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2022 DIGILAW 1095 (ALL)

Suvansh Prasad v. State Of U. P.

2022-07-15

CHANDRA KUMAR RAI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar Nigam learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for respondent Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 and Mr. Sudhir Bharti, learned counsel for the respondent No.5.Gaon Sabha. 2. With the consent of the parties, writ petition is being finally disposed of at admission stage. 3. Brief facts of the case are that petitioner was allotted abadi land of Arazi No. 225/1 in the year 1993 in accordance with rules and the same was approved by Sub-Divisional-Magistrate on 21.03.1993. Petitioner comes under first category of sub-section (3) of Section 122 of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act. The construction was raised by the petitioner over the land allotted to him. On an application dated 23.07.1999 under Section 115-P of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act filed by the Gram Pradhan after six year, proceedings were imitated against the petitioner. Petitioner filed objection in the aforesaid proceeding. The Sub-Divisional-Magistrate vide order dated 05.09.2013 cancelled the approval order dated 22.03.1993. Petitioner challenged the order dated 05.09.2013 through revision No.447 of 2013 before respondent No.3 in which interim order was granted by the respondent No.3 staying operation of the order passed by the courts below and matter was fixed for disposal. Revision was fixed for 14.05.2016 but due to absence of counsel for the petitioner revision was dismissed as default on 14.05.2016. Petitioner came to know about the order dated 14th May, 2016 on 01.05.2018 accordingly, the restoration application along with delay condonation was filed to recall the order dated 14.05.2016. The respondent No.3 vide order dated 06.10.2018 rejected the restoration application on the ground of delay. Petitioner challenged order dated 06.10.2018 by way of revision before the respondent No.4. In the revision interim order was passed, but later on, revision was rejected by impugned order dated 27.10.2021 saying that matter was rightly decided by the courts below and the revision filed by the petitioner dismissed, hence the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was allotted abadi land of the gaon sabha himself after following due procedure of law even approval was also granted by the Sub-Divisional-Magistrate but in order to harass the petitioner-proceeding of under Rule 115-P of U.P.Z.A.& L.R.Act has been initiated which was arbitrarily decided against the petitioner, against which revision was filed and the revision was dismissed on the technical ground. He submitted that in place of dismissal of the revision, on technical grounds matter should be decided on merits. 5. On the other hand, learned Standing counsel and learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha submitted that petitioner has not explained the delay satisfactorily and have not appeared on the date fixed in the revision in order to linger on the proceeding as such, the restoration was rejected and revision has been rightly dismissed by the courts below. 6. I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is an allottee of gaon sabha land and the proceeding initiated after six years by the gaon sabha was decided arbitrarily, against which petitioner has filed the statutory revision which was dismissed on the technical ground. Petitioner has explained delay in filing the restoration application, as such in the interests of justice in view of the law laid by the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1987 SC 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and another Vs. Mst Kantiji and others in place of dismissing the matter on technical ground, matter should be decided on merits. 8. Para No.3 of the above mentioned Supreme Court judgment is as follows: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 9. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned above, writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.10.2021 passed by the respondent No.4 in revision No.421 of 2019 and the orders dated 14.05.2016 and 06.10.2018 passed by the respondent No.3 are hereby set aside. The matter is sent back before the respondent No.3 to decide the petitioner's revision on merit after affording opportunity of hearing to both parties expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him.