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2022 DIGILAW 1086 (KER)

Sajikumari K. S. W/o Late Somarajan v. Ansardeen S/o Kochumuhammed

2022-12-15

MARY JOSEPH

body2022
JUDGMENT : MARY JOSEPH, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is against an award passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pathanamthitta (for short ‘the Tribunal’) on 01.04.2014 in O.P. (M.V.) No. 1742/2007. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to this appeal will hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners and respondents 1 to 3 in accordance with their status in the Original Petition. 3. The appellants herein are the petitioners before the Tribunal who moved the above Original Petition seeking for a sum of Rs. 12,00,250/- as compensation for the death of one Mr. Somarajan in a motor accident occurred at 1.45 p.m. on 02.12.2007 with the involvement of a mini bus bearing Registration No. KL-04/T-6916. Mr. Somarajan was a pedestrian through Pampa-Mannarakulanji public road and he sustained injuries when knocked down by the mini bus referred to above. Alleging that the motor accident was occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the mini bus by its driver and claiming compensation, the above Original Petition was filed. The driver, the owner and the insurer of the Bus were arrayed as respondents 1 to 3 in the Original Petition. 4. During the pendency of the Original Petition, the father of the victim, who was the 3rd petitioner in the Original Petition died. The wife of the victim was carrying at the relevant time of his death following the motor accident. She gave birth to a child later who was impleaded in the Original Petition as additional 5th petitioner. 5. Respondents 1 and 2 did not contest the Original Petition. 3rd respondent after entering appearance has filed a written statement admitting issuance of a valid policy for the mini bus, covering the date of the motor accident. It was contended by the 3rd respondent that 1st respondent was driving the mini bus carefully and vigilantly and the motor accident was caused due to the carelessness and negligence of the victim who was walking through the road. Claims regarding the age, the occupation, the monthly income and the compensation were also disputed. 6. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A10 were marked in evidence by the petitioners. Respondents did not adduce any evidence. Based on the above evidence, the Tribunal found that the driver of the Mini Bus had caused the motor accident by his rash and negligent driving. 6. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A10 were marked in evidence by the petitioners. Respondents did not adduce any evidence. Based on the above evidence, the Tribunal found that the driver of the Mini Bus had caused the motor accident by his rash and negligent driving. Petitioners were also found by the Tribunal entitled to get compensation for the death of Mr. Somarajan, following the fatal injuries sustained by him in the motor accident and in the calculation adopted by it, arrived at a sum of Rs. 10,21,200/- as the compensation payable. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the quantum of compensation stood awarded by the Tribunal, petitioners approached this Court in the appeal on hand. 7. It is contended by Sri. T.K. Koshy, the learned counsel for the petitioners that though the Identity Card and the Salary Certificate of the victim of the motor accident were produced and marked respectively in evidence as Exts.A9 and A8 to establish his occupation and monthly income, the Tribunal discarded those for the reason that the person responsible for it’s issuance was not examined. The Tribunal fixed Rs. 4,000/- notionally as his monthly income and calculated compensation payable on its basis. According to the learned counsel, the Tribunal is totally unjustified in discarding the documents marked in evidence and relied on by the petitioners and fixing the monthly income notionally. He has also relied on the decision of the Apex Court to fortify his argument. 8. In the context on hand it is relevant to have discussion on the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. Rajani vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 2022 (5) KLT Online 1012 (SC) has been relied on by the learned counsel to rest his argument that a robust view has to be taken of the quantum of earnings since documentary evidence may not be available to specifically prove the quantum of earnings of a self-cultivating agriculturist/self-skilled worker. The learned counsel urged that the Apex Court has held in the said case that Rs. 12,000/- adopted by the Tribunal as the monthly income of a self-cultivating agriculturist cannot be regarded as disproportionate or arbitrary. According to him, the Apex Court found that the High Court has reduced the monthly income of Rs. 12,000/- fixed by the Tribunal to Rs. 10,000/-, without justification. 12,000/- adopted by the Tribunal as the monthly income of a self-cultivating agriculturist cannot be regarded as disproportionate or arbitrary. According to him, the Apex Court found that the High Court has reduced the monthly income of Rs. 12,000/- fixed by the Tribunal to Rs. 10,000/-, without justification. The learned counsel canvassed on the basis of the dictum supra that this Court has to take a liberal view in the matter of fixation of the monthly income. 9. The learned counsel also relied on a judgment of the Apex Court passed in common in Rajwati @ Rajjo and Others vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Others in Civil Appeal No. 8179/2022 and Seema and Others vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Others, 2022 Live Law (SC) 1016 [Civil Appeal No. 8180/2022] to rest his argument that a salary certificate marked by the petitioners in evidence before the Tribunal cannot be discarded for the reason that it’s signatory was not examined. 10. Exts.A8 and A9 are produced by the petitioners with a view to establish the job and monthly income of the victim of the motor accident. As per the claims raised by the petitioners in the Original Petition, the victim was an electrician working with a contractor under NTPC, Kayamkualm. Ext.A9 is the original Identity Card of the deceased wherefrom he is identified as an electrician under a contractor namely Libin Erectors engaged in the main plant of NTPC at Kayamkulam. Ext.A9 was found issued by the Central Industrial Security Force and valid till 04.10.2007. It is endorsed in Ext.A9 that the validity of it was extended till 02.01.2008. Therefore, it stood established that as on date of the motor accident in question, Mr. Somarajan was working as an electrician under Libin Erectors. Ext.A8 is a certificate dated 21.12.2007 issued by one Mr. Abhayan K. Vasu in his capacity as the site-in-charge of Libin Erectors. It was certified in Ext.A8 that Mr. Somarajan was working under the Contractors at N.T.P.C. RGCCPP, Kayamkulam site since 14.07.2006 for a monthly salary of Rs. 6,900/- inclusive of all incentives. 11. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent contended on the contrary that the salary certified in Ext.A8 is inclusive of all incentives and therefore, the entire sum shown in it cannot be considered for calculation of compensation for loss of dependency. 6,900/- inclusive of all incentives. 11. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent contended on the contrary that the salary certified in Ext.A8 is inclusive of all incentives and therefore, the entire sum shown in it cannot be considered for calculation of compensation for loss of dependency. A contention was also raised against reception of it in evidence that the person who issued it was not examined. 12. Ext.A8 was marked in evidence before the Tribunal without it’s signatory being examined. The monthly income certified in Ext.A8 indisputably is inclusive of all incentives. The learned counsel relied on the dictum in Kirti and Others vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. 2021 (1) KHC 196 (SC) also to fortify his argument that a liberal approach needs to be adopted by a court while fixing the monthly income for calculating compensation. 13. In Rajwati and Seema supra the wife of the deceased and a co-worker were examined before the Tribunal and they tendered corroborative versions regarding the monthly income earned by the victim prior to his death following the motor accident. Apart from that, the income certified in the salary certificate and shown in the pay slip marked in evidence in those cases also find corroboration with what have been orally stated by the witnesses. In that context, the Apex Court has said that despite the non-examination of the signatory, it can be relied on to fix the monthly income. 14. It is pertinent to note that in the case on hand, the only evidence tendered by petitioners to base the fixation of monthly income is Exts.A9 and A8 which are nothing but salary certificate and an identity card allegedly issued by the employer of the deceased. The deceased was an employee in a private institution. None of the petitioners who survived the victim of the motor accident entered into the witness box to depose about the monthly income, the deceased was getting at the relevant time. Therefore, there was no further evidence to corroborate the contents of Exts.A8 and A9 which are documents issued by the alleged employer of the deceased, which is only a private institution. True that unlike in criminal cases the strict rule of evidence is not applicable in motor accident compensation cases. The standard of proof required is preponderance of probability. Therefore, there was no further evidence to corroborate the contents of Exts.A8 and A9 which are documents issued by the alleged employer of the deceased, which is only a private institution. True that unlike in criminal cases the strict rule of evidence is not applicable in motor accident compensation cases. The standard of proof required is preponderance of probability. If some other evidence was there to corroborate the income shown in Exts.A9 and A8, without examination of it’s signatory, the Tribunal could have relied on it to base fixation of monthly income for the purpose of calculation of the compensation payable. The decision cited for reliance is distinguished by this Court in that manner and is discarded from consideration. 15. The decisions cited by the learned counsel as above cannot be relied on in the case on hand for the reason that petitioners themselves have made a claim in the Original Petition that the deceased was getting Rs. 6,500/- as monthly income from his occupation as an electrician. As already stated, Exts.A8 and A9 were marked in evidence but those were discarded for non-examination of the person responsible for its issuance. This Court has also expressed the opinion to discard those documents not for the mere reason of non-examination of the signatory thereto, but also for want of any other corroborative materials. 16. When petitioners themselves have a claim that the deceased was getting only Rs. 6,500/- as his monthly income, and the documents produced and proposed for reliance to establish the monthly income, would disclose Rs. 6,900/- as the monthly income (inclusive of incentives), this Court finds it improper to take a liberal view in the matter of fixation of monthly income in the case on hand, as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 17. Only in cases where the monthly income claimed by the petitioners is a reasonable sum and the occupation wherefrom he claimed to have obtained the same is such that, proof of income is difficult to be established by evidence, it is open to a court to take a liberal view in the matter of fixation of monthly income. In the case on hand, petitioners having raised a claim that the deceased was getting only Rs. In the case on hand, petitioners having raised a claim that the deceased was getting only Rs. 6,500/- as his monthly income at the relevant time of his death following the motor accident and having due regard to 2007, the year of the occurrence, it is improper for a court to fix a higher sum ignoring his claim. In the above circumstances, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for reliance are discarded and this Court is inclined to re-fix the monthly income as Rs. 6,500/-. 18. Without any hesitation, this Court would say that the Tribunal is justified in discarding Exts.A9 and A8 from consideration for non-examination of the person who was responsible for issuance of those. 19. It is noticed from the impugned award that the Tribunal had accepted the claim of the petitioners that the deceased was an electrician by profession. Respondents have not come in challenge against that consideration of the Tribunal. 20. As already stated, for want of any evidence to corroborate the monthly income sought to be established through Exts.A9 and A8, those are discarded by the Tribunal. It opted to fix the monthly income notionally as Rs. 4,000/-. The notional fixation does not appear to this Court sound and therefore, is inclined to re-fix it. As per the claim of the petitioners in the Original Petition, the deceased, was an electrician having Rs. 6,500/- as his monthly income. 21. Whether future prospects is required to be considered in the case on hand is the next question to be dealt with. In Kirti supra, the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the fixation of notional income in the case of a homemaker as well as consideration of future prospects for the purpose of grant of compensation. According to the learned counsel, the Apex Court after making observations in the matter, held that fixation of notional income of a homemaker attains special significance. The Court further held that various methods can be employed by courts to fix notional income of a homemaker depending on the facts and circumstances of a case and to grant future prospects based on the notional income, thus fixed. The Court further held that various methods can be employed by courts to fix notional income of a homemaker depending on the facts and circumstances of a case and to grant future prospects based on the notional income, thus fixed. The general observations made by the Apex Court in the matter of fixation of notional income for homemakers and consideration of loss of future prospects in their case for the purpose of grant of compensation are: “(a) Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. (b) Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a homemaker attains special significance. It becomes a recognition of the work, labour and sacrifices of homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring dignity to all. (c) Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. (e) The granting of future prospects, on the notional income calculated in such cases, is a component of just compensation.” 22. It is relevant to note from the impugned award that the Tribunal had accepted the claim of the petitioners that the deceased was an electrician by occupation at the relevant time when his life has been lost in the motor accident. As per the claim of the petitioners, the deceased was aged 44 years at the relevant time of his death. In Kirti supra, the Apex Court has held that consideration of future prospects on the notional income fixed with respect to a homemaker, is a component of just compensation. 23. As per the claim of the petitioners, the deceased was aged 44 years at the relevant time of his death. In Kirti supra, the Apex Court has held that consideration of future prospects on the notional income fixed with respect to a homemaker, is a component of just compensation. 23. When the Apex Court has held that granting of future prospects on the notional income fixed even in the case of a homemaker is a component of just compensation, there is every justification in considering loss of future prospects for the deceased in the case on hand, who was an electrician by occupation and aged only 44 years at the relevant time of his death. The Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 (4) KLT 662 (SC) had extended the benefit of consideration of future prospects even to self employed persons or those having a fixed salary. The finding of the Apex Court as contained in Paragraph 59 of the judgment is extracted hereunder: “Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated Under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one’s income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardization on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable.” 24. The victim of the motor accident who died was accepted by the Tribunal as an electrician by occupation against which, challenge was also not raised by the 3rd respondent. This Court has already proposed for re-fixation of monthly income in the case on hand as Rs. 6,500/-. The age of the victim was already considered by the Tribunal as 44 years at the relevant time. As per the claim of the petitioners itself, the deceased was working as an electrician under a contractor. Therefore, the deceased in the case on hand will not come within the category of persons dealt with in Pranay Sethi supra who are entitled to have consideration of loss of future prospects. But the Apex Court has taken a view in Kirti supra that even in the case of a deceased house-wife, loss of future prospects can be a component for calculation of just compensation. 25. The deceased being an electrician under a contractor can be taken as earning fixed salary. Therefore, relying on the dictum in Pranay Sethi supra consideration of 25% addition can be to the monthly income proposed to be fixed by this Court notionally in the case of the victim of the motor accident who died untimely at his age of 44 years. 26. The learned counsel canvassed for re-fixation of the compensation stood awarded by the Tribunal under the conventional heads of loss of estate, funeral expenses and loss of consortium. According to him Rs. 15,000/- each is payable as compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses and Rs. 40,000/- is payable to each of the petitioners towards loss of consortium. 27. The survivors of the victim of the motor accident were his wife, parents and children. According to him Rs. 15,000/- each is payable as compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses and Rs. 40,000/- is payable to each of the petitioners towards loss of consortium. 27. The survivors of the victim of the motor accident were his wife, parents and children. Wife was conceived at the relevant time and delivered a male child after the death of the victim due to the motor accident. Therefore, he was brought on record as additional 5th petitioner. Father of the victim was alive at the relevant time of his death, but during pendency of the Original Petition, he died. 28. Appeal being taken up for consideration in the year 2022, petitioners are entitled to get Rs. 15,000/- each as compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses and Rs. 40,000/- per petitioners as compensation towards loss of consortium. 29. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent urged that the father of the deceased in view of his death during pendency of the Original Petition is not entitled to get compensation towards loss of consortium. Therefore the question is whether changes that succeed the filing of the Original Petition would have any impact on the grant of compensation payable as on date when the motor accident was occurred. The answer is ‘no’ for the reason that the rights and liabilities will crystallize at the time of the cause of action itself, and the cause of action for raising a claim for compensation in the case on hand is the motor accident itself. 30. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent urged that the additional 5th petitioner being in the womb at the relevant time of the motor accident is not entitled to get Rs. 40,000/- as compensation for loss of consortium. 31. True that additional 5th petitioner was not born at the relevant time of the death of the victim of the motor accident. He was only in the womb of the 1st petitioner (mother) even at the time when the Original Petition seeking compensation was filed. He was born on 12.02.2008, during pendency of the Original Petition before the Tribunal. Therefore, at the relevant time when the motor accident was occurred, the pregnancy of the 1st petitioner was advanced about seven months. He was only in the womb of the 1st petitioner (mother) even at the time when the Original Petition seeking compensation was filed. He was born on 12.02.2008, during pendency of the Original Petition before the Tribunal. Therefore, at the relevant time when the motor accident was occurred, the pregnancy of the 1st petitioner was advanced about seven months. The question to be dealt with in the context is whether a foetus who has completed existence for six months in the womb of his/her mother would be equated to a living child. As per medical jurisprudence, for an embryo on completion twenty weeks in the womb, organs will almost be in a stage nearing completion of formation. 32. It is pertinent in the context to have the term ‘viability of child’ extracted hereunder: “Viability of child - The term ‘viability’ means the ability of neonate to lead a separate existence outside the mother. Viability denotes the stage of maturity at which a normally developed neonate is potentially able to survive. Generally, the term ‘viability’ is used in its legal rather than in its biological sense, the legal definitions of viability ranging from 180 to 210 days of intra-uterine development. Viability, it should be noted, is not synonymous with live birth.” In the above backdrop, it is an indisputable factum that the additional 5th petitioner was a viable child in the womb of the 1st petitioner at the relevant time of the death of his father in the motor accident. 33. As per the explanation appended to Section 6 of the Limitation Act also, ‘a minor’ include a child in the womb. 34. Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is also relevant to be considered in the context and it reads: “20. 33. As per the explanation appended to Section 6 of the Limitation Act also, ‘a minor’ include a child in the womb. 34. Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is also relevant to be considered in the context and it reads: “20. Right of child in womb - A child who was in the womb at the time of the death of an intestate and who is subsequently born alive shall have the same right to inherit to the intestate as if he or she had been born before the death of the intestate, and the inheritance shall be deemed to vest in such a case with effect from the date of the death of the intestate.” When viewed in the backdrop of the legal provisions discussed above, this Court is convinced that a child in the womb is a living person and is entitled to inherit the estate of his deceased father. 35. In the case on hand, the additional 5th petitioner was a foetus having more than 6 months’ existence in the womb of his mother at the relevant time when his father died in the motor accident. Indisputably, he was a ‘viable child’ at the relevant time. He was also born alive after two months of the death of his father in the motor accident and preferring of the Original Petition seeking compensation by his legal representatives. He was born alive during pendency of the Original Petition before the Tribunal. 36. Therefore, the additional 5th petitioner is also entitled to get Rs. 40,000/- as compensation for loss of consortium. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent/insurer that compensation for loss of consortium is not liable to be granted in his favour is discarded being devoid of merits. 37. When 25% is added to Rs. 6,500/- or Rs. 8,125/- [Rs. 6,500/- + (25% of Rs. 6,500/-)] is arrived at. The multiplier of ‘14’ and deduction of 1/4th taken consideration of by the Tribunal being correct are maintained. Compensation for loss of dependency when calculated afresh with the modified factors, a sum of Rs. 10,23,750/- [Rs. 8,125/- x 12 x 14 x ¾] is arrived at. Rs. 6,55,200/- stood awarded by the Tribunal under the head when adjusted against the sum now arrived at, the petitioners will get Rs. 3,68,550/- [Rs. 10,23,750/- - Rs. 6,55,200/-] as additional compensation. 38. 10,23,750/- [Rs. 8,125/- x 12 x 14 x ¾] is arrived at. Rs. 6,55,200/- stood awarded by the Tribunal under the head when adjusted against the sum now arrived at, the petitioners will get Rs. 3,68,550/- [Rs. 10,23,750/- - Rs. 6,55,200/-] as additional compensation. 38. The Tribunal has already awarded Rs. 25,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- as compensation respectively towards funeral expenses and loss of estate, which are Rs. 10,000/- excess and Rs. 5,000/- less than the compensation payable under those heads as per Pranay Sethi supra. Therefore, Rs. 5,000/- (Rs. 10,000/- - Rs. 5,000/-) stood paid in excess is deducted from the total sum arrived at as additional compensation. 39. As compensation towards loss of consortium, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- in favour of the wife who is the 1st petitioner. Each of the petitioners are found entitled to get Rs. 40,000/- each as compensation for loss of consortium. Thus, Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rs. 40,000/- x 5) is arrived at. Rs. 1,00,000/- stood awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of consortium in favour of the 1st petitioner when adjusted against, Rs. 2,00,000/- now arrived at, the petitioners will get Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. 2,00,000/- - Rs. 1,00,000/-) as additional compensation. Rs. 1,00,000/- was also awarded by the Tribunal to each of the children and Rs. 20,000/- to the mother as compensation towards loss of love and affection. Petitioners being disentitled to get compensation for loss of love and affection, Rs. 2,20,000/- (Rs. 1,00,000/- + Rs. 1,00,000/- + Rs. 20,000/-) stood awarded by the Tribunal as compensation under that head is deducted from the total sum arrived at. 40. When calculation is made in the above manner afresh, petitioners will get Rs. 2,43,550/- (Rupees Two lakhs forty three thousand five hundred and fifty only) [(Rs. 3,68,550/- + Rs. 1,00,000/-) - (Rs. 2,20,000/- + Rs. 5,000/-)] as additional compensation. The said amount will also carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the Original Petition till date of realisation excluding 135 days, being the period of delay occurred in filing the appeal. The Tribunal made the 3rd respondent liable to pay the compensation arrived at and any challenge not being raised against, that is maintained. 41. The Tribunal made the 3rd respondent liable to pay the compensation arrived at and any challenge not being raised against, that is maintained. 41. 3rd respondent shall pay the sum now arrived at as additional compensation with interest fixed as above, within a period of two months from the date on which a certified copy of this judgment is received, in accordance with the directions issued by this Court in Circular No. 03/2019 dated 06.09.2019. Petitioners shall pay additional court fee for the compensation awarded being excess than that was claimed. 42. MACA stands allowed accordingly.