JUDGMENT : 1. Additional defendants 9 to 13 in O.S.No.419 of 1994 on the file of the Munsiff’s Court, Karunagappally are the appellants. The plaintiff and the other defendants are the respondents. The suit relates to the redemption of a mortgage dated 18.8.1096 M.E. in respect of 1 acre 31 cents of land. The redemption was claimed in respect of 96 cents of land. The plaintiff instituted the suit in 1962. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit on 17.2.1964 by the Munsiff’s Court, Adoor. The preliminary decree was challenged in A.S.No.265 of 1965 before the Sub Court Pathanamthitta. On 19.8.1966 the appeal was partly allowed modifying the preliminary decree. The matter came in appeal in S.A.No.92 of 1967 before this Court. In the second appeal decree for redemption was granted. 2. On 25.1.1973 final decree was passed allowing the plaintiff to recover possession of 96 cents of land. The final decree was challenged in A.S.No.60 of 1973 before the Sub Court, Pathanamthitta. The matter was remanded to the trial Court as per judgment dated 13.10.1974 for considering the question whether the contesting defendants are entitled to fixity of tenure as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short ‘the KLR Act’). The trial Court found that the contesting defendants were entitled to fixity of tenure and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to redemption of the mortgage in respect of 96 cents of land. 3. This decree was again challenged in A.S.No.19 of 1977 before the Sub Court, Pathanamthitta. On 11.1.1980 the First Appellate Court set aside the final decree passed and remanded the matter for disposal afresh. On 19.8.1981 the Munsiff’s Court, Adoor passed a final decree holding that the contesting defendants were entitled to fixity of tenure based on the finding that the land involved was waste land at the time of the mortgage. This decree was challenged in A.S.No.69 of 1981 before the Sub Court, Pathanamthitta, which confirmed the decree of the trial Court. The decree of the First Appellate Court was challenged in S.A.No.675 of 1984 before this Court. The original suit was again remanded to the trial Court for considering the only question as to whether the contesting defendants were deemed tenants as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act. The decree of the First Appellate Court was challenged in S.A.No.675 of 1984 before this Court. The original suit was again remanded to the trial Court for considering the only question as to whether the contesting defendants were deemed tenants as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act. The trial Court found that the contesting defendants were not entitled to fixity of tenure under the KLR Act. The decree was challenged in A.S.No.159 of 1996 before the District Court, Kollam. The First Appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial Court holding that the contesting defendants were not entitled to fixity of tenure essentially on the ground that the land involved was not waste land as required by Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act. The additional defendant Nos.9 to 13 are in appeal, invoking Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure before this Court. 4. This Court reformulated the substantial questions of law as follows:- 1. Can the benefit of Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act be extended to the holding situated in the erstwhile Travancore State? 2. Has the Court below drawn the necessary inferences and presumptions in accordance with law, while holding that the land involved was not waste land as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act? 5. Heard Sri.P.Viswanathan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants 9 to 13 and Sri.K.G.Balasubramanian, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/plaintiff. 6. The essential question that requires consideration is whether the contesting defendants are entitled to fixity of tenure in terms of Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act. 7. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the defendants could establish the ingredients required under Section 4A(1)(c) to sustain the claim for fixity of tenure in terms of the KLR Act. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the admission of the plaintiff to the effect that at the time of mortgage there was no improvement in the land is sufficient to hold that the property involved was waste land. It is further submitted that the existence of scattered trees in the mortgaged holding is not a ground to decline the benefit of the statutory provision as the relevant explanation to the section says that a land shall be deemed to be waste land notwithstanding the scattered trees thereon. 8. It is further submitted that the existence of scattered trees in the mortgaged holding is not a ground to decline the benefit of the statutory provision as the relevant explanation to the section says that a land shall be deemed to be waste land notwithstanding the scattered trees thereon. 8. The learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff, per contra, contended that the recitals in the mortgage deed are sufficient to hold that the holding was not waste land at the time of the mortgage. The learned counsel further contended that the benefit of the statutory provision cannot be extended to the land in question as the provision is limited to the land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 would have applied if the Act had been in force at the time of mortgage. 9. It is profitable to extract Section 4A of the KLR Act, 1963, which reads thus: “4A. 9. It is profitable to extract Section 4A of the KLR Act, 1963, which reads thus: “4A. Certain mortgagees and lessees of mortgagees to be deemed tenants of mortgagees to be deemed tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of Court, a mortgagee with possession of land, other than land principal by planted with rubber, coffee, tea or cardamom, or the lessee of a mortgagee, of such land shall be deemed to be a tenant if- (a) the mortgagee or lessee was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than fifty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969; or (b) the mortgagee or lessee has constructed a building for his own residence in the land comprised in the mortgage and he was occupying such building for such purpose for a continuous period of not less than twenty years immediately preceding such commencement: Provided that a mortgagee or lessee falling under this clause shall not be deemed to be a tenant if he, or, where he is a member of a family, such family was holding any other land exceeding two acres in extent on the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968, in the Gazette; or (c) the land comprised in the mortgage was waste land at the time of mortgage or land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, would have applied if that Act had been in force at the time of mortgage, and (i) the mortgagee or lessee was holding such land for a continuous period of not less then thirty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969; and (ii) the mortgagee or lessee has effected substantial improvements on such land before such commencement.” The relevant provision in respect of the holding in question is Section 4A(1)(c). 10. Before dealing with the applicability of the relevant provisions, I shall first consider the challenge of the plaintiff that the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to the holding under consideration. 10. Before dealing with the applicability of the relevant provisions, I shall first consider the challenge of the plaintiff that the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to the holding under consideration. The learned counsel Sri.K.G.Balasubramanian contended that the word ‘or’ in Section 4A(1)(c) is to be read as ‘and’, and therefore, the benefit of the provision can be extended to the land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 would have applied if the Act had been in force at the time of mortgage. The contention of the learned counsel is that the benefit of the provision cannot be given to a holding situated in the erstwhile Travancore State. 11. Section 4A(1)(c) reads that the benefit can be extended to a holding if it was waste land at the time of mortgage or land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 would have applied if that Act had been in force at the time of mortgage. It is contended that the word ‘or’ in between the words ‘waste land at the time of mortgage’ and ‘land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, would have applied if that Act had been in force at the time of mortgage’ is to be read as ‘and’. 12. On the construction of conjunctive and disjunctive words ‘or’ and ‘and’ in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, the author comments thus:- “The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive but at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by SCRUTTON, L.J.: “You do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. As stated by SCRUTTON, L.J.: “You do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.” But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and’ may be read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and’ as ‘or’ produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in place of ‘and’. The alternatives joined by ‘or’ need not always be mutually exclusive.” 13. It is trite that if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. (Vide: Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1976 SC 331 ). If the disjunctive sense of the word ‘or’ also subserves the object of the provision, there can be no doubt that ‘or’ cannot be construed as ‘and’. In the statutory provision referred to above, there is nothing to show that the alternatives joined by ‘or’ are mutually inclusive. On a reading of the provisions of the Statute there is no difficulty in concluding that the Legislature intended that the alternatives joined by ‘or’ are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that the word ‘or’ in between the alternatives referred to in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act is to be read as ‘and’ cannot be sustained. 14. The requirements for getting the benefit as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act are: (1) The land comprised in the mortgage was waste land at the time of mortgage. (2) The mortgagee was holding such a land for a continuous period not less than 30 years immediately after the commencement of the KLR (Amendment) Act, 1969. (3) The mortgagee has effected substantial improvements on such land before such commencement. 15. (2) The mortgagee was holding such a land for a continuous period not less than 30 years immediately after the commencement of the KLR (Amendment) Act, 1969. (3) The mortgagee has effected substantial improvements on such land before such commencement. 15. I shall now turn to the question as to whether the holding in question was waste land at the time of mortgage. There is no dispute as to the date of mortgage. 16. Exhibit B2 mortgage deed describes the property as “ ” (land, as also trees). The term ‘waste land’ is not defined in the Statute. While dealing with the meaning of the term ‘waste land’ in Mathai Varkey v. Mariam (1969 KHC 113) this Court held thus:- “Thus, the object of the statute, the context in which the provision is made and the effect of the various clauses in S.4A lead to the inference that a waste land is one which at the time of the mortgage was rather neglected and not put to any agricultural use but at the same time is a kind of land which can be put to agricultural use by the effort of man.” 17. The meaning of the term ‘waste land’ according to Shorter Oxford Dictionary is as follows:- “Waste or desert land, inhabited (or sparsely inhabited), an uncultivated country; a wild and desolate region, a wilderness.” “A piece of land not cultivated or used for any purpose, and producing little or no herbage or wood. In legal use a piece of such land not in any man’s occupation, but lying common.” 18. The meaning of the word ‘wasteland’ in the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary is as follows:- “A desolate and barren region” 19. In the context of Section 4A of the KLR Act, in Mathai Varkey’s case (supra) this Court concluded thus:- “6. …….I must state that there may be different connotations for the same expression in different statutes and the features emphasised in a legislation conferring fixity of tenure on tenants may be a matter of indifference in a statute which deals with acquisition of land by the State and valuation for that purpose. However, it is useful to remember that arable land and waste land are antithetical in content and meaning. However, it is useful to remember that arable land and waste land are antithetical in content and meaning. But the semantic significance of waste land, under the statute I am considering, is not that it is altogether and ever uncultivable, but that at the given time it is uncultivated, barren and having no vegetation. When it is clothed with thick vegetation it ceases to be waste land, but when it is bare and desolate, although capable of bloom, it is wasteland.” 20. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants/defendants contended that the admission of the plaintiff that there were no improvements in the holding at the time of mortgage is sufficient to conclude that it was a waste land at the time of the mortgage. The admission of the plaintiff as projected by the learned Senior Counsel cannot be construed in the sense that the plaintiff pleaded that the property was bare and desolate at the time of the mortgage. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the holding at the time of mortgage contained only scattered trees also supports the case of the appellants that it was waste land as the explanation to the section states that the land shall be deemed to be waste land notwithstanding the existence of scattered trees thereon. 21. Explanation (VII)(ii) to Section 4A of the KLR Act says that the presence of scattered trees cannot alter the character of the land. So what is important is whether a land is waste land or not has to be ascertained from the character of the land irrespective of the presence of scattered trees. 22. The evidence on the question whether the holding was a waste land or not was adduced after the remand of the matter in A.S.No.159 of 1996. The First Appellate Court found that there was nothing on record as to the lie of the land as on the date of the mortgage. In the absence of acceptable evidence as to the nature of the land as on the date of execution of the mortgage deed the description of the property in the mortgage deed gets more prominence. As I noted above, the mortgage deed narrated the holding as ‘land, as also trees’. In the absence of acceptable evidence as to the nature of the land as on the date of execution of the mortgage deed the description of the property in the mortgage deed gets more prominence. As I noted above, the mortgage deed narrated the holding as ‘land, as also trees’. In Mariyakutty Chellamma v. Kesavan Sreedharan ( 2019 (3) KHC 512 ) this Court had occasion to consider the question whether a holding is waste land or not, covered by a mortgage deed wherein the holding was described as ‘land, as also trees’. In Mariyakutty Chellamma this Court held thus:- “It is evident from the extracted provision that in order to claim fixity in terms of Section 4A(1)(c) of the Act, the mortgagee has to establish that the land comprised in the mortgage was a waste land at the time of mortgage. The first and foremost fact to be established in a case of this nature, therefore, is that the land was a waste land at the time of the mortgage. True, in terms of Explanation VII to Section 4A(1) of the Act, a land shall be deemed to be waste land notwithstanding the existence of scattered trees thereon. The expression "scattered trees" contained in the provision in the context would only mean trees naturally grew up and standing scattered in the property, as otherwise, the land would not be a waste land. It is seen that the appellate court noticed that valuable trees were in existence in the property at the time of mortgage. Further, going by the description of the property in the mortgage deed as extracted by the appellate court in its judgment, it is evident that the mortgage holding was not only the land but also the trees stood therein. When the mortgage was in respect of the land as also the trees stood therein at the relevant time, it cannot be said that the property mortgaged was a waste land and the trees referred to in the description of the mortgage holding as contained in the mortgage deed were only scattered trees. Further, the question whether the property was a waste land at the time of mortgage is a pure question of fact, the correctness of which cannot be gone into in a proceedings under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the same is demonstrated to be a perverse one. Further, the question whether the property was a waste land at the time of mortgage is a pure question of fact, the correctness of which cannot be gone into in a proceedings under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the same is demonstrated to be a perverse one. In the said view of the matter, I do not find any infirmity in the decisions rendered by the courts below. The second appeal, in the circumstances, is without any merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.” 23. The resultant conclusion is that the appellants/contesting defendants failed to establish that the holding in question was waste land at the time of the mortgage. The First Appellate Court has rightly held that the land covered by Ext.B2 mortgage deed was not waste land, and therefore, the appellants/defendants are not entitled to fixity of tenure as provided in Section 4A(1)(c) of the KLR Act. The Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.