JUDGMENT : S.V. Bhatti, J. We have heard the learned Senior Advocates, Mr. Joseph Markos and Mr. P.K.R. Menon, for the parties. 2. Sahyadri Agencies Limited/assessee is the appellant. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Thrissur/Revenue, is the respondent. The appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act 1961 (for short, the Act) arises from the order dated 05.11.2019 in I.T.A. No.439/Coch/2019 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench (for short, the Tribunal). The controversy relates to the return filed by the assessee for the assessment year 2014-15. 3. The assessee, on 29.09.2014, e-filed the income tax return for the Assessment Year 2014-15. Under Section 143(1) of the Act, the return was processed, and a refund of Rs.6,92,550/- was generated. The return was selected for scrutiny under Computer Aided Scrutiny Selection (CASS) on (i) significant interest expenses relatable to exempt income (under Section 14A) and (ii) substantial interest paid which is not commensurate with the loans raised and that the assessee has returned less turnover. Such scrutiny in the present scenario is known as limited scrutiny. On 25.11.2016, a pre-assessment notice was issued, and for our purpose, it is unnecessary to refer to all averments made by the assessee and the Revenue. On 16.12.2016, the assessment was completed under Section 143(3) of the Act determining the total income of Rs.14,97,304/-. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Thrissur issued a notice under Section 263 of the Act for the following reasons : “During the previous year the Company had issued 30,00,000 lakh optionally convertible cumulative preference shares of Rs.10/- each, fully paid up amounting to Rs.3,00,00,000/- along with securities premium of Rs.57,00,00,000/- to Sri M P Ramachandran, one of the Directors of the Company. This issue is not seen to have been examined by the Assessing Officer. The securities premium of Rs.57,00,00,000/- may have to be brought to tax under Section 56(2)(viib) or 68. This issue is also to be examined.” 4. The Commissioner received the assessee’s reply and called for ITMR from the Assessing Officer. Upon perusing the material on record, the Commissioner noticed that the assessee, during the financial year 2013-14 (AY 2014-15), planned to raise money (on a private placement basis to one of the promoters) in the form of borrowing and issue preference shares and invest such shares in the equity shares of M/s. Jyothy Laboratories Ltd (JLL) on a preferential allotment basis. JLL is a listed company in which one of the promoters of the assessee company (Mr. M.P. Ramachandran) had a substantial interest as a promoter. During the said year, the assessee company raised Rs.205 crores [Rupees Two hundred and Five crores only] through private placement of non-convertible debentures at a premium after two years, 11 months and 12 days from the date of allotment {i.e., November 14, 2013}. The above debentures are secured by first and exclusive charge on the equity share of M/s. Jyothy Laboratories Ltd was held as an investment by the assessee and personal guarantees of promoters. Mr. M.P. Ramachandran, Mrs. M.G. Shanthakumar and Mrs. M.R. Jyothy. 4.1 The Commissioner further noticed that due to the assessee’s non-cooperation during assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer did not verify the details regarding the applicability of provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) and Section 68 of the Act and these transactions undertaken by the assessee company during the relevant Financial Year. Further, without relevant details, the Assessing Officer could not determine the fair market value of unquoted shares as per Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules 1962. The non-consideration of the effect of allotment of preference shares investment etc., is an omission under Sections 56(2)(viib) and 56(2). The consideration is triggered at the stage of computation of income itself when the share application money received from a resident by a Company in which the public is not substantially interested is above the face value. In other words, this is an issue on the effect of share allotment, consideration and computation of these shares investment entries under Section 56(2)(viib) read with Section 56(2) of the Act and its effect on the net total and taxable in case of the assessee. The Commissioner, having recorded the above reasons, found that the assessment order, in his opinion, under Section 263 of the Act is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Hence, set aside the assessment order dated 16.12.2006 and directed the Assessing Officer to obtain relevant details and examine the valuation of optionally convertible cumulative preference shares following Rule 11UA for determining the net value of the shares and to verify the applicability of provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) read with Section 68 and re-do the assessment, after allowing the assessee an opportunity of hearing. 5. The assessee, aggrieved by order of reopening dated 29.03.2019, filed ITA No.439/Coch/2019 before the Tribunal. 5. The assessee, aggrieved by order of reopening dated 29.03.2019, filed ITA No.439/Coch/2019 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned order, dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. Hence, the second appeal before this Court on the following substantial questions of law : “1. "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding that even in case of limited scrutiny assessment, the AO is duty bound to make prima facie inquiry as to whether there is any other items (that is items which are not subject matter of limited scrutiny) which requires examination?" 2. "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the revision under section 263 of the Act in respect of issues which were beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the assessing officer while framing the original assessment order under section 143(3) of the Act in case of limited scrutiny is sustainable in law?" 3. "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that Explanation 2 to section 263 of the IT Act is not applicable to the relevant assessment year." 4. "Without prejudice to the aforesaid, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal failed to appreciate that even in view of Explanation 2(a) to section 263 of the IT Act, the PCIT cannot set aside an issue for examination by AO under section 263 of the IT Act without recording prima facie finding on the merits of the issues?" 5. "Without prejudice, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in upholding the order of the PCIT under section 263 on the ground that since the AO having failed to convert the limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny, the order was erroneous and prejudicial which was beyond the reasons mentioned in the order passed by the PCIT under section 263?" 5.1 Mr. Joseph Markos for convenience, categorised questions 1 to 3 as having identical arguments and considerations and questions 4 and 5 as a separate category dealing with the alleged irregularity or illegality committed by the Tribunal in determining the objection raised under Section 263 of the Act. 6. Joseph Markos for convenience, categorised questions 1 to 3 as having identical arguments and considerations and questions 4 and 5 as a separate category dealing with the alleged irregularity or illegality committed by the Tribunal in determining the objection raised under Section 263 of the Act. 6. Taking up the first category, it is argued that the income tax return filed by the assessee for the subject Assessment Year was selected for scrutiny under CASS. Only two points were noted for limited scrutiny by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was right by confining the scrutiny/assessment to two limited aspects mentioned under CASS. The CBDT Circulars Nos.7/2014 dated 26.09.2014, 20/2015 dated 29.12.2015, and 5/2016 dated 14.07.2016 provide the guidelines on scrutiny of returns based on CASS etc. The Circulars, stated briefly, call upon the Assessing Officers to confine the scope of enquiry to verify the noted aspects and none else. In other words, the scrutiny restricts the questionnaire and subsequent enquiry or verification only to the specific point(s) based on which the particular return has been selected for scrutiny. Hence, on the strength of Circulars, the question commended for our consideration is whether the non-consideration of any issue or an issue arising under Section 56(2)(viib) read with Section 68 by the Assessing Officer would make the assessment order erroneous. While undertaking the limited scrutiny, the Assessing Officer must confine to the points on which CASS has enabled the scrutiny. The learned Senior Counsel elaborating arguments states that, in a given case, the Assessing Officer comes across information in such limited scrutiny, then the option available to the Assessing Officer is to take permission from the Principal Commissioner and expand the contours of scrutiny. In the case on hand, the Assessing Officer obeyed the Circular instructions, and such action or act of the Assessing Officer cannot be termed as erroneous. Therefore, the omission to examine an issue arising under Section 56(2)(viib) is not an error or could be considered erroneous for invoking the power under Section 263 of the Act. Once it is not erroneous in the given set of circumstances, the consequence of such an incorrect decision cannot be termed as prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. Therefore, he argues for setting aside the order of the Commissioner dated 29.03.2019. 6.1 On question nos. Once it is not erroneous in the given set of circumstances, the consequence of such an incorrect decision cannot be termed as prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. Therefore, he argues for setting aside the order of the Commissioner dated 29.03.2019. 6.1 On question nos. 4 and 5, the learned Senior Counsel argues that the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal is the decision of the Commissioner dated 29.03.2019 under Section 263 of the Act. The twin requirements of the order under Section 263 must satisfy the dictum laid by the Supreme Court in Malabar Industrial Company Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2000) 243 ITR 83 (SC) namely, the Commissioner is satisfied that (i) the order of the Assessing Officer sought to be revised is erroneous, and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. If any one of them is absent, recourse cannot be had to Section 263(1) of the Act. Therefore, the argument attracts the very foundation of a finding recorded in the order of the Assessing Officer being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. When called upon to decide the adequacy of reasons for reassessment, the Tribunal supplemented the reasons and held against the assessee. Such an approach is illegal, and the Tribunal's order warrants this Court's interference. 6.2 The counsel placed reliance on the judgment reported in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chandrika Educational Trust, (1994) 207 ITR 108 (Ker.). The Division Bench of this Court referred to and followed the ratio of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jagadhri Electric Supply and Industrial Co., (1983) 140 ITR 490 . We would like to excerpt the operative portion, which has a bearing on the argument addressed before us, and secondly the view taken by this Court by following the said judgment : Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jagadhri Electric Supply and Industrial Co. “The jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner under Section 263(1) of the Act is special or, in other words, the Commissioner has the exclusive jurisdiction under the Act to revise the order of the ITO if he considers that any order passed by him was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Before doing so, he is also required to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Before doing so, he is also required to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If after hearing the assessee in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section 263(1) of the Act, he is not satisfied, he may pass the necessary orders. Of course, the order thus passed will contain the grounds for holding the order of the ITO to be erroneous, as contemplated under Section 263(1) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved therefrom, the assessee may file an appeal against the same, as provided under Section 253(1)(c) of the Act. In the memorandum of appeal, the assessee is supposed to attack the order of the Commissioner and to challenge the grounds for decision given by him in his order. At the time of the hearing, if the assessee can satisfy the Tribunal that the grounds for decision given in the order by the Commissioner are wrong on facts or are not tenable in law, the Tribunal has no option, but to accept the appeal and to set aside the order of the Commissioner. The Tribunal cannot uphold the order of the Commissioner on any other ground which, in its opinion, was available to the Commissioner as well. If the Tribunal is allowed to find out the ground available to the Commissioner to pass an order under Section 263(1) of the Act, then it will amount to a sharing of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner, which is not warranted under the Act. It is all the more so, because the Revenue has not been given any right of appeal under the Act against an order of the Commissioner under Section 263(1) of the Act. In case he proceeds thereunder after hearing the assessee in pursuance of the notice given by him, then the appeal filed by the assessee under Section 253(1)(c) of the Act cannot be treated on the same footing as an appeal against the order of the AAC passed in assessment proceedings, where both the parties have been given the right of appeal. In this view of the matter, the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue, that, in appeal, the Tribunal may uphold the order appealed against on the grounds other than those taken by the Commissioner in his order, is not tenable. In this view of the matter, the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue, that, in appeal, the Tribunal may uphold the order appealed against on the grounds other than those taken by the Commissioner in his order, is not tenable. Under Section 263 of the Act it is only the Commissioner who has been authorised to proceed in the matter and, therefore, it is his satisfaction according to which he may pass necessary orders thereunder in accordance with law. If the grounds which were available to him at the time of the passing of the order do not find a mention in his order, appealed against, then it will be deemed that he rejected those grounds for the purpose of any action under Section 263(1) of the Act. In this situation, the Tribunal, while hearing an appeal filed by the assessee, cannot substitute the grounds which the Commissioner himself did not think proper to form the basis of his order.” (emphasis supplied) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chandrika Educational Trust “We are in agreement with this view. In entertaining an appeal from the Commissioner's order, what the Tribunal does is to examine whether the said order is sustainable in law and whether it is within the powers conferred by section 263. Therefore, when the Commissioner has chosen to set aside the order of the Income-tax Officer only on a particular ground, the Tribunal is not entitled to go beyond and sustain the order of the Commissioner on grounds different from that relied on by the Commissioner himself.” 7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.K.R. Menon for the Revenue argues that the Circular instructions issued by CBDT, from the very nature of expression used in the said Circulars, must be limited to the Assessing Officer. In the case on hand, it is not even the case of the assessee that the Assessing Officer, while making the assessment order dated 16.12.2016, transgressed the guidelines of the CBDT. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the stages of verification, under Section 143, 147 or 146 on the one hand and on the other hand, under Section 263, are firstly two-tier verification, one by the Assessing Officer and another by the Commissioner in charge of the respective territorial jurisdictions. Once an order is made in a proceeding, the Commissioner may call for and examine the record or any proceeding under the Act. Once an order is made in a proceeding, the Commissioner may call for and examine the record or any proceeding under the Act. The Commissioner considers that any order passed therein by the Assessing Officer is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, may, by following the procedure, order reassessment. The learned Senior Counsel argues that once the Assessing Officer has finalised the assessment, the matter becomes an issue for verification by the Commissioner. In this background, the Commissioner has called for subject ITMR, perused the record and found a serious error under Section 56(2)(viib) which deals with the treatment of consideration for the issue of shares as per the requirement of the said section. The learned counsel argues that extending the application of Circulars to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 263 would cause violence to the categorical expression in Section 263. The assessee’s argument would defeat the supervisory role assigned to the Commissioner to correct gross errors resulting in revenue loss. 7.1 He refers to Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting and Wire Industries, MANU/SC/8792/2008, wherein the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that a Circular which is contrary to the statutory provision has no existence in law. Therefore, the argument is concluded that the power of the Commissioner under Section 263 is attracted, independent and not limited by the influence of Circulars for invocation after the proceeding resulted in an assessment order. The guidelines/CBDT Circulars do not fetter the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act. The discretion or jurisdiction of the Commissioner is not regulated by what the Assessing Officer would have done or could not have done on account of the Circular dated 23.09.2010 but by whether the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Taking up the facts of the case, it is illustrated that investment in shares etc., which shall be examined under Section 56(2)(viib), is not computed at all. Limited scrutiny is a facilitation and not a restriction on the supervisory jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act. The omission in the computation under Section 56(2)(viib) in the assessment order is referable to the final assessment resulting in an error and loss of Revenue. Therefore the supervisory power of the Commissioner under Section 263 is attracted to the case on hand. 8. The omission in the computation under Section 56(2)(viib) in the assessment order is referable to the final assessment resulting in an error and loss of Revenue. Therefore the supervisory power of the Commissioner under Section 263 is attracted to the case on hand. 8. We have perused the order dated 29.03.2019 and the Circulars referred to above. To appreciate the tenor and the Officers to whom the Circulars are issued, in other words, on whom it is binding, we prefer to excerpt a few portions from the circular dated 26.09.2014. “It has come to the notice of the Board that during the scrutiny assessment proceedings some of the AOS are routinely calling for information which is not relevant, for enquiry into the issues to be considered. This has been causing undue harassment to the taxpayers and has also drawn adverse criticism from several quarters. Further, feedback and analysis of such orders indicates that many times the core issues, which formed the basis of selection of the case for scrutiny were not examined properly. Such instances primarily occurred in cases selected for scrutiny under Computer Aided Scrutiny Selection ('CASS') for verification of specific information obtained from third party sources which apparently did not match with the details submitted by the taxpayer in the return-of-income. 2. Therefore, for proper administration of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('Act'), Central Board of Direct Taxes, by virtue of its powers under section 119 of the Act, in supersession of earlier instructions/guidelines on this subject, hereby directs that the cases selected for scrutiny during the Financial Year 2014-2015 under CASS, on the basis of either AIR data or CIB information or for non re-conciliation with 26AS data, the scope of enquiry should be limited to verification of these particular aspects only. Therefore, in such cases, an Assessing Officer shall confine the questionnaire and subsequent enquiry or verification only to the specific point(s) on the basis of which the particular return has been selected for scrutiny.” 8.1 On a reading of the Circular, it is discernible that the Circular is applicable during the scrutiny assessment taken up by the Assessing Officer under CASS. As explained to this Court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties, the CASS is a system-driven identification of returns for limited scrutiny. The picking up of a return under CASS for scrutiny must be restricted only to the selected reasons. As explained to this Court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties, the CASS is a system-driven identification of returns for limited scrutiny. The picking up of a return under CASS for scrutiny must be restricted only to the selected reasons. Therefore, it is procedurally legal for the Assessing Officer to confine the scrutiny to the limited reasons selected under CASS. The Assessing Officers are not allowed to expand the limited scrutiny introduced through the faceless interface of scrutiny to other aspects, because the ease desired through CASS is effaced. The CBDT, in its jurisdiction, inputs received and wisdom, restrained the Assessing Officers to the reasons for selecting a return under CASS and computing the assessment. In this case, it is not a complaint of the assessee that the Assessing Officer committed a breach of the binding instructions communicated through the Circulars read above. However, the extended argument by referring to the circulars is that omission to notice an error under Section 56(2)(viib) by the Assessing Officer cannot be termed as erroneous, much less prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. 8.2 We take note of this argument from more than one perspective and cannot agree with the reasoning and the persuasive force with which the argument is made before us. Section 263 empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax to consider any order passed in any proceeding under the Act. It is impossible to read the provision as limited to exercising revisional powers of the order of assessment only. The reason for an omission or commission is legally paled into insignificance if, in his jurisdiction, the Commissioner believes that the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. 8.3 The expressions 'erroneous', 'erroneous assessment' and 'erroneous judgment' have been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 542. According to the definition, 'erroneous' means 'involving error; deviating from the law'. 'Erroneous assessment' is an assessment that deviates from the law and is therefore invalid. It is a defect that is jurisdictional in its nature and does not refer to the judgment of the Assessing Officer in fixing the amount of valuation of the property. Similarly, 'erroneous judgment' means 'one rendered according to the course and practice of the Court, but contrary to law, upon a mistaken view of law, or erroneous application of legal principles. Similarly, 'erroneous judgment' means 'one rendered according to the course and practice of the Court, but contrary to law, upon a mistaken view of law, or erroneous application of legal principles. Error', here, should be an error in approach, error in computation, error in applying the relevant law or facts, or error in selecting a principle which would not govern the fact situation; arbitrary exercise of quasi-judicial power certainly would fall within the scope of section 263. By resorting to a different method, a larger tax can be levied and collected cannot be the sole consideration to attract section 263, as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, unless the said method is the only mode legally applicable [S.S. Muddanna v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 89 STC 90 , 95 (Karn)]. 8.4 For the limited purpose of examining whether the assessment order has looked at the computation obligated under Section 56(2)(viib), it is more than clear that the effect of these entries is not at the first instance captured in CASS and prevented by Circulars while taking up scrutiny assessment. It is an error going by the literal meaning excerpted above. 9. The supervisory power, which is axiomatic given the precedents on the point, would take within its reach even the orders wherein the proceedings are dropped, or the proceedings are filed. In Hilltop Holdings India Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2002) 278 ITR 501 (Cal.) it has been held as follows : “Power under section 263 can be exercised in relation to a proceeding in which the AO has passed an erroneous order prejudicial to the Revenue. In order to attract section 263, the following four conditions need be satisfied, viz., (a) there should be a proceeding; (b) there should be an order passed by the AO in such proceeding; (c) such order should be erroneous; (d) and such order should be prejudicial to the Revenue. In order to attract section 263, the order must be an order passed by the AO in the proceeding. A proceeding is to be understood in its common ordinary dictionary meaning. The word 'proceeding' has not been defined in the Act. According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word "proceeding' means the formal manner in which legal proceedings are conducted. In order to attract section 263, the order must be an order passed by the AO in the proceeding. A proceeding is to be understood in its common ordinary dictionary meaning. The word 'proceeding' has not been defined in the Act. According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word "proceeding' means the formal manner in which legal proceedings are conducted. A 'proceeding' can be said to be initiated and conducted only when the AO proceeds to assess the income (Hilltop Holdings India Lid v. CIT, (2005) 278 ITR 501 (Cal)]” 9.1 We are referring to only a few precedents on the jurisdiction/limitation of Commissioners under Section 263 of the Act. By juxtaposing the Circulars and Section 263 of the Act, we are convinced that the Circulars are not applicable vis-à-vis the power under Section 263. The Commissioner has supervisory jurisdiction not only on a proceeding dropped or filed by the Assessing Officer but the legality of a proceeding resulting in an assessment. In the said context, the Commissioner certainly has jurisdiction to find out the omission in the assessment order. In the case on hand, the Commissioner has precisely done the same and recorded the views for setting aside the assessment dated 16.12.2016. The reasoning in para 3 of the Commissioner’s order dated 29.03.2019, namely that the Assessing Officer is seen not to have examined the above issue, which resulted in the said order being erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue is the background of an assessment order but not by referring to the Circulars. A contrary view would restrict the discretion to be exercised by the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act vis-à-vis limited scrutiny under CASS. For the above reasons, questions 1 to 3 are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 10. The answer to the above questions takes us to the next aspect, whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the order is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. 11. Mr. Joseph Markos invites our attention to the consideration of these grounds by the Tribunal. He argues that the Tribunal has not examined the reasons recorded by the Commissioner on the order of assessment being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue but has supplemented additional reasons for sustaining an order made under Section 263 of the Act. 11. Mr. Joseph Markos invites our attention to the consideration of these grounds by the Tribunal. He argues that the Tribunal has not examined the reasons recorded by the Commissioner on the order of assessment being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue but has supplemented additional reasons for sustaining an order made under Section 263 of the Act. Our attention is specifically drawn to the following passage in paragraph 8.9 of the Tribunal’s order : “As mentioned earlier, in this case the assessment order was passed without making inquiry / verification as regards the potential escapement of income mentioned in the Board Instructions for the relevant period. Therefore, even in case of limited scrutiny assessment, the A.O. is duty bound to make a prima facie inquiry as to whether there is any other items which requires examination and in the event, the potential escapement of income would have exceeded Rs.10 lakh and he ought to have sought the permission of the CIT / DIT to convert a limited scrutiny assessment' to a complete scrutiny assessment'. Having failed to do so, the CIT, who was the authority to have granted permission for converting a limited scrutiny assessment' to a complete scrutiny assessment' is fully justified in invoking his revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 of the I.T. Act.” 12. We are convinced that the Tribunal’s order on the twin requirements, whether the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue's interest, needs to be re-examined. The argument that the Tribunal either has substituted or expanded the reasoning of the Commissioner is not without merit. By relying on the decisions relied on by the assessee, this finding of the Tribunal warrants our interference. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Tribunal on this behalf need to be set aside, and the matter remitted to Tribunal for reconsideration afresh. For statistical purposes, these questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Income Tax Appeal is allowed as indicated above and remitted to Tribunal for considering questions 4 and 5.