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2022 DIGILAW 1095 (JHR)

Naresh Prasad, son of late Ramnarayan Prasad v. Jharkhand Gramin Bank through its Chairman

2022-09-01

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2022
ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellant who is the writ petitioner suffered the order dated 18th July 2012 of removal from service passed by the Chairman, Jharkhand Gramin Bank. 2. The aforesaid order of punishment was affirmed by the appellate authority vide an order dated 5th December 2012. 3. These orders were challenged by the appellant in WP(S) No. 6628 of 2013, without success. 4. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant, an employee of the respondent Bank, while posted at Brambay branch in the capacity of Clerk-cum-Cashier was served the charge memo dated 31st December 2009. The charge against him is that on 12th December 2008 he reported late for duty so the Audit Officer could not open and verify the cash balance in the morning. However, at 11:05 AM, on verification of the cash balance it was found that cash was short by Rs.33,470/-. The actual cash in the vault was Rs.2,44,567/-whereas the closing balance of cash as per Daily Cash Balance Book of 11th December 2008 was Rs. 2,78,037/-. It was further found during the verification that denominations of cash in the Bank varied from the denominations as per Daily Cash Balance Book. 5. The appellant filed his reply and denied the charges levelled against him but a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. At one stage, an application dated 11th October 2010 was filed for change of the Enquiring Officer who, according to the appellant, was biased against him. However, the Enquiring Officer was not changed and by the letter dated 21st October 2010 the appellant was intimated that the Enquiring Officer has been advised to proceed fairly. 6. Thereafter the enquiry proceeding was further conducted by the same Enquiring Officer and the enquiry report dated 7th January 2011 was submitted by him. The appellant objected to the enquiry report through representation dated 19th January 2011 on the ground that the enquiry was concluded without affording him an opportunity to produce his witnesses and without supplying documents to him. 7. The disciplinary authority reopened the enquiry and directed the Enquiring Officer to re-start the enquiry, in which the appellant did not participate. Finally, a second enquiry report dated 3rd November 2011 was submitted in which the charge has been found to be proved against the appellant. 7. The disciplinary authority reopened the enquiry and directed the Enquiring Officer to re-start the enquiry, in which the appellant did not participate. Finally, a second enquiry report dated 3rd November 2011 was submitted in which the charge has been found to be proved against the appellant. The disciplinary authority vide order dated 18th July 2012 passed an order of removal from service which, as noticed above, was upheld by the appellate authority. 8. Aggrieved with the aforementioned orders, the appellant filed WP(S) No. 6628 of 2013. 9. The writ Court observed that, even if the plea raised on behalf of the delinquent employee that cheques for Rs. 23,000/-and 10,000/-were presented and encashed is accepted, the shortage of Rs.470/-remained unexplained. 10. In the aforesaid background, the writ Court has held as under: “6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, this Court finds that the allegations against the petitioner are very serious in nature. It is also noted that during verification, the denomination of actual cash was found varied from that of the cash in the Daily Cash Balance Book. Even if the arguments of the petitioner, so far as Rs.33,000/-is concerned, is accepted, there is no explanation with respect to Rs. 470/-. Further, looking to the way enquiry has been conducted, viz. on intervention of the authority of the Bank, enquiry was reopened wherein the petitioner chose not to participate, it cannot be said that there is violation of principles of natural justice. The second show cause was also issued, to which the petitioner filed his reply and taking into consideration all the documents and discussing entire aspects of the matter in detail, the Disciplinary Authority had passed the order of removal of the petitioner from service. The Appellate Authority has also passed the order after discussing all the related facts and it appears that there is application of mind on behalf of the Appellate Authority. Therefore, as a cumulative effect of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, this writ petition fails. ” 11. The first challenge by the appellant to the writ Court's order dated 14th August 2019 is based on breach of the rules of natural justice in conducting the departmental enquiry. 12. Therefore, as a cumulative effect of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, this writ petition fails. ” 11. The first challenge by the appellant to the writ Court's order dated 14th August 2019 is based on breach of the rules of natural justice in conducting the departmental enquiry. 12. Under Regulation 2(i) of the Jharkhand Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2006, the competent authority for the officers of the Bank is the Chairman and for other employees the competent authority shall be the officer designated by the Chairman of the Bank. Under Regulation 3, classification of the officers and employees has been made, in terms of which, the appellant shall fall under Group-B and not under Group-A which refers to the Officers' Cadre. Under Regulation 5, the appointment authority of the Clerical Cadre shall be the General Manager of the Bank who, in fact, issued show cause notice to the appellant but the charge memorandum dated 31st December 2009 was issued by the Chairman who passed the order of removal from service on 18th July 2012. 13. On such facts, a plea of bias against the disciplinary authority has been taken by the appellant. However, we do not find any substance in this plea. There is no bar in serving of the charge memorandum by the disciplinary authority rather this is the proper procedure in a domestic enquiry. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant refers to the departmental proceeding dated 16th July 2010 to put forth a plea that the appellant was not afforded opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the documents which could have probabilized his defence were not supplied to him. Above all, a re-enquiry was conducted by the same Enquiring Officer who submitted a similar report holding the charge proved against the appellant. 15. Before the Enquiring Officer, the appellant gave a list of seven documents which, according to him, were necessary to put forth his defence against the charge memorandum dated 31st December 2009. The proceeding dated 16th July 2010 in the departmental enquiry records objection of the presenting officer to the demand of documents by the appellant. With respect to the documents at serial Nos. 1 to 5, such objection was sustained by the Enquiring Officer holding that those documents are irrelevant. The proceeding dated 16th July 2010 in the departmental enquiry records objection of the presenting officer to the demand of documents by the appellant. With respect to the documents at serial Nos. 1 to 5, such objection was sustained by the Enquiring Officer holding that those documents are irrelevant. Thereafter the departmental proceeding against the appellant continued and 2nd enquiry report dated 3rd November 2011 held the charge as per the charge sheet (ME1) proved against the appellant. 16. As noticed above, the objections raised by the appellant regarding non-supply of documents and denial of opportunity to him to produce witnesses were accepted by the disciplinary authority and 1st enquiry report dated 7th January 2011 was not accepted. 17. Proviso to explanation C to Regulation 38 of the Regulation provides that a delinquent Bank employee shall be provided opportunity to defend himself. 18. A glance at the documents listed in the proceeding dated 16th July 2010 which include Circular of the Bank relating to carrying cash outside the Bank, Vouchers for 11th and 12th December 2008 and Ledger folio for 11th and 12th December 2008 do not appear to be irrelevant. These documents pertained to transactions in the Bank on 11th and 12th December 2008 which is the relevant period as regards imputations of misconduct against the appellant. The appellant has put forth a plea that there were transactions in the Bank on 12th December 2008 which needed to be verified. For proving his defence about encashment of two cheques of Rs.33,000/-and mutilated cash of Rs.470/-, the demand by the appellants of the aforementioned documents could not have been rejected. Moreover, at this stage, the Enquiring Officer could not have held those documents irrelevant. 19. In “State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha” (2010) 2 SCC 772 , the departmental enquiry was quashed on the ground that the essential documents were not supplied to the delinquent officer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when a departmental enquiry is conducted against a government employee, it cannot be treated as a casual exercise and procedural fairness is to be shown while conducting the enquiry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/ disciplinary authority/ Government. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/ disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.” 20. The allegation of bias against the Enquiring Officer made by the appellant was not accepted by the disciplinary authority and the departmental proceeding against the appellant continued/re-started, which was continued by the same Enquiring Officer. He submitted 2nd enquiry report dated 3rd November 2011 holding the charge against the appellant proved and on that basis the punishment of removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under regulation 39(2)(b) of the Jharkhand Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2010 was passed against the appellant. This is an admitted position that 2nd enquiry report was submitted not because there was any technical error in 1st enquiry report. This is an admitted position that 2nd enquiry report was submitted not because there was any technical error in 1st enquiry report. Rather, accepting objection of the appelant, 1st enquiry report was not accepted by the disciplinary authority. 21. Therefore, what further vitiates the entire departmental proceeding is continuance of the departmental proceeding against the appellant – a sort of second enquiry; by the same Enquiring Officer. This is not the law that on mere allegation of bias the disciplinary authority is obliged in law to remove the Enquiring Officer. The allegation of bias against the Enquiring Officer must be founded on some act or omission of the Enquiring Officer during conduct of the departmental proceeding. This is also a well settled proposition that the act or omission on the basis of which allegation of bias is made need not be actuated with malice and even bona fide act or omission on the part of the Enquiring Officer may cause prejudice to the delinquent government employee. 22. The disciplinary authority has recorded in his order dated 18th July 2012 that on the objection raised by the appellant, the departmental proceeding against him was re-opened. It is a matter of record that while awarding punishment of removal from service the disciplinary authority did not place reliance on 1st enquiry report dated 7th January 2011. Neither any dispute in this regard was raised by any party at any stage and the enquiry report dated 7th January 2011 was ignored by the Bank itself. Now if the Bank itself rejected 1st enquiry report and it is the statement of the disciplinary authority that the enquiry proceeding commenced afresh against the appellant on the objections raised by him, the imputation of bias levelled by the appellant against the Enquiring Officer must stand accepted by the disciplinary authority. 23. This requires no further enquiry or investigation into the facts of the case that the reason why 1st enquiry report dated 7th January 2011 was rejected/ignored by the Bank was the objection raised by the appellant and while so the enquiry conducted by the same Enquiring Officer pursuant to which the enquiry report dated 3rd November 2011 was submitted must be held vitiated. Any order of punishment based on such enquiry report would not retain any sanctity in law and, therefore, must be quashed. 24. Any order of punishment based on such enquiry report would not retain any sanctity in law and, therefore, must be quashed. 24. Accordingly, the order dated 14th August 2019 passed in WP(S) No. 6628 of 2013 is set-aside and the writ petition is allowed. Consequently, the punishment order dated 18th July 2012 as affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 5th December 2012 is also quashed. 25. LPA No. 727 of 2019 is allowed.