JUDGMENT : R.M. Chhaya, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 01.10.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 4564/2016, the appellant/original petitioner has preferred this intra-Court appeal. 2. The following facts emerge from the records of the appeal: The appellant/original petitioner was working as an Assistant Manager in Assam Gramin Vikash Bank at its Dhemaji Branch. As per record, the appellant/writ petitioner was working in the said Bank since 1984 and when he was working as an Assistant Manager, Scale-I at the said Branch, by an order dated 14.09.2012, the appellant/original petitioner was put under suspension pending enquiry for certain acts of gross misconduct alleged to have been committed by him at Dhemaji Branch. A show cause notice was served upon the appellant on 28.03.2013 and eleven charges were levelled against him. It was specifically alleged that the appellant committed alleged irregularity in dealing with Central Sector Scheme of National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) under ‘Pig Development’ Scheme. It was also alleged that such irregularities were particularly noticed in recommending loan application of beneficiaries to the General Manager (Credit) for sanctioning loan. The appellant submitted his reply to the said show cause notice by denying all the charges vide reply dated 27.04.2013. The respondent authorities thereafter framed charge on 09.05.2014 and written statement was submitted by the appellant on 26.05.2014. Upon considering such written statement, as the same was not found to be satisfactory, departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellant and an enquiry officer and a presenting officer came to be appointed vide order dated 16.06.2014. As a matter of chronology, as the presenting officer initially appointed expressed his inability to conduct the enquiry, another person named Ananta Hazarika, Manager of the respondent Bank at Regional Office, Lakhimpur was appointed as the presenting officer vide order dated 13.08.2014. The departmental enquiry was conducted on 12.09.2014, 26.09.2014, 16.10.2014, 17.10.2014, 18.10.2014 and concluded on 27.10.2014, which culminated into the enquiry report dated 30.11.2014. The enquiry report was served upon the appellant/original petitioner after which the appellant/original petitioner filed his reply and after considering the same, the disciplinary authority passed an order imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement from service on the appellant on 30.05.2015. The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal before the appellate authority which, however, came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.05.2016. The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal before the appellate authority which, however, came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.05.2016. The order of compulsory retirement was challenged before this Court by way of filing a writ petition which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge and being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed. 3. We have heard Mr. K. Sarma, learned counsel assisted by Mr. D. Das, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondents. The original records of enquiry were produced by the learned counsel for the respondents in a sealed cover. 4. Referring to the impugned judgment and order, Mr. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant contended that out of the list of seven witnesses, only one witness was examined and rest of the witnesses were not examined by the enquiry officer. According to Mr. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant, nothing was established against the appellant. It was contended that the style of examination of the witness was also erroneous. It was also contended that the copies of the documents which were relied upon were not furnished to the appellant and even during cross-examination the contents of such documents have not been discussed. It was further contended that the allegation of bribe having been taken by the appellant has not been proved as no one who gave the bribe has been examined and only on presumption it has been decided against the appellant. It was contended that the principles of natural justice have been breached. It was also contended that the enquiry suffers from bias and has been carried out hurriedly within a span of five days and, therefore, the order of punishment deserves to be set aside. 5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya –vs- United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 . The learned counsel has invited the attention of this Court to the observations made in Paragraph No. 26 of the said judgment to contend that when the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are based on no evidence, the Court can interfere. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 . The learned counsel has invited the attention of this Court to the observations made in Paragraph No. 26 of the said judgment to contend that when the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are based on no evidence, the Court can interfere. It was also contended that, as held by the Apex Court, suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry and the writ Court is entitled to rely upon the findings of fact in certain circumstances. 6. Mr. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi –vs- Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and has contended that mere production of documents is not enough and even the contents of the documentary evidence has to be proved by examining witnesses. It was contended that in the case on hand no such exercise was undertaken and the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority are without any evidence and not a single witness has been examined to prove the same. 7. Per contra, Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel for the respondent Bank has relied upon the observations made by the learned Single Judge and has contended that proper enquiry has been conducted and as held by the learned Single Judge, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. It was contended by Mr. Dutta that during the enquiry no complaint whatsoever was raised by the appellant as regards not giving any opportunity of being heard and the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant participated in the departmental enquiry and that he has also examined the Management witness and, as such, has not raised any objection with regard to production of witnesses. Mr. Dutta has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation –vs- M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 422 (Paragraph No. 25) and in the case of T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. –vs- K. Meerabai, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 255 (Paragraph Nos. Mr. Dutta has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation –vs- M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 422 (Paragraph No. 25) and in the case of T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. –vs- K. Meerabai, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 255 (Paragraph Nos. 25 and 35) and has contended that once the employer has lost confidence in the employee and the fact of loss of confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge. It was contended by Mr. Dutta that all the charges against the appellant have been proved and the appellant has not examined any of his witness but has only cross examined the witness of the Management and, therefore, when the respondent Bank as an employer has lost confidence in the employee and the charges have been proved, the same should not be interfered with. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Anr. –vs- N. Gangaraj, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 , it was contended that strict rule of evidence does not apply to a departmental proceedings and the scope of judicial review is only confined to the decision making process, which in the instant case, is not erroneous at all and it was therefore contended that no interference is called for and the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. 8. We have gone through the records of the appeal and upon considering the submissions made, it deserves to be noted that the appellant had actively participated in the disciplinary proceedings. It is a matter of record that the appellant has not examined any of the witnesses and he also got an opportunity to cross-examine the Management witness. It is also a matter of record that neither the appellant has ever complained that no opportunity of hearing was given to him, nor has he raised any objection with regard to production of witnesses by the respondent Bank and such contentions have been raised for the first time in the writ petition which have been properly considered by the learned Single Judge. The record indicates that every opportunity to give reply and file written statement has been given by the authority to the appellant and the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry for almost six days. The record indicates that every opportunity to give reply and file written statement has been given by the authority to the appellant and the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry for almost six days. What has to be seen is whether the enquiry has been conducted properly or not. Only because the enquiry was over in a little more than two months’ time, it cannot be said that the enquiry was completed hurriedly or that the appellant was not given proper opportunity, as tried to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the style of examination was erroneous; the enquiry was completed hurriedly and that there is breach of the principles of natural justice, is without any basis. Similarly, the allegation of bias is without any foundation. This Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot act as an appellate authority in a disciplinary proceedings to reappreciate the evidence. It is also noteworthy that the Management witness was examined and the appellant has also cross-examined the said witness on every point and on consideration of the same, the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the appellant are proved which have also been considered by the disciplinary authority while passing the order of punishment. Thus, it is not a case of no evidence as tried to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant and, therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) and Roop Singh Negi (supra) will not be applicable in the present case. 9. Apart from the fact that the appellant was working as a Banker and, that too, on an important post with the responsibility of making recommendation for sanctioning of loan, the opinion of the appellant as regards the eligibility of a loanee was pivotal and, therefore, when the charge of not having conducted himself in a proper and expected manner is proved against the appellant, the authorities are right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent Bank as an employer has lost confidence in the appellant. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to the judgment in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. -vs- N.Gangaraj (supra), relied upon by Mr. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to the judgment in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. -vs- N.Gangaraj (supra), relied upon by Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent Bank as regards the jurisdiction of this Court while exercising the power of judicial review, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus : “8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority. 9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under: “7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., again, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., again, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil , this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under: “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. It was held as under: “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham and Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana, High Court of Bombay vs. Shahsikant S Patil). * * * 10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.” 13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.Gunasekaran , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings: “13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.Gunasekaran , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings: “13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” 10. In the case on hand also we find that the evidence on record has been considered and the enquiry report came to be submitted which was considered by the disciplinary authority while imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement. 11. We are therefore in total agreement with the observations made by the learned Single Judge and we do not find any patent error which warrants judicial review by this Court. We have also noticed that the decision making process is not at all erroneous and, as held by the Apex Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we do not find it to be an appropriate case where interference with the findings of the disciplinary authority is called for. The writ appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 12. The original records as produced by Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel for the respondent Bank be returned back.