ORDER 1. In this revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant has challenged the validity of the order dated 05.07.2022 passed by learned 25th Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Criminal Appeal No.300 of 2022 so far as the same has imposed payment of 20% of the amount (i.e. Rs.50,47,397/-) by the appellant and his brother as a condition precedent for suspension of sentence. 2. The facts, in a nutshell, are that respondent MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (in short' the MPSIDC) in the year 2001 filed a complaint for dishonour of cheque of Rs.87,78,082/- against the applicant. Thereafter on 17.04.2004, the MPSIDC took the possession of the factory unit of M/s Alpine Industries P. Ltd. under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Thereafter a tripartite agreement was arrived at between MPSIDC, M/s. Alpine Industries Ltd. and M/s NPA by which M/s NA alone was responsible for payment of entire amount to MPSIDC. M/s NPA has paid an amount of Rs.9.08 Crores to the MPSIDC. 3. By the judgment dated 22.04.2022, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal convicted the appellant and levied interest at the rate of 9% per annum with effect from 10.06.2001 till the date of the judgment. The appellant preferred an appeal (Cri.A. No.300 of 2022) against the aforesaid judgment. The lower appellate Court by impugned judgment dated 05.07.2022 directed the applicant to deposit 20% of the amount in question i.e. Rs.50,47,397/- as a condition precedent for suspension of sentence. 4. The main contention of the senior counsel for the applicants is that in view of tripartite agreement executed towards settlement of all dues during pendency of the complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the liability under the cheque would not be further enforceable. In this regard, learned senior counsel has referred to various decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court. It is further vehemently contended that condition precedent for depositing 20% of the amount, is absolutely illegal and therefore, the same deserves to be set aside. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Gimpex Private Ltd. v. Manoj Goel, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 925; D. Purushotama Reddy v. K. Sateesh, (CA No.4751 of 2008 decided on 01.08.2008); and Meters and Instruments Private Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, (2018) 1 SCC 560 . 5. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Gimpex Private Ltd. v. Manoj Goel, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 925; D. Purushotama Reddy v. K. Sateesh, (CA No.4751 of 2008 decided on 01.08.2008); and Meters and Instruments Private Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, (2018) 1 SCC 560 . 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently contended that against the interim direction, revision is not maintainable. It is further contended that the lower appellate Court has rightly directed for depositing 20% of the amount as a condition precedent and the same does not in any way call for any interference by this Court. In this context, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deshwal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 wherein it has been held that use of word 'may' in Section 148 of the NI Act has to be read as 'shall' and appellate Court must orinarily order depositing of minimum 20% of compensation or fine amount imposed by the trial Court. He has also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Neena V. Patel v. State of M.P. and Others, (Criminal Revision No.219 of 2021 decided on 07.05.2022) 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. The most of the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant pertain to merits of the case. So far as the maintainability of the revision is concerned, it is appropriate to refer to subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: '397. Calling for records to exercise power of revision. (2) The power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.' 8. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision in the case of Bapuji Murugesan v. Mythili Rajagopalan, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 3258 wherein it has been held in paragraphs 16 and 17 as under: '16. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision in the case of Bapuji Murugesan v. Mythili Rajagopalan, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 3258 wherein it has been held in paragraphs 16 and 17 as under: '16. Applying the tests to the power exercisable under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent, it is not a pre-condition in the appeal to be taken on file and therefore will not result in a final order of deciding the appeal. Applying the test of deciding the rights of the parties, it has been held that it is only a direction to deposit, subject to the final outcome in the appeal and therefore is only a matter of procedure without finally determining the rights of parties. Applying the test as to whether non-passing of such order or accepting of any plea by the accused or the complainant, whether it would result in culmination of proceedings, the answer is again in the negative. Therefore, applying any of the tests advocated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, still the order, which is passed in exercise of power under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is neither a final order nor an intermediate order so as to hold that the revision as against the same is maintainable. 17. Thus, in this context, it is pertinent to state that by the judgment of Kerala High Court in Samuel George, Maliyekkal Bunglow's case (cited supra), it has been held that such powers are in the interlocutory in nature and Revision is not maintainable. Even in a case as instance case where the direction of deposit is made coupling it as a condition for grant of suspension of sentence, this Court had already held in Udaiyar @ Sattaludaiyar v. State [Crl.R.C.(MD). No. 126 of 2018] (stated supra) that the order for grant of suspension of sentence or bail are all interlocutory orders and are not revisable under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Therefore, viewing from any angle, I hold that the Revision against the present order is not maintainable.' Thus, the revision against the interlocutory order is not maintainable. 9. 9. That apart, in the case of Surinder Singh Deshwal (supra) Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that use of word 'may' in Section 148 of the NI Act has to be read as 'shall' and appellate Court must orinarily order depositing of minimum 20% of compensation or fine amount imposed by the trial Court. 10. Analysing from both the above angles, the impugned order passed by the lower appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Hence, the revision being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.