ORDER : SONIA GOKANI, J. 1.0. The petitioners are before this Court aggrieved by the order passed by the Ahmedabad Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad wherein the Tribunal has quashed and set aside the first of order of extension of suspension in view of the FIR No.3 of 2021 dated 27.03.2021 lodged against the respondent in the ACB Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 12, 13(1) and 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2.0. Brief facts leading to this petition are as follows: 2.1. The respondent was working as Joint Commissioner in the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax, Ahmedabad Zone where one complainant lodged complaint dated 26.3.2021 against the respondent for demanding a bribe of Rs.1,50,000/- along with one of Junior Officer before the Anti Corruption Bureau. 2.2 An FIR being 3 of 2021 came to be lodged in ACB Police Station, Ahmedabad against the respondent on 27.3.2021 and she was arrested on the very day by the Anti Corruption Bureau. Considering the complaint and FIR, respondent was placed under suspension by way of order dated 4.5.2021 under Rule 10(2)(a) of the CCA(CCA) Rules, 1965. 2.3. The Anti Corruption Bureau after investigation filed a charge-sheet on 24.5.2021 before the learned Special Judge (ACB) at District and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur. The respondent has also been enlarged on regular bail on 8.6.2021. The suspension period was extended for 180 days w.e.f. 25.6.2021, against which, the respondent preferred the Original Application No.249 of 2021 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad, which quashed and set aside the order of suspension and also ruled that the respondent entitled to salary for the interregnum period with a simple interest of 8%. 2.4. This has aggrieved the present petitioners and it has approached this Court. It is the case of the petitioners that the coordination of effort between multiple agencies is a must being ACB, CVC, DgoV and the Ministry and this exercise is time consuming exercise. There is no undue or unjustified delay in issuance of charge-sheet against the respondent by the concerned department. To issue a departmental chargesheet within a period of 90 days is an uphill task. There is no undue or unjustified delay in issuance of charge-sheet against the respondent by the concerned department. To issue a departmental chargesheet within a period of 90 days is an uphill task. He sought to rely upon the couple of decisions to urge that the currency of suspension though is not expected to be extended beyond three months but that would also not mean that as a matter of fact once its extended, it should be declared null and void. There should not be any hard and fast rule in this regard. The overall circumstances in each case will needs to be regarded before implementing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 . The prayers sought for as follows: “A. Issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the order impugned dated 29.03.2022: B. Pending admissions, hearing and disposal of the petition be pleased to stay the effect of the order impugned dated 29.03.2022: C. Be pleased to grant ex parte ad interim relief in terms of para 8(B) above:” 3.0. On issuance of notice, respondent is represented by learned advocate Mr. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, who has resisted this petition. We have extensively heard Mr. Nikunt Raval, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Union of India and Mr. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, learned advocate for the respondent. 4.0. We notice that application moved under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act by the respondent aggrieved by the order dated 24.6.2021 has been dealt with extensively by the Court where the period of suspension has been extended for a further 180 days w.e.f. 25.6.2021. The Tribunal after giving a detailed consideration of the various authorities concluded that the respondent had been placed under deemed suspension w.e.f. 27.3.2021 and till further extension the petitioner had not initiated any disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. The second order was also passed on 21.12.2021 extending the further suspension period for 180 days with 50% increased in subsistence allowance, which was being paid to the respondent. Noticing the fact that there is no memorandum of charge / charge-sheet issued to the respondent and no departmental proceedings obviously were initiated till date with only criminal proceedings is pending for framing of charge. Noticing the fact that there is no memorandum of charge / charge-sheet issued to the respondent and no departmental proceedings obviously were initiated till date with only criminal proceedings is pending for framing of charge. Relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and other decisions to conclude that the order dated 24.6.2021 is not sustainable and same suffers from legal infirmity. According to the Tribunal, the very first order of extension of 24.6.2021 is also not sustainable. There is hardly any requirement for then considering that the extended period by a second extension. 5.0. We notice that from the material which has been placed before us that the respondent is serving as Joint Commissioner in the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax, Ahmedabad Zone. She had been a direct recruit in the batch of 2011 of Indian Custom and Central Excise Service. The FIR filed being 3 of 2021 on 27.3.201 before the ACB police station has culminated into the charge-sheet where offences leveled against her under Sections 7, 12, 13(1) and 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Her arrest made on 27.3.2021 eventually culminated into the grant of regular bail to her on 8.6.2021. The serious allegations are leveled against her and audio recording of the conversation has also been tendered by the complainant to the Investigating Agency, which had been sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Raval is not having the instructions as to whether the report of voice spectrography has been received or not. However, what one can notice from the submissions made urged that so far, the chargsheet has not been served upon the respondent. 6.0. We would like to refer to the decision of this Court rendered in a similarly situated employee being Special Civil Application No.6087 of 2022 where also relying on the decision of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) the Court had directed the completion of inquiry in a stipulated time period. The only difference was that there departmental proceedings had already been initiated whereas in the instant case, the respondent not as yet served the charge-sheet upon the respondent. This Court in Special Civil Application No.6087 of 2022 has held & observed thus: “8. The only difference was that there departmental proceedings had already been initiated whereas in the instant case, the respondent not as yet served the charge-sheet upon the respondent. This Court in Special Civil Application No.6087 of 2022 has held & observed thus: “8. In the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph no.11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22 as under:- 11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of Charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that - "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. 13. Article 12 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 13. Article 12 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks". 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: 6(1) "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time...." and in its second sub article that 6(2) "everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law". 20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Ranghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481 , and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 21. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us. 22. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the Appellant has now been served with a Chargesheet, and, therefore, these directions may not be relevant to him any longer. However, if the Appellant is so advised he may challenge his continued suspension in any manner known to law, and this action of the Respondents will be subject to judicial review.” 9. In the case of Dr. Rishi Anand (supra), the Delhi High Court has observed in paragraph no.17 as under: “17. It may not always be possible for the government to serve the charge sheet on the officer concerned within a period of 90 days, or even the extended period, for myriad justifiable reasons. In the case of Dr. Rishi Anand (supra), the Delhi High Court has observed in paragraph no.17 as under: “17. It may not always be possible for the government to serve the charge sheet on the officer concerned within a period of 90 days, or even the extended period, for myriad justifiable reasons. At the same time, there may be cases where the conduct of the government servant may be such, that it may be undesirable to recall the suspension and put him in position once again, even after sanitising the environment so that he may not interfere in the proposed inquiry. On a reading of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), we are of the view that the Supreme Court has not denuded the Government of its authority to continue/ extend the suspension of the government servant - before, or after the service of the charge sheet - if there is sufficient justification for it. The Supreme Court has, while observing that the suspension should not be extended beyond three months - if within this period the memorandum of charges/ charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer, has stopped short of observing that if the charge memo/ charge-sheet is not issued within three months of suspension, the suspension of the government servant shall automatically lapse, without any further order being passed by the Government. No such consequence - of the automatic lapsing of suspension at the expiry of three months if the charge memo/ chargesheet is not issued during that period, has been prescribed…….” 10. In the case of Naresh Kumar (supra), the Uttarakhand High Court has observed in paragraphs no.29 and 30 as under:- 29. While taking note of the fact that disciplinary proceedings may commence after completion of the criminal proceedings, the Constitution Bench, in R.P. Kapur, was of the view that suspension during investigation, enquiry or trial relating a criminal charge is intimately related to disciplinary matters. The fact that an order of suspension could continue during the trial of a criminal charge, and even thereafter till completion of disciplinary proceedings, if any, initiated against the Government servant was recognised in R.P. Kapur by the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court. None of the aforesaid Constitution bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand; V.P. Gidroniya and R.P. Kapur were noticed in the latter two bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary. 30. None of the aforesaid Constitution bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand; V.P. Gidroniya and R.P. Kapur were noticed in the latter two bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary. 30. All subsequent decisions by benches comprised of lesser number of Judges should be read in the light of the earlier Constitution Bench decisions. (N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N). In cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of the Supreme Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law, is followed by the Supreme Court itself. (State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi; Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian). The legal position is that, in the hierarchical set up of Courts, the High Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. However, when a smaller bench of the Supreme Court lays down a proposition contrary to and without noticing the ratio decidendi of the earlier larger Benches, such a decision will not become the law declared by the Supreme Court so as to have a binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution on all the Courts within the country. (Sakinala Harinath v. State of A.P). Judicial discipline requires that the opinion expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court, in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Supreme Court, should be followed. (K.S. Subramanian; O. Ramachandra Reddi v. The Director, DRDL, Hyderabad and Buddana Venkata Murali Krishna)”. 11. In the case of Shreedharan Kallat (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph no.5 as under:- “5. Assuming that the respondents could challenge fixation of seniority of the appellant as the order which furnished foundation for the determination of seniority, was passed without impleading the respondents, the scope of such petition could be limited. In service matters where validity or interpretation of rule is concerned any order passed by the courts which achieves finality is binding on the Department. In service matters where validity or interpretation of rule is concerned any order passed by the courts which achieves finality is binding on the Department. If the court is satisfied that any employee has been prejudiced or his right under Article 14 has been violated it may interfere in his favour. But the Department is precluded from challenging the interpretation given by the court. Since the earlier order has been upheld by this Court the order could be set aside by this Court. The Tribunal could not have passed an order which resulted in disturbing the finality about interpretation of rule specially when the S.L.P. had been dismissed by this Court.” 12. In the case of Prem Nath Bail (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph nos.26 and 28 as under: “26. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that it is the duty of the employer to ensure that the departmental inquiry initiated against the delinquent employee is concluded within the shortest possible time by taking priority measures. In cases where the delinquent is placed under suspension during the pendency of such inquiry then it becomes all the more imperative for the employer to ensure that the inquiry is concluded in the shortest possible time to avoid any inconvenience, loss and prejudice to the rights of the delinquent employee. 28. Keeping these factors in mind, we are of the considered opinion that every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavor to conclude the departmental inquiry proceedings once initiated against the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six months as an outer limit Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time frame then efforts should be made to conclude within reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year. 13. In the case of M. R. Diwan (supra), the High Court of Delhi has held that if disciplinary proceedings are not concluded within a year, the same will lapse, even if the charged officer is responsible for any delay. 14. We have considered the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 13. In the case of M. R. Diwan (supra), the High Court of Delhi has held that if disciplinary proceedings are not concluded within a year, the same will lapse, even if the charged officer is responsible for any delay. 14. We have considered the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. We have perused the materials available on record and also the decisions cited at the bar. We have also gone through the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. 15. The Central Administrative Tribunal, while passing the impugned order dated 21.01.2022 has observed in paragraphs no.14 and 16 as under: 14. It can be seen that there is no instance of tampering by the applicant or any hurdle created by the applicant to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. Against the applicant the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year February 2019 and the same is yet at enquiry stage only. In criminal proceedings same is at the stage of framing of charges. It is not the case of respondents that due to reasons attributed to the applicant the respondents could not meet with the time line stipulated in the OM issued by DoP&T (supra) for issuing belated charge memorandum. The disciplinary authority while extending the period of suspension, recorded one of the reason that the applicant has been charged with serious offence. In this regard it is required to mention that it is trite of law that one the reason that the applicant has been charged with serious offence. In this regard it is required to mention that it is trite of law that once the disciplinary proceedings are initiated for alleged misconduct against the employee, the said proceeding should reach to its logical conclusion and till then it cannot be said that the alleged charges are proved and officer cannot be held guilty before the trial. Under the circumstances, the submission of the respondents that the competent authority has recorded ground for extension of the suspension which is suffice to justify the impugned order is not acceptable and we are in agreement with the submission of the counsel for the applicant that the continued suspension of the applicant is contrary to the DoP&T instructions on the subjects as also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 15. 15. On a conjoint reading of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in case of Sandeep GM Yadav (supra) as also judgment passed by Delhi High Court in case of Rishi Anand (supra) and the factual matrix in the present case, the respondent failed to follow the binding instructions contained in OM dated 23.08.2016 and 21.07.2016 (supra) of DoP&T while reviewing the suspension of the applicant. The reason assigned for extending the period of suspension is not acceptable in light of dictum laid down in the aforesaid judgments as also the spirit of provision of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 since the respondent failed to adhere to the time line stipulated in OM issued by DoP&T and it is trite law that suspension cannot take the form of punishment. Resultantly, the very first order of extension of suspension dated 21.12.2017 suffers from legal infirmities. Accordingly, the subsequent orders for extension of suspension of the applicant which are impugned herein are not tenable. We, at this stage, also take note of the fact that the headquarter of the applicant has already been changed from his original place of working i.e. Mundra to Ahmedabad. We are convinced that no useful purpose will be served by continuing the applicant under suspension are longer. 16. As a result of above, the applicant is entitled to succeed. The present OA is accordingly partly allowed with following directions:- (i) Suspension of the applicant beyond initial 90 days is hereby set aside and quashed. (ii) As a consequence, the impugned orders dated 21.12.2017, 18.06.2018, 17.06.2019, 10.12.2019, 11.06.2020 and 08.12.2020 (Annexures A/1 to A/6) are quashed and set aside. (iii) As a consequence of quashing of the suspension, the applicant shall be reinstated within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. (iv) The applicant shall be entitled to salary minus the subsistence allowance already received by him for the interregnum period i.e. from the date when his initial suspension ended after 90 days and till the date he is reinstated in service with simple interest @ 8%. (v) Initial period of suspension shall be decided in accordance with the rules on the subject. (v) Initial period of suspension shall be decided in accordance with the rules on the subject. (vi) This order will not however, come in the way of the respondents in further proceeding with the memorandum of charges dated 26.02.2019 in accordance with law. 16. The Central Administrative Tribunal, while passing the impugned order dated 27.04.2022 has observed as under:- 1. After arguing for some time, Shri Tushar Mohanty, counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant will be satisfied, if appropriate direction be issued to the competent authority to complete the pending departmental inquiry within stipulated time framed with respect to charge memorandum dated 26.02.2019. 2. On the other hand, Shri H. D. Shukla, standing counsel for the respondents submits that it is expected that the applicant will cooperate to complete the pending departmental inquiry expeditiously. 3. Considering the aforesaid submissions, as also taking into facts that the departmental inquiry was initiated against the applicant in the year 2019, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case of the applicant, we deem it fit to dispose of this OA with a direction to the competent authority that pending departmental inquiry initiated against the applicant be concluded expeditiously, but later than six months from today. It is also expected that the disciplinary proceedings be also completed expeditiously on receipt of the Inquiry Report. 4. OA stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.” 17. It is thus clear from the decision of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) that a temporary phase is of a suspension and, therefore, essentially and as laid down emphatically the same should be of a shorter duration. This surely is not a punitive action. Ordinarily, all the departmental and disciplinary proceedings commence with delay. It also takes a while for the department to draw the charges and proceed with the inquiry culmination of which is always quite late. Therefore, not only the suspended person suffers from ignominity from the society, but it also needs to suffer this phase awaiting the outcome and the very process is quite protracted. Eventhough, no one ends to deliberately procrastinate the same. 18. The Apex Court has been emphatic that even though the right to speedy trial which has been ensured in the Constitution is not specifically incorporated so far as the departmental proceedings are concerned. Nevertheless, it should be construed as interwoven. Eventhough, no one ends to deliberately procrastinate the same. 18. The Apex Court has been emphatic that even though the right to speedy trial which has been ensured in the Constitution is not specifically incorporated so far as the departmental proceedings are concerned. Nevertheless, it should be construed as interwoven. The Court has acquainted with the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. to moderate the suspension order in case of departmental inquiry by holding in unclear terms that Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. speaks of personal freedom. However, the human dignity and preservation of respect as well as right to speedy trial needs to be put on the same pedestrian and, therefore, it has been directed that the suspension order should not extend beyond period of three months. If within the said period, the memorandum of charges is not served on delinquent officer, they shall be need to be a reasoned order passed for extension of suspension. Of course, the employer is given a freehand to transfer the concerned person to any department in any of its office within or outside the State so as to severe the ties with the local or personal contact to stop any misuse of investigation against the person. The Court, thus, has emphasized on the said time limit. In the case of Dr. Rishi Anand (supra), the Delhi High Court has made it clear that there is no automatic lapsing of suspension at the expiry of three months if the charge memo or charge-sheet is not issued during the period. It is always not visible for surviving the chargesheet on officer concerned within a period of 90 days or even the extended period and then may be time where it would be undesirable to recall the suspension and put him in position once again. The Apex Court in the case of Prem Nath Bail (supra), also has emphatically held that it is for the employer to ensure that the departmental inquiry initiated against the employee is concluded within the shortest possible time by taking priority measures. The Apex Court in the case of Prem Nath Bail (supra), also has emphatically held that it is for the employer to ensure that the departmental inquiry initiated against the employee is concluded within the shortest possible time by taking priority measures. In cases where a person is placed under suspension during the pendency of such inquiry, all the more reason for the employer to ensure that the inquiry is concluded in the shortest possible time, not only to avoid any inconvenience, loss and prejudice to the rights of the delinquent employee, but also because the employer has to incur huge amount without taking any work from the person concerned. All these aspects has led the Court to hold that sincere endeavor must be made to conclude the departmental proceedings within six months as an outer limit and once initiated, where it is not possible for the employer to so do it, then efforts should be made to conclude the same within reasonably extended period depending upon the nature of inquiry but surely not for more than a year. The Delhi High Court went to the extent of saying that if the charged officer is responsible for the delay, the disciplinary proceedings would delay. However, we are not wanting to stretch that aspect to that extent. The DOPs issued will also lead to hold that on a Non-Sensitive post, the person can be posted so that some work could also be taken from him, if there is a stretch disciplinary proceedings. 19. We have taken note of the fact that the respondent has been under suspension from 29.09.2017 and the same has been extended time and again. His charges are also quite serious of demanding bribe of Rs.30,00,000/- in his position for clearing 27 kilogram gold found concealed in imported goods. Rs.10 Lakh has already delivered and Rs.20 Lakh ought to be given to one Hiten Thakkar. A trap was arranged and Hiten Thakkar was caught raid-handed. In these circumstances, if the employer has chosen not to place him under suspension and reinstated back in the Custom Department, at Mundra however, not only one year of initiating inquiry is long over so almost five years since the manners under suspension and is also facing departmental proceedings. A trap was arranged and Hiten Thakkar was caught raid-handed. In these circumstances, if the employer has chosen not to place him under suspension and reinstated back in the Custom Department, at Mundra however, not only one year of initiating inquiry is long over so almost five years since the manners under suspension and is also facing departmental proceedings. In such circumstances, on Non-Sensitive post, as has been held by the Apex Court, he can be always posted if delay has been caused not on account of delinquent. We are given to understand that the departmental proceedings shall be surely over within a period of three months and, therefore, we have chosen not to insist on implementation of the order immediately.” 7.0. Let the charge memo be served upon the respondent at the earliest and the departmental proceedings shall be attempted to be completed in six months’ period and if the proceedings get elongated further for no fault of the petitioner beyond one year, the competent authority would reinstate the respondent on Non-Sensitive Post on completion of the stipulated time period. Apex Court has insisted on endeavors to complete departmental inquiry/proceedings at the earliest and if delay is not on account of changed officer, huge amount be not spent without taking work for which Non-Sensitive post would be chosen. 8.0 It shall be ensured in the instant case while posting that neither trial nor inquiry be influenced directly or indirectly by very presence or of the charged officer. 9.0. In view of the aforesaid discussions and observations, the present petition is disposed of accordingly.