JUDGMENT PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA,CJ. - In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioners have called in question the legality and validity of Memo C.No.7164/A6/2004 of the 3rd respondent dtd. 6/6/2005, issued pursuant to the recommendations of A.P. State Human Rights Committee, as illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and to set aside the same. 2. Petitioner No.1 was working as S.I. of Police, II Town Police Station, Eluru, whereas petitioner No.2 was working as A.S.I. of Police of the same Police Station, at the relevant point of time. Around 11.20 p.m. on 1/11/2003, petitioner No.1 who was on night rounds along with a constable, reached Devi Restaurant and found that it was still open. Since the restaurant was required to be closed by 11.00 p.m., as per the Circular dtd. 1/7/2003 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Eluru, West Godavari District, petitioner No.1 instructed the owner of the restaurant to close it. At the same time, he instructed petitioner No.2 to take the persons whose shops were kept open, to the Police Station. 3. One Mothukuri Nagabhushanam who was brought to the Police Station died and Cr.No.290 of 2003 under Sec. 304 of IPC of Eluru II Town Police Station was registered against petitioner No.1 and other police personnel. Since the matter was reported in newspapers, the State Human Rights Committee had taken up the matter suo motu and after enquiry directed the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide its order dtd. 30/12/2004 in H.R. Case No.36/200 as follows: "a) To pay a sum of Rs.4,00,000.00 (rupees four lakhs only) as compensation to Mothukuri Krishnakumari, Mothukuri Ramakumari and Mothukuri Dhanalakshmi who are the widow, second and third unmarried daughters of the deceased M. Nagabhushanam respectively for violating the fundamental right to life and liberty and causing the death of M. Nagabhushanam by its functiories the S.I. of Police Sri P. Bharathmathaji and Pentapati Seshagiri Rao, A.S.I. b) The first daughter Mangathayuru of deceased Nagabhushanam is not awarded any compensation, as she is already married and staying with her husband at Bimadolu village. c) We consider appropriate to apportion the compensation awarded in three equal shares, one for the widow and one each for the second and third daughters of the deceased. c) We consider appropriate to apportion the compensation awarded in three equal shares, one for the widow and one each for the second and third daughters of the deceased. d) The Committee further directs the Government to pay the compensation amount to the widow and second and third daughters of the deceased within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. e) Out of the total compensation amount of Rs.4,00,000.00 the Government of A.P. may recover a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 (Rupees One Lakh only) from S.I. of Police Sri Panja Bharath Mataji and Rs.50,000.00 (Rs. Fifty Thousand only) from Pentapati Seshagiri Rao, A.S.I. f) The Committee further directs the Government to take appropriate disciplinary action against respondents 1 and 2 in respect of the illegalities and violations committed by them as pointed out in this order." 4. Consequent upon the order passed by the Human Rights Committee, the Superintendent of Police, West Godavari District, issued the impugned Memo dated 06- 06.2005, instructing the petitioners to pay sums of Rs.1,00,000.00 and Rs.50,000.00, respectively, in District Police Office, Eluru, in order to credit the same to the Government under proper head of account. 5. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Sec. 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (for short, "the 1993 Act") postulates the steps during and after enquiry. However, it does not authorise the Committee or the Commission to direct for recovery of the amount from the officers concerned; as such, the order of the Human Rights Committee or, for that matter, the Memo issued by the Superintendent of Police, West Godavari, is without jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the report of the Committee is illegal and perverse for the reason that there is no evidence to establish that deceased Mothukuri Nagabhushanam was subjected to torture in the hands of the Police. 6. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.3, Superintendent of Police, West Godavari District, action in issuance of impugned Memo has been defended by submitting that pursuant to the order passed by the Human Rights Committee, the sums of Rs.1,00,000.00 and Rs.50,000.00, are to be recovered from petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2, respectively and, therefore, there is no illegality in issuing the impugned Memo. 7. At the relevant time, Human Rights Commission was not constituted in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 7. At the relevant time, Human Rights Commission was not constituted in the State of Andhra Pradesh. State Human Rights Committee was constituted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh under the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it was directed that in such States where Human Rights Commission is not functional, a Committee in the name of State Human Rights Committee shall be formed. The Committee was, thus, exercising the same functions as were entrusted to the State Human Rights Commission under the 1993 Act. 8. The issue as to the powers and jurisdiction of Human Rights Commission was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India and others reported in (2004) 2 SCC 579 , wherein, in paragraph 14, it is held thus: "14. We cannot endorse the view of the Commission. The Commission which is a "unique expert body" is, no doubt, entrusted with a very important function of protecting human rights, but, it is needless to point out that the Commission has no unlimited jurisdiction nor does it exercise plenary powers in derogation of the statutory limitations. The Commission, which is the creature of statute, is bound by its provisions. Its duties and functions are defined and circumscribed by the Act. Of course, as any other statutory functionary, it undoubtedly has incidental or ancillary powers to effectively exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the powers confided to it but the Commission should necessarily act within the parameters prescribed by the Act creating it and the confines of jurisdiction vested in it by the Act. The Commission is one of the fora which can redress the grievances arising out of the violations of human rights. Even if it is not in a position to take up the enquiry and to afford redressal on account of certain statutory fetters or handicaps, the aggrieved persons are not without other remedies. The assumption underlying the observation in the concluding passage extracted above proceeds on an incorrect premise that the person wronged by violation of human rights would be left without remedy if the Commission does not take up the matter." 9. The assumption underlying the observation in the concluding passage extracted above proceeds on an incorrect premise that the person wronged by violation of human rights would be left without remedy if the Commission does not take up the matter." 9. Differentiating the power to issue recommendation with that of the power to issue direction or mandate under Sec. 20(2) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar, S/o. Manikrao Anchule v. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14 , observed as under: "...power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a "recommendation" and not a "mandate" to conduct an enquiry. "Recommendation" must be seen in contradistinction to "direction" or "mandate". But recommendation itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty." 10. In a celebrated judgment in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others reported in air 1958 SC 538 (1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the function of the Enquiry Commission constituted under the provisions of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the function of the Commission is recommendatory in nature and observed thus: "...In the first place neither Parliament nor the Government has itself undertaken any inquiry at all. Parliament has made a law with respect to inquiry and has left it to the appropriate Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in Sec. 3 of the Act. The Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has undertaken to hold any inquiry. The Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has undertaken to hold any inquiry. In the second place the conclusion that the last portion of clause (10) is bad because it signifies that Parliament or the Government had usurped the functions of the judiciary appears to us, with respect, to be inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in a later part of the judgment that as the Commission can only make recommendations which are not enforceable proprio vigore there can be no question of usurpation of judicial functions. As has been stated by the High Court itself in the latter part of its judgment, the only power that the Commission has is to inquire and make a report and embody therein its recommendations. The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore. A clear distinction must, on the authorities, be drawn, between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by some action being taken. Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called and consequently the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this case and the elaborate discussion of the American authorities founded on the categorical separation of powers expressly provided by and under the American Constitution appears to us,..." 11. Sec. 18 of the 1993 Act makes provision for steps during and after inquiry. The same is reproduced hereunder: "18. Sec. 18 of the 1993 Act makes provision for steps during and after inquiry. The same is reproduced hereunder: "18. Steps during and after inquiry.-The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely:" " (a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abetment thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority- (i) to make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons; (iii) to take such further action as it may think fit."; (b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary; (c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (d) subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative; (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission; (f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission." 12. The provision contained in Sec. 18 of the 1993 Act, as reproduced above, empowers the Commission to recommend to the concerned Government and authority to make payment of compensation; to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action. However, it has no power to straightaway direct payment of compensation and, thereafter, to direct further recovery of part of compensation from the erring officers. 13. However, it has no power to straightaway direct payment of compensation and, thereafter, to direct further recovery of part of compensation from the erring officers. 13. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board, Raipur v. Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission reported in AIR 2018 CHHATTISGARH 53, a learned single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court has observed that Human Rights Commission can only recommend to the concerned Government to compensate the claimant and cannot exercise jurisdiction to pass order directing payment of compensation. 14. In the case at hand also, Andhra Pradesh Human Rights Committee has directed for payment of compensation of Rs.4,00,000.00 to the widow, second and third unmarried daughters of the deceased Mothukuri Nagabhushanam and, thereafter, directed the Government of Andhra Pradesh to recover a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 from petitioner No.1 and Rs.50,000.00 from petitioner No.2. The Committee has also directed the Government to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioners in respect of the illegalities and violations committed by them. 15. Paragraph 37 of the order passed by the Committee nowhere used the word "recommendation" or "recommend". The Committee straightaway issued an order directing the State Government to pay compensation and, thereafter, to recover the amount of Rs.1,00,000.00 and Rs.50,000.00 from petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2 respectively. In the teeth of the language contained in Sec. 18 of the 1993 Act, the Human Rights Committee lacks jurisdiction to direct payment of compensation. A Committee or a Commission is a recommendatory body. Therefore, it cannot direct payment of compensation. 16. Although the order passed by the Committee directing payment of compensation is not in accordance with law, petitioners have not challenged the order passed by the Committee, but they have challenged the consequential Memo, i.e. Memo C.No.7164/A6/2004 of the 3rd respondent dtd. 6/6/2005, directing petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2 to deposit the sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 and Rs.50,000.00, respectively, with the Government. In such a view of the matter, this Court is of the view that there is no need to set aside the order dtd. 30/12/2004 passed by the State Human Rights Committee, Andhra Pradesh, but Memo C.No.7164/A6/2004 of the 3rd respondent dtd. 6/6/2005, deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside. 17. Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.