JUDGMENT: A.K. MENON, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent taken up for hearing and final disposal. The learned Additional Government Advocate waives service on behalf of the State and the learned Central Government Standing Counsel, waives service on behalf of the Central Government. 3. This common order disposes the above Writ Petitions and Civil Application No. 1660 of 2021 (F) filed in Writ Petition No. 1149 of 2021. The factual aspects in each of these Writ Petitions are set out in brief. WRIT PETITION NO. 1119 OF 2021(F) 4. The six petitioners claim as owners of lands engaged in cultivation. They claim that the income that they derive from the agriculture is their only source. They will be gravely prejudiced and lose their only source of income if the lands are acquired. The petitioners challenge the process of acquisition of land initiated by the Union of India under the National Highways Act, 1956 (Highways Act) proposing to construct a link road (new NH-166S) from NH-66 (old NH17) near Dhargalim to Mopa near Varconda in the State of Goa. The petitioners also challenge an order dated 18.02.2021 passed by the Competent Authority of the Land Acquisition Office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO), PWD Cell. The petitioners allege illegal invocation of the Highways Act, 1956 for the purpose of constructing the link road from the national highway to the new Airport. The intention being to allegedly deprive the petitioners from right to fair compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR Act). Briefly put, it is the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of the Highways Act have been invoked in order to defeat provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and thereby violating fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 5. In Writ Petition No. 1128 of 2021 the twenty petitioners are residents of Tulaskarwadi, Nagzer, situated in Casarvanem village in Pernem Taluka, a few kilometres away from the proposed new Airport at Mopa. They challenge notifications dated 23.09.2020, 28.12.2020, 18.02.2021 and two orders dated 18.02.2021 and 15.02.2021, by which, the respondent no. 5. In Writ Petition No. 1128 of 2021 the twenty petitioners are residents of Tulaskarwadi, Nagzer, situated in Casarvanem village in Pernem Taluka, a few kilometres away from the proposed new Airport at Mopa. They challenge notifications dated 23.09.2020, 28.12.2020, 18.02.2021 and two orders dated 18.02.2021 and 15.02.2021, by which, the respondent no. 3, namely, the SLAO under the Highways Act rejected objections raised by petitioners 1 to 4, 6 to 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16 to the proposed acquisition of land owned by them. In the order dated 15.02.2021, the respondent no. 3 dismissed proceedings raising objections by petitioners 12 and 16. The petitioners also challenge notifications dated 06.04.2021, 23.09.2020 and 28.12.2020, which were issued under Section 2(2) and 3-A of the Highways Act, declaring the intention to acquire land described in the schedule to the notification for construction near NH-166S. Notification dated 06.04.2021 declares that the land mentioned in the schedule to the notification would vest absolutely in the Central Government free of encumbrances. The last notification also invited claims from interested persons for determination of compensation payable as the result of the proposed acquisition. WRIT PETITION NO. 1127 OF 2021 6. The petitioners in this Writ Petition are thirteen in number. The challenge is identical to that in Writ Petition No. 1128/2021 except for the description of their property. WRIT PETITION NO. 1149 OF 2021 7. The petitioners are ten in number and the challenge is to issuance of notification dated 28.12.2020 proposing to acquire 46.6693 hectares of land in villages Dhargalim, Varconda and Casarvarnem in Pernem Taluka for construction of NH-166S. In addition also, the lands are said to be agricultural lands in possession of petitioners' families for over a century and are said to be a part of the Tillari Irrigation Project and a notified Command Area under the Goa Command Area Development Act, 1997 (GCAD Act). The challenge mounted is slightly different from the other three Petitions inasmuch as the area proposed to be acquired for construction of the proposed link road it is alleged is not part of the initial approved approach road to the Mopa Airport as per the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. It is the contention of the petitioners that they had filed their objections to the acquisition of the land under Section 3-C of the Highways Act before the Competent Authority, respondent no. It is the contention of the petitioners that they had filed their objections to the acquisition of the land under Section 3-C of the Highways Act before the Competent Authority, respondent no. 2, who conducted a hearing and vide order dated 18.12.2021 rejected the objections. Rejection of these objections is also subject matter of challenge in this Petition. The challenge in all these Petitions is essentially to the acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of NH166S. Having briefly dealt with the nature of the challenge, we now proceed to consider the submissions made by the Counsel in each of these matters. 8. In Writ Petition No. 1119/2021, submissions were led by Mr. Nikhil Pai, who submitted that the petitioners as owners of land and being in cultivation of these lands would be gravely prejudiced since they would lose their only source of income. Mr. Pai submitted that ordinarily acquisition of land would be subject to provisions of the LARR Act of 2013. Mr. Pai submitted that in accordance with notification dated 28.12.2020, the third respondent declared its intention to acquire 46.6693 hectares of land at Dhargalim, Varconda and Casarvarnem in Pernem Taluka and petitioners land bearing Survey Nos. 336/0, 339/0, 340/0, 303/10, 303/9, 291/0 and 303/11 in Dhargalim village are part of the proposed acquisition process. He submitted that the invocation of the Highways Act was deliberately designed to avoid the compliance with the LARR Act, which makes a Social Impact Assessment Study mandatory prior to the acquisition of the land. Various other procedures are also required to be followed for acquisition of land for infrastructure projects such as the airport and the respondents have allegedly invoked provisions of the Highways Act meant for speedy construction of highways only to defeat the rights of the petitioners amongst others. 9. Mr. Pai submitted that the Court ought not to allow the acquisition to proceed under the Highways Act. It is contended that the respondents ought to have proceeded under the LARR Act knowing fully well that they are required to carry out necessary safeguards in the interest of the villagers including the petitioners. A very large area of land is proposed to be acquired only for construction of a road of only 8 kilometres in length. Objections raised by the petitioners, have been rejected without any justification. Mr. A very large area of land is proposed to be acquired only for construction of a road of only 8 kilometres in length. Objections raised by the petitioners, have been rejected without any justification. Mr. Pai submitted that at the hearing of the objections, the Competent Authority was bound to decide all the questions raised including the suitability of the land proposed to be acquired. The procedure prescribed under Section 3-C of the Highways Act is similar to the procedure under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition of 1894 and Section 15 of the current LARR Act, but these processes have not been followed with the intention of rejecting the objections of the petitioners. 10. While the respondents have contended that the proposed acquisition was for improving the existing junctions on the Mopa Airport road, Mr. Pai submits that the existing road is being widened and upon being widened, there will be no need for NH-166S to connect the national highway to the new Airport. Mr. Pai invited our attention to copy of notification dated 18.02.2021 issued by the Deputy Collector and Sub Divisional Officer, Pernem Taluka and submitted that the proposed link road could be an elevated road that would be constructed and therefore, it would require prior environmental clearance from the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF) under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 2006, whereas the respondents have proceeded to issue notification on 06.04.2021 under Section 3-D of the said Highways Act, proposing to acquire land without obtaining valid environmental clearance for the project. Mr. Pai submitted that ignoring such mandatory requirements, respondent no. 4 has also been informed of the fact that the lands under acquisition are part of a Command Area under the GCAD Act, 1997 and there is a strong possibility that environmental clearance may not be granted. 11. Mr. Pai submitted that the acquisition of land in the manner that is proposed, is illegal. The procedures under the LARR Act are required to be followed and the intention of the respondents was to deny the petitioners of the benefits accruing to them. According to Mr. Pai, there no declaration was issued under Section 2(2) of the Highways Act for declaring this stretch of land from NH-66 to the Mopa Airport as a national highway and therefore, the land cannot be acquired. 12. Mr. According to Mr. Pai, there no declaration was issued under Section 2(2) of the Highways Act for declaring this stretch of land from NH-66 to the Mopa Airport as a national highway and therefore, the land cannot be acquired. 12. Mr. Pai submitted that unless this Court interferes, the petitioners will be put to extreme hardship. It is also his case that ordinarily, the Social Impact Assessment Study contemplated under Section 4(4) (a) to (f) of the LAAR Act must include an assessment as to whether the proposed acquisition serves the public purpose. It must estimate the affected number of families and the families likely to be displaced and also the number of houses in settlements affected by the proposed acquisition. It must also assess the bare minimum required for the project and whether, an alternative place has been sought to be ascertained prior to the acquisition being actioned. According to Mr. Pai, a Social Impact Assessment Study is also required in this case in order to consider the impact that the project may have on various components such as livelihood of affected families, public and community properties and other infrastructure as contemplated in Section 4(5) of the Land Acquisition Act. That it is subject to such study that the Government is required to prepare a Social Impact Management Plan setting out ameliorative measures required to be undertaken for addressing the impact under Section 4(6) of the Land Acquisition Act. A public hearing ought to have been conducted by virtue of Section 5 of the Act and reliance is placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar Vs. Union Of India, (2020) 12 SCC 1 to the effect that the views of the project affected persons must be incorporated in the Social Impact Assessment Report. It is only thereafter that the study is to be published and post publication, a group of independent multidisciplinary expert group would opine. 13. Mr. Pai also submitted that the Social Impact Assessment Report would have taken into consideration the effect of the proposed acquisition on the persons interested in the land, whose objections could be heard. Mr. It is only thereafter that the study is to be published and post publication, a group of independent multidisciplinary expert group would opine. 13. Mr. Pai also submitted that the Social Impact Assessment Report would have taken into consideration the effect of the proposed acquisition on the persons interested in the land, whose objections could be heard. Mr. Pai submitted that Section 3-A of the Highways Act requires the Central Government to be satisfied that the land is for the public purpose, prior to proceeding with acquisition, but there are no safeguards to protect against acquisition as contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act. He submits that the Highways Act is draconian in its nature, offers no protection from the acquisition once the process is commenced. Therefore, the Authorities are burdened arriving to the satisfaction that the land is being acquired for the purpose of building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or a part thereof. Mr. Pai further submitted that the expression “National Highway” is not defined under the Highways Act and that the declaration of State roads as National highways is to be based on well established principles, the criteria must be followed. Our attention is invited to the affidavit dated 29.07.2020 filed on behalf of respondent no. 3, who is a Chief Engineer cum Regional Officer of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, who claims to have conducted a preliminary analysis and upon being satisfied with the requirement, an arterial road connecting the Airport is to be declared for the proposed acquisition. According to Mr. Pai, it is evident that no analysis has been carried out as contemplated by law and the bare statement that a preliminary analysis has been carried out is of no consequence whatsoever. That the respondent no. 3 had failed to produce any document in support of any analysis having been carried on and in the conclusion Mr. Pai submits that the acquisition proceedings are illegal only to bypass the provisions of the LARR Act. He, therefore, seeks relief sought in the Petition. 14. Mr. Pai alleges gross violation of fundamental rights under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and submits that the State instrumentalities be directed to comply with the LARR Act in force. Pai submits that the acquisition proceedings are illegal only to bypass the provisions of the LARR Act. He, therefore, seeks relief sought in the Petition. 14. Mr. Pai alleges gross violation of fundamental rights under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and submits that the State instrumentalities be directed to comply with the LARR Act in force. The Competent Authority has not issued any finding that the lands were required for a public purpose for building, maintenance and operation of a national highway. He, therefore, submitted considering all these aspects and the fact that the land is a part of a Command Area, environmental clearance is mandatory that the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed in the Petition by restraining the respondents from interfering with the lands described in the Petition and by quashing and setting aside the land acquisition process and notifications dated 28.12.2020 and setting aside the order dated 18.02.2021, passed in numerous proceedings by the SLAO, particulars of which have been set out in the Petition. 15. Save and except the identity of the petitioners and that survey numbers of the plots, the challenge in Writ Petition Nos. 1127/2021 and 1128/2021 is identical. Almost all the lands involved are situated in village Casarvarnem. In some cases land is involved in Warkhand village. In view of the identical interest of the petitioners, we propose to deal with the facts as set out in the first of these two Petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 1127/2021. Mr. Desai on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 1127/2021 and 1128/2021 adopted the submissions of Mr. Pai in Writ Petition No. 1119/2021. In support of his Petition he submitted that the opposed link road being described as a highway is not in compliance with the criteria laid down by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) Government of India and therefore, the impugned notifications were liable to be struck down. He further submitted that the issuance of the notification no. 1 under the Highways Act, 1956 was clearly violative and a misuse of the provisions of the Highways Act. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the rejection of the objections of the petitioners was clearly actionable. According to Mr. Desai, the MoRTH had devised a 11 point criteria for declaration of a road as a national highway based on the comments of the planning commission. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the rejection of the objections of the petitioners was clearly actionable. According to Mr. Desai, the MoRTH had devised a 11 point criteria for declaration of a road as a national highway based on the comments of the planning commission. The criteria were apparently discussed in parliament and an extract of Lok Sabha deliberations appear on the website contended that the only roads that runs through the length and breadth of the country and roads connecting to adjacent countries and to the National capital with State capitals and roads connecting mutually the State Capitals could be identified as highways. Certain other roads such as those connecting major ports, non major ports, industrial centres and tourists centres and those of strategic importance including arterial roads enabling sizable reduction in travel distance are required to be designated highways. It is contended that for a road to be declared a national highway, it should preferably have a right of way of minimum 30 metres, free of encroachments and the State Government is required to complete acquisition of lands expeditiously. Thus, according to Mr. Desai, the declaration of the current proposed NH-166S is in violation of 11 point criteria laid down by MoRTH. The so called highway was only 8 kilometres long and the declaration of this road as a national highway is unconstitutional and it misuses the provisions of the statute, especially since the road did not link States, lacked sufficient length and did not in any manner comply with the strategic purposes for which highways were defined and sought to be constructed. 16. Furthermore, in the absence of a zonal plan or a development plan, it was impermissible for any authority to bypass the powers vested in local authorities for preparing a town development scheme and on this basis alone, the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed and set aside. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that Panchayats and Municipalities are also Constitutional bodies empowered to make plans for development of their villages and towns and cannot be forced by respondent no. 2 to accept unilateral decisions in respect of roads that are sought to be built up after acquiring properties of the local residents. 17. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that Panchayats and Municipalities are also Constitutional bodies empowered to make plans for development of their villages and towns and cannot be forced by respondent no. 2 to accept unilateral decisions in respect of roads that are sought to be built up after acquiring properties of the local residents. 17. According to the petitioners, the notification of this road is also contrary to the Goa Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 and Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act of 1991 and since most of these lands were used for agricultural purposes, the constructions of these roads would cause wide scale destruction of agriculture, livelihood and apart from affecting the environment and community in general. The notifications impugned in these two Petitions are allegedly issued without consulting the Ministry for Environment, Forest and Climate Change for getting their approval and hence, absent approval from the MoEF, the notifications are bad in law. The impugned notification no. 2 did not set out names of persons, whose names in fact appear in the land records and these persons were not able to file objections for sheer want of knowledge. It is also contended that the notification no. 2 ought to have been published in all newspapers so that the public at large could have been made aware of the proposed acquisition of land, specially since a large number of people were involved and are likely to be displaced since almost one crore square metres of agricultural land and grazing lands had already been acquired under the Land Acquisition proceedings for the Airport and about 381 acres of the said land had been given for commercial exploitation to big corporations including to casinos. This is cited as an example of misuse of power. It is also contended that although, Section 3-C of the Highways Act grants interested persons, the right to object to the proposed acquisition, the scope of objections under Section 3-C were extremely limited and it empowers the Competent Authority only to hear grievances pertaining to survey numbers and area of the land and the nature of land shown under the preliminary notification, the rate of compensation and rehabilitation. The provisions do not in any way provide for powers to the Competent authority to decide several other larger issues such as validity of the notification, technical aspects pertaining to the utility of land sought to be acquired and the impact on the environment. It is contended that the impugned notifications have been issued only to pave the way of the subsequent notifications all under the Highways Act so as to obviate any hurdles in the construction of the road and by circumventing and bypassing provisions of the LARR Act. 18. An affidavit in reply has been filed in the aforesaid Petitions by the Chief Engineer cum Regional Officer for MoRTH. The affidavit raises a preliminary objection to the Writ Petition being filed belatedly and on the ground of laches. The delay in filing the Writ Petition should be viewed seriously since the petitioners have failed to offer an plausible explanation for having approached this Court belatedly while the notification was issued in relation to the declaration of the proposed road NH-166S as a highway and although the notification was dated 23.09.2020 and issued under Section 2(2) of the Highways Act, however, the petitioners have approached this Court only on 23.04.2021. There has been inordinate delay in approaching the Court and on that ground itself, the Petition is sought to be opposed. It is contended that the petitioners do not have any locus to file the Petition and the only reason for the petitioners to impugn the actions of the respondents is that they claim to be tenants of land in question. It is contended that none of the petitioners' names appear in Form I or Form XIV in relation to these properties. That in accordance with Section 105 of the Land Revenue Code entries in records of right are presumed to be correct and the fact that the petitioners' names do not appear in either Form I or Form XIV, which constitute the Revenue Record, there are disputed questions of fact as to the status of the petitioners as tenants. If at all they were tenants, their rights can be agitated only by the Mamlatdars in accordance with the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. Thus, locus of the petitioners has been called in question. 19. If at all they were tenants, their rights can be agitated only by the Mamlatdars in accordance with the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. Thus, locus of the petitioners has been called in question. 19. The deponent has further shaped that the Government of Goa had undertaken development of a new green field Airport near village Mopa in North Goa as an international Airport which would serve tourists and business markets. Connectivity to the proposed Mopa Airport is presently through an existing village road, which is wholly insufficient considering that the Airport is to be an international Airport and anticipating growth in traffic, it was found that an arterial road is required to be constructed connecting the Airport with major tourist centres and the State Capital and it is in this context that MoRTH had declared the proposed road as a national highway NH-166S. The responsibility of developing this connectivity was then entrusted to the State, Public Works Department, National Highway Section and the Government of Goa. It is contended that the proposed length of the road is about 6.60 kilometres. It is further contended that considering the limited scope of inquiry under Section 3C of the Highways Act, the objections were considered by the third respondent and were rejected. It was further contended that the respondents have a high degree of expertise excess to the best technical know how and resources for implementation of the project and by appointing expert consultant and as such, the alignment of the national highway is not likely to destroy the environment or effect the community at large. Expert opinion has revealed that the construction of the national highway from Dhargalim upto the Airport was in the interest of the general public and to cater to the need of the commuters which would become critical after the Airport commenced operations. 20. Once the Airport was operational, it would be seen that the internal road just passing through the village would be extremely difficult to negotiate. Moreover, it was likely to cause great disturbance to the residents of the village and surrounding areas given the high volume of traffic that would pass through the road in the village. The deponent has assailed to the attempt of the petitioners to raise objections which were bereft of any factual basis. Moreover, it was likely to cause great disturbance to the residents of the village and surrounding areas given the high volume of traffic that would pass through the road in the village. The deponent has assailed to the attempt of the petitioners to raise objections which were bereft of any factual basis. Reliance is placed on provisions of Section 2 of the Highways Act to contend that the Central Government has wide powers in declaring any highway to be a national highway and it includes under Section 3-A of the Highways Act to acquire land where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary for a public purpose to so acquire land for building, maintenance, management and operation of national highway or part thereof. In view of this power vested in the Central Government, it was contended that the MoRTH has found it necessary to build NH-166S. Under Section 3-B of the Highways Act, the expression land is defined and land includes benefits arising out of the land and the things attached to the earth and permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and as such, the respondents may declare it intentions to acquire any such lands, which is not linked to an existing road or a State highway. Thus, even construction of a new road on land acquired under the Highways Act cannot be assailed on the basis that there is no highway in existence in order to be classified as a national highway. 21. That brings us to consider the last of these Petitions i.e. Writ Petition No. 1149/2021 alongwith Civil Application (F) No. 1660/2021. The petitioners in WP No.1149/2021 are also claiming the possession of agricultural lands for over a century. They have been sustaining them. The petitioners claim to come from families of agriculturists and with the background of agricultural community and as canvassed by Mr. Costa Frias, the lands which are listed in Annexure A collectively are Tillari lands, part of the Tillari Irrigation Project. They impugn the notification dated 28.12.2020, which declares the intention to acquire 46.6693 hectares of land of villages Dhargalim, Varconda and Casarvarnem in the same Pernem Taluka. The purpose for which the acquisition is proposed is the same as in other Petitions, namely, the construction of NH-166S. Mr. They impugn the notification dated 28.12.2020, which declares the intention to acquire 46.6693 hectares of land of villages Dhargalim, Varconda and Casarvarnem in the same Pernem Taluka. The purpose for which the acquisition is proposed is the same as in other Petitions, namely, the construction of NH-166S. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that under the GCAD Act of 1997, a Command Area is defined as an area irrigated or capable of being irrigated either by gravitational flow or by lift irrigation had to be specified by the Command Area Board. Our attention is invited to the fact that the proposed link road is not part of the initial approved road for the Mopa Airport and as contemplated in the environmental clearance as granted by the MoEF. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that initially, the Airport had been granted approval on the basis of an alternate road that had been proposed which did not pass through the lands, now proposed for the acquisition. It is the contention of the petitioners that the third respondent namely the MoRTH had changed the alignment of the link road without approval of the MoEF and the EIA Notification. Mr. Costa Frias invited our attention to a Manual of Guidelines on Land Acquisition for National Highways under the Highways Act, 1956 (Manual of Guidelines). He submitted that this was published in December 2018 and mandated the appointment of a consultant and a due diligence of a highest degree for selection of the best alignment for the connecting road. In the instant case, Mr. Costa Frias submitted that no such consultant has been appointment and there has been no attempt to consider an alternate alignment at all. He submits that the lands that are proposed to be acquired are eco-sensitive, rich in bio-diversity with natural springs with species of plants and trees and need to be protected. He admits however that under Section 3-C(2) of the Highways Act, 1956, the respondent no. 2 conducted a hearing of objections raised by the petitioners amongst others, but by an order dated 18.02.2021, these objections were overruled and it is now proposed that the construction will proceed. 22. Mr. Costa Frias further submitted that even otherwise under Section 19 of the GCAD Act, 1997 permission had to be taken from the Board which has apparently not been taken. 22. Mr. Costa Frias further submitted that even otherwise under Section 19 of the GCAD Act, 1997 permission had to be taken from the Board which has apparently not been taken. According to him, a declaration issued on 06.04.2021 under Section 3-D of the Highways Act notifying that the land admeasuring 4,09,516 square metres was needed for public purpose is not justified. A further notification dated 23.09.2020 issued by the MoRTH is said to be vitiated since the SLAO had not decided the objections in accordance with law. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the Special Gram Sabha of Warkhand Nagzer village Panchayat had in fact resolved to oppose the entire acquisition at a meeting held on 24.01.2021. According to the petitioners, their ancestors had developed and nurtured the land, which will now be destroyed unless protected by this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners therefore assailed the rejection of the objections by the order dated 18.02.2021 and submitted that the right conferred under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is akin to a fundamental right and guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India as also a human right as contemplated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705 . 23. In support of his submissions Mr. Costa Frias invited our attention to the provisions of the GCAD Act and the extracts of the Regional Plan for Goa 2021 and the specific conditions which contemplated a distribution system by which all main canals, minor canals, water courses and field channels and farm channels are required to be utilized for the purposes of cultivation and under Section 3 of the GCAD Act, the Command Area Board has to be constituted to function and provide technical assistance and guidance to farmers including water distribution cooperative societies and coordinate efforts to develop ground water to supplement surface irrigation. Under Section 16, Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the Board was required to prepare a scheme which would be comprehensive for development of the Command Area and upon preparation of the scheme, certain further actions would ensue in accordance with Section 19. Mr. Costa Frias supported that interpretation placed by Mr. Pai and Mr. Desai in support of the other Writ Petitioners. 24. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Mr. Costa Frias supported that interpretation placed by Mr. Pai and Mr. Desai in support of the other Writ Petitioners. 24. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Costa Frias invited our attention to the fact that the acquisition of the land for the approach road was initiated in 2008 under the Land Acquisition Act of 1994, but was allowed to lapse. Logically, the acquisition should have proceeded under the LARR Act which replaced the old Land Acquisition Act. The LARR Act provided for various safeguards, requirement of public hearings, etc. which would have enabled the authorities to take a proper decision in the right perspective and taking into consideration the interest of the petitioners and those similarly placed. This had not been done. On the other hand, the SLAO has approached the objections with a pre-conceived notion dismissing the objections without proper application of mind. Mr. Costa Frias therefore submitted that the Court may quash and set aside the notification dated 23.09.2020 and further issue a mandamus to the first respondent to acquire lands under the LARR Act. He also seeks that the impugned notifications dated 28.12.2020 and 06.04.2021 assailed in this and the other Petitions be quashed and set aside. In the alternative, it is pleaded that the rejection of the objections by order dated 18.02.2021 be set aside and the petitioners' objections be heard afresh in accordance with law. Needless to mention, stay of further proceedings in acquisition pursuant to the notification dated 06.04.2021 is also sought. 25. In the course of submissions Mr. Costa Frias has taken us through the relevant annexures in an attempt to identify that the land is cultivated, they are tenanted lands occupied by the petitioners and he also invited our attention to the Annexure XIII to demonstrate how the area already acquired for the airport has caused them substantial harm. He sought to demonstrate from the colour coded chart the areas under the proposed approach road additional area to be acquired and the area under possession of the Transport Department. By inviting our attention to the various notifications that are under challenge including the one pertaining to new NH166S, he has taken us through the provisions of the Manual of Guidelines. Mr. By inviting our attention to the various notifications that are under challenge including the one pertaining to new NH166S, he has taken us through the provisions of the Manual of Guidelines. Mr. Costa Frias has laid specific emphasis in the course of his submissions on the role and responsibilities of the DPR consultants as set out in clause 1.2 (i), (ii) and (iii). He has taken us through the proposed roads in just position in the Google Earth Map imagery taken on 21.04.2019 and the relevant correspondence on the subject. He invited our attention to the fact that alternate routes are possible through various other lands and that these routes have been suggested to the respondents, but to no avail. REPLY: 26. The Petitions are opposed by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State and other authorities. He submits that the challenge to the notifications and the rejections of objections are devoid of any merit as in the other cases. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Highways Act is a self contained code and acquisition of land under the said Act is independent of other formalities and procedures. That the EIA Notification, 2006 itself provides that any clearance required in respect of new projects and activities or for expansion and modification of existing projects and activities, the EIA notification does not require environmental clearance for proposed acquisition of land for construction of a link road. Accordingly, it is his case that the authorities need not obtain any clearance while carrying out its statutory duties under the Highways Act. As far as Writ Petition No. 1149/2021 is concerned, the learned Advocate General has identified six objections that the petitioners have raised in support of their grounds to challenge and have dealt with these. In conclusion it is submitted that none of these challenges will survive. Just as the EIA Notification does not affect the acquisition for the purpose of road, the GCAD Act also does not contain statutory provisions that require obtaining permission prior to acquisition proceedings under the Highways Act. 27. The learned Advocate General has contended that the petitioners grievance that the provisions of the Highways Act has been invoked only to avoid complying with provisions of the LARR Act is devoid of any merit and based on misconception of law. 27. The learned Advocate General has contended that the petitioners grievance that the provisions of the Highways Act has been invoked only to avoid complying with provisions of the LARR Act is devoid of any merit and based on misconception of law. The acquisition process has been undertaken by the respondents in strict compliance with the provisions of law. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Land Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable in the instant case and the LARR Act in Section 105 itself contemplates that its provisions will not apply in certain cases or may apply with modifications. 28. The learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners apprehensions are misplaced and these apprehensions arise more out of fear that they would not be provided benefit of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Advocate General further contended that by virtue of exclusion of the Highways Act from the scope of the LARR Act, there is no substance in the objections raised on behalf of the petitioners. He submitted that the lands were acquired for a public purpose and the objections sought to be raised by the petitioners are motivated with the intention of delaying the construction of NH-166S. In this behalf, our attention is invited by the learned Advocate General to Form I & XIV in an attempt to demonstrate that the names of the petitioners, who claim to be tenants of the respective plots do not even appear in the form as cultivators or otherwise. On this basis, it was contended by the learned Advocate General that there is no substance in the challenge. 29. The Advocate General has controverted the contentions of Mr. Costa Frias that the alignment of the road proposed did not go for an assessment by DPR consultant because in fact for one Technogem Consultant Pvt. Ltd. was indeed engaged as a DPR consultant for preparation of the detailed project report. Before the proposal to acquire the land as now identified was taken, a feasibility study considered five alternate alignments and it is only after such feasibility study was completed that the present alignment was selected. He therefore submitted that there is no merit in the contentions of the petitioners. Referring to the contention of Mr. Before the proposal to acquire the land as now identified was taken, a feasibility study considered five alternate alignments and it is only after such feasibility study was completed that the present alignment was selected. He therefore submitted that there is no merit in the contentions of the petitioners. Referring to the contention of Mr. Costa Frias that the link road does not fulfill the requirements of the national highway, reliance was placed on the criteria for State roads to be declared as new national highways include roads running through the length and breadth of the country and by virtue of that interpretation which is inclusive in nature. The learned Advocate General submitted that there is no occasion to find fault with the acquisition of the proposed stretch of 6.60 kilometres as NH-166S. It serves a specific purpose. 30. In this respect, the Advocate General referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Kushala Shetty & Others., (2011) 12 SCC 69 , which identifies the National Highway Authority as a professionally managed body which deals with construction of new highways, widening and development of existing highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the country. It also holds that the Courts are not at all equipped to decide the viability and feasibility of a particular project or whether a particular alignment would sub-serve the larger public interest and in such matters the scope for judicial review is limited. 31. The Advocate General has in the course of submissions highlighted the fact that the nature of objections raised by the petitioners did not constitute substantial objections. He has taken us through the provisions of Sections 3-C of the Highways Act, Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and Section 15 of the LARR Act. He has identified the differences between these three provisions and submitted that Section 3-C of the Highways Act, which has been invoked in the present case, has a very limited scope unlike Sections 5A and 15 of the Land Acquisition Act. 32. Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Central Government has also opposed the Petitions. He has submitted that once the Union Government has decided to invoke the Highways Act, all other provisions that have been cited by the petitioners are of no avail. 32. Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Central Government has also opposed the Petitions. He has submitted that once the Union Government has decided to invoke the Highways Act, all other provisions that have been cited by the petitioners are of no avail. Inviting our attention to paragraph 17 of the Petition itself, he submits that the Petitions proceed on an incorrect premise that the Manual of Guidelines provided by the MoRTH have been totally ignored in the acquisition proceedings. The contention of the petitioners that the DPR consultant has not been appointed is far from the truth. 33. Mr. Lotlikar submits that this is one of the fundamental challenges to the Petition. It was submitted by the petitioners that there was no due diligence in selecting the route. and that no attempts were made to find out the route that is less costly in terms of socio, economic and environmental impact and construction costs. He has faulted the petitioners approach in having suggested an alternative route on the map that is been marked and to which we have already made reference. The petitioners contention is that alternative routes could have been considered with lesser socio economic impact and lower construction costs. This in our view has not been established. CONCLUSIONS: 34. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and having considered the pleadings, the notifications and the representations made to which the learned Counsel for all the petitioners have made reference to and their written submissions, we are of the view that there is no case for interference. In the course of submissions Mr. Costa Frias had an occasion to rely upon a judgment of the Uttar Pradesh High Court in the case of Bhimavarapu Giridhar Kumar Reddy Vs. the Union Government of India in W.A. No. 80/2012. Reference was made to the fact that opportunity to persons whose lands are proposed to be acquired are mandated by Section 3-C(1) of 1956 enactment. That Section 3-C(1) does not indicate a ritual or an empty formality. It is a salutary provision akin to provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. Reference is made, in that judgment, to the decisions of Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, Union of India Vs. That Section 3-C(1) does not indicate a ritual or an empty formality. It is a salutary provision akin to provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. Reference is made, in that judgment, to the decisions of Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, Union of India Vs. Kishan Lal Arneja and other judgments in which the Supreme Court had observed that the opportunity of hearing the land owners to object to the acquisition of their land was a valuable right which cannot be jettisoned for jejune reasons and that such opportunities and compliances of rules of natural justice is a small price which the State should always be prepared to pay before it can deprive any person of his property. The petitioners had pressed this into service and submitted that it is also pertinent to note that an uncommunicated administrative order is to be treated as inoperative and in the present case, the Competent authority had not provided a proper opportunity nor communicated the reasons for effective rejection of the objections. 35. In our view, it is not open to the petitioners to decide the nature of the enactment that has to be invoked for the purposes of acquisition of land. The petitioners for instance cannot expect the authorities to take a decision on invocation of the appropriate statute which the petitioners' find suitable for the present purposes. The Highways Act has withstood the test of time and there are been occasions where it has been subjected to judicial review and its provisions have not been held to be unconstitutional and in this background, scope of Section 3-C of the Highways Act has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Competent Authority Vs. Barangore Jute Factory & Others, (2005) 13 SCC 477 , in which the Supreme Court has considered the limited scope of objections under Section 3-C of the Highways Act, which is largely restricted to the objections to user of the land. In the present case, the challenge does not meet the test of illegality or unreasonableness. Mr. Costa Frias has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. In the present case, the challenge does not meet the test of illegality or unreasonableness. Mr. Costa Frias has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Others, (2005) 7 SCC 627 and has invited this Court to consider the fact that the main question which fell for consideration before the High Court in that case was whether the objections raised by the appellant to the acquisition of lands on various grounds have been considered by the Court. The Supreme Court observed that Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 conferred a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands were sought to be acquired and having regard to the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same, but it must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation must be paid for it. He also relied upon the observations in paragraph 9 of that judgment in which the Supreme Court reiterates that it is trite law that hearing that is given to a person must be an effective one and not only a formality. The formation of opinions as regards public purpose and suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind. The State must not commit a misdirection in law and that Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act confers a valuable and important right to a party in connection with Article 300A of the Constitution which has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. 36. The petitioners had submitted that in the instant case the State has not met the basic requirements. The arguments, in our view, overlook the fact that in the case at hand and given the invocation of the Highways Act, it is not Section 5A that would come into play and even assuming that Mr. Costa Frias is right in seeking to use the decision in Hindustan Petroleum (supra) to further canvas his contention that the LARR Act should have been applied instead of the Highways Act, we are afraid that is a decision that cannot be forced on the State. It is the State which is expected to act in the best interest of society. It is the State which is expected to act in the best interest of society. Having come to the conclusion that the contentions of petitioners to the extent that the enactment to be brought into play for the purposes of acquisition of the land cannot be decided by the petitioners or the Court, it is only the applicability of the provision that can be gone into in the event the petitioners were able to persuade the Court to hold that the application and invocation of the Highways Act would be entirely improper. We would therefore proceed to consider that aspect of the challenge. 37. While on the subject we find that in a Civil Application No.1660/2021, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1149/2021 had taken up the contention that the respondent no. 2, the SLAO had issued a public notice on 07.06.2021, published it in the local papers and announced the making of an award in respect of Section 3-G of the Highways Act. That the compensation was also placed at the disposal of the second respondent by the MoRTH. The members of the public including the petitioners were informed that they would receive their compensation from the office of the SLAO upon submitting title documents, calling upon them to surrender and deliver possession of the lands failing which possession would be taken with police assistance upon expiry of 60 days. The 60 days period was then expiring on 07.08.2021 and they apprehended that the authorities would take forcible possession of the land. By an interim order dated 06.05.2021 passed in this Petition, this Court had directed that development of land would be subject to the outcome of the Petition. Therefore the petitioners sought an interim direction staying the operation of notice dated 07.06.2021 and restraining the authorities from taking possession of the land. In the light of the view we have taken in these Petitions, the Civil Application will be rendered infructuous. 38. In our view, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate breach of the obligation under Section 3-C. It is noted that the petitioners were granted a hearing. In the affidavit in reply on behalf of respondent no. In the light of the view we have taken in these Petitions, the Civil Application will be rendered infructuous. 38. In our view, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate breach of the obligation under Section 3-C. It is noted that the petitioners were granted a hearing. In the affidavit in reply on behalf of respondent no. 3, one Rajiv Singh, who is also the Chief Engineer cum Regional Officer of MoRTH he has in clear terms stated that the Highways Act having been invoked, the notification under Section 3-A of the Highways Act had been issued. That the petitioners along with various others had filed their objections on various grounds including alignment of the proposed road and the need for the road at all and that after publication of notice all the objections have been received and considered by the authority. 39. In terms of the said procedure, the respondents prepared a detailed project report by appointing a DPR consultant. The consultant collected information required for the work and carried out various field surveys and investigations and in the process of preparing the DPR, it considered the feasibility, viability and the necessity for the road. In terms of the DPR, the project was found to be in public interest at large since the project road will be the main highway which will connect the new international Airport to NH-66. The existing village road was found to be grossly insufficient to provide the requisite connectivity and in our view, experience has shown that absent proper and sufficiently wide and easily accessible roads to an important infrastructural development such as an international Airport would cause huge bottlenecks in movement of people, personnel, equipment and facilities. The importance of a proper connecting road to the National Highway which is an arterial road is also important from the point of view of safety. Easy access of emergency services such as the fire brigade, hospital services, ambulances and all other disaster management service will have to be taken into account. Absent proper access, all safety measures including those for disaster management would be frustrated and blocked and rendered insufficient would result in emergency measures also inoperable from both sides viz. from the Airport and to the Airport. Absent proper access, all safety measures including those for disaster management would be frustrated and blocked and rendered insufficient would result in emergency measures also inoperable from both sides viz. from the Airport and to the Airport. The Airport being an international Airport and considering the extent of tourist traffic and the popularity of the State of Goa as tourist destination of great attraction worldwide, it is bound to attract large number of visitors over the years not only for the purposes of tourism, but also for the purposes of promoting entrepreneurship, business development and developing the economy of the State as a whole. 40. An important infrastructural project such as the international Airport provides a gateway to the State which will necessarily witness a constant flow of people, personnel, cargo and equipment through vehicular mode and that will require a suitable road access from other arterial roads connecting the State, intra-state and inter-state. The DPR consultants having carried out this exercise, it is not for this Court to examine the suitability of the road that is selected. The DPR consultants, no doubt, will have a degree of expertise ability and knowledge, which in their judgment would have been utilized for the purpose of arriving at a decision in the interest of the project. The petitioners basic premise that a DPR consultant had not been appointed is found to be incorrect. The challenge in the Petitions being predicated on the invocation of the Highways Act instead of the LARR Act, offers no serious constitutional challenge. The enactments are all in force and continue to be in force. It is for the authorities, respondents to decide the manner and extent to which, appropriate enactment is to be invoked. Once having decided on invocation of the Highways Act, in our view, it is not open for this Court to interfere in that discretion and the law of the land must follow and it is only if the provisions of the Highways Act have not been implemented in the facts situation at hand that may call for interference from this Court. 41. In the instant case, a DPR consultant having been appointed and having carried out its exercise and having recommended the suitable route, in our view, it is not open to object to this course of action. 41. In the instant case, a DPR consultant having been appointed and having carried out its exercise and having recommended the suitable route, in our view, it is not open to object to this course of action. Amongst the challenges that have been pressed into service, one of the fundamental challenges to these notifications and the proposed acquisition is on the basis of lack of environmental clearance. We have seen that construction of roads under the Highways Act do not require environmental clearance under the EIA Notification of 2006, permission of the Command Area Development Board is also not mandatory. Considering the fact that the Highways Act is a self contained Code and the Central Government has framed Rules in exercise of Section 9 of the Act, it is these Rules that are required to be followed by the executing authority and nothing in these Rules oblige the Central Government to obtain environmental clearance prior to issuing a notification under Section 3-A. 42. We had occasion to consider the notification dated 14.09.2006 issued by the MoRTH and we are unable to find any provision that restricts the power of the Central Government to issue notifications under the Highways Act. The Airport itself has since obtained environmental clearance after the initial hiccups and clearance having being provided, the land proposed to be acquired would vest in the Central Government. 43. In summary the challenge is as follows: (a) The declaration of lands under the National Highways Act is unconstitutional and illegal, arbitrary and a colourable exercise of power. (b) Road in question does not qualify as a highway, fails to meet any of these strategic requirements set out in 11 point agenda. (c) It only connects from Dhargalim junction to the Mopa International Airport and hence, does not fall within the 11 point agenda, which defines and identifies national highway criteria. (d) The notifications and the proposed road is being sought to be constructed in violations of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. (e) The petitioners being tenants of the property sought to be acquired and have been in enjoyment of lands for decades, the abrupt acquisition under the National Highways Act is unsustainable. (f) The alignment of the national highway need not be through fertile agricultural lands since these lands are the only source of income for the petitioners. (g) In a welfare State, the respondent nos. (f) The alignment of the national highway need not be through fertile agricultural lands since these lands are the only source of income for the petitioners. (g) In a welfare State, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were duty bound to take public interest into account and consider the fact that agricultural activity was being undertaken which is equally important and in the public interest. (h) The livelihood of the farmers and their welfare has been ignored and the proposed road is likely to cause an adverse impact on the ecology of the area. 44. No other aspect has been urged before us in any of these Petitions. 45. Our attention was invited by the respondents to Section 105 of the LARR Act, which reads as follows: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to sub-section (2) of section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be. (4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament. 46. Section 105 of the LARR Act reveals that this Act would not apply to enactments listed in the fourth schedule and the National Highways Act, 1957 is one such Act that is included in the fourth schedule of the LARR Act. Thus, the provisions of the LARR Act, except for computation of compensation for the land acquired will not be applicable to the land acquired under the Highways Act. The exclusion contemplated in the fourth schedule read with Section 105 is one of the salient features of the LARR Act, the petitioners grievance therefore has no merit. 47. The provisions of the LARR Act would not therefore be attracted specially since the Highways Act finds place in the fourth schedule which provides for exclusion of enactments that would apply in the facts of the case. It is further seen that prior to vesting of the land, surveys were carried on and it is only after the DPR consultant has so opined that notifications would be given effect to. The DPR consultant has identified the road. 48. We are also unable to accept the petitioners' submission that the alternative routes proposed by the petitioners and as reflected in the Google Earth Map that is been produced before us ought to be chosen instead of the approved route. The submission of Mr. Costa Frias, Mr. Pai and Mr. Desai on this aspect also will not help. We have already considered the fact that choosing an alternative route would put other people in the same position as that of the petitioners, namely, acquisition of other lands would entail similar inconvenience and disputes. The submission of Mr. Costa Frias, Mr. Pai and Mr. Desai on this aspect also will not help. We have already considered the fact that choosing an alternative route would put other people in the same position as that of the petitioners, namely, acquisition of other lands would entail similar inconvenience and disputes. It is not as if that the lands have been sought to be acquired without payment of compensation. The compensation payable under the LARR Act would be so paid and the public notice issued has so provided. We do not find any breach of the provisions of the Highways Act and indeed none have brought to our notice. The grounds of lack of permission from the Command Area Development Board is also not material since the Highways Act stands on its own feet. It is not subject to obtaining permission under Section 19 and notifications under the Highways Act are not subservient to the provisions of the GCAD Act. We have perused Section 19 of the GCAD Act, which provides as follows: 19. Consequences of notification.- Upon the sanction of the Scheme or any phase thereof by the Command Area Development Board under section 18 (hereinafter called as the ‘approved Scheme’), the following consequences shall ensue, namely:- (1) The Command Area Development Board may require any department of the Government, any statutory or corporate body controlled by the Government functioning within the area of operation of the approved Scheme to follow such directions in respect of such matters as are specified in the approved Scheme. (2) All development plans relating to land development drawn by any department of the Government or any local or statutory authority or body or any corporation controlled by the Government shall be intimated to the CAD Board and shall be executed with its approval and subject to such modifications or changes, if any, as the CAD Board may suggest and also subject to such directions as the CAD Board may give. 49. From a fair reading of this, it is clear that only development work be carried on without such clearance from the Board. The vesting of the land in the Central Government upon acquisition is not subject to any clearance from the Board that would be if at all a subsequent event. 49. From a fair reading of this, it is clear that only development work be carried on without such clearance from the Board. The vesting of the land in the Central Government upon acquisition is not subject to any clearance from the Board that would be if at all a subsequent event. The petitioners believe that prior permission of the GCAD Board is required for the road and the petitioners have so contended in paragraph 20 of the Petition. The absence of the approval of the Board therefore, in our view, cannot prevent the vesting of land. Once the land vests, it is for the authority to consider the implications of the GCAD Act. 50. As regards the requirements of the Highways Act, we find no reason to dislodge the proposed acquisition on the basis that the proposed road terminates at the Airport and therefore it is not a highway. The Act is intended to provide for access via national highways including all roads running through the length and breadth of the country and the proposed road would certainly provide access to NH-166S. The nomenclature of the link road as NH-166S need not in our view lead to the conclusion that such nomenclature is bad in law. This link road is absolutely essential, a fact that the petitioners themselves have recognized in having recommended alternative routes over other lands. What remains to be seen is whether NH-166S through the present route would be appropriate and in that behalf, it is not for this Court to consider the viability of the route. That is best left to the expertise of the DPR consultant. In our view, despite of the reply having disclosed that the DPR consultant have carried out a survey and have carried out their obligations under the Highways Act, the petitioners have not rejoined to this contention. 51. Nothing has been shown to us to indicate that the DPR consultants have not carried out the requisite survey and therefore, we must reject the contentions of the petitioners that the acquisition proposed and the construction proposed is bad in law for want of assessment by the DPR Consultant. We find no reason to hold the respondents action as being infused with any malice either. The LARR Act is being followed to the extent it relates to payment of compensation thereunder. We find no reason to hold the respondents action as being infused with any malice either. The LARR Act is being followed to the extent it relates to payment of compensation thereunder. The identification of the land and the proposed acquisition and the public hearing and the other social economic impact assessment is not something that the Highways Act is concerned with. The Highways Act clearly provides in Section 3-C for an enquiry and that enquiry has been carried out. 52. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that proposed NH-166S is not a highway because it merely leads to the Airport terminal and facilitates transportation of men and materials to the Airport and back. In other words, it does not go beyond the Airport and therefore, cannot be termed as a “highway”. In our view, the interpretation placed by Mr. Costa Frias though attractive, cannot be accepted for the reason that the Highways Act contemplates declaration of State roads as National highways. The creation of a State road for the purpose of access to National highway would also include roads which connect to arterial roads which run through the length and breadth of the country. Thus, the effect of accepting the petitioners' contentions qua the professed need to proceed under the LARR Act for the purpose of acquisition of the link road would entail that part of the acquisition would be under the LARR Act and probably a different part under the Highways Act. This could lead to an incongruous situation whereby part of the land to be acquired would have to follow the detailed provision of the LARR Act and could result in various impediments in concluding work of what is otherwise recognized as an important project and a project that has now been on-stream for a long time. The petitioners' objections are not to the construction of the Airport or the need to provide a proper link road, but restricted to what alludes to be a motive inasmuch as they do not wish their lands which they claim to be acquired but have no objection in third party's land being acquired. This notion that the petitioners carry and with which they have approached the Court militates against all the fundamentals which they have sought to canvas in these Petitions. This notion that the petitioners carry and with which they have approached the Court militates against all the fundamentals which they have sought to canvas in these Petitions. These fundamentals are that an environmental impact assessment has not been carried out, the Manual of Guidelines has not been followed, that they have been cultivating the land as tenants for more than essentially and that the construction of road would result in wanton destruction of flora and fauna and land used for cultivation. If an alternate route is chosen the very same result would be faced by those persons who are living in such alternate areas. 53. We also find that the Supreme Court has in Kushala Shetty (supra) observed that the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot make a roving inquiry to fish out material and draw a dubious conclusion that decisions of the authorities are tainted with malafides. In the instant case, there are no allegations on malafides as contemplated in law. For instance, the petitioners do not allege that the action impugned has been taken with the intention of damaging interests of the petitioners or with the intention of helping some other parties or any vested interests. On the other hand, the case as it has proceeded and as has been canvassed before us is that the petitioners' land ought not to be acquired, but the authorities were free to acquire “some other lands”. This obviously overlooks the effect of such alternate acquisition upon persons claiming such other lands. 54. It is on record that the properties in question are being used as grazing ground for cows, collection of firewood. The other objection that the road is only 8 kilometres long and therefore, the respondents ought not to acquire 46.6693 hectares of land is not justified does not find favour with us. The petitioners having contended that the proposed NH-166S cannot be termed as a highway since it is a small stretch of land from NH-66 to the Mopa Airport and therefore, falls foul also need not engage us in any detailed study since the Supreme Court in Project Director, Project Implementation Unit Vs. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Others (2021) 3 SCC 572 observed that the expression “highway” is not defined in the National Highways Act. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Others (2021) 3 SCC 572 observed that the expression “highway” is not defined in the National Highways Act. In paragraph 59, the Court set out various meanings of the term highway as per Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon (2nd Edition), Halsbury's Laws of England (Volume 16, para 1), P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (6th Edition), R. ex rel Johnson Vs. Johansen, Words and Phrases Legally Defined (2nd Edition, Volume 11) and eventually concluded in paragraph 62 that the Central Government whilst exercising power under Section 2(2) of the Highways Act creates a right in the locals of the area concerned to pass and repass along a highway from one marked town or inhabited place to another. Such highway is dedicated for the ordinary and reasonable user of the road as a national highway, but also with the the Central Government is fully competent to notify “any land” (not necessarily an existing road/highway) for acquisition, to construct a highway to be a national highway and this precisely what the Central Government has contemplated while deciding to construct NH-166S. This concern of the petitioners must also stand answered. 55. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Another Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (1997) 1 SCC 134 also is material inasmuch as the construction of the Airport and the operationalization of the Airport being inevitable, it is obvious that a proper access is also inevitable. The access would have to be linked to the arterial road such as NH-66 in the facts at hand. The power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution being discretionary, we have weighed all pros and cons. The authorities appear to have considered the necessary criteria including the public interest versus private interest aspect and have come to the conclusion that the land proposed is required to be acquired. We find no reason to take a different view and in conclusion, we believe that the law of the land has been followed to the extent applicable and the challenges in this Petition cannot succeed. 56. As a result, we pass the following order: (a) Writ Petition (Filing) Nos. 1119/2021, 1128/2021, 1127/2021 and 1149/2021 are dismissed. (b) Civil Application (Filing) No. 1660/2021 in Writ Petition (Filing) No. 1149/2021 stands disposed. (c) No orders to costs. (d) Interim protections, if any, stands vacated. (e) Rule is discharged. No orders to costs.

Pratap Yeshwant Kanolkar v. State of Goa, Through the Chief Secretary