JUDGMENT : R.M. Chhaya, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment & order dated 28.02.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition being WP(C) No.7032/2015 filed by the appellant, the original petitioner has preferred this intra-Court appeal. 2. The following facts emerge from the record of this appeal. The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Lachima High Madrassa of Nalbari District pursuant to the selection process initiated in the year 1996. It is the case of the appellant that she was selected and recommended for appointment by the District Level Selection Board of Nalbari District with an order dated 22.10.1998 issued by the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari. It is also the case of the appellant that she was given all consequential benefits including Group Insurance, GPF, annual increments as per ROP, 1996 in 2010 as well as financial up-gradation under ACPS, which is also reflected in her Service Book. 3. As the record unfolds, some candidates, who were not selected in the said recruitment process, preferred a writ petition before this Court being WP(C) No.3949/2001 and the said writ petition came to be disposed of with an order dated 20.03.2007 giving liberty to the State Government to decide on course of action on the errant officials as well as on the illegal appointees. 4. It is the case of the appellant that she was terminated abruptly on 21.05.2012 by an order passed by the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari District Circle, Nalbari without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing and directed the Principal of Mugdi Milan H.S. School not to allow the appellant and other similarly situated terminated teachers to continue in service after 21.05.2012. The appellant along with other similarly situated teachers, whose services were terminated, filed writ petitions before this Court and by an order dated 01.08.2013, the termination orders came to be quashed and set aside predominantly on the ground that the affected persons did not have opportunity to defend their cause. According to the appellant, she was one of the petitioners in WP(C) No.3117/2012. 5. According to the appellant, she was one of the petitioners in WP(C) No.3117/2012. 5. This Court while disposing of the said writ petition vide order dated 01.08.2013 directed the State authorities to take final decision in the matter and to pass a speaking order following due process of law by resorting to de-novo proceedings after issuing show cause notice and after considering the stand taken by the appellant and other similarly situated persons. Pursuant to the said order passed by this Court, the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari issued a notice dated 18.01.2014 directing the appellant to resume her duty in the School concerned so as to complete the process of de-novo proceeding. Accordingly, the appellant resumed her duties on the very same day. 6. Facts indicate that the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari District Circle, Nalbari issued a show cause notice dated 20.03.2014, whereby the appellant was asked to show cause why her appointment should not be declared to be illegal and void and why her services should not be terminated. The appellant gave her reply to the said show cause notice on 04.04.2014. After the de-novo enquiry, the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari submitted his report to the Director of Secondary Education, Assam with a communication dated 30.09.2014, wherein the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari stated that on being satisfied with the reply of show cause notice and after going through the different orders passed by this Court, he is of the opinion to cancel the order of termination dated 21.05.2012 and also recommended that the appellant and other similarly situated persons be continued in service with all consequential benefits, keeping in view the legitimate claims of the appointees. It appears from the record that the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari District Circle, Nalbari, on resumption of duty by the appellant, granted current salary with an order dated 24.03.2015, however, denied the salary from 21.05.2012 to 18.01.2014. 7. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant/original petitioner preferred the present writ petition being WP(C) No.7032/2015, which came to be dismissed with the impugned judgment & order dated 28.02.2019 and being aggrieved by the same, the present writ appeal is filed. 8. Heard Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel with Mr. S.K. Das, Advocate for the appellant. Also heard Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned standing counsel, Education (Secondary) Department appearing for all the respondents. 9. 8. Heard Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel with Mr. S.K. Das, Advocate for the appellant. Also heard Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned standing counsel, Education (Secondary) Department appearing for all the respondents. 9. Learned counsels appearing for both the parties have also submitted written submissions, which are taken as basis of this judgment & order. 10. Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Chand Sawhney -Vs-Union of India, reported in (1969) 3 SCC 642 , contended that once the order of termination dated 21.05.2012 came to be set aside and has been declared to be invalid, the same would be invalid or voidabinitio and the salary due to public servant concerned must be deemed to have accrued month after month because the dismissal is set aside. It was contended by Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel for the appellant that the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Jai Chand Sawhney (supra) would squarely cover the case of the appellant as the termination order dated 21.05.2012 was set aside by this Court with a common judgment & order dated 01.08.2013 and the appellant, therefore, should be deemed to be in service and as such, she was entitled to her arrears of salary for the intervening period. 11. It is contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court. It was also contended by Mr. R. Islam that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that for all practical intents and purposes, the appellant was not working in her school for the period from 21.05.2012 to 18.01.2014. Mr. R. Islam also further contended that this Court in the case of Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed and Chafiur Rahman Choudhury @ Safiur Rahman Choudhury has granted arrears of salary to the similarly situated persons. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the termination order in case of the present appellant was never quashed and set aside, which is contrary to the record. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appeal be allowed and appropriate direction is required to be issued to the respondents to pay the arrears, as prayed for. 12. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appeal be allowed and appropriate direction is required to be issued to the respondents to pay the arrears, as prayed for. 12. Per contra, Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned standing counsel, Education (Secondary) Department appearing for the respondents has opposed the appeal and has submitted that as the appellant has not worked during the period from 21.05.2012 to 18.01.2014 and hence, she is not entitled to the arrears of salary. It was also contended that the persons in respect of whom the termination orders have been set aside by this Court and in respect of whom this Court directed that they may be deemed to be in service throughout and be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears and salary, had been paid salary for the aforesaid period in which they remained terminated. However, in case of the appellant, while setting aside the termination order dated 21.05.2012, this Court did not direct that the appellant would be deemed to be in service or that she would be entitled to arrears of salary from the date of her termination and for the period she remained out of service and, therefore, it was contended that the appellant is not entitled to the arrears of salary and the learned Single Judge has not committed any error, which requires interference by this Court and the appeal being meritless, deserves to be dismissed. 13. No other or further submissions, contentions or grounds have been raised by the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 14. On perusal of the record of this appeal, it clearly appears that the termination order dated 21.05.2012 was challenged by the appellant and other similarly situated persons by filing WP(C) No.3177/2012, which is evident from the order at Annexure-4 to WP(C) No.7032/2015. Thus, the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the appellant had not challenged the order of termination, is contrary to the record. By order dated 01.08.2013 passed in WP(C) No.3117/2012 and other connected matters, the learned Single Judge of this Court observed thus:- “15. From the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the DSE, Assam, it is clear that the show-cause-notices issued earlier on 18.5.2010 was cancelled and was not taken to their logical conclusion. By order dated 01.08.2013 passed in WP(C) No.3117/2012 and other connected matters, the learned Single Judge of this Court observed thus:- “15. From the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the DSE, Assam, it is clear that the show-cause-notices issued earlier on 18.5.2010 was cancelled and was not taken to their logical conclusion. Thereafter the impugned termination order was abruptly issued against the petitioners by the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari on 21.5.2012. Therefore it is apparent that the affected persons did not have any opportunity to defend their cause and therefore their termination was not through a legally permitted process. 16. In the above circumstances, the State authorities are given the liberty to proceed against the persons appointed from the 2 controversial select list(s) of the Barkhetri Constituency. The process should start with show-cause-notice(s) and appropriate action is permitted to be taken by the appointing authority only after replies are considered. The noticee(s) should be the petitioners, the private respondents and the 3 persons who claim to be from the Nalbari Constituency but whose names figure in the controversial select list(s) of Barkhetri Constituency. After considering the replies from the noticee, speaking order be passed. The earlier termination order dated 21.5.2012 issued by the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari will abide by the final decision to be taken, in the de novo proceeding.” 15. Thus, the termination order dated 21.05.2012 was held to be passed not through a legally permitted process. It is pertinent to note that the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari District Circle, Nalbari vide communication dated 18.01.2014 also informed the Principal of the School in which the appellant was serving that the petitioner, i.e. the appellant and the other similarly situated persons, be again taken in service and were permitted to resume their duties to complete the process of de-novo proceedings as held by this Court and admittedly thereafter the appellant was permitted to resume her duties. Thus, the learned Single Judge has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant did not challenge the order of termination dated 21.05.2012. It is also an admitted position that after considering the reply given by the appellant to the show cause notice issued by the respondent authority, the competent authority of the respondents has come to the conclusion that the order of termination dated 21.05.2012 is not proper. It is also an admitted position that after considering the reply given by the appellant to the show cause notice issued by the respondent authority, the competent authority of the respondents has come to the conclusion that the order of termination dated 21.05.2012 is not proper. Thus, the services of the appellant from the date of her entry in the school are in a way recognized. It also clearly appears that in a similarly situated case of Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed, who was petitioner of WP(C) No.1030/2016, has been granted similar relief by this Court. 16. Considering the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the claim raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge has been wrongly declined. The learned Single Judge has also committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had accepted the order. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. 17. The Director of Secondary Education, Assam is directed to take necessary steps to release the arrears of salary of the appellant and process the same for the period from 21.05.2012 to 18.01.2014 and after quantifying the same, make such payment of arrears of salary to the appellant within a period of 3(three) months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment & order. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.