ORDER : Sri.Vilas Ranganath Datar., learned counsel for petitioner and Sri.Prashanth.B.K., learned counsel for respondent have appeared in person. 2. The parties are referred to as per the ranking before the Labour court. 3. The brief facts of the case are stated as under: The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Painter on and from 01.07.2015. The petitioner is a Governing Council Member of the Industrial and General Workers Union. The Respondent is an industrial establishment and is carrying on manufacture of automobile parts viz., precision forging, expertise machining and customized assemblies and is the main supplier of these automobile parts to M/s.Honda Motor cycle Company Ltd, based at Narasapura Industrial Area, Kolar, that the Industrial establishment of the Respondent is located in the allocated industrial site in the industrial estate of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board at Malur. That the Respondent employer is employing more than 100 workmen. It is stated that on 14.06.2017 the petitioner was placed under suspension pending domestic enquiry alleging slow production. That the petitioner states that a charge sheet cum show cause notice was issued to him on 24.06.2017 for certain acts of misconduct and appears to have given an opportunity to submit his explanation. The Respondent engaged the services of professional lawyer Shri.Pradeep B.V., Advocate from Bengaluru to conduct the inquiry proceedings; he conducted the inquiry from 22.09.2017 and appears to have concluded the domestic inquiry in 17.05.2018. It is said that the domestic enquiry conducted was far from satisfactory and the reasonable opportunity which is required to be given to defend his case was not afforded. Hence, it is stated that it was case of victimization. The Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report on 17.8.2018. The Respondent issued second show cause notice dated 21.08.2018 calling upon the petitioner to respond, the petitioner submitted his reply dated 10.09.2018. However, without considering the same and past record, the Respondent-Employer issued the order of dismissal on 17.11.2018. It is averred that said action of the Respondent was patently mala fide exercise of power of taking disciplinary action, right from placing him under suspension, issuing charge-sheet, initiating enquiry and passing final order, it’s a case unfair labour, practice, victimization and discrimination per se. It is averred that said action of the Respondent was patently mala fide exercise of power of taking disciplinary action, right from placing him under suspension, issuing charge-sheet, initiating enquiry and passing final order, it’s a case unfair labour, practice, victimization and discrimination per se. After passing of the final order of dismissal on 17.11.2018, the Employer invoked the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking approval of the action of dismissal of the petitioner from its service since an industrial dispute is pending in I.D.No.338/2018 before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore wherein the petitioner is also concerned workman in the said industrial dispute, claiming to have sent Rs.11,092/- (Rupees Eleven thousand ninety two only) wages being one month's wages by cheque and claiming to have complied with the provisions of the Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D.Act. That the petitioner states that the said Application came to be numbered before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore as Application No.429/2018 which is pending disposal before the said Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore. The petitioner is contesting the same. It is further averred that pending said Approval Application which may take its own time to be decided, the petitioner being aggrieved by the illegal retrenchment by way of illegal dismissal order passed on 17.11.2018, challenged the dismissal order before the jurisdictional Labour Court being Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Kolar by invoking the provisions of Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which came to be numbered as I.D.No.06/2019. After service of notice the Respondent appeared and has filed their Counter Statement. The Respondent filed an Application under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 151 of C.P.C to reject the Claim Statement filed by the petitioner on the ground that until the Approval Application pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore in Application No.429/2018 is disposed of the ID Application ought not be proceeded with by referring to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme court in JAIPUR ZILA SAHAKARI VIKAS BANK LTD. VS. SHRI.RAM GOPAL SHARMA - 2002 (2) FLR 667. VS. SHRI.RAM GOPAL SHARMA - 2002 (2) FLR 667. The petitioner who was served with copy of the said I.A. filed his reply statement to the same denying that the said I.D.No.06/2019 could be rejected merely because the Approval Application filed by the Respondent-Employer is pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore in Application No.429/2018, contending that the reference to JAIPUR ZILA's case had no application and Hon'ble Supreme Court has rendered decision in SHARMA H.D. V/S NORTHERN INDIA TEXTILE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION – 2001 (1) LLJ 1384 in this regard that Applications filed under Section 10(4-A) of I.D Act were maintainable and both the proceedings being independent of each other could be proceeded simultaneously as there is no bar to proceed with the same as the reliefs claimed are not identical. The Application I.A.No.II was heard and the Labour Court partly allowed the Application I.A.No.II vide order dated:17.03.2021 and stayed the proceedings in I.D.No.06/2019 until the disposal of Approval Application filed before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act by the Respondent - Employer for approval, in I.D.No.338/2018 holding that both the proceedings cannot be held simultaneously. It is this order which is challenged in this Writ Petition on several grounds as set out in the Memorandum of Writ Petition. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner and respondent have urged several contentions. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner has relied on the following decisions. 1. JOHN D'SOUZA Vs. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION - (2019) 18 SCC 47 . 2. JAIPUR ZILA SAHAKARI BHOOMI VIKAS BANK LTD. Vs. RAM GOPAL SHARMA AND OTHERS - (2002) 2 SCC 244 . 3. SHARMA H.D. Vs. NORTHERN INDIA TEXTILE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION & ANOTHER - 2000 I LLJ 1384. 4. RPG CABLES LIMITED Vs. SRI G.M.KULKARNI - WA NO.600/2012 (L-RES) DATED 26.11.2012. 5. MANAGEMENT OF HINDUSTAN LEVER LIMITED, DHARWAD Vs. DOOD BADSHAH BANI - 2007 (3) KAR L.J. 544. 6. ITC LIMITED Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA - ILR 1985 KAR 1459. 7. JAI BHAGWAN Vs. MANAGEMENT OF THE AMBALA CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. AND ANOTHER. (1983) 4 SCC 611 . 8. G.CHANDRASHEKAR AND OTHERS Vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF SUNRISE INDUSTRIES - WP NO.53933/2003 DATED 30.05.2008. 9. G.CHANDRASHEKAR AND OTHERS Vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF SUNRISE INDUSTRIES - W.A.NO.1179/2008 C/W W.A.NO.1160/2008 (L-TER) DATED 16.10.2009. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NEURO SCIENCES Vs. C.PARAMESWARA- (2005) 2 SCC 256 . 11. SUNIL KUMAR Vs. AND ANOTHER. (1983) 4 SCC 611 . 8. G.CHANDRASHEKAR AND OTHERS Vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF SUNRISE INDUSTRIES - WP NO.53933/2003 DATED 30.05.2008. 9. G.CHANDRASHEKAR AND OTHERS Vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF SUNRISE INDUSTRIES - W.A.NO.1179/2008 C/W W.A.NO.1160/2008 (L-TER) DATED 16.10.2009. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NEURO SCIENCES Vs. C.PARAMESWARA- (2005) 2 SCC 256 . 11. SUNIL KUMAR Vs. STATE OF HARYANA- (2012) 5 SCC 398 . 5. Learned counsel for Respondent has relied on the following decisions. 1. JAIPUR ZILLA SAHAKARI BHOOMI VIKAS BANK Vs. RAM GOPLA SHARMA AND OTHERS - AIR 2002 SC 643 . 2. ITC LIMITED Vs. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS - (1985) II LJ 430 KANT. 3. THE MANAGEMENT OF HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD Vs. DOOD BADSHSH BANI - ILR 2007 KARNATAKA 1591. 4. G. CHANDRASHEKAR AND OTHERS Vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF SUNRISE INDUSTRIES – 2008 (6) KAR L J 334. 6. Heard the contentions urged on behalf of the parties and perused the Writ papers with care. 7. The short and simple point which arises for consideration is whether the learned Judge is justified in staying the further proceedings? 8. The facts have been sufficiently stated. Suffice it to note that the issue involved in the present Writ Petition raises on important question of stay of adjudicatory proceedings pending disposal of summary action. The argument advanced is that the workman has filed Claim Statement under Section 10(4-A) for adjudication of the dispute during the pendency of Section 33 (2)(b) proceedings. It is also argued that the pendency of such proceedings is a matter to be taken into consideration, while deciding the dispute i.e., the adjudication of the main dispute. A good deal of argument was canvassed on Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Much reliance was also placed on JAIPUR ZILLA’s case. Sri.Prashanth.B.K., learned counsel for the respondent while presenting his argument strenuously urged that the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D Act. Hence, the Claim Statement filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. By way of answer to this contention, it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings under Section 10(4-A) and Section 33(2)(b) are independent of each other and they can proceed simultaneously. I have considered the rival contentions urged on behalf of respective parties with care. Hence, the Claim Statement filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. By way of answer to this contention, it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings under Section 10(4-A) and Section 33(2)(b) are independent of each other and they can proceed simultaneously. I have considered the rival contentions urged on behalf of respective parties with care. It is quite true that the workman has filed a Claim Statement filed under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D. Act and the same is pending adjudication; it is also true that the application under Section 33(2)(b) is also pending for consideration. The first argument is centered round the pendency of Section 33(2)(b) application and second argument is regarding the maintainability of the Claim Statement filed under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D Act. I find extracting the above said provisions is helpful in indicating the right approach. Hence, I may with advantage refer to Section 10(4-A) and 33(1)(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. "Section 10 (4A) -- Notwithstanding anything contained in the section 9C and in this section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of section 2A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1). Suffice it to note that Section 10(4-A) was substituted by way of amendment vide Karnataka Act 3 of 1988, sec.2 w.e.f. 7-4-1988. Section 10(4-A) provides that the individual workman concerned may file a Claim Statement. Section 33 (1) and (2) of the Act reads: SECTION 33. Suffice it to note that Section 10(4-A) was substituted by way of amendment vide Karnataka Act 3 of 1988, sec.2 w.e.f. 7-4-1988. Section 10(4-A) provides that the individual workman concerned may file a Claim Statement. Section 33 (1) and (2) of the Act reads: SECTION 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.-(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,- (a) in regard to any matter connected with dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workman concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute 3[or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied between him and the workman]- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. A reading of the above two sub-sections of Section 33 makes it clear that they are intended to be applied during the pendency of any proceeding either in the nature of conciliation proceeding or in the nature of proceeding by way of reference made under Section 10 of the Act. Section 33(1) of the Act also protects workman concerned in the main dispute which is pending conciliation or adjudication. Section 33(1) of the Act also protects workman concerned in the main dispute which is pending conciliation or adjudication. The effect of sub- section (1) is that where the conditions precedent prescribed by it are satisfied, the employer is prohibited from taking any action in regard to matters specified by clauses (a) and (b) against the workman concerned in such dispute without previous express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. In other words, in cases falling under sub-section (1), before any action can be taken by the employer to which reference is made by clauses (a) and (b), he must obtain the express permission of the specified authority. Section 33(2) of the I.D. Act proceeds to lay down a similar provision and the conditions prescribed by it are the same as those contained in Section 33(1) of the I.D Act. This proviso provides if an action is intended to be taken by an employer against any of his employees which falls within the scope of clause (b) he can do so, subject to the requirements of the proviso. If the employee is intended to be discharged or dismissed, an order can be passed by the employer against him, provided he has paid such employee the wages for one month, and he has made an application to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by him. It is settled by series of decisions of the Apex Court that the requirements of the proviso have to be satisfied by the employer on the basis that they form part of the same transaction. The employer must either pay or offer the salary of one month to the employee before passing an order of discharge or dismissal and must also apply to the specified authority for approval of his action at the same time or within reasonable time. Thereafter, if the approval is granted it takes effect from the date of the order passed by the employer and if the approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer is wholly invalid or inoperative and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment notwithstanding the order passed by the employer dismissing or discharging him. As is well known that the inquiry contemplated under Section 33(2)(b) with respect to the validity and legality of the domestic inquiry is of a very limited nature. It can disregard the findings entered by the inquiry officer only if they are perverse. It is a summary proceeding to inquire into the domestic inquiry. Under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Authorities specified therein can only grant or withhold the permission. In other words, the said authorities can lift the ban or maintain the ban. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act has not conferred on the authorities any general power of adjudication of dispute between the parties. The only limited power conferred is to lift the ban or to maintain a ban. No machinery is also provided to enforce the order made under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Even after the approval is given it is open to the workman concerned to raise a dispute concerning his discharge or dismissal and approach the Government with a request to refer the dispute under Section 10 of the Act for adjudication. It is relevant to note that by virtue of Section 10(4-A), the workman concerned may also file a Claim Statement for adjudication of the dispute. This, I think, makes it clear that the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act are taken on an application by the employer for approval of the action taken by him. Those proceedings are not adjudication proceedings on a reference under Section 10 of the Act or on a Claim Statement filed by the workman concerned under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D Act. Therefore, it follows that an application made by an employer under Section 33(2)(b) for approval must be dealt with according to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. No change has been effected in that section by amending the Act. Even in cases where no inquiry has been held by the employer before passing an order of dismissal or discharge it is open to him to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal in justification of the action taken. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act only imposes a ban. Even in cases where no inquiry has been held by the employer before passing an order of dismissal or discharge it is open to him to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal in justification of the action taken. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act only imposes a ban. An order of dismissal or discharge even with the approval of the Tribunal can form the subject of a dispute and as such referred under Section 10 of the Act for adjudication vide THE WORKMEN OF M/S FIRESTONE TYRE AND RUBBER CO. OF INDIA (PVT.) LTD. Vs. THE MANAGEMENT AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1973 SCC 1227. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention urged on behalf of the Respondent - Management. It is therefore, clear that the scope of inquiry on a reference under Section 10 and a Claim Statement under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is much wider. In both the cases, the Tribunal/Court adjudicates the dispute. The decision of the Tribunal/Court is binding on the parties and is executable. That apart, the Tribunal/Court can substitute its own finding even if the charges are proved or alter the punishment. But in proceedings on an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal can only lift or maintain ban imposed on the employer. As already noted above the Tribunal is not vested with general power of adjudication of the dispute between the parties. It is needless to say that it is open for the workman concerned to raise a dispute with reference to his discharge or dismissal and request the Government to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act or to file a Claim Statement under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D Act. The Government is therefore competent to refer such dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Act notwithstanding the fact that the employer’s application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act for approval is pending before the Tribunal. At the same time, the Court is also competent to adjudicate the Claim Statement filed by the workman concerned during the pendency of Section 33(2)(b) application. At the same time, the Court is also competent to adjudicate the Claim Statement filed by the workman concerned during the pendency of Section 33(2)(b) application. In my view, grant of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act does not conclude the dispute and the parties would be free to seek reference under Section 10 of the Act and the workman concerned is free to file a claim statement under Section 10 (4-A) of the I.D. Act. The scope and object of proceedings under Section 10, 10(4-A) and Section 33(2)(b) of the Act are different. The distinction between Section 10, 10(4-A) and 33(2)(b) is clearly marked. The former is adjudicatory in nature; the latter is summary in nature. The distinction is as it is definite, for it casts a duty on the respective Courts and Tribunals to distinguish the basic distinction/difference and proceed in the matter. I must add a word here that an understanding of the distinction is important. In proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the ban imposed on the employer can only be removed or maintained. No other order can be made or relief given by the authorities in those proceedings. Even if the ban is lifted, the dispute is not finally settled and the employer can request for reference under Section 10 of the Act. The law is also settled by the Apex Court. The Apex Court in SHARMA H.D. VS NORTHERN INDIA TEXTILE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER reported in 2000 (1) LLJ 1384 has held that the scope of proceedings under the two provisions is substantially different. Hence, it can be safely be held that separate rights, remedies and protections provided are different. In the present case, the Respondent moved an application under Section 11 of the I.D Act read with Section 151 of CPC to stay further proceedings on the ground that Section 33(2)(b) application is pending consideration before the Tribunal. The Court stayed its own proceedings. I may venture to say that the Court has failed to have regard to relevant considerations and disregarded relevant matters. The power is not conferred on the Court to stay its own proceedings which powers generally are conferred on the Civil Court while exercising it under Section 10 of CPC. In my considered opinion, the order passed by the Court is unsustainable in law. The power is not conferred on the Court to stay its own proceedings which powers generally are conferred on the Civil Court while exercising it under Section 10 of CPC. In my considered opinion, the order passed by the Court is unsustainable in law. Hence the contention with regard to pendency of Approval Application is satisfactorily hopeless. Consequently, the theory of applying the pendency of Section 33(2)(b) proceedings is also wholly without foundation. If the forgoing analysis of the relevant law is correct, it can be safely summarized by stating that there is a basic difference between adjudicatory process and a summary action which many Courts and Tribunals do not recourse, at least in their judicial pronouncements. The proceedings under Section 10, 10(4-A) and 33(2)(b) are independent of each other. We therefore, not only may but must, in accordance with provision of the act make a clear distinction between adjudicatory process and summary action. The confusion which, I venture to think, has sometimes crept into the cases is, in my view, due to a failure to distinguish the distinction/difference between the said provisions and in particular to keep steadfastly in mind that (first) that the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) are summary in nature and (second) that the scope of proceedings under the two provisions is substantially different and are independent of each other. The misconception consists in confusion of understanding the Suttle distinction/difference. There is thus a double misconception in the theory. Unconsciously, the Courts and Tribunals slip in misunderstanding the Suttle distinction/difference. I have no doubt at all that the decision at which the learned Judge arrived is substantially against the provisions of the I.D Act and also against law well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court. I therefore disagree with the order passed by the Court. In my view, the order should have been the other way. To conclude, let me make two matters quite clear. Firstly, the proceedings under Section 10, 10(4-A) and 33(2)(b) are independent of each other; secondly the Court cannot stay adjudication proceedings under the guise of pendency of approval application. In the last resort, Sri.Prashanth B.K., learned counsel for Respondent in presenting his argument raised contention regarding applicability of principles of res-judicata. On the other side, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the principles of res-judicata has no application. I have considered the submission urged on behalf of respective parties. In the last resort, Sri.Prashanth B.K., learned counsel for Respondent in presenting his argument raised contention regarding applicability of principles of res-judicata. On the other side, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the principles of res-judicata has no application. I have considered the submission urged on behalf of respective parties. The law with regard to applicability of principles of res-judicata in adjudication of Industrial Dispute is no longer res-integra. The law has been settled by the Division Bench of this Court in RPG CABLES LIMITED VS SRI.G.M KULKARNI reported in MANU/KA/1739/2012 wherein, the Division Bench has held that principles of res judicata have no part to play in the adjudication of Industrial Dispute under Section 10 of the I.D Act. Hence, the contention with regard to res-judicata is also perfectly hopeless. The captioned Writ is filed as against the interim order. Hence, I am not discussing anything on the merits of the case. Counsel for petitioner and Respondent have cited a number of cases, but I do not think that the law is in doubt. Each decision turns on its own facts. The present case is also tested in the light of the aforesaid decisions. Resultantly, the Writ Petition deserves to be allowed. The order dated:17.03.2021 passed by the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge at Kolar on I.A.No.II in I.D.No.06/2019 is quashed/set aside. The learned Judge is hereby directed to adjudicate the dispute on merits in accordance with law.