr. Phukan submitted, amounted to serious socioeconomic offence, which shocked the moral fibre of the people of the state in addition to blatant deprivation of the rights of the said job aspirants and thereby, even lowered the constitutional sanctity of the A.P.S.C. in the estimation of the people in general. Mr. Phukan further submitted that Sec. 436-A Cr.P.C. being a directory provision, in the backdrop of the shocking facts of the case, the accused cannot claim his release on bail as a matter of right. Mr. Phukan vehemently submitted that continuation of detention of the accused petitioner in judicial custody during the period of trial of the case is necessary to prevent any hampering and tampering with the evidence that may be tendered by the prosecution witnesses to prove the case. Mr. M. Phukan, learned Public Prosecutor, in support of his argument, has relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 1) Surjit Singh Vs. Nahara Ram and Anr., reported in (2004) 6 SCC 513 ; 2) Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav Vs. CBI, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 70 ; 3) Mohd. Firoz Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 7 SCC 443 ; 4) Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, CBI and Anr., reported in (2014) 8 SCC 682 ; 5) State of M.P. Vs. Shambhu Dayal Nagar, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 693 ; 6) Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 439 ; 7) Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT, Delhi and Anr., reported in (2001) 4 SCC 280 ; 8) Nimmagadda Prasad Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466 ; 9) Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal Vs. State of Mahar-ashtra, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 642 ; 10) State of Bihar and Anr. Vs. Amit Kumar @ Bachcha Rai reported (2017) 13 SCC 751 ; 11) Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta Vs. CBI, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 134 ; 12) Virupakshappa Gouda and Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2017) 5 SCC 406 ; 13) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694 and 14) Ash Mohammad Vs. Shiv Raj Singh, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 446 . An Analysis of Prima Facie Evidence: 9. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2017) 5 SCC 406 ; 13) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694 and 14) Ash Mohammad Vs. Shiv Raj Singh, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 446 . An Analysis of Prima Facie Evidence: 9. I have given due consideration to the above arguments advanced by the learned counsel of both sides and perused records. Also perused the most relevant citations referred to by the learned counsel of both sides. 10. A perusal of the case records reveals that the accused petitioner was shown arrested in connection with the instant case vide order, dtd. 17/8/2017 and since then, he has been in judicial custody for 5 years, 1 month, 4 days. In this context, as strenuously submitted by the learned Sr. counsel for the accused petitioner, regarding the permissible length of detention in law, one has to look into the Sec. 436-A Cr.P.C., which reads as hereunder- “436-A.Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties: Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties: Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law." 11. The above provisions provide that in a case where punishment for the offence cannot be death and a person has undergone detention for a period extending up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment, specified for the offence, he may be released on bail. The above provisions provide that in a case where punishment for the offence cannot be death and a person has undergone detention for a period extending up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment, specified for the offence, he may be released on bail. It is, of course, not an absolute right in view of the proviso thereof which states that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded in writing, order the continued detention of such a prisoner for a period longer than one-half of the period of imprisonment prescribed in law. Therefore, the right to liberty of the prisoner has to be reasonably balanced with the need for the protection of the interest of the society or the State making the provision a directory one. Although the accused has a right to be presumed innocent, a serious case like the present one where cash for job scam was involved, cannot be treated at par with an ordinary offence keeping in consideration of the position and standing of the accused, who allegedly abused his constitutional office in the matter of selection process of talented candidates to the post of A.D.O. of the State of Assam, where the public or the community at large had an indefeasible interest. Ex facie, the dishonest conduct of the accused, who was a public servant, amounted to criminal misconduct which undoubtedly deeply affected the moral fibre of the society and caused harm to the institutional reputation of the A.P.S.C. It is prima facie apparent on evidence, collected during investigation, subject, of course, to testing veracity in cross-examination of the P.Ws during trial of the case. The prescribed punishment for such misconduct by a public servant under Sec. 13(2) of the P.C. Act is imprisonment, which shall not be less than 4 (four) years, but may extend to 10 (ten) years and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, the accused petitioner from the point of view of the proviso to the aforesaid Sec. 436-A of the IPC as well as in the attending facts and circumstances that emerge from the evidence collected by the investigating agency in the case, at the present stage of its trial, is not entitled to be released on bail. 12. Therefore, the accused petitioner from the point of view of the proviso to the aforesaid Sec. 436-A of the IPC as well as in the attending facts and circumstances that emerge from the evidence collected by the investigating agency in the case, at the present stage of its trial, is not entitled to be released on bail. 12. In Satender Kumar Antil (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles for granting or refusal of bail to the under trial prisoners as extracted hereinbelow (Relevant paragraphs)- "Bail is the Rule 11. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 , held that: "19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465, the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30) "27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476 : 1924 Cri LJ 732], AIR pp. 479-80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the "Meerut Conspiracy cases" observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In two other cases which, significantly, are the "Meerut Conspiracy cases" observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504 : 1932 Cri LJ 94 it was observed, while dealing with Sec. 498 which corresponds to the present Sec. 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Sec. 497 which corresponds to the present Sec. 437. It was observed by the Court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Sec. 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously 28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. State, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 that : (SCC p. 242, para 1) '1. the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of "procedure established by law". The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.' 29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p. 129, para 29) '29. There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.' 12. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 , has observed that: "21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. 22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. 23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson." 13. In Sanjay Chandra (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held "20. The appellants are facing trial in respect of the offences under Ss. 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 109 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sec. 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Bail has been refused first by the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi and subsequently, by the High Court. The appellants are facing trial in respect of the offences under Ss. 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 109 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sec. 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Bail has been refused first by the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi and subsequently, by the High Court. Both the courts have listed the factors, which they think, are relevant for refusing the bail applications filed by the applicants as seriousness of the charge; the nature of the evidence in support of the charge; the likely sentence to be imposed upon conviction; the possibility of interference with the witnesses; the objection of the prosecuting authorities and the possibility of absconding from justice. 21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty." 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashim (supra) held that liberty guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness, but also access to justice and speedy trial is imperative and under trials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Further held that deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution. The aforesaid view was earlier set in K.A. Najeeb case (supra). In Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), this Court observed that Article 21 of the Constitution has to be balanced to the interest of the society or the state. In Siddharam (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly explained the object of Article 21 of the Constitution as hereunder "64. The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachment upon personal liberty in any manner. Article 21 is repository of all human rights essential for a person or a citizen. A fruitful and meaningful life presupposes life full of dignity, honour, health and welfare. The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachment upon personal liberty in any manner. Article 21 is repository of all human rights essential for a person or a citizen. A fruitful and meaningful life presupposes life full of dignity, honour, health and welfare. In the modern "Welfare Philosophy", it is for the State to ensure these essentials of life to all its citizens, and if possible to non-citizens. While invoking the provisions of Article 21, and by referring to the oft quoted statement of Joseph Addison, "Better to die ten thousand deaths than wound my honour", the Apex Court in Khedat Mazdoor Chetna Sangath v. State of M.P. [ (1994) 6 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1643] posed to itself a question "If dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?" This is the significance of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India in its Third Part." 15. The Apex Court, however, cautioned that the Court should be cautious in maintaining perfect balance between two conflicting interests namely, sanctity of individual liberty and interest of society. In Amit Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when seriousness of offence was of wide magnitude, mere fact that accused was in jail for long time, is inconsequential. It was further held that though "bail is the rule and jail an exception" competing forces need to be carefully measured before enlarging accused on bail. It was emphatically held that socio-economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with different approach in matter of bail since socio-economic offences have deep-rooted conspiracies affecting moral fibre of society and causing irreparable harm. In Ash Mohammad (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court clarified that the period of custody may be one of the factors to be considered, but cannot be the whole and sole factor in every case. Grant of bail depends upon nature of the offence, manner in which it is committed and its impact on the society. In Shambhu Daya Nagar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as extracted hereinbelow- "32. It is difficult to accept the prayer of the respondent that a lenient view be taken in this case. The corruption by public servants has become a gigantic problem. It has spread everywhere. No facet of public activity has been left unaffected by the stink of corruption. It is difficult to accept the prayer of the respondent that a lenient view be taken in this case. The corruption by public servants has become a gigantic problem. It has spread everywhere. No facet of public activity has been left unaffected by the stink of corruption. It has deep and pervasive impact on the functioning of the entire country. Large-scale corruption retards the nation-building activities and everyone has to suffer on that count. As has been aptly observed in Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana [ (1997) 4 SCC 14 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 909] corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralising the honest officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. The reputation of corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of the officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke." 16. A detailed story of the prosecution case is narrated above. On scrutiny of the material on the case record including the evidence of P.W. 1 (Approver) along with the case diary, it prima facie transpires that the accused petitioner, while working as Chairman of the A.P.S.C. and by virtue of that position being a public servant indulged in rampant corruption in the written examination and in viva-voce test held in succession in 2014 and 2015 respectively for selection of A.D.Os in the State of Assam by demanding and accepting illegal gratifications from many candidates to the tune of several lakhs each. Amongst the aforesaid victim candidates was the informant. The forgery included in respect of the answer-scripts, tabulation sheets etc. Such widespread illegal and corrupt misdeeds allegedly committed by the accused petitioner in connivance with the Members of the A.P.S.C. and others indicate his culpable mental state. Amongst the aforesaid victim candidates was the informant. The forgery included in respect of the answer-scripts, tabulation sheets etc. Such widespread illegal and corrupt misdeeds allegedly committed by the accused petitioner in connivance with the Members of the A.P.S.C. and others indicate his culpable mental state. Therefore, the nature of accusation and the supporting evidence available on case record and case diary certainly give rise to a reasonable apprehension that in all probability the accused may again indulge in tampering with the witnesses cited in the charge-sheet if he is granted the liberty of bail, invoking the rights normally vested on an individual under Article 21 of the Constitution and at the same time, by wholly ignoring the collective interest of the society in general. Here, it is pertinent to mention that Article 21 is not an absolute right of a prisoner/individual. A fair, reasonable and just and as per the procedure established by law may often require some restrictions on the right of individual to life and liberty depending on the attending nature of facts and circumstances in a given case. In the case of Rajesh Ranjan Yadav (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Article 21 is of great importance because it enshrines the fundamental right to individual liberty but at the same time a balance has to be struck between the right to individual liberty and the interest of society. While it is true that one of the considerations in deciding whether to grant bail to an accused or not is whether he has been in jail for a long time, the Court has also to take into consideration other facts and circumstances such as the interest of the society. In granting of bail individual interests are always considered but more important consideration to be given utmost emphasis is interest of society and in particular interest of criminal justice. In the aforesaid backdrop of facts and prima facie evidence that emerge from the case records and the case diary, this Court is of the considered opinion that it would not be unreasonable to hold the view that the collective interest of the society or the people of the state must outweigh the right to personal liberty of the individual, that is, the accused petitioner, whose trial just commenced on 18/12/2021. There is need to balance between the accused's right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the right of the unemployed job aspirants to a fair and transparent competitive examination, which the accused deliberately flouted. His continuation of detention, therefore, is of utmost necessity to prevent any further probable manipulation and tampering with the charge sheet cited witnesses in course of a fair trial of the case until an appropriate favourable stage for him is reached. The present accused is apparently the prime accused in the case and his case, as a whole, prima facie, is not exactly on a similar footing to the co-accused persons. 17. Having carefully considered the above material aspects of the whole case and balancing the various principles laid in the above referred judgments, this Court is of the opinion that at the present nascent stage of trial of the case involving cash for job scam and balancing the various settled principles pertaining to consideration of bail, the accused petitioner is not entitled to be released on bail on the mere factor of his length of detention or on other grounds cited in the petition. Conclusion: 18. Accordingly, the bail application of the accused petitioner namely, Rakesh Kumar Paul stands rejected. 19. It is, however, provided that the accused petitioner shall have right to apply for bail afresh before the learned trial Court, if so advised and if such bail application is filed, the same shall be considered and disposed of at an appropriate stage of trial of the case in accordance with law. 20. The learned trial Court shall make an endeavour to identify the most material witnesses of the case and ensure their examination on day to day basis so as to prevent undue delay in the disposal of the case, preferably within a period of 6(six) months from the date of this order. The learned trial Court shall see that steps for summoning the witnesses are taken well in advance from the due date for evidence and that the process serving agencies punctually serve the same. The learned trial Court shall also submit monthly progress report of trial of the case to the Registrar (Vigilance) of this Court for the next 6(six) months. 21. Be it mentioned that no observation made in course of this order shall have any bearing on the discretion of the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court shall also submit monthly progress report of trial of the case to the Registrar (Vigilance) of this Court for the next 6(six) months. 21. Be it mentioned that no observation made in course of this order shall have any bearing on the discretion of the learned trial Court. The bail application stands disposed of. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the Registrar (Vigilance).