JUDGMENT : S.Serto, J. The petitioners, who rose from ranks and were promoted to Junior Grade NPS Cadre vide Notification date 25.05.2010, issued by the Principal Secretary, Government of Nagaland, Home Department: Police Establishment Branch are aggrieved by the tentative Seniority List of Nagaland Police Service Officers as on 01.01.2016, which was prepared as per Rule 19(C) of the Nagaland Police Service Rules,2006 and circulated vide Memorandum No. POL/ESTT-3/57/2005(Vol-1) dated 09.10.2020, of the same Department, as they were placed below the direct recruits, who were appointed vide order dated 11.10.2010, issued by competent Authority in pursuance of the recommendation of the Nagaland Public Service Commission. Therefore, they are here before this Court challenging the same and the provisions of the Nagaland Police Service Rules,2006 (which shall hereafter be referred to as the Rules of 2006) particularly Rule 19 (C) and Rule 25. 2. Heard Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners; Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent Nos. 5 to 20 and Mr. T. B. Jamir, learned Additional AG appearing for the State respondents. 3. The brief facts and circumstances leading to the filing of this writ petition is that the petitioners who were stated to have been appointed as Sub-Inspectors of Police between the year 1988-1994 were promoted to the post of Un-Armed Branch Inspectors (in short UBI) on 13.05.2003. After serving in that Grade for more than seven years they were promoted to the cadre of Junior Grade of NPS vide notification dated 25.05.2010, issued by the Principal Secretary to the Government of Nagaland; Home Department; Police Establishment Branch, in terms of the Schedule 2 Serial No. V of the Rules of 2006 which provides for appointment of Inspectors of Police who have completed not less than seven years in that grade and has a minimum educational qualification of HSLC or equivalent to 50% of Junior Cadre of NPS. In the same year, the private respondents were also appointed to the same Junior Grade Cadre of NPS vide order dated 11.10.2010, issued by the competent authority. Recruitment to Nagaland Police Service and Conditions of Service of persons appointed to that service are governed by the Rules of 2006, (it shall be reproduced at relevant stage of this Judgment). In the same year, the private respondents were also appointed to the same Junior Grade Cadre of NPS vide order dated 11.10.2010, issued by the competent authority. Recruitment to Nagaland Police Service and Conditions of Service of persons appointed to that service are governed by the Rules of 2006, (it shall be reproduced at relevant stage of this Judgment). As per Rule 19(C) of the 2006 Rules, in 2018, vide Memorandum No. POL/ESTT-3/57/2005, dated 30.05.2018, the seniority list of NPS Officers as on 01.05.2018, was published and in that seniority list, the private respondents were shown as senior to the petitioners. Being aggrieved, the petitioners submitted a representation to the Home Department to reconsider the same and to rearrange the Seniority List. Thereafter, vide Memorandum No. POL/ESTT-3/57/2005 dated 09.10.2020(which hereafter is being referred to as impugned tentative Seniority List) the tentative Seniority List of NPS Officers as on 01.01.2016, wherein, the private respondents (direct recruits) were placed at Serial No. 107-122 and the petitioners were placed at Serial No. 124-139 clearly indicating that the private respondents are senior to the petitioners in the cadre, was notified. Being aggrieved by the impugned Seniority List, the petitioners once again submitted a representation dated 05.11.2020, to the respondent No.3, praying for re-fixation of the Seniority. Since no positive response was received, theyhave approached this Court through the instant Writ Petition. 4. Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 is unconstitutional as it violates the provisions of Article 14 and16 of the constitution and, therefore, the impugned tentative Seniority List prepared in accordance with the provisions of that Rule cannot be allowed to stand and deserves to be set aside and quashed. The learned Senior counsel, pressing his submission further, submitted that, Rule 6 of the Rules of 2006 provides two methods of recruitment: (i) by direct recruitment through open competition and (ii) through promotion.Further, Schedule 1 serial No. 5 provides that vacancy is to be shared in the ratio of 50:50, i.e., 50 by direct recruitment and 50 by promotion and Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 provides that direct recruits to NPS Junior Grade Cadre of the same recruitment year would be senior to the persons who are appointed to the same cadre by way of promotion. All these would show that a classification or distinction has been made between the two groups of appointees i.e., one appointed through direct recruitment and the other appointed through promotion. Such a classification or a distinction between the two would result in inequality between the two groups which belongs to the same cadre. Hence, the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 is violative of the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that though there is a difference in the method of recruitment of the two groups once they are appointed to the Junior Grade of NPS there cannot be any distinction between the two, as such, they should be treated equally and one should not be discriminated against the other. The learned Senior counsel also submitted that in the case of direct recruits, the procedures given at Rule 7 of Rules of 2006 is followed,that is to say they are basically recruited through open competition conducted by Nagaland Public Service Commission and in the case of promotees, the process as provided in Rule 11 and 12 of the same Rules are followed. Reading of these provisions would show that promotees are also appointed through merit cum seniority which is assessed and determined by the Police Establishment Board headed by none other than the Chief Secretary as the Chairman and, the Director General of Police, Additional CS, Principal Secretary P&AR and Secretary in-charge of Home Department as members. Therefore, there is no reason as to why any distinction should be made between the two groups as far as it relates to determination of their seniority in service. In other words, there can be no reasonable classification between the two.As such, the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 drawing distinction between the two amounts to unreasonable classification and this goes to the very root of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 6. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that since no reasonable classification between the direct recruits and promotees could be made out, the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 is violative of the provisions of Article 14 and 16 and as a consequence, the impugned tentative Seniority List prepared in accordance to such provision is liable to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr v. Union of India and Others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 17 . The contents of the two paragraphs are reproduced herein below: “37.The tests for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, when legislation is challenged as being violative of the principle of equality, have been settled by this Court time and again. Since equality is only among equals, no discrimination results if the Court can be shown that there is an intelligible differentia which separates two kinds of creditors so long as there is some rational relation between the creditors so differentiated, with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. This aspect of Article 14 has been laid down in judgments too numerous to cite, from the very inception. 38. Another development of the law is that legislation can be struck down as being manifestly arbitrary. This has been laid down by the recent Constitution Bench decision in Shayara Bano as follows: “95. On a reading of this judgment in Natural Resources Allocation case, it is clear that this Court did not read McDowell as being an authority for the proposition that legislation can never be struck down as being arbitrary. Indeed the Court, after referring to all the earlier judgments, and Ajay Hasia in particular, which stated that legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is “arbitrary” under Article 14, went on to conclude that “arbitrariness” when applied to legislation cannot be used loosely. Instead, it broad based the test, stating that if a constitutional infirmity is found, Article 14 will interdict such infirmity. And a constitutional infirmity is found in Article 14 itself whenever legislation is “manifestly arbitrary” i.e. when it is not fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased, with favouritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. Positively speaking, it should conform to norms which are rational, informed with reason and guided by public interest, etc. 96. Another Constitution Bench decision in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI dealt with a challenge to Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. This section was ultimately struck down as being discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14. Positively speaking, it should conform to norms which are rational, informed with reason and guided by public interest, etc. 96. Another Constitution Bench decision in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI dealt with a challenge to Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. This section was ultimately struck down as being discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14. A specific reference had been made to the Constitution Bench by the reference order in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI and after referring to several judgments including Ajay Hasia, Mardia Chemicals, Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and McDowell, the reference, inter alia, was as to whether arbitrariness and unreasonableness, being facets of Article 14, are or are not available as grounds to invalidate a legislation. 97. After referring to the submissions of the counsel, and several judgments on the discrimination aspect of Article 14 this Court held: (Subramanian Swamy case SCC pp. 721-22,paras 48-49) “48. In E.P. Royappa, it has been held by this Court that the basic principle which informs both Articles 14 and 16 are equality and inhibition against discrimination. This Court observed in para 85 as under: (SCC p.38) “85. … From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.” ‘Court’s approach 49. Where there is challenge to the constitutional validity of a law enacted by the legislature, the Court must keep in view that there is always a presumption of constitutionality of an enactment, and a clear transgression of constitutional principles must be shown. The fundamental nature and importance of the legislative process needs to be recognised by the Court and due regard and deference must be accorded to the legislative process. The fundamental nature and importance of the legislative process needs to be recognised by the Court and due regard and deference must be accorded to the legislative process. Where the legislation is sought to be challenged as being unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court must remind itself to the principles relating to the applicability of Article 14 in relation to invalidation of legislation. The two dimensions of Article 14 in its application to legislation and rendering legislation invalid are now well recognised and these are: (i) discrimination, based on an impermissible or invalid classification, and (ii) excessive delegation of powers; conferment of uncanalised and unguided powers on the executive, whether in the form of delegated legislation or by way of conferment of authority to pass administrative orders—if such conferment is without any guidance, control or checks, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also needs to be mindful that a legislation does not become unconstitutional merely because there is another view or because another method may be considered to be as good or even more effective, like any issue of social, or even economic policy. It is well settled that the courts do not substitute their views on what the policy is.” 100. To complete the picture, it is important to note that subordinate legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In COAI v. TRAI, this Court referred to earlier precedents, and held: (SCC pp. 736-37, paras 42-44) ? “Violation of fundamental rights 42. We have already seen that one of the tests for challenging the constitutionality of subordinate legislation is that subordinate legislation should not be manifestly arbitrary. Also, it is settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. [See [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, SCC at p. 689, para 75.] 43. The test of “manifest arbitrariness” is well explained in two judgments of this Court. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka this Court held: (SCC p. 314, para 13) “13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The test of “manifest arbitrariness” is well explained in two judgments of this Court. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka this Court held: (SCC p. 314, para 13) “13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Although the protection of Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to the appellants, the Rules must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14, which is a guarantee against arbitrary action. However, one must bear in mind that what is being challenged here under Article 14 is not executive action but delegated legislation. The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down, such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law-making power. In [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121], this Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation may be questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is unreasonable; “unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary”. Drawing a comparison between the law in England and in India, the Court further observed that in England the Judges would say, -Parliament never intended the authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires”. In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.‘ 44. Also, in Sharma Transport v. State of A.P. v. State of A.P, this Court held: (SCC pp. 203-04, para 25) “25. … The tests of arbitrary action applicable to executive action do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order to strike down a delegated legislation as arbitrary it has to be established that there is manifest arbitrariness. Also, in Sharma Transport v. State of A.P. v. State of A.P, this Court held: (SCC pp. 203-04, para 25) “25. … The tests of arbitrary action applicable to executive action do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order to strike down a delegated legislation as arbitrary it has to be established that there is manifest arbitrariness. In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.” (emphasis in original) 101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14” 7. The learned counsel also referred to paragraphs 40, 44 and 45 of the judgment passed by the Honb’le Supreme Court in the Case of A.P. Coop Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd V. D. Achyuta Rao reported in (2007) 13 SCC 320 . The contents of the paragraphs are also reproduced herein below: “40. Shri. P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Federation submitted that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere when the majority of the employees had accepted the scheme of voluntary retirement. The contents of the paragraphs are also reproduced herein below: “40. Shri. P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Federation submitted that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere when the majority of the employees had accepted the scheme of voluntary retirement. He relied upon the decision of Kamal Kanti Dutta v. Union of India and submitted that where service rules operate, more than one view is always possible to take without sacrificing either reason or common sense, but the ultimate choice has to be necessarily conditioned by several considerations ensuring justice to as many as possible and injustice to a few. He submitted, relying upon the aforesaid decision, that no matter with what care, objectivity and foresight a rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice is bound to some members of the service. The paramount consideration is the reconciliation of conflicting claims. He also brought to our notice the decision of this Court in RBI v. C.N. Sahasranaman wherein it was held that in matters of service conditions, it is difficult to evolve an ideal set of norms governing various conditions of service. Reiterating the principles laid down in Kamal Kanti Dutta this Court held that the constitutionality of any service rule has to be judged by considering whether it is fair, reasonable and does justice to the majority of the employees and fortunes of some individuals is not the touchstone. In judging whether a rule is just, fair and reasonable, it must be seen that the rule does not suffer from the vice of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution or any other constitutional guarantee. 44. Mr. Rao also contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the probation of the employees had not been declared. The normal rule was of one-year probation and the maximum period of probation was 2 years. So an employee on probation must be deemed to have been confirmed after the completion of two years of probation. He placed reliance on decisions of this Court in Commr. of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver, R, L. Gupta v. Union of India and Krishan Lal v. State of J&K. 45. So an employee on probation must be deemed to have been confirmed after the completion of two years of probation. He placed reliance on decisions of this Court in Commr. of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver, R, L. Gupta v. Union of India and Krishan Lal v. State of J&K. 45. In any event he submitted that the learned Single Judge had deferred the date of promotion of candidates to 21-7-1979 on equitable consideration as that was the date which least affected the parties.” 8. Lastly, the learned Senior counsel referred to paragraphs 28,32 and 34 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Singla v. Union of India reported in (1984) 4SCC 405. The contents of the paragraphs are also reproduced herein below: “28. It is however difficult to appreciate how, in the matter of seniority, any distinction can be made between direct recruits who are appointed to substantive vacancies in the Service on the recommendation of the High Court under Rule 5(2) and the promotees who are appointed in consultation with the High Court to posts in the Service under Rules 16 and 17. Rule 16 provides for the appointment of promotees to temporary posts in the Service, while Rule 17 provides for appointment of promotees to substantive vacancies in the Service on a temporary basis. Promotees who are appointed to the Service under either of these two rules must be considered as belonging to the same class as direct recruits appointed under Rule 5(2). They perform similar functions, discharge identical duties and bear the same responsibilities as direct recruits. They are appointed on a regular basis to posts in the Service in the same manner as direct recruits are appointed, the only distinction being that whereas the latter are appointed on the recommendation of the High Court promotees are appointed in consultation with the High Court. Therefore, no distinction can be made between direct recruits on one hand and promotees appointed to the Service on the other, in the matter of their placement in the seniority list. Therefore, no distinction can be made between direct recruits on one hand and promotees appointed to the Service on the other, in the matter of their placement in the seniority list. Exclusion from the seniority list of those promotees who are appointed to posts in the Service, whether such appointment is to temporary posts or to substantive vacancies in a temporary capacity, will amount to a violation of the equality rule since, thereby, persons who are situated similarly shall have been treated dissimilarly in a matter which constitutes an important facet of their career. 32. That is why, it would be hyper-technical to make a sub-classification between promotess appointed under rule 16 and those appointed under Rule 17, with the object of denying to the latter the equality of status and opportunity with the former and with direct recruits. It is true that under Rule 16, promotees are appointed to temporary posts in the Service while, under Rule 17 they are appointed in a temporary capacity to substantive vacancies in the Service. But this kind of service jargon clouds the real issue as to whether persons appointed under different rules necessarily belong to different classes and tends to produce inequalities by an artful resort, dictated by budgetary expediency, to the familiar device of fixing dissimilar labels on posts which carry the same duties and responsibilities and are subject to similar pre-appointment tests. It may even be that in the process of consultation, the High Court exercises greater vigilance in regard to appointments proposed under Rule 16 than in regard to appointments which are proposed under Rule 17. But, the fact that the High Court chooses to adopt, of its own volition any particular approach in the matter of appointments made under different rules, cannot justify the proposition that persons appointed under different rules necessarily belong to different classes. The requirement for appointments under both the Rules is, equally, that they must be made in consultation with the High Court. The High Court is, therefore, expected to apply the same standard and adopt the same approach whether appointments are proposed to be made under Rule 16 or Rule 17. Any attempt to sub divide the promotees according as to whether they are appointed under Rule 16 or Rule 17 will result in the creation of a distinction where no difference exists. Any attempt to sub divide the promotees according as to whether they are appointed under Rule 16 or Rule 17 will result in the creation of a distinction where no difference exists. The object of classification is to find a remedy to such situations, not to create or perpetuate them. 34. The best solution to the situation which confronts us is to apply the rule which was adopted in S.B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra.(1) It was held by this Court in that case that all other factors being equal, continuous officiation in a non-fortuitous vacancy ought to receive due recognition in fixing seniority between persons who are recruited from different sources, so long as they belong to the same cadre, discharge similar functions and bear the same responsibilities. Since the rule of `quota and rota' ceases to apply when appointments are made under Rules 16 and 17, the seniority of direct recruits and promotees appointed under those Rules must be determined according to the dates on which direct recruits were appointed to their respective posts and the dates from which the promotees have been officiating continuously either in temporary posts created in the Service or in substantive vacancies to which were appointed in a temporary capacity.” 9. Mr. C. T. Jamir also submitted that the manner in which the impugned seniority list was drawn is unreasonable and it is against the settled principles of law which says that a person’s seniority cannot be counted from the date before he or she was borne in the Cadre. The learned senior counsel, then, submitted that in this case, the promotees i.e., the petitioners were promoted on 25.05.2010 and the direct recruits i.e., the respondents were appointed on 11.10.2010. Therefore to place the direct recruits that is the respondents above the promotees (petitioners) in the Seniority list would amount to counting seniority of the direct recruits (respondents) even before they were born to the cadre. The learned senior counsel further submitted that this kind of practice has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the principles of law has been settled in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and others v. Ninga Siro and others reported in (2020) 5SCC 689. The learned senior counsel specifically referred to para 30 and 39. The learned senior counsel further submitted that this kind of practice has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the principles of law has been settled in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and others v. Ninga Siro and others reported in (2020) 5SCC 689. The learned senior counsel specifically referred to para 30 and 39. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment referred to by the learned senior counsel are reproduced herein below: “30.We may also benefit by referring to the Judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava and Anr. This judgment is significant since this is rendered after the N.R. Parmar decision. Here the Court approved the ratio in Pawan Pratap Singh and Ors. Vs. Reevan Singh & Ors., and concurred with the view that seniority should not be reckoned retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service Rules. The Supreme Court held that seniority cannot be given for an employee who is yet to be borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime. The law so declared in Ashok Kumar Srivastava being the one appealing to us, is profitably extracted as follows: 24. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has drawn inspiration from the recent authority in PawanPratap Singh v. Reevan Singh where the Court after referring to earlier authorities in the field has culled out certain principles out of which the following being the relevant are produced below: “45. (ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.” 39. The judgment in N. R. Parmar relating to the Central Government employees cannot in our opinion, automatically apply to the Manipur State Police Officers, governed by the MPS Rules, 1965. We also feel that N.R. Parmar had incorrectly distinguished the long-standing seniority determination principles propounded in, inter-alia, J.C. Patnaik, Suraj Prakash Gupta & Ors. vs. State of J&K & Ors. and Pawan Pratap Singh & Ors.Vs.Reevan Singh & Ors. These three judgments and several others with like enunciation on the law for determination of seniority makes it abundantly clear that under Service Jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed from a date when the incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre. In our considered opinion, the law on the issue is correctly declared in J.C. Patnaik and consequently we disapprove the norms on assessment of inter-se seniority, suggested in N. R. Parmar. Accordingly, the decision in N.R. Parmar is overruled. However, it is made clear that this decision will not affect the inter-se seniority already based on N.R. Parmar and the same is protected. This decision will apply prospectively except where seniority is to be fixed under the relevant Rules from the date of vacancy/the date of advertisement.” 10. Mr. C. T. Jamir further submitted that, realizing that the Rules of 2006 particularly Rule 19 (C) of the Rule is not in tune with the settled principles of law, the State Government has not followed the same but, instead, has continued to follow the provisions of the O.M.No. 11/APA/1/77 dated 09.06.1966 issued by the Government of Nagaland, Home Department; Appointment ‘A’ Branch, which provides as follows: “4. The relative seniority of directs and of promotees shall be determined according to the rotation of vacancies between direct recruits and promotees which shall be based on the quotas of vacancies reserved for direct recruitment and promotion respectively in the recruitment Rules. (I) Where reservation for each source is 50% the order of seniority shall be (i) promote (ii) direct recruitment and so on. Therefore the respondents cannot all of a sudden apply the rules of 2006 and put the petitioners into disadvantage in their seniority. 11. Mr. T. B. Jamir, learned Senior Additional AG, who appears on behalf of the State respondents, at the very outset, submitted that a law made by a legislature can be declared null and void only on two grounds (i) On lack of legislative competence and (ii) for violation of the fundamental rights or any provision of the Constitution, there is no third ground.In this case, since no question has been raised on the legislative competence the only issue to be determined is whether any of the fundamental rights provided in Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the constitution has been violated or not. 12. The learned Senior Additional AG, further submitted that the petitioners and the private respondents, though they were appointed to the same cadre they come from two different sources one through promotion and the other through direct recruitment. And, the requisite qualification required for promotees as per the provisions of the Rules of 2006 particularly Schedule II Serial No. 4 are; (I) they should have served not less than seven years of service in the rank of Inspector of Police and (II) should have passed a minimum educational qualification of HSLC or equivalent. But, in the case of direct recruits, the minimum qualification prescribed therein is a degree of any recognized university. By the above, one can make out that they belong to distinct groups and they can be reasonably classified. When reasonable classification can be made out or is made out, equality clause under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution will not come into the picture. By the above, one can make out that they belong to distinct groups and they can be reasonably classified. When reasonable classification can be made out or is made out, equality clause under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution will not come into the picture. He also further submitted that equality as provided under Article 14 is not absolute it is for equality among equals and not equality among non equals, as such, the direct recruits and the promotees in this case, who are distinguishable or classifiable as stated above are not equals.Therefore, the question of equal treatment of the two groups does not arise. Taking this into account, the State respondents have drawn the impugned Seniority list. The learned senior Additional AG also submitted that State respondent being the employer is best placed to decide such issues, therefore it is not for Courts to interfere in such matters. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Additional AG referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Rathinaswami and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in (2009) 5 SCC 625 . The relevant paragraphs i.e., Para 25 and 26 are reproduced herein below: “25. However, the question whether the difference in the educational qualifications is sufficient to give preferential treatment to one class of candidates against another, should in our opinion be ordinarily left to the executive authorities to decide. The executive authorities have expertise in administrative matters, and it is ordinarily not proper for this Court to sit in appeal over their decisions unless it is something totally arbitrary or shocking. 26. Whether graduate degree is a sufficient basis for classification for promotion vis-a-vis non-graduates, and whether such classification has rational relation to the nature of duties of a Deputy Tehsildar, is, in our opinion for the State Government to decide, and not the Court. Hence, we uphold the validity of impugned rule to the extent that it gives preference to the directly recruited Assistants over the promoted Assistants who are non graduates.” 13. The learned Additional AG also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 34 , the relevant paragraph being paragraph 6. The learned Additional AG also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 34 , the relevant paragraph being paragraph 6. Lastly, the learned Senior Additional AG also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shanker and Others v. Union of India and Others reported in (1994) 9 SCC 349.The relevant paragraphs being Para 7 and 8. The contents of the paragraphs of the judgments are reproduced herein below one after the other: (2002) 4 SCC 34 “6.The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute equality amongst all which may be a physical impossibility. All that Article 14 guarantees is the similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The protection of equal laws does not mean that all laws must be uniform. Equality before the law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality before the law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as though they were the same. It is true that Article 14 enjoins that the people similarly situated should be treated similarly but what amount of dissimilarity would make the people disentitle to be treated equally is rather a vexed question. A legislature, which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power of making special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not ‘per se’ amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. The State has always the power to make classification on a basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with. In order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act. When a law is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it. Having ascertained the policy and the object of the Act, the Court has to apply a dual test in examination the validity, the test being, whether the classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from others that are left out of the group, and whether the basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and objects In order that law may be struck down under this Article, the inequality must arise under the same piece of legislation or under the same set of laws which have to be treated together as one enactment. Inequality resulting from two different enactments made by two different authorities in relation to the same subject will not be liable to attack under Article 14. It is well settled that Article 14 does not require that the legislative classification should be scientifically or logically perfect. If we examine the impugned provisions of the Emergency Recruitment Rules from the aforesaid stand point the conclusion is irresistible that the aforesaid set of Rules have been framed for a specific recruitment to the Administrative Service. The provision of Section 25 dealing with the seniority has been specifically designed to meet all situations under which people from different walks of life could be recruited to the Rajasthan Administrative Service under the Emergency Recruitment Rules. The law making authority must be presumed to have examined pros and cons in making the aforesaid provision for seniority in the cadre which is in parimateria with similar provisions for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service and, therefore, it is difficult for us to hold that the aforesaid provision in discriminatory in nature.” (1994) 9 SCC 349 “7. The scope and content of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, familiarly known as the equality clause, have been laid down in innumerable decisions of this Court. It is unnecessary to refer to all of them. Briefly stated the gravamen of the article is equality of treatment. Article 14 forbids discrimination. The scope and content of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, familiarly known as the equality clause, have been laid down in innumerable decisions of this Court. It is unnecessary to refer to all of them. Briefly stated the gravamen of the article is equality of treatment. Article 14 forbids discrimination. As stated by Shah, J. in Western U.P Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. : (S.C.C p. 82 1, para 7) "Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law." It is implicit from the above, that equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike. It is settled law that in giving effect to the said salutary principle, a mathematical precision is not envisaged and there should be no fanatical or 'doctrinaire' or wooden approach to the matter. A practical or realistic approach should be adopted. It is open to the State to classify persons or things or objects, for legitimate purposes. 8. The scope of Article 14 has been summarised in the oft-quoted decision, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar. At (AIR p. 547), the Constitution Bench of this Court relied on the following passage from the judgment of the seven-Judge Constitution Bench in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar : (AIR p. 547) "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration." The Court then laid down : "The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation." The above decision has been followed in innumerable subsequent cases. See Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, Kerala Education Bill, 1957, Re7 and other cases.” 14. See Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, Kerala Education Bill, 1957, Re7 and other cases.” 14. The learned Additional AG has also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported in (2014) 8 SCC 682 , (the paragraphs referred to are Para 40 and 49) and submitted that whenever there is a challenge to the constitutional validity of a law enacted by a legislature, it may be kept in mind that there is always a presumption of constitutionality of the same. As such, unless a clear transgression of constitutional principles is shown, Courts must be slow in interfering with such enactment. The contents of the two paragraphs of the judgment stated above are reproduced here below; “40. This Court exposited the ambit and scope of Article 14 in Budhan Choudhry 69 as follows: “5….It is now we -established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well-established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.” 49. Where there is challenge to the constitutional validity of a law enacted by the legislature, the Court must keep in view that there is always a presumption of constitutionality of an enactment, and a clear transgression of constitutional principles must be shown. The fundamental nature and importance of the legislative process needs to be recognized by the Court and due regard and deference must be accorded to the legislative process. The fundamental nature and importance of the legislative process needs to be recognized by the Court and due regard and deference must be accorded to the legislative process. Where the legislation is sought to be challenged as being unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court must remind itself to the principles relating to the applicability of Article 14 in relation to invalidation of legislation. The two dimensions of Article 14 in its application to legislation and rendering legislation invalid are now well recognized and these are (i) discrimination, based on an impermissible or invalid classification and (ii) excessive delegation of powers; conferment of uncanalised and unguided powers on the executive, whether in the form of delegated legislation or by way of conferment of authority to pass administrative orders–if such conferment is without any guidance, control or checks, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also needs to be mindful that a legislation does not become unconstitutional merely because there is another view or because another method may be considered to be as good or even more effective, like any issue of social, or even economic policy. It is well settled that the courts do not substitute their views on what the policy is.” 15. Lastly the learned Senior Additional AG submitted that Article 16 deals with appointment and not with seniority therefore, the same does not apply in the case involving seniority. Therefore, the same does not apply in this case. 16. On the second issue raised by the petitioners, the learned Senior Additional AG submitted that giving retrospective seniority is permissible when service rule clearly provides. After having stated thus, he continued his submission by stating thatin this case, the Rules of 2006, clearly provides fixing of the seniority between the direct recruits and promotees in the cadre of NPS Junior Grade appointed in the same year, by making the direct recruits senior to the promotees. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the impugned seniority list. The learned Senior Additional AG referred to Para 20 and 24 of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Ashok Kumar Srivasthava and another reported in (2014) 14 SCC 720 ,in support of his submission. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the impugned seniority list. The learned Senior Additional AG referred to Para 20 and 24 of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Ashok Kumar Srivasthava and another reported in (2014) 14 SCC 720 ,in support of his submission. The learned Senior Additional AG also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ganga Vishan Gujrati and others v. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2019) 16 SCC 28 para 45. The contents of the paragraphs of the judgments given above are reproduced here below one after the other: (2014) 14 SCC 720 “20. The thrust of the matter is how the seniority is to be determined in such circumstances. In Union of India v. S.S. Uppal and another,[4] it has been opined that the seniority of a person is to be determined according to the seniority rule applicable on the date of appointment. It has also been observed that weightage in seniority cannot be given retrospective effect unless it is specifically provided in the rule in force at the material time. 24. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has drawn inspiration from the recent authority in PawanPratap Singh and others v.Reevan Singh and others, where the Court after referring to earlier authorities in the field has culled out certain principles out of which the following being the relevant are reproduced below: “45 (ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.” (2019) 16 SCC 28 “45. A consistent line of precedent of this Court follows the principle that retrospective seniority cannot be granted to an employee from a date when the employee was not borne on a cadre. Seniority amongst members of the same grade has to be counted from the date of initial entry into the grade. This principle emerges from the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v State of Maharashtra. The principle was reiterated by this Court in State of Bihar v Akhouri Sachindra Nath and State of Uttaranchal v Dinesh Kumar Sharma. In Pawan Pratap Singh v Reeven Singh, this Court revisited the precedents on the subject and observed: “45. … (i) The effective date of selection has to be understood in the context of the service rules under which the appointment is made. It may mean the date on which the process of selection starts with the issuance of advertisement or the factum of preparation of the select list, as the case may be. (ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iii) Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from the backdate and if it is done, it must be based on objective considerations and on a valid classification and must be traceable to the statutory rules. (iii) Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from the backdate and if it is done, it must be based on objective considerations and on a valid classification and must be traceable to the statutory rules. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.” This view has been re-affirmed by a Bench of three judges of this Court in P Sudhakar Rao v U Govinda Rao.” 17. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General also submitted that to follow or implement the provisions of the Government Memorandum dated 09.06.1966, (earlier referred to by the learned senior counsel of the petitioners) which provides that the order of seniority shall be promotees first, followed by direct recruits where reservation for each source of recruitment is 50 % each, would amount to supplanting which is not provided by the service rules that governs the conditions of service of the parties involved, and that would amount to violation of the settled principles of law which does not allow such practice. Therefore, the submissions of the learned counsel of the petitioners that the provisions of the said Government Memorandum ought to have been followed in the case of the parties involved in this case is not a valid argument in law. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Additional AG referred to Para 7 of the judgment in the case of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others reported in AIR (1967) SC 1910. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: “7. We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr. N.C. Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.” 18. After taking us through the above paragraph, the learned Senior Additional AG submitted that when the existing rule has already provided how seniority between the direct recruits and promotees should be regulated or fixed, the same cannot be substituted by a memorandum. 19. Lastly, the learned Additional AG submitted that, seniority is not fundamental right but is a civil right only, and therefore, the State may alter or deny any such ostensible right even by way of retrospective effect, if it so chooses in public interest. Therefore, just because the petitioner claims to have suffered hardship because of their placement in the seniority list, Court cannot declare the provisions of the Rules of 2006 as ultra vires the Constitution, unless, the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of his submission, the learned Additional AG referred to Para 33,44 and 45 of the judgment passed in the case of Prafulla Kumar Das and others v. State of Orissa and others reported in (2003) 11 SCC 614.The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are given herein below: “33.Under Aricle 309 of the Indian constitution, it is open to the Governor of the State to make rules regulating their recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the legislature. As has been rightly pointed out by the Court in Nityananda Kar case, the legislature, or the Governor of the State, as the case may be, may in its discretion, bestow or divest a right of seniority. As has been rightly pointed out by the Court in Nityananda Kar case, the legislature, or the Governor of the State, as the case may be, may in its discretion, bestow or divest a right of seniority. This is essentially a matter of policy, and the question of a vested right would not arise, as the State may alter or deny any such ostensible right, even by way of retrospective effect, if it so chooses in public interest. 44. Seniority is not a fundamental right but is merely a civil right. The right of seniority in this case was also not a vested or accrued right. 45. In this case, the petitioners seek benefit to which they are not otherwise entitled. The legislature, in our opinion, has the requisite jurisdiction to pass an appropriate legislation which would do justice to its employees. Even otherwise a presumption to that effect has to be drawn. If a balance is sought to be struck by reason of the impugned legislation, it would not be permissible for this Court to declare it ultra vires only because it may cause some hardship to the petitioners. A mere hardship cannot be a ground for striking down a valid legislation unless it is held to be suffering from the vice of discrimination or unreasonableness. A valid piece of legislation, thus, can be struck down only if it is found to be ultra vires Artice 14 of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. We do not think that in this case, Article 14 of the constitution is attracted.” 20. Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents while adopting the submissions of the learned Senior Additional AG also referred to the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the following cases :- i) State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara reported in (1951)AIR SC 318; ii) State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali reported in(1952) AIR SC 75; iii) Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India and Anr reported in (2008) 5 SCC 287 The principles of law enunciated or followed in the above cited cases are more or less the same with the ones followed in the judgments already cited by the learned Senior Additional AG, therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, the contents are not reproduced. 21. Mr. 21. Mr. Joshua Sheqi, also submitted that the minimum length of service required for the promotees to be eligible for appointment or promotion to the post of NPS Junior Grade Cadre is given as 7 years in the Rules of 2006, however, the petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 13, 14 and 16 did not have seven years length of service as Inspectors when they were promoted to the cadre of NPS Junior Grade. This also clearly shows that they were not even qualified to be promoted. 22. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsels representing the parties in the writ petition and we have also gone through the pleadings, the documents and the judgments referred to. After having done so, we shall now discuss the issues raised. On perusal of the catena of judgments pronounced by the Apex Court including the ones referred to by the learned counsels, we are of the view that, there can no longer be any confusion or doubt on the settled principles of law which must be followed while deciding the issue as to whether a legislative enactment is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or any other provision of the Constitution. At the very outset, it must be stated that an enactment of a legislature can be struck down or declared null and void if it violates the equality clause of the Constitution or the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, if it can be shown or made out that the unequal treatment given to two different groups is based on reasonable classification which has nexus with the object sought to be achieved, the enactment would not be declared null and void on that account. Therefore, unequal treatment of similarly situated persons per-se would not amount to violation of the equality clause unless it is shown that the unequal treatment is not based on reasonable classification which is intelligible and has nexus with the object sought to be achieved. As such, what we have to examine in this case is whether the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006, passed the test stated above or not. For that purpose, it would be necessary to reproduce the provisions of Rule 19(C)and the other relevant provisions of the Rules of 2006, before we go any further. As such, what we have to examine in this case is whether the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006, passed the test stated above or not. For that purpose, it would be necessary to reproduce the provisions of Rule 19(C)and the other relevant provisions of the Rules of 2006, before we go any further. Relevant provisions of the Rules of 2006 are abstracted here below for ready reference - “6. Method of Recruitment: a) Recruitment to the service after the commencement of these rules shall be made by any one of the following methods, viz:- i) direct recruitment at Junior Grade level by open competition in accordance with rule 7; ii) recruitment by promotion to Junior Grade level in accordance with Rule 11 and 12. b) The respective quotas reserved for each source of recruitment, the qualifications required for direct recruitment, the qualifications and other conditions required for promotion from a lower grade to a higher grade shall be as specified in Schedule-II. 7. Direct recruitment by open competition: a) Whenever there is a vacancy to be filled up through direct recruitment by open competition to the service in accordance with Rule 6(a) (i), the Home Department shall send a requisition, in duplicate, to the Commission in the form prescribed by the Commission, after obtaining clearance form P & AR Department about the number of reserved posts. The Commission shall advertise the post(s) specifying the number of vacancies to be filled on the basis of the recruitment, the number of vacancies reserved for indigenous inhabitant of Nagaland, as well as for the backward tribes, as per the reservation policy of the Government in force, and other terms and conditions of these rules as may be considered necessary. b) A candidate must apply on or before such date, in such manner and in such form as the Commission may prescribe. c) The decision of the Commission as to the eligibility or otherwise of a candidate for recruitment shall be final, and no candidate, to whom a certificate of admission has not been issued by the Commission, shall be admitted to the examination/interview by the Commission. d) A preliminary examination, main examination and interview for selection to the service shall be held at such time employees as may be prescribed in the notice ensued by the Commission for the purpose. d) A preliminary examination, main examination and interview for selection to the service shall be held at such time employees as may be prescribed in the notice ensued by the Commission for the purpose. The scheme of the preliminary and main examinations, the syllabus for the examinations and the marks to be assigned for the written examinations and the interview etc. shall be as may be notified by the Government in the P&AR Department from time to time. 8. Qualification for Direct Recruitment: a) Age : The age of a candidate for direct recruitment to the service under Rule 6(a) (i) shall not be less than 21 years, and not more than 27 years as on the first day of the year in which recruitment is held. The upper age limit is relaxable by 5 years in the case of candidates belonging to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes in accordance with the general or special orders issued by the Government in this behalf from time to time. b) Educational Qualifiction : A candidate for appointment to the service shall hold a degree of a recognized university. Candidates who have appeared, or intend to appear for the degree examination and are awaiting the result thereof, are also eligible to appear for their preliminary written examination. However, the candidate shall have to produce proof of having passed degree examination before he is allowed to sit for the main written examination. c) Character :A candidate shall produce before the Commission a certificate of good character from: i) the Principal or Academic Officer of the University or College in which he last studied. ii) two responsible persons (not related to the candidate) who are well acquainted with the candidate. d) Physical fitness :A candidate should be of sound health both mentally and physically, and be free from organic defects or bodily infirmity likely to interfere with the efficient performance of his duties. Candidates should not be less than 5 feet 2 inch in height and chest measurement 32 inches in deflated condition, with expansion capacity of one and half inches in the case of ST/SC candidates, and 5 feet 4 inches in height, and chest measurement of 33 inches in deflated condition, with expansion capacity of 2 inches, in respect of all other candidates. (A candidate for direct recruitment shall be required to undergo medical examination before final appointment to the service). 11. (A candidate for direct recruitment shall be required to undergo medical examination before final appointment to the service). 11. Constitution of Police establishment board : a) There shall be a Police Establishment Board(PEB) to clear all promotions to members of the services consisting of the following:- 1. The Chief Secretary, Nagaland Chairman 2. The Director General of Police, Nagaland Member 3. The Addl. C. S. & Commissioner, Nagaland Member 4. The Principal Secretary, P&AR Member 5. The Secretary in-charge of Home Member/Secretary Deptt b) All recruitment to the service at the Junior Grade level through promotion under Rule 6 (a) (ii) shall be done through the Police Establishment Board. c) Only those members of the service in Selection Grade, who had given their option in writing not to accept nomination/promotion to the IPS, will be eligible for promotion to Higher Selection Grade. 12. Procedure for recruitment by promotion through PEB: a) The Home Department shall prepare the following papers/documents for being sent to the Chairman and members of PEB:- i) a statement showing the number of vacancies to be filled by promotion during the recruitment year. ii) a list of officers, as per seniority in the feeder grade as on 1st January of the recruitment year, whose number should be three times the number of vacancies in the grade to which promotion is to be considered. iii) the ACRs of the last five years in respect of all the officers in the list; and iv) the representations of the individual officers, if any, again adverse entries in the ACR, the comments of Reviewing Officer and of the Chief Secretary, may be kept with the ACRs consent. b) The Member Secretary of the PEB shall ascertain the convenience of the Chairman and Members of PEB for fixing a meeting of the PEB. Preferably the PEB meeting may be held at least one month ahead of the commencement of the recruitment year concerned. Notice for the PEB meeting shall, however, be issued by the Secretary of Home Department. c) No proceedings of a PEB shall be valid without the attendance of the Chairman, the Member Secretary and at least one member of the Committee. d) All decisions shall be made by majority decision if consensus is not emerging. Notice for the PEB meeting shall, however, be issued by the Secretary of Home Department. c) No proceedings of a PEB shall be valid without the attendance of the Chairman, the Member Secretary and at least one member of the Committee. d) All decisions shall be made by majority decision if consensus is not emerging. e) The Committee shall meet and prepare, based on the priniciple of merit-cum-seniority, a ‘select list’ of officers in order of preference, equal to one and half times the number of the vacancies to be filled by promotion during the recruitment year. Whenever a junior officer is selected in preference to a senior one, the Committee shall record in writing the reason(s) of such supersession. The list so prepared shall be forwarded by the Committee to the appointing authority. 19. Seniority: a) Seniority of members of the service shall normally be determined with reference to the date of joining the service, except as provided under sub-rule (b) of this rule. b) The seniority of the promotees shall be determined in the order of preference, or select list prepared by the Committee, whereas the seniority of persons appointed through direct recruitment shall be determined in accordance to the marks obtained by the trainee during the basic training held at NEPA which should be added to the marks obtained by the officer in State Police Service exam conducted by the Commission or the Selection Committee, provided that if a person does not join the Service within one month from the date of issue of the offer of appointment or within the period specified or within the period of extended joining time allowed, he shall rank below those who joined before him c) Candidates recruited under Rule 6 (a) (i) shall be ranked senior to those recruited under Rule 6 (a) (ii) during the same year. 20) Seniority List : There shall be prepared every year a common seniority list prepared grade-wise consisting of the names of all the members of the service arranged in order of seniority, and duly published and circulated among the members of the service. NAGALAND POLICE SERVICE RULES, 2006 SCHEDULE II (Rules 6 B) Sl. No. Grade & Name of posts Percentage of posts to be filled by Eligibility for promotion/qualification for direct recruitment Direct recruitment Departmental promotion 1 2 3 4 5 V Junior Grade (Dy.SP/SDPO/Asst. NAGALAND POLICE SERVICE RULES, 2006 SCHEDULE II (Rules 6 B) Sl. No. Grade & Name of posts Percentage of posts to be filled by Eligibility for promotion/qualification for direct recruitment Direct recruitment Departmental promotion 1 2 3 4 5 V Junior Grade (Dy.SP/SDPO/Asst. Commdt./ Coy Commander) 50% 50% For direct recruitment, the minimum qualification shall be a degree of a recognized university. For promotion; not less than 7 years of service in the rank of Inspector of Police, and a minimum educational qualification of HSLC or equivalent. 23. The above provisions of the Rules of 2006, shows that there are two methods of recruitment to the post of NPS Junior Grade Cadre; (i) through direct recruitment and (ii), through promotion from amongst the Inspectors of Police. Further it can also be seen that the basic qualification required for appointment to the cadre through direct recruitment is degree of recognized university and for the promotees, minimum educational qualification is HSLC or equivalent and, having not less than seven years length of service in the rank of Inspector of Police. Furthermore, in the case of the direct recruits they have to go through three stages of competitive examinations (a) preliminary examination (b) main examination and (c) interview. In addition the candidate should not be less than 21 years of age and not more than 27 years on the date on which the recruitment is held; and for the upper age limit it is relaxable by 5 years in case of candidates belong to SC/ST category. On physical fitness; the candidate of direct recruits should not be less than 5 ft 2 inches in height and measure 32 inches at the chest in deflated condition, with expansion capacity of 1 and a half inches in the case of SC/ST category. In the case of promotees no such requirements are given. Furthermore, for the direct recruits the examination is conducted by the Nagaland Public Service Commission and in the case of promotees, assessment is made by Police Establishment Board headed by Chief Secretary. In the case of promotees no such requirements are given. Furthermore, for the direct recruits the examination is conducted by the Nagaland Public Service Commission and in the case of promotees, assessment is made by Police Establishment Board headed by Chief Secretary. Looking at the methods of selection, the basic minimum educational qualification required, the level of physical fitness required, the minimum and maximum age required in the case of direct recruitment, it is quite apparent that the objective is to choose the best among the creams of the society for the Police service of the State, who can also rise to the high levels of the Service, so that there is efficient and effective State Police administered by qualified and efficient Police officers. On the other hand, the minimum educational qualification required as already stated is HSLC and the required length of service in the feeder post is 7 years at the minimum. Besides these, no other requirements like in the case of direct recruits is given for the promotees. It appears from all these that promotion to the Junior Cadre of NPS is given to Inspectors of Police in recognition of their long illustrious career in service, and to facilitate coexistence of young and old blood in order to have experience, intelligence and energy in the service at all times. Further, it can also be seen that the promotees start from the bottom and only after so many years of service, they are given the chance of being promoted to the cadre of Junior NPS. Therefore, it is quite obvious that they are not likely to have high educational qualifications and the kind of physical fitness the direct recruits are required to have. From all these, we conclude that the two groups of appointees to the cadre of Junior NPS, though they belong to the same grade or cadre, are easily distinguishable or classifiable and the same was done on intelligible and reasonable grounds. 24. Now, we shall come to the second requirement that is whether the distinction or classification so made between the direct recruits and the promotees has nexus with the object sought to be achieved or not. 24. Now, we shall come to the second requirement that is whether the distinction or classification so made between the direct recruits and the promotees has nexus with the object sought to be achieved or not. It is quite apparent or obvious that the object sought to be achieved is to create and build efficient and effective body of Police Officers at the high levels of Nagaland Police so that all over the State, the Police service would be efficient and effective at all times. To achieve that, the young police officers who are selected from amongst the creams of the society has to be given at least a little bit of edge when it comes to interse seniority between them and the promotees so that they may have some advantage in their career graph. Because that will help them to become part and parcel of the body of Police Officers of the State at higher levels at the early part of their lives which in turn will help in building and maintaining a highly efficient Police service in the State. Besides, such actions will also motivate and encourage them to perform better in their duties and that will also have its impact in the building of efficient and effective Police service in the State. Therefore, we are of the view that the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 does not violate the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, for that matter any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 25. As stated above, we have examined the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 in the light of the settled principles of law as can be seen from the catena of judgments pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court including in the judgments referred to by the learned counsels, and after having done so, we have come to the conclusions as aforestated. 26. Over and above what has been stated above, we may also state here that we agree with the submission of the learned Senior Additional AG and Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents that, fixation of seniority is not a fundamental right but, only a civil right. 26. Over and above what has been stated above, we may also state here that we agree with the submission of the learned Senior Additional AG and Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents that, fixation of seniority is not a fundamental right but, only a civil right. Therefore, the legislature has the power to make the rules for the same, as deemed fit by them, provided it does not infringe on the equality clause of the Constitution. Taking into consideration this principle of law and keeping in view the conclusions already drawn by us in the preceding paragraphs, we are of the view that there is no ground or reason to hold or declare the provisions of Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 unconstitutional and null and void. 27. Now, coming to the second issue, that is, as to whether the impugned Seniority list has been prepared as per the settled principles of law on the determination of seniority list particularly, between direct recruits and promotees of the same service and cadre; after perusing the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Ashok Kumar Srivasthava and another reported in (2014) 14 SCC 720 ; PawanPratap Singh v. Reevan Singh reported in (2011) 3 SCC 267 ; Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa reported in (1998) 4 SCC 456 and in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and Others v. Ningam Siro and Others reported in (2020) 5SCC 689 and several others, we find that the settled general principles for determination of seniority between direct recruits and promotees are; (i) Seniority should not be counted from a date when the incumbent has not even been borne in the cadre (ii) to avoid possibilities of causing any hardship, to count or fix seniority from the date of actual appointment. However, it also appears prominently that an exception has been made to the general principles and, that is, if a service rule expressly provides otherwise, the same has to be followed provided, it does not infringe on the equality clause of the Constitution. However, it also appears prominently that an exception has been made to the general principles and, that is, if a service rule expressly provides otherwise, the same has to be followed provided, it does not infringe on the equality clause of the Constitution. The relevant paragraphs of the judgments passed in the State of U.P v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava and in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and Others v. Ningam Siro and Others has been already reproduced in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and they are relevant on this. In this case, Rule 19(C) of the Rules of 2006 has clearly provided that the direct recruits shall be senior to promotees of the same year. After having examined the same to find as to whether it infringes on the equality clause of the Constitution we have found that it does not. Therefore, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned seniority list is legally valid and there is no reason to quash and set it aside. Before we state our final conclusion we may also add here that in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and Others v. Ningam Siro and Others the Service Rule also provided that seniority shall be counted from the date of appointment to the service, whereas, in the present case, the service rule provides that direct recruits shall be senior to promotees of the same year. Therefore, the judgment passed in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh and Others v. Ningam Siro and Others cannot be applied in toto in this case. 28. Keeping in view of the discussions and the conclusions drawn herein above, we are not inclined to allow the prayers of the petitioners in the writ petition. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own cost.