ORDER With the consent of parties, matter is heard finally. 1. By the instant petition, the petitioner has questioned the legality, validity and propriety of order dated 26/11/2021 (Annexure-P-4), whereby the Court below in an appeal preferred under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC assailing the order passed in Civil Suit No.58-A/17 has rejected application of temporary injunction. By the impugned order, appellate Court set aside the order dated 25/10/2021 and allowed the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent no.1, directing that till the decision of the civil suit i.e RCS 58-A/17 the defendants shall not disturb the possession of the plaintiff over the land belonging to survey No.52/1 area ad-measuring 2.839 hectares situated at Gram Chhindwara Savasan Tahsil Athner District Betul. 2. As per the facts of the case, the plaintiff (respondent no.1 herein) institute a regular Civil Suit bearing No. 58-A/2017 against original defendants no.1 & 2 (who are respondents no.2 & 3 herein), (defendant no.2 i.e. Kishori died later on) and also against other defendants who were later on added as defendants claiming title on the ground of adverse possession over the land bearing survey no.52/1, area ad-measuring 2.839 hectare situated at Gram Chhindwara Savasan, Tahsil Athner District Betul. An application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC was also filed claiming injunction that the defendants be restrained from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiff. 3. It is pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff has been in possession of the land in question for more than 12 years and cultivating the same. The land was in the name of Laxmi Bai widow of Sakharam. It is also pleaded in the plaint that plaintiff/respondent no.1 earlier also instituted a suit for specific performance of sauda chitthi (agreement to sale) made in favaour of the plaintiff by Laxmi Bai and Kisna (respondent no.2 herein), but Laxmi Bai and her son denied to perform any such agreement to sale and also filed a counter claim, but later on it has been withdrawn. Consequently, by way of amendment, it is pleaded by the plaintiff that during the pendency of the suit, the defendant no.1(respondent no.2 herein) executed a sale-deed in favour of defendants no.4 and 5(respondents no.3 & 4 herein) and defendant no.2 had sold 1.296 hectare of land in question to the defendant no.6 (petitioner herein) through registered sale-deed. It is further pleaded that all the sale deeds have been executed without giving possession of the respective land to the respective purchasers, therefore, the same do not affect the rights of the plaintiff. Since respective purchasers were trying to get the possession of land purchased by them, the application for granting temporary injunction against those defendants has been filed before the trial court but that application has been rejected by the court below vide order dated 25/10/2021 (Annexure-P-2). 4 . Being aggrieved by the same, an appeal was preferred under Order 43 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure challenging the order passed by the trial court on 25/10/2021 before the appellate court which was allowed by order dated 26/11/2021 (Annexure-P-4) granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff setting-aside the order passed by the trial court. The appellate court in its order has observed that the possession over the land in questionprima facie has been substantiated by the plaintiff as sauda chitthi dated 17/06/2003 reveals that the plaintiff was put in possession over the land in question. The proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff in a revenue court by respondents no.3 and 4 under Section 250 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 to take the possession back and according to the appellate Court these facts are sign of possession of the plaintiff over the land in question. The appellate court has passed the order granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff by setting aside the order of trial court observing there in that the suit for declaration on the ground of adverse possession has been filed and if plaintiff fails to retain the possession, the very purpose of filing the suit would be frustrated. 5. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has assailed the order dated 26/11/2021 (Annexure-P-4) of appellate court contending that suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of contract has been dismissed by the court below and that order has also attained finality, as the same has not been further assailed. 5. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has assailed the order dated 26/11/2021 (Annexure-P-4) of appellate court contending that suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of contract has been dismissed by the court below and that order has also attained finality, as the same has not been further assailed. In the said suit, the court below has found that the agreement to sale dated 17/06/2003 had not been executed by the Laxmi Bai & Kisna and as such there was no contract between plaintiff and original defendants no.1 & 2 for selling the land in question. The Court has observed that the land has been given to the plaintiff by the defendant no.1 on sikmi (a contract for the purpose of cultivating the land). According to the petitioner, when the trial court in a suit filed by the respondent no.1(plaintiff) has observed that the plaintiff was put in possession over the land, as the same was given to him for cultivation, the possession given to the plaintiff cannot be considered to be a hostile possession. It is further argued that the suit in fact was not maintainable because declaration was being sought on the ground of adverse possession and the same was not available to the plaintiff, as his suit for specific performance of contract had already been dismissed by the trial court and that judgment and decree had attained finality; even the suit for declaration on the ground of adverse possession should not have been entertained, as the same has been filed to grab the land of the petitioner. It is a trite law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. In support of his submission he has relied upon the order passed by the Supreme Court in N.Birendra Singh Vs. L.Priyonkumar Singh and others, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 650 . It is also argued that admittedly the plaintiff has no right and title over the land, then granting injunction in his favour by the appellate court without considering the fact that the suit for specific performance had already been dismissed is not proper. 6. On the contrary, counsel appearing for respondent no.1 has supported the order passed by the appellate court and submitted that plaintiff was in possession of the land in question and he has every right to protect the same. 6. On the contrary, counsel appearing for respondent no.1 has supported the order passed by the appellate court and submitted that plaintiff was in possession of the land in question and he has every right to protect the same. The trial court did wrong in not granting temporary injunction and that mistake was rightly rectified by the appellate court by granting injunction in favour of plaintiff/respondent no.1 while allowing the application and appeal. He submits that order is a reasoned one and does not call for any interference. 7. Considering the submissions made by counsel for parties and perusal of record, this Court is of the opinion that the order passed by the appellate court granting injunction in favor of the plaintiff in a suit filed for declaration on the ground of adverse possession was a illegal because it is a settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. 8. As per the available facts, respondent no.l/plaintiff initially filed a suit for specific performance in respect of the land in question against Laxmi Bai and Kisna on the ground that they have entered into the agreement with the plaintiff by executing an agreement to sale on 17/06/2003 on a consideration of Rs.50,000/-, out of which they have paid Rs.42,000/-. However, the said suit was dismissed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 19/11/2014 on the ground that the plaintiff was failed to substantiate that any such agreement to sale dated 17/06/2003 (Ext P-1) was ever executed by the defendants. It is observed by the Court that the land was given to the plaintiff on contract only for cultivation purpose by the defendants, therefore, they are not under any obligation for executing the sale deed in favour of plaintiff (respondent no.1 herein). The plaintiff had tried to grab the land in question by filing a suit for specific performance, but when he failed, he again filed a suit claiming declaration of title on the basis adverse possession. Here in this case, as per the stand taken by the plaintiff he was put in possession by the defendant/true owner in pursuant to the agreement to sale dated 17/06/2003, then question of claiming declaration on the basis of adverse possession is a plea of dishonesty. Here in this case, as per the stand taken by the plaintiff he was put in possession by the defendant/true owner in pursuant to the agreement to sale dated 17/06/2003, then question of claiming declaration on the basis of adverse possession is a plea of dishonesty. Under such a circumstance, when the fate of the suit is obvious, the order of granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff and to protect his unauthorized possession against true owner is not proper. Once the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance has been dismissed and order has also attained finality then again filing civil suit on the ground of adverse possession, in my opinion, is an attempt made by the plaintiff to grab the property of the defendants. 9. Similar facts have been dealt with by the High Court in Ganesh Prasad S/o.-Jagannath Prasad Vs. Narendralal Nathulal Gupta and others, reported in 1992 MPLJ 886 . In paragraph 3, this Court has observed as under:- As seen above, the plaintiff's suit is based on possessory title acquired by adverse possession. The question for decision is whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour. Admittedly, he entered into possession of the suit plot under oral agreement of sale in case Kalloolal failed to repay the loan within six months. Since Kallolal allegedly failed to repay the loan the plaintiff continued in possession of the suit plot. There is no document to evidence the alleged loan or the agreement to sell. The plaint allegations also do not clearly specify whether the consideration for alleged sale was the amount representing the loan or the contract was to be further negotiated and discussed after consultation by Kalloolal with his family members. Even, if the plaint case is accepted for disposal of application for temporary injunction, putting the plaintiff's case at the highest, is that the plaintiff entered into possession as a prospective purchaser or in par performance of the agreement, in other words with the permission of Kalloolal. A possession by permission or licence from the owner, is not adverse and cannot ripen into title, no matter how long continued or however exclusive in may be, Kodoth Ambu Vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 150 . A possession by permission or licence from the owner, is not adverse and cannot ripen into title, no matter how long continued or however exclusive in may be, Kodoth Ambu Vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 150 . So long as the occupation is under permissive possession, it cannot be adverse, but when the permission is (a) withdrawn, or (b) terminated by efflux of time, or (c) the occupant disclaims, or (d) gives notice of such disclaimer to the person under whom he entered, he holds adversely, Mahendra BAhadur Vs. Chandrapal, 1955 NLJ 519=AIR 1955 Nag.221. There is no reliable evidence on record to show any of these. His initial entry on the suit plot was with the consent and permission of Kalloolal. 10. This Court in the case of Skol Breweries Ltd Vs. Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd (M.A.No.2745/2018) has considered as to on what basis the Court can form an opinion ofprima facie case. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under- 12. In reply to the query raised with the parties, I am of the opinion that for forming an opinion of prima facie case in an appeal preferred against the rejection of temporary injuction especially in a suit which was filed in the year 2012, 6 years have passed, no temporary injunction was granted by any of the Court when matter has already travelled upto the Hon'ble Apex Court and the evidence has been recorded and concluded by the Trial Court, this Court has every right to form its own opinion in respect of prima facie case and for which the Court can take into account certain aspects of the matter. As per the Major Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 4th Edition 2010, Vol.5, a prima facie case is defined as under: "Prima facie case" is that which raises substantial question, of course bona fide which needs investigation and ultimately a decision on merits.When the Court is called upon to examine whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case in a suit, for the purpose of determining whether a temporary injunction should be granted, the Court must perforce examined the merits of the case, and it will be compelled to consider whether there is likelihood of the suit being decreed. The depth of investigation which the Court must necessarily pursue for that purpose will vary with each case. The depth of investigation which the Court must necessarily pursue for that purpose will vary with each case. When the decision of the suit turns principally on a question of law, very often the decision as to whether a prima facie case exists will turn on considerations identical with or substantially similar to those affecting the ultimate determination of the suit. A 'prima facie' case implies the probability of the plaintiff obtaining a relief on the materials placed before the Court at that stage. Every piece of evidence produced by either party has to be taken into consideration in deciding the existence of a prima facie case to justify issuance of a temporary injunction." 13. In a case reported in AIR 1968 Kerala 179 Vellakutty vs. Karthyayani, the Court has observed what has to be considered by the Court while granting temporary injunction, which reads thus; "3.........The granting of an injunction being a very serious matter in that it restrains the opposite parties from the exercise of their rights, the court does not issue the injunction unless it is thoroughtly satisfied that there is a prima facie case in favour of the applicant. (Abdul Qadeer v. Municipal Board, Moradabad. AIR 1955 All 414 ). It is also clear that a prima facie case implies the probability of the plaintiff obtaining a relief on the materials placed before the Court at that stage. Every piece of evidence produced by either party has to be taken into consideration in deciding the existence of a prima facie case to justify issuance of a temporary injunction." 14. Besides, in a case reported in AIR 1977 Himachal Pradesh 10 Roshan Lal vs. Ratto, the Court has observed the prima facie case, which reads thus; "When the Court is called upon to examine whether the plaintiff has prima facie case in a suit for the purpose of determining whether a temporary injunction should be granted, the court must perforce examine the merits of the case and it will be compelled to consider whether there is likelihood of the suit being decreed. The depth of investigation which the court must necesssarily pursue for that purpose will vary with each case. The depth of investigation which the court must necesssarily pursue for that purpose will vary with each case. When the decision of the suit turns principally on a question of law, very often the decision as to whether a prima facie case exists will turn on considerations identical with or substantially similar to those affecting the ultimate determination of the suit." 15. Likewise, in a case reported in AIR 1993 Delhi 356 - Krishan Lal Kohli v. VK. Khanna and another, the Court has held as under:- "4...... What is meant by prima facie case? Prima facie case is that which raises substantial question, of course bona fide, which needs investigation and ultimately a decision on merits and, as already noticed by me above, the respondent before me and the plaintiff in the suit, namely Mr. Khanna does succeed in raising such questions. And, for the present, I find no reason to hold that the questions so raised have not been raised bona fide. But then, as we all know, mere existence of a prima facie case would not suffice." 16. Since the appellant/plaintiff is claiming temporary injunction then it is the duty of this Court to first form an opinion regarding prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and then to decide whether temporary injunction can be granted or not. To form an opinion this Court cannot shut its eyes ignoring the stage of the suit, especially when admittedly evidence has been closed by the parties and case is fixed for final arguments. Further, it cannot be ignored by this Court in the light of law laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in case of Mohanlal, Proprietor of Mourya Industries (supra), on which the respondent has placed reliance contending that suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant is not maintainable. As per the respondent, the plaintiff/appellant in his evidence has also admitted that he failed to produce any of the incidents showing use of bottle of the plaintiff by the defendant for the purpose of selling their beer. As per the respondent, the plaintiff/appellant in his evidence has also admitted that he failed to produce any of the incidents showing use of bottle of the plaintiff by the defendant for the purpose of selling their beer. Therefore, I do not find any substance to grant temporary injunction of any nature in favour of the plaintiff/appellant and to reverse the finding given by the Trial Court especially under the circumstance, when on earlier occasion this Court has passed detailed order refusing injunction to the plaintiff and thereafter the only change made in favour of plaintiff is that the application submitted by defendant for cancellation of registration of their design bearing No.223479 has been rejected by the competent authority. I am also not convinced with the contention made by learned counsel for the appellant that as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC, this Court has no option but to decide the appeal on merits. On a close scrutiny of the provisions of Order 41, it is seen that the said provisions deal with the appeal arising out of the original decree and Rule 31 of Order 41 prescribes the manner in which the judgment is written by the Appellate Court, but here in this case, the appeal is not against the original decree, this Court is not writing any judgment, therefore, Rule 31 of Order 41 has no applicability. This appeal is under Order 43 and under the said provision, there is no such binding for this Court. Accordingly, this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has no substance that the present appeal has to be decided by this Court on merits and also on the basis of material available before the Trial Court at the time of deciding the application of temporary injunction. 11. Thus, in view of aforesaid, it is clear that this Court is of the opinion thatprima facie, no case is made out in favour of the plaintiff and therefore granting temporary injunction in his favour is not proper. The Court below has failed to consider the fact that injunction is granted only whenprima facie case is made out in favour of plaintiff and for determiningprima facie case the trial court has to consider the following ingredient:- (i) whether there is likelihood of the suit being decreed. The Court below has failed to consider the fact that injunction is granted only whenprima facie case is made out in favour of plaintiff and for determiningprima facie case the trial court has to consider the following ingredient:- (i) whether there is likelihood of the suit being decreed. (ii) Implies probabilities of plaintiff obtaining a relief on the material placed before the Court at that stage. 12. In view of aforesaid when chances of passing decree in favour of the plaintiff is very rare then granting injunction and depriving the true owner from getting possession by virtue of sale deed executed in their favour is a material irregularity. 13. Accordingly, in my opinion, the order dated 26/11/2021 (Annexure-P-4) passed by the court below is not sustainable, the same is hereby setaside. Application submitted by the plaintiff/respondent no.1 herein for grant of temporary injunction is also rejected. Petition is allowed. No order as to costs.