JUDGMENT : M.S. Sonak, J. 1. Heard Ms. B. Andrade, learned Counsel appointed under the Legal Aid Scheme on behalf of the Appellant, and Mr. Nikhil Vaze learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.11.2017, by which the Appellant was convicted for an offense under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-and in default to undergo three months simple imprisonment. The Appellant was also convicted for an offense under Section 201 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-and, in default, undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 3. On 19.11.2015, the Learned Additional Sessions Judge framed a charge against the Appellant alleging therein that on 06.07.2015 at about 00.30 hours at D'Costa Restaurant, IDC, Verna, Goa, the Appellant intentionally and knowingly murdered one Shiva Bhakti thereby committing an offense under Section 302 of IPC. The charge also states that the Appellant caused certain evidence concerning the said offense to disappear to screen himself from legal punishment and thereby committed a crime punishable under Section 201 of IPC. The Appellant refused to plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses and produced documentary evidence. The Appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) but did not examine himself or lead any defense evidence. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge has convicted and sentenced the Appellant as above by the impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal. 5. Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the incident, and the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge has convicted and sentenced the Appellant as above by the impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal. 5. Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the incident, and the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. Learned Sessions Judge has not listed each of the circumstances that it has referred to or relied on, but from the evaluation of the impugned judgment and order, it is apparent that the learned Sessions Judge has relied upon the following circumstances to convict the Appellant:- (a) That the death of Shiva Bhakti (victim) was homicidal; (b) That the Appellant and the victim were last seen together on 05.07.2015, some hours before the incident; (c) The extra-judicial confession of the Appellant to PW1, PW2, and PW3; (d) The presence of human blood on the clothes which the Appellant was wearing at the time of or a little after the incident; (e) The presence of the victim's blood on the koyta and gas cylinder with which the victim was struck. The presence of some brain portions of the victim on the gas cylinder with which he was hit; (f) The previous fights between the Appellant and the victim that afford a motive for the crime; 6. Ms. Andrade, learned Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the tests prescribed in a case based upon circumstantial evidence in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra-(1984) 4 SCC116 were not fulfilled in this case and, therefore, the Appellant should not have been convicted. She submitted that most of the circumstances had not been proved by the prosecution and, in any case, the proved circumstances are not sufficient to sustain the conviction. 7. Ms. Andrade pointed out a severe discrepancy between the blood group of the deceased and the Appellant. She pointed out the circumstance of last seen as not at all been proved by the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge completely overlooks the presence of Rora Singh (PW3) and his suspicious testimony. She submitted that no fingerprints of the Appellant were found either on the koyta or cylinder. There is a discrepancy about the keys and the consequent entry and exit of the Appellant into the premises where the incident took place. There are discrepancies in time and visibility. She submitted that Motilal's (PW2) and Rora Singh's (PW3) versions are inherently improbable and contrary to normal human conduct. There is a discrepancy about the keys and the consequent entry and exit of the Appellant into the premises where the incident took place. There are discrepancies in time and visibility. She submitted that Motilal's (PW2) and Rora Singh's (PW3) versions are inherently improbable and contrary to normal human conduct. She submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has not even adverted to and, in any case, not considered the Appellant's statement under Section 313 of CrPC. She submits that the impugned judgment and order warrant interference for all these reasons. 8. Mr. Vaze defends the impugned conviction and sentencing based, among other things, on the reasoning reflected in the impugned judgment and order. He submits that the presence of the Appellant at the scene of the crime is admitted and proved. The extra-judicial confessions are also established. Further, he submits that the circumstances proved by the prosecution are sufficient to sustain the conviction and, therefore, this Court should dismiss this appeal. 9. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 10. Since this is a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, we must remind ourselves of the principles set out in paragraphs 153 and 154 of Sharad Sarda (supra). 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 11. So far as the first circumstance relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge is concerned, we agree with Mr. Vaze that there is overwhelming evidence that the victim's death was homicidal. This is clear from the deposition of Dr. Svitlana Gomes (PW7) and Dr. Avinash Pujari (PW12), who conducted the post mortem of the deceased and certified the cause of the death as a compressional crush injury to the head with a fracture of the skull and facial bones and damage to the brain and intracranial hemorrhage due to impact by heard/heavy object. 12. The prosecution relies on the testimony of the complainant Vildo D'Costa (PW1) – the owner of the restaurant in which both the accused and the victim were working; Motilal (PW2), a co-worker. Rora Singh (PW3) -another co-worker, and Jayraj Kolhar (PW4)-a milkman. 13. Vildo D'Costa (PW1), the restaurant owner, did depose that he had come to the restaurant on 05.07.2015 at around 8.00 p.m. However, he has made no statement that at that time, he saw the Appellant and the deceased along with the other two workers on the restaurant premises. He, however, deposed that on 06.07.2015, at around 6.15 a.m., he received a call from Motilal (PW2) informing him that the Appellant had murdered the victim and had gone towards the D-Link company. Thus, there is nothing in Vildo D'Costa's (PW1) testimony to support any alleged last seen theory. 14. Motilal (PW2) is also not definite about seeing the Appellant and the victim on 05.07.2015. He, however, has stated that on 05.07.2015, which was a Sunday, he went to his room at Kesarval at night, but Deva (Appellant), Shiva (victim), and Rora Singh (PW3) remained in the restaurant. Motilal (PW2) then deposes about what happened the following day. 14. Motilal (PW2) is also not definite about seeing the Appellant and the victim on 05.07.2015. He, however, has stated that on 05.07.2015, which was a Sunday, he went to his room at Kesarval at night, but Deva (Appellant), Shiva (victim), and Rora Singh (PW3) remained in the restaurant. Motilal (PW2) then deposes about what happened the following day. Thus, even Motilal (PW2) does not support the last seen theory involving only the Appellant and the victim before the incident and before any third party could intervene. Even Motilal (PW2) speaks about the presence of Rora Singh (PW3). 15. Rora Singh's (PW3) testimony is most interesting. First, he has deposed that the Appellant, the victim, and himself were all sleeping in the restaurant on the night intervening 05.07.2015 and 06.07.2015 though slightly different places. Then, he deposed that the Appellant and the victim had gone out of the restaurant, and he (PW3) was sleeping alone in the restaurant. Then, he deposed that sometime late in the night, the Appellant came and woke him up saying "uth uth" and told him that he had murdered Shiva. Rora Singh (PW3) then adds that he went to the place where Shiva and Deva used to sleep, that is, near the shutter of the restaurant on the front side of the restaurant, and he saw the body of Shiva near the bed. 16. Rora Singh (PW3) has then deposed that he was scared of seeing the body, and he ran away as the gate was open and went to his friend's room near Mahalasa temple, Verna. He deposed that he went to sleep in his friend's room, got up the next day and went to the restaurant between 8.00 a.m. to 9.00 a.m. when he saw the police team. 17. Now, this testimony of Rora Singh (PW3) hardly inspires any confidence because his conduct does not appear to be natural or the normally expected conduct of a person in such a position. Besides, based on this testimony, we cannot say that the prosecution has conclusively established the circumstance of last seen. In Harbans Lal V/s. State of Punjab- (1996) 2 SCC 350 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to believe the testimony of a witness who, after allegedly witnessing a murder, did not raise any alarm or inform anyone about the same for quite some time. In Harbans Lal V/s. State of Punjab- (1996) 2 SCC 350 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to believe the testimony of a witness who, after allegedly witnessing a murder, did not raise any alarm or inform anyone about the same for quite some time. The Court held that such conduct was most unnatural and created a serious doubt on the creditworthiness of such a witness. 18. Jayraj Kolhar (PW4), the milkman, deposed that when he reached in front of the restaurant, he knocked as usual, and he heard the voice from inside saying that the gate was open. After that, he saw a person sleeping on the steps, covered with a blanket from head to toes. He, therefore, went inside the gate, put the milk packet in the stainless steel container, and returned. This is hardly any evidence of the Appellant and the deceased being seen together by Jayraj Kolhar (PW4) before the alleged crime was committed. 19. Based on the above evidence, we are not inclined to agree that the prosecution has established the circumstance of last seen, and the onus in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act had shifted upon the Appellant. No account is taken about the presence of Rora Singh (PW3) on the same premises where the crime was allegedly committed. Paragraph 45 of the impugned judgment and order only observes that it was suspicious that Rora Singh (PW3) did not disclose hearing any shouting or other sound from the restaurant where the crime was allegedly committed. But this significant factor is downplayed by simply observing that the Appellant was sleeping on the steps on the front side of the restaurant where the murder took place. The Appellant also woke up Rora Singh (PW3) and told him about the commission of the murder. Based upon such reasoning, we do not think the circumstance of last seen could have been accepted as proved. 20. As noted earlier, the very circumstance that the Appellant woke up Rora Singh (PW3) and told him about the commission of the murder and after that himself went back to sleep in the proximity of the dead body is a little difficult to accept. 20. As noted earlier, the very circumstance that the Appellant woke up Rora Singh (PW3) and told him about the commission of the murder and after that himself went back to sleep in the proximity of the dead body is a little difficult to accept. Similarly, the version of Rora Singh (PW3) that after noticing the dead body, he left the premises at night and stayed with his friend some distance away, only to return the following day, is also a little difficult to accept. Therefore, in this case, the doubt's benefit should favor the Appellant's version more than Rora Singh's version. 21. In Reena Hazarika V/s. The State of Assam- (2019) 13 SCC 289 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the mere invocation of last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. In Bodh Raj @ Bodha & Ors. V/s. State of Jammu & Kashmir – (2002) 8 SCC 45 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that this theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen alive and the time when the deceased is found dead is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. The prosecution case here fails to exclude the intervention of any person other than the Appellant. The other circumstances on record, including the conduct of PW3, render the prosecution version rather unsafe to rely on to sustain this conviction. 22. The extra-judicial confessions allegedly made to PW1, PW2, and PW3 could not have formed the basis for the Appellant's conviction. Firstly, in the nature of the things, an extra-judicial confession is a relatively weak piece of evidence. Secondly, if there is any doubt whether the accused had confessed, then there is no question of even going into the weight that is to be attached to such a weak piece of evidence. As discussed above, we are not at ease in accepting that the Appellant would confess the murder to Rora Singh (PW3) and then go back to sleep close to the dead body. As discussed above, we are not at ease in accepting that the Appellant would confess the murder to Rora Singh (PW3) and then go back to sleep close to the dead body. The conduct of Rora Singh (PW3) after hearing the confession and witnessing the dead body is also not entirely natural, as discussed above. We also find that the Appellant's plea in his Section 313 statement on this aspect was not even considered. The Appellant had repeatedly maintained that he did not murder Shiva and was sleeping at his usual place from where he was arrested in the morning. The Appellant also repeatedly stated that he was mercilessly beaten up by the Police, made to sign blank papers, and told that he would be released within two days if he confessed. 23. A settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that extrajudicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Accordingly, whenever the Court appreciates the entire prosecution evidence and intends to base conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that it inspires confidence and corroborates by other prosecution evidence. If there are discrepancies or inherent probabilities, the Court would be fully justified in ruling out such evidence from consideration. See Sahadevan and Anr. V/s. State of T.N. – (2012) 6 SCC 403 . 24. In Sahadevan(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial confession is weak evidence and must be examined with greater care and caution. The Court should be satisfied that it was voluntarily made and truthful. Furthermore, the Court should be satisfied that it inspires confidence. An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. To base conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it should not suffer from material discrepancies and inherent probabilities. Such a statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accord with the law. In the present case, the extra-judicial confessions relied upon by the prosecution failed to pass this muster. 25. The fourth circumstance is about the alleged presence of human blood on the Appellant's clothes allegedly worn at the crime. Now, there is no clear evidence on the aspect of clothes, their attachment, and sealing. In his Section 313 statement, the Appellant says in specific terms that the Police brought the deceased's clothes from the restaurant and made the Appellant wear them. Now, there is no clear evidence on the aspect of clothes, their attachment, and sealing. In his Section 313 statement, the Appellant says in specific terms that the Police brought the deceased's clothes from the restaurant and made the Appellant wear them. (See answers to question nos.131, 135, 272 & 294.). This was entirely ignored or rather not even adverted to. That apart, there is a serious discrepancy concerning the blood group of the deceased that has not been addressed by the prosecution adequately. 26. The prosecution version was that the blood group of the deceased was 'A,' but Dr. Avinash Pujari (PW12), through whom Exhibit 41 was brought on record, certified that the blood group of the deceased was 'O+ve,' which was incidentally was also the blood group of the Appellant. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has only observed that the document at Exhibit 41 produced in cross- examination was not proved as far as the contents of it are concerned. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has then observed that since at least some human blood was found on the Appellant's pants about which he has offered no explanation whatsoever and, therefore, the prosecution is entitled to claim adverse inference. 27. Again, with respect, we cannot align with the above reasoning. In the first place, the Appellant offered an explanation that was either not noticed or not considered by the Additional learned Sessions Judge. Therefore, this is not a case of the Appellant failing to offer any explanation. Secondly, it was for the prosecution to explain the discrepancy arising from the two contradictory expert reports placed on record by the prosecution itself through two expert witnesses. Exhibit 41 was duly marked as an exhibit. Finally, Dr. Avinash Pujari (PW12) had every opportunity to explain the same. Ultimately, there is a presumption of innocence in such matters, and the burden is always on the prosecution to rebut the same. We do not think that the prosecution has proved the fourth circumstance beyond any reasonable doubt for all these reasons. 28. The fifth circumstance about the presence of the victim's blood on the koyta or the gas cylinder or the presence of some brain fragments on the gas cylinder, even if established, does not link the Appellant to the crime. Therefore, based upon this singular circumstance, there is no question of any conviction. 29. 28. The fifth circumstance about the presence of the victim's blood on the koyta or the gas cylinder or the presence of some brain fragments on the gas cylinder, even if established, does not link the Appellant to the crime. Therefore, based upon this singular circumstance, there is no question of any conviction. 29. The prosecution also does not satisfactorily prove that the sixth and the last circumstance about previous fights afford some motive for the crime. Paragraphs 43 & 44 of the impugned judgment and order record that the prosecution has not brought on record any material to show that on the date of the incident or any earlier day, there was any such altercation or fight between the Appellant or the deceased on the allegation of cash theft or for any other reason. But, the learned Additional Sessions Judge reasons that since the material brought on record suggests that the deceased and the accused used to fight earlier, the motive could be established from such circumstances and it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to bring on record any motive for the accused to commit such an offense. With respect, we cannot align with this line of reasoning in a matter of such nature. Therefore, even this circumstance has not been conclusively proved by the prosecution. 30. Applying the principles in Sharad Sarda (supra), the prosecution, in this case, has not fully proved the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt can be said to be fully established. The test is that the guilt 'must or should' and not merely 'may be' established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Even the circumstances, in this case, are not conclusive enough to exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. The chain, in this case, is far from complete, and this is not a matter where there is no reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the Appellant. This is also not the case where the prosecution has established that the Appellant must have done the act in all human probabilities. 31. Though not necessary, we must advert to the discrepancies on the aspect of the key to the main entrance of the restaurant where the crime took place. Motilal (PW2) and Vildo D'Costa (PW1) maintained that there are two keys, one with each of them. 31. Though not necessary, we must advert to the discrepancies on the aspect of the key to the main entrance of the restaurant where the crime took place. Motilal (PW2) and Vildo D'Costa (PW1) maintained that there are two keys, one with each of them. They also claimed that the main door is locked and the employees, including at least the Appellant, the deceased, and Rora Singh (PW3), sleep inside the restaurant. In his statement under Section 313, the Appellant said that other employees also used to sleep on the restaurant premises. However, in the night intervening 5th and 6th July 2015, the witnesses say that this door was open. Motilal (PW2) then curiously explains that he had opened this door/gate the previous night and left the key in the lock itself. Now, this belated explanation appears a little strange. This door or gate being open at the fateful time has consequences for appreciating the other evidence on record. Rora Singh (PW3) speaks about the Appellant and the deceased going out together and returning late at night. The same is the position with the evidence of Jayraj Kolhar (PW4), a milkman who claims to have been knocked on the door and heard someone tell him that the door is open. The prosecution has not investigated who this someone was. This was not the Appellant because now the prosecution claims that the person who was sleeping outside the door or on the steps covered with a blanket from head to toe was the Appellant. All these aspects have not been adequately considered, and they, at least, create a reasonable doubt about the prosecution's version. 32. Finally, there is yet another reason why we propose to set aside the Appellant's conviction. In his statement under Section 313, the Appellant has repeatedly claimed innocence. That by itself will not amount to anything much. However, on critically evaluating the Appellant's responses to each of the questions posed to him, we find that the Appellant has not simply admitted or denied the circumstances put to him but that his answers to each of the questions are pretty discerning. Moreover, there is consistency in his responses, and some of the responses even derive support from the evidence on record. Yet, such answers have been altogether ignored or, in some cases, not even adverted to before recording the Appellant's conviction. 33. Moreover, there is consistency in his responses, and some of the responses even derive support from the evidence on record. Yet, such answers have been altogether ignored or, in some cases, not even adverted to before recording the Appellant's conviction. 33. For example, the Appellant had consistently maintained that he was sleeping at his usual place when he was apprehended the following day. Vildo D'Costa (PW1) and Motilal (PW2) accept that the Appellant did not resist any arrest or attempt to flee. However, they maintained that the Appellant was apprehended at some distance away from the restaurant. The Appellant's responses about the clothes he was made to wear, the blank papers he was made to sign, the threats, and the physical assaults inflicted upon him have not even been considered or even adverted. The Appellant's repeated and specific statements that he was forcibly told to confess having killed the deceased so that he could be sent to his home at the State's cost after two days have not even been adverted to, much less considered. 34. In response to the last and the omnibus question as to whether the Appellant has anything else to say in the present case, the Appellant told the following:- Q.324. Do you have anything else to state in the present case? Ans. I say that a false case has been filed by Police. I was heavily assaulted, beaten by Police and was made to sign on blank papers, promised that I would be sent to my home by their own money. If we release now people will beat you. You have food and stay here only for few days. As you have not committed the murder. I have not killed Shiva (deceased). I would have run away if killed as the restaurant owner had no ID proof of mine, being an industrial area. I would have run away. I have come for livelihood. I would not kill after coming from West Bengal. I am innocent. 35. Again, the above explanation is not even adverted. In particular, the Appellant has explained that if he had killed Shiva, he would have run away as the restaurant did not have his ID proof. This being an industrial area, he had come to Goa for livelihood. He said he would not kill after coming from West Bengal and was innocent. 36. In particular, the Appellant has explained that if he had killed Shiva, he would have run away as the restaurant did not have his ID proof. This being an industrial area, he had come to Goa for livelihood. He said he would not kill after coming from West Bengal and was innocent. 36. The prosecution version is that the Appellant killed the deceased at about 00.30 hrs. on 06.07.2015, the Appellant made attempts to shift the body after that. The prosecution's version is that the Appellant managed to shift the body for only a few paces and could not conceal the same. The prosecution's version is that the Appellant woke up Rora Singh (PW3) after this murder and told him about this murder. As noted above, Rora Singh (PW3) saw the dead body, left the restaurant premises, went away, and slept with some friend who was not even examined by the prosecution, only to return to the site the following day. Motilal (PW2) claims to have been returned to the restaurant at about 4.30 a.m. but failed to notice either the dead body or even the Appellant for quite some time. Later, Motilal (PW2) claims to have seen the Appellant wiping the blood around the dead body and then confessing to Motilal (PW2) about the murder. There is a testimony of Jayraj Kolhar (PW4), a milkman, who claims to have seen someone sleeping outside the main door (on the steps) covered with the blanket from head to toes which now the prosecution claims, the Appellant. 37. All the above versions should have been considered along with the Appellant's statement under Section 313 of CrPC. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has considered only one or two allegedly inculpatory parts of the statement, but the most crucial parts have not been adverted to, much less considered. This seems a case where the explanation offered by the Appellant in the course of Section 313 statement has not even been considered before convicting the Appellant. 38. In Reena Hazarika(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 313 CrPC could not be seen simply as a part of Audi alteram partem rule. This seems a case where the explanation offered by the Appellant in the course of Section 313 statement has not even been considered before convicting the Appellant. 38. In Reena Hazarika(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 313 CrPC could not be seen simply as a part of Audi alteram partem rule. It confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, even if it is not considered a piece of substantive evidence. In a given case, if there is no consideration at all of the evidence taken under Section 313 of CrPC, even the conviction may well stand vitiated. If the accused takes a defense after the prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) CrPC, the Court is duty-bound, under Section 313(4) CrPC, to consider the same. The mere use of the word 'may' cannot be held to confer a discretionary power on the Court to consider or not to consider such defense since it constitutes a valuable right of an accused of access to justice and the likelihood of the prejudice that may be caused thereby. Whether the defense is acceptable or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the evidence available is an entirely different matter. If there has been no consideration at all of the defense taken under Section 313 CrPC, the conviction may well stand vitiated in the given facts of a case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that a solemn duty is cast on the trial Court in the dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defense of the accused taken under Section 313 CrPC and to either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing. 39. In Parminder Kaur @ P.P.Kaur @ Soni vs The State Of Punjab - 2020 (8) SCC 811 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court affirmed the above view in Reena Hazarika(supra) the Court added that any alternate version of events or interpretation proffered by the accused must be carefully analyzed and considered by the trial Court in compliance with the mandate of Section 313(4). Such opportunity is a valuable right of the accused to seek justice and defend themselves. Therefore, the trial Court's failure to fairly apply its mind and consider the defense could endanger the conviction itself. Such opportunity is a valuable right of the accused to seek justice and defend themselves. Therefore, the trial Court's failure to fairly apply its mind and consider the defense could endanger the conviction itself. The Court also pointed out that, unlike the prosecution, which needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to create reasonable doubt or prove their alternate version by a mere preponderance of probabilities. Thus, once a plausible version has been put forth in defense at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such a defense plea. 40. Therefore, upon cumulative consideration of all the circumstances above and the law applicable to such matters, we are satisfied that the impugned judgment and order convicting the Appellant must be set aside by granting the Appellant the benefit of reasonable doubt that arises in the matter. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment and order and the conviction and the sentence recorded in Sessions Case (302) No.44/2015 and direct that the Appellant be set at liberty, if not required in any other case. 41. This appeal is accordingly allowed in the terms above. The muddemal property must be disposed of according to law and established procedures. 42. We thank Ms. Andrade and Mr. Shivan Desai, who assisted the Appellant in this matter under the Legal Aid Scheme. We also appreciate the reasonable approach of the Additional Public Prosecutor in the case. The fees payable to Ms. Andrade shall abide by the rules.