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2022 DIGILAW 1097 (KER)

Afsal L. S. S/o Latheef v. State of Kerala

2022-12-19

ALEXANDER THOMAS, SOPHY THOMAS

body2022
JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. 1. The prayers in the afore captioned Writ Petition (Criminal) seeking for issuance of writs of certiorari and Habeas Corpus in relation to the impugned order of preventively detaining the detenu under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ of Habeas Corpus to the respondents to produce the body of the detenu Sri. Ajmal, aged 27 years S/o Latheef, Kochukuttiyil Thekkethil, Parakodu (P.O.) Adoor Village, Pathanamthitta District before this Hon’ble Court and set him at liberty. (ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing Exhibits P3 and P5 orders. (iii) And grant such other and further relief, as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. (iv) dispense with the filing of the translation of vernacular documents.” 2. Heard Sri. Nireesh Mathew, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 3. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of this case are as follows. 4. The petitioner herein is the brother of the detenu. That the 3rd respondent District Police Chief (Sponsoring Authority) had submitted initial report dated 05.04.2022 and a subsequent report dated 16.05.2022, recommending to the 2nd respondent (detaining authority) that, in view of the factual aspects stated therein, it is a fit case to enable the 2nd respondent to pass order under Section 3(1) of the KAAPA, so as to preventively detain the detenu concerned, as otherwise he is likely to indulge in further prejudicial activities, as envisaged in Section 2(a) of the Act. Thereupon, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022 under Section 3(1) of the Act, whereby it has been ordered that, in view of the factual aspects stated therein, the 2nd respondent is satisfied that the said order dated 18.06.2022 should be issued, with a view to prevent the detenu from committing further anti-social activities. It is the case of the respondents that copy of Ext.P3 detention order, alongwith all the relevant records, were forthwith transmitted to the 1st respondent State Government. Ext.P3 detention order was executed on 02.07.2022. Ext.P3 was approved by the 1st respondent State Government on 14.07.2022. Thereafter, the 1st respondent State Government has forwarded the matter for the considered opinion of the Advisory Board, under Section 9 of the Act. Ext.P3 detention order was executed on 02.07.2022. Ext.P3 was approved by the 1st respondent State Government on 14.07.2022. Thereafter, the 1st respondent State Government has forwarded the matter for the considered opinion of the Advisory Board, under Section 9 of the Act. The Advisory Board has thereafter considered the matter and has given report to the 1st respondent State Government on 26.08.2022 stating that, in view of the aspects stated therein, there is sufficient cause for the preventive detention of the detenu. Later, the 1st respondent State Government has issued Ext.P5 order dated 30.08.2022, confirming Ext.P3 detention order. There is no dispute that the various statutory timelines in the Act as in Section 3(3) for forthwith communicating the detention order with records to the State Government, the 5 days time limit in Section 7(2) for communicating grounds of detention to the detenu, 12 days time limit under Section 3(3) for approval of the detention order by the State Government after excluding public holidays, 3 weeks time limit under Section 9(1) for placing the matter before the Advisory Board from the date of detention, 9 weeks time limit under Section 10(1) for submission of Advisory Board’s report etc have been followed in this case. 7 crimes have been reckoned by the 2nd respondent detaining authority in the issuance of Ext.P3 detention order. The details of the said 7 crimes are given in Ext.P3 detention order as well as in paragraph 6 on pages 5 to 8 of the counter affidavit dated 08.12.2022, filed by the 1st respondent State Government in this case. There are no factual disputes regarding the allegations in those 7 crimes, so there is no necessity to reiterate the same. So also, there is no dispute that, going by the details of the said 7 crimes, the detenu would satisfy the definitional parameters of ‘known rowdy’ as per Section 2(p)(iii) read with Section 2(t) of the Act. 5. Three contentions have been urged by the counsel for the petitioner to support his argument that the impugned Ext.P3 detention order is liable for judicial interdiction. The first contention is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention in terms of Ext.P3 detention order has been rightly snapped, in view of the inordinate and unexplained delay as between the last prejudicial activity (06.04.2022) and Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022. 6. The first contention is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention in terms of Ext.P3 detention order has been rightly snapped, in view of the inordinate and unexplained delay as between the last prejudicial activity (06.04.2022) and Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022. 6. The second ground is that the sufficiency or otherwise of the bail contentions of the bail order granted in respect of the 6th crime has not been considered by the 2nd respondent detaining authority in the issuance of Ext.P3 detention order and therefore the decision making process is vitiated. 7. The 3rd and the last ground urged by the petitioner is that the detenu was already in judicial custody in regard to his involvement in the 7th crime since 15.04.2022, which is even before the issuance of Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022. Further that, the 2nd respondent detaining authority has not considered all the relevant aspects, as to why the preventive detention order is still highly necessary and imperative, though, the detenu was already under judicial remand since 15.04.2022. Hence, it is urged that the impugned order is liable for interdiction on this ground as well. 8. These contentions of the petitioner have been strongly opposed by the learned Prosecutor. Instead of dealing with the details of the respective rival pleas, we propose to deal with each of these contentions. Contention A 9. The first contention is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity (06.04.2022) and the purpose of detention, as per Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022, has been rightly snapped, as there is inordinate and unreasonable delay as between 06.04.2022 (last prejudicial activity) and 18.06.2022 (date of issuance of detention order at Ext.P3). 10. In the instant case, the 6th crime out of the 7 cases have been registered against the detenu on 05.02.2022 and he was arrested and released on bail in the 6th case on 06.02.2022. The sponsoring authority had given their 1st report on 05.04.2022. On the same day (05.04.2022) as the date of sponsoring agency’s report, the detenu has committed the 7th crime out of the 7 cases, i.e. on 05.04.2022 and the said crime incident has been registered as an FIR on 06.04.2022. 11. The sponsoring authority had given their 1st report on 05.04.2022. On the same day (05.04.2022) as the date of sponsoring agency’s report, the detenu has committed the 7th crime out of the 7 cases, i.e. on 05.04.2022 and the said crime incident has been registered as an FIR on 06.04.2022. 11. Taking note of these aspects, the 3rd respondent Sponsoring has given an additional report to the detaining authority on 16.05.2022, and gave the details of the 7th crime as well. This is so, as the 1st report of the detaining authority given on 05.04.2022, has mentioned only about the 6 crimes committed by the detenu till then, as the 7th crime was registered only on the next day, on 06.04.2022. After getting the additional report of the Sponsoring agency on 16.05.2022 and after consideration of various aspects, the 2nd respondent has passed Ext.P3 detention order on 18.06.2022. 12. The Division Bench of this Court in decisions as in Rahila Nazeer vs. State of Kerala, 2016 (2) KLT 838 , Vishnuja vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2018 (1) KLT 978 etc. has considered the impact of the issue of snapping of live link as between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. It has been held that, what is most relevant is to assess as to whether the delay or the time taken between the date of registration of the last crime up to the date of issuance of the detention order is inordinate and unexplained and that if the delay in that regard is duly and properly explained, then it cannot be said that the live link has been lost. In Rahila Nazeer’s case (supra) paragraph 12 thereof, the Division Bench has held that there could be varied reasons in that regard and for instance, if the person concerned is in judicial custody and if there is likelihood of his being released shortly, then the detaining authority may stay its chance for a short while and think of passing an order of detention, subsequent to the release of the person concerned and that it is not necessary that the person concerned should commit another crime after the expiry of his judicial custody, in order to enable the detaining authority to pass an order of detention. In Vishnuja’s case supra, the Division Bench dealt with a case where the last prejudicial activity was on 28.08.2016. In Vishnuja’s case supra, the Division Bench dealt with a case where the last prejudicial activity was on 28.08.2016. Therein, the detenu was arrested in connection with the said last case and he was in judicial custody and he was enlarged on bail only on 18.11.2016. Prior thereto, Section 107 Cr.P.C. proceedings was initiated against him, in which he had executed a bond on 03.05.2016. It was after executing the said bond that the detenue got involved in the last crime. The sponsoring authority gave its report in the matter on 27.03.2017. Bail order could be secured by a detenu in this case on 18.11.2016 and it is thereafter that the sponsoring authority has given their report on 23.07.2017, which led to the issuance of the impugned detention order in that case on 02.05.2017. This Court held in paragraph 13 to 15 of Vishnuja’s case supra, as follows: “13. There is no doubt that that last prejudicial activity alleged against Shri Aneesh was committed on 28.08.2016. However, it is also to be noted that he was immediately thereafter taken into judicial custody and that he was enlarged on bail only on 18.11.2016. Obviously, the police Authorities have been investigating the crime and such proceedings would certainly take some time to be proceeded and concluded as per the law. The issue, in such perspective, is whether the request made by the District Police Chief, (Rural), Thiruvananthapuram to detain Shri Aneesh under the Preventive Detention, initiated through his letter dated 27.03.2017, was too much delayed so as to snap its live link with the prejudicial activity alleged against him. 14. We see that a counter affidavit has been placed on record by the first respondent-State of Kerala offering their explications as to how and why this delay was occasioned. The specific asserverations in this regard is available in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, which we deem it apposite to extract, so as to enable its reading as pleaded: “10. The last crime committed by the detenue was on 28.08.2016. The detenue was arrested in connection with this crime and he was in judicial custody till he was enlarged on bail on 18.11.2016. A proceedings u/s.107 Cr.P.C. has been initiated against the detenue in which he had executed a bond on 03.05.2016. It was after execution of the bond that the detenu got involved in the last crime. The detenue was arrested in connection with this crime and he was in judicial custody till he was enlarged on bail on 18.11.2016. A proceedings u/s.107 Cr.P.C. has been initiated against the detenue in which he had executed a bond on 03.05.2016. It was after execution of the bond that the detenu got involved in the last crime. It is true that the proposal was made by the sponsoring authority only on 27.03.2017. The delay for submitting the proposal was that sponsoring authority was collecting materials regarding the involvement of the detenue in the criminal cases which are in plenty and are covering three police station limits. It is submitted that Sponsoring authority had taken adequate measures to control the criminal activities of the detenu. Despite these, the detenu continued his criminal activities including robbery, murder, attempt to commit murder and house breaking etc. In such circumstances the detaining authority had no other option, but to invoke the provisions of the Act. The proposal was made by the sponsoring authority only after it was satisfied that the detenue could not be expected to be controlled or his anti-social activities prevented through ordinary, constabulary or magisterial procedures like proceedings u/s,107 Cr.P.C. The proposal of the Sponsoring authority culminated in the detention order dared 02.05.2017 which was duly executed on 06.05.2017. 15. We are satisfied with the explanation offered by the competent Authorities in the counter affidavit and going by the specific pleadings as above extracted, we do not think that the so called delay of three months occasioned after the petitioner's husband was released from jail on bail will be sufficient ground to release him or to question Ext.P4 order, especially in view of the two precedents that we have already referred to above.” 13. Taking note of these aspects, the Division Bench held that the delay, as between the last prejudicial activity and the date of issuance of the impugned detention order, has been satisfactorily explained. In the instant case, the delay involved is much less. The last prejudicial activity has been committed on 06.04.2022. In the instant case, the sponsoring agency gave their report on 05.04.2022. We are dealing with the cases till then, i.e. upto the 6th crime. The last crime in this case was committed on 05.04.2022. In the instant case, the delay involved is much less. The last prejudicial activity has been committed on 06.04.2022. In the instant case, the sponsoring agency gave their report on 05.04.2022. We are dealing with the cases till then, i.e. upto the 6th crime. The last crime in this case was committed on 05.04.2022. It is after submission of the first report of the sponsoring authority on 05.04.2022 about the 6 cases till then that the accused has committed the 7th crime on 05.04.2022. The detenu was arrested in the 7th case on 15.04.2022. The sponsoring authority gave the additional report on 16.05.2022. It is thereafter that Ext.P3 detention order has been passed on 18.06.2022. The time taken between the registration of the 7th and the last crime (06.04.2022) and Ext.P3 detention order dated 18.06.2022 is 2 months and 12 days. The time taken between the 2nd report of the sponsoring authority (16.05.2022) upto the detention order issued on 18.06.2022 is one month and 2 days. In view of these facts and circumstances, we are of the view, that the abovesaid time factor cannot be said to be inordinate and unexplained. This is so, as the 7th crime was registered only after the submission of the first report of the sponsoring authority, so a subsequent report was really necessary, especially after the arrest of the detenu in the 7th crime on 15.04.2022. Moreover, the fact that the detenu has committed the 7th crime after the submission of the first report of the sponsoring agency, shows his proclivity to commit crimes quite repeatedly. In the light of these aspects, the explanation offered by the detaining authority broadly appears to be acceptable. Hence, the petitioner cannot succeed on the first ground. Contention B Sufficiency of the bail conditions in relation to the 6th crime. 14. In the instant case, the 6th crime was committed on 05.02.2022 and the detenu was released on bail on 06.02.2022. The fact that the detenu was released on bail in the 6th crime is specifically admitted to by the detaining authority in Ext.P3 detention order (see the top portion of page 307 of the paper book). Dealing with the similar case, the Division Bench of this Court has held in Anita Antony vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KLT 271 , paragraph no. Dealing with the similar case, the Division Bench of this Court has held in Anita Antony vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KLT 271 , paragraph no. 12, which reads as follows: “The second contention is a claim that the detenu has scrupulously followed the bail conditions in the last crime [Crime No. 460/2021 if Alappuzha North Police Station] and therefore, the subjective satisfaction to initiate proceedings under the KAA(P)A is vitiated. We cannot endorse the said submission of the learned counsel. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the last prejudicial activity reckoned by the detaining authority is the fourth crime and in all previous crimes, while being enlarged on bail, the detenu was put on similar condition that he shall not indulge in any criminal activity while on bail. This condition has been contemptuously violated by the detenu, as is established by the subsequent crimes, including the last one of the year 2021. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the compliance with the bail condition in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenu, to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is otherwise established by materials on record.” 15. Therein it has been held that the contention of the detenu therein that he had scrupulously followed the bail conditions in the last crime and therefore, the subjective satisfaction initiate proceedings under the KAA(P)A is vitiated. This Court held that the said contention is not acceptable, as the last prejudicial activity reckoned by the detaining authority in the 4th crime and in all the previous crimes by being enlarged on bail, the detenu was put on similar condition that he shall not indulge in any criminal activity while on bail and this condition has been contemptuously violated by the detenu as is established by the subsequent crimes, including the last one. Hence the Division Bench of this Court held that the compliance of the bail condition in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenue to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is otherwise established in the case on record. In the instant case also, the penultimate crime (6th crime) was committed on 05.02.2022 and the detenu had secured bail. It is thereafter that the 7th crime was committed on 05.04.2022. In the instant case also, the penultimate crime (6th crime) was committed on 05.02.2022 and the detenu had secured bail. It is thereafter that the 7th crime was committed on 05.04.2022. Hence, the contention of the petitioner, that the sufficiency of the bail conditions in relation to the 6th case has not been considered etc. cannot be accepted, inasmuch as the actual conduct of the detenu shows his proclivity to commit subsequent crimes and therefore, it shows that the bail conditions in the 6th case was not sufficient to prevent him from committing subsequent crimes. Hence, the 2nd contention of the petitioner also fails. Contention C 16. The last ground urged by the petitioner is that the detenu was already in judicial custody in the 7th crime since 15.04.2022. Further that, the detaining authority has not considered in the correct perspective as to why preventive detention order in the nature of Ext.P3 was still highly necessary and imperative, even though the detenu was already in judicial remand in the 7th case. The legal position in this regard is well settled in various decisions of the Apex Court as in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat vs. Union of India and Others, 1990 (1) SCC 746 paragraph 21 which reads as follows: “The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression “compelling reasons” in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 17. In UOI and Another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad, the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 35 and 36 as follows: 35. In the light of the well-settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority: (i) that the detenu is in custody; (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenues have been rejected by the Court. Of course, in the detention orders, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released.” It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenue's likelihood of being released on bail” and “if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities.” But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedent of the detenues and its satisfaction that detenues Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar have the high propensity to commit such offences in future. 36. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail and on being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In Senthamilselvi vs. State of T.N. and Another, (2006) 5 SCC 676 : 2006 AIR SCW 4648, the Supreme Court held that the satisfaction of the authority coming to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail is the “subjective satisfaction” based on the materials and normally the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 18. In UOI vs. Ankit Ashok Jalan, 2020 (16) SCC 185 , the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 10 and 11 as follows: “10. detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 18. In UOI vs. Ankit Ashok Jalan, 2020 (16) SCC 185 , the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 10 and 11 as follows: “10. Now, so far as the first ground on which the detention orders have been set aside, namely, there is a clear lapse and failure on the part of the detaining authority, to examine and consider the germane and relevant question relating to imminent possibility of detenus being granted bail while recording its subjective satisfaction and passing the detention orders is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that in paragraph 7, the detaining authority observed and stated as under: 7. I am aware that you, i.e. Sri. Ashok Kumar Jalan are in judicial custody at present at Presidency Correctional Home, Alipore, Kolkatta. However, there is an immediate possibility of your release from judicial custody and if you are released on bail, you are likely to continue to indulge in the prejudicial activities and therefore, there is a need to issue a detention order against you under the COFE POSA Act, 1974 with a view to prevent you from smuggling of gold and foreign currency. 11. As per catena of decisions of this Court, even if a person is in judicial custody, he can be detained under the relevant provisions of the Act concerned, like the COFE POSA Act, etc. However, there must be a proper application of mind and the detaining authority must have been subjectively satisfied on considering the relevant materials that there is a reason to believe that there is a real possibility of detenus being released on bail and that on being so released and detenus will in all possibility indulge in prejudicial activities. However, there must be a proper application of mind and the detaining authority must have been subjectively satisfied on considering the relevant materials that there is a reason to believe that there is a real possibility of detenus being released on bail and that on being so released and detenus will in all possibility indulge in prejudicial activities. In the recent decision, this Court in Dimple Happy Dhakad had an occasion to consider the abovesaid aspect and after considering the decisions of this Court in Kamarunnissa, Union of India vs. Paul Manikam, Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur, Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat vs. Union of India and Veeramani, this Court observed and held (i) that the order of detention validly can be passed against a person in custody and for that purpose, it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was already in custody; (ii) That the detaining authority must be further satisfied that the detenu is likely to be released from custody and the nature of activities of the detenu indicate that if he is released, he is likely to indulge in such prejudicial activities and therefore, it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities; (iii) The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail and on being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities with the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.” 19. In other words, the order of preventive detention can be validly passed against a person who is already in judicial custody and for that purpose, it is necessary that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention and that there are compelling reasons justifying such preventive detention, though he is already in judicial custody and in that regard, the detaining authority should have some cogent materials to hold that it is satisfied that the detenu is likely to be released from custody, in the near future and that taking into account, the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, he is likely, after his release from such custody, to indulge in further prejudicial activities and therefore, it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities etc. In the instant case, it is stated, in internal page no. 6 of grounds of detention attached to Ext.P3 detention order, that the detaining authority was aware of the registration of the 7th crime and that he was already remanded to judicial custody since 15.04.2022. Thereafter, the further paragraph therein reads as follows: [See page 311 and 312 of the paper book of this W.P. (Crl)]. 20. A reading of the said provision would make it clear that the detaining authority has taken the view that though, the detenu was then continuing in judicial remand, it is very likely for him to secure bail in that case and that if he is released on bail, then he would be a menace and threat for peace loving people, in view of his proclivity to commit such prejudicial activities. Hence, we are of the view that the necessary parameters, for ordering preventive detention of a detenu, who is already in judicial custody, has been satisfied in this case. The sufficiency or otherwise of the subjective satisfaction in that regard is not justiciable in judicial review. Hence, we are constrained to overrule the 3rd contention of the petitioner as well. 21. The last contention urged by the petitioner is that the 7th crime was ultimately quashed by this Court, as the matter was settled between the detenu and the defacto complainant therein on the ground that the defecto complainant has initially given the complaint on the basis of some mistake of fact. 21. The last contention urged by the petitioner is that the 7th crime was ultimately quashed by this Court, as the matter was settled between the detenu and the defacto complainant therein on the ground that the defecto complainant has initially given the complaint on the basis of some mistake of fact. The issue in that regard is no longer res integra and that it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court, in cases as in Vijayamma and Others vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2014 (4) KLT 563 paragraph 4, that merely because the subject crimes have been quashed by this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. subsequently, is no ground to hold that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing the preventive detention order by reckoning such crimes will stand vitiated. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Vijayamma’s case (supra) has been relied on by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 15 of Stenny Aleyamma Saju vs. State of Kerala, 2017 (3) KLT 676 (FB) and it has been held therein that even acquittal or discharge of an accused subsequently cannot be the ground to hold that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to issue preventive detention order by reckoning such crimes, will be vitiated. 22. Hence, we are constrained to overrule the last contention of the petitioner as well. In other words, the petitioner has not made out any successful grounds in judicial review in this case. The writ petition stands accordingly dismissed.