Sushma Lakda W/o. Shri Cleymaint Lakda v. State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Panchyat and Rural Development
2022-01-05
P.SAM KOSHY
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. Aggrieved by the impugned order Annexure P-1 dated 29.12.2021 the present writ petition has been filed. Vide the impugned order, the service of petitioner who is a Sapanch of Gram Panchayat, Duldula, Janpad Panchayat Duldula, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur has been placed under suspension invoking the provisions of Section 39(1) of the CG Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. 2. The challenge to the impugned order is primarily on the ground that the petitioner does not meet the requirement under section 39 (1) of the CG Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam inasmuch as no charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner nor is there any show cause notice for removal from the post issued to the petitioner before placing the petitioner under suspension. 3. Counsel for petitioner drew the attention of the Court to Annexure P-1 whereby the entire order sheet would reflect that the petitioner has been placed under suspension only on the ground of certain allegations which have been made where the respondent authorities intend to conduct an inquiry and during the inquiry the petitioner has been placed under suspension. This procedure adopted by the respondents is not what is contemplated under Section 39(1) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. 4. State counsel, on the other hand, submits that the contents of the impugned order itself reflect that the allegations against the petitioner are of serious irregularities and therefore, pending an inquiry, it would not be proper and justified for continuing the petitioner to discharge her duties of Sarpanch as that would have an adverse impact on the inquiry. 5. However, the State counsel does admit the fact that from the plain reading of the impugned order Annexure P-1 it does not reflect whether charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner or a notice of removal from the post of Sarpanch has been issued to the petitioner. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the provisions of Section 39 (1) which for ready reference is being reproduced hereinunder: “39.
It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the provisions of Section 39 (1) which for ready reference is being reproduced hereinunder: “39. Suspension of office-bearer of Panchayat – (1) The prescribed authority may suspend from office any office bearer, - (a) against whom charges have been framed in any criminal proceedings under Chapter V-A, VI, IX, IX-A, X, XII, Sections 302, 303, 304-B, 305, 306, 312 to 318, 366-A, 366-B, 373 to 377 of Chapter XVI, Sections 395 to 398, 408, 409, 458 to 460 of Chapter XVII and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) or under any Law for the time being in force for the prevention of adulteration of food stuff and drugs, suppression of immoral traffic in women and children, Protection of Civil Rights and Prevention of Corruption; or (b) on whom, show cause notice along with charge sheet under this Act, has been served for removal from office.” 6. This High Court in the case of Umashankar Porte Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No. 745 of 2017, decided on 29.03.2017 had already decided an identical issue whereby the order of suspension without any charge sheet and notice of removal from office, served upon the petitioner was questioned and the High Court while dealing with the issue in paragraphs - 6 to 11 held as under : “6. The provision contained in Section 39 (1) of the Act of 1993 exhaustively provides for circumstances, the manner and the condition under which, the office bearer of Panchayat can be placed under suspension. The first eventuality under which the office bearers could be placed under suspension is that the charges have been framed in any criminal proceedings under Chapter V-A, VI, [IX], IX-A, X, XII, Section 302, 303, 304-B, 305, 306, 312 to 318, 366-A, 366-B, 373 to 377 of Chapter XVI, Section 395 to 398, 408, 409, 458 to 460 of Chapter XVII and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) or under any Law for the time being in force for the prevention of adulteration of food stuff and drugs, [suppression of immoral traffic in women and children protection of civil rights and Prevention of Corruption].
The other contingency under which the office bearer of Panchayat could be placed under suspension is that a show cause notice along with charge-sheet under the Act, has been served for removal from office. 7. The aforesaid provision unmistakably reflects the statutory scheme of the Act of 1993, placing fetter upon the exercise of power of suspension of an office bearer of Panchayat. The legislature does not allow the prescribed authority to place an office bearer of Panchayat, unless one of the two preconditions are fulfilled. The office bearers of Panchayat namely Sarpanch and Panchs are elected by a democratic process. Keeping in view the above status as elected representative of the people, the Act of 1993 makes special provision in the matter of removal or suspension. While an office bearer could be removed from his office by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority, as provided under Section 40 of the Act of 1993, in appropriate cases, he could also be placed under suspension but the exercise of power of suspension is circumscribed by the precondition engrafted in Section 39 of the Act of 1993. 8. In the present case, there is no allegation of framing of charges for alleged commission of any of the offences as prescribed under Section 39(1) (a) of the Act of 1993. In order to invoke power of suspension under Section 39(1)(b), the Prescribed Authority is required to give a show cause notice along with the charge-sheet for removal from office. The law further provides that it should be served. The show cause notice as contemplated under Section 39(1)(b), must be one requiring the office bearer to show cause why he should not be removed from the office. Further, the other statutory requirement, which is mandatory in nature is that the show cause notice must be served along with the charge-sheet. The legal requirement of giving notice along with the charge-sheet is clearly indicative of the legislative mandate that the office bearer, against whom, removal is proposed, must clearly know as to what are the allegation along with the material on which those allegations as based as also the witnesses and documentary evidence by which those allegations are proposed to be proved against him. The word 'charge-sheet' would not mean that only allegation are leveled and the office bearer is expected to file his reply.
The word 'charge-sheet' would not mean that only allegation are leveled and the office bearer is expected to file his reply. The requirement of giving show cause notice along with charge-sheet, therefore, it is a necessary precondition of exercise of power of suspension. 9. If the notice dated 08.03.2017 is examined in the light of aforesaid statutory requirement, there is no iota of doubt that it does not fulfill the requirement of law of giving a show cause notice along with charge-sheet. The show cause notice, read as it is, requires the petitioner to show cause as to why action should not be taken under Section 39 of the Act of 1993. 10. Curiously enough, the Prescribed Authority under the misconceived notion of law, thinks that the petitioner could be punished under Section 39 of the Act of 1993, which is patent misleading of the provision of law. Section 39 of the Act of 1993 does not provide for any penalty but only provides for suspension. The only other provision under the Act of 1993 under which an office bearer could be removed is the provision contained in Section 40 of the Act of 1993. The notice does not even mention Section 40 of the Act of 1993, much less requiring the petitioner to show cause against removal. It appears that the Prescribed Authority has completely misconstrued the provision of law and the precondition for exercise of power of suspension. 11. The submission of State counsel that the details given in the order of suspension by itself should be treated as charge-sheet, cannot be accepted. The impugned order of suspension shows that the allegations against the petitioner were inquired into and impugned order shows that the authority got some inquiry made and has also prejudged the whole issue.” 7. Given the aforesaid legal statutory position as is reflected from the plain reading of Section 39(1) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and also the legal position that has been laid down in the case of Umashankar Porte (supra), this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order of suspension in the given set of facts also would not be sustainable and the same therefore deserves to be and is accordingly set aside/quashed. 8.
8. However, the quashing of the order of suspension Annexure P-1 dated 29.12.2021 would not preclude the respondent authorities from initiating appropriate proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law particularly keeping in view the provisions of Section 39 of the CG Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. 9. The writ petition accordingly stands allowed and disposed of.