JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. S. S. Dey, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. J. Kapil, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. A. Gayan, learned CGC for Union of India and Enforcement Directorate. Also heard Mr. P. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the State of Meghalaya representing the respondent Nos. 5 and 6. 2. In the present writ petition, the petitioners have primarily sought for the following two reliefs :- I. Quashing the entire proceedings contained under File Nos. ECIR/05/GWZO/2017/1390, ECIR/05/GWZO/2017/1391 and ECIR/05/GWZO/2017/1392, as well as the Provisional Attachment Order No. 03/2018 dated 28.09.2018 passed therein as well as the proceedings initiated and pending vide OC-1046/2018 and the Order dated 09.11.2018 passed therein. II. Directing the Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 to immediately defreeze all the bank accounts mentioned under Scheduled of Properties in the Provisional Attachment order No. 03/2018 dated 28.09.2018 and by rescinding the Provisional Attachment Order dated 28.09.2018 and the Order dated 09.11.2018 passed in OC-1046/2018. 3. The immediate facts prior to initiation of the proceeding under challenge can be summarized as follows:- I. On the basis of an FIR lodged by the Joint Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Forest and Environment Department, a Case No. 3(11)/2012 was registered by the CID, Meghalaya against the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4, under Sections 120(B)/423/468 IPC read with Section 13(1)(c) of PC Act. II. Pursuant to an investigation, the CID, Meghalaya filed charge sheet being charge sheet No. 2/2017 dated 01.09.2017 under Sections 120(B)/420/423 IPC read with Section 13(c) of PC Act, 1988 before the learned District and Sessions Judge, East Khasi Hills. III. Thereafter, on a satisfaction that prima facie case of money laundering was there, the Enforcement Directorate, Guwahati Zonal Office, recorded ECIR No. 05/GWZO/2017 dated 03.08.2017 and started investigation under PML Act, 2002 (in short PMLA, 02). IV. Thereafter, the impugned provisional attachment order was issued. 4. The immediate facts prior to lodging of CID investigation by the State of Meghalaya. I. The petitioner No. 1, claims ownership of an area of land called “Mawpali” as village forest. IV. Thereafter, the impugned provisional attachment order was issued. 4. The immediate facts prior to lodging of CID investigation by the State of Meghalaya. I. The petitioner No. 1, claims ownership of an area of land called “Mawpali” as village forest. It is the further claim of the petitioner No. 1 that the Soil Conservation Department of erstwhile State of Assam (prior to re-organization of the State of Meghalaya) entered into an agreement in the year 1953 for plantation in the Mawpali hill with a promise that the land will be returned back to the petitioner No. 1 being the rightful owner. II. Subsequently around the year 1994, the petitioner No. 1 through its representative, started initiating the process of return of the Mawpali hill to the petitioner No. 1. Ultimately in a meeting held in the Office Chamber of the concerned Minister, on 05.12.1994, it was decided to return back Mawpali to the petitioner No. 1 with a request to the petitioner No. 1 to reserve the road sides of National Highway and to protect matured trees with a further decision that the same will be handed over by December, 1994. III. Subsequently, in a preceding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. between the Divisional Soil Conservation Officer and the Headman of the Village (the petitioner No.1), the Executive Magistrate while closing the C.R.( Misc. 14/1996) held that the village is having the possession of the land from 23.12.1994 and that the first party Divisional Soil Conservation Officer could not produce any document to support its right of continuing possession. The learned Court below held that the land was handed over to Jum Control Department (Soil Conservation Department) of the erstwhile of Government of Assam for affore-station in 1953 with an agreement that the land will be returned back to the village authority on expiry of 30 years and when the State of Meghalaya was created in the year 1972, the land was still under possession of the Department, as 30 years was not completed and it was also held that in State of Meghalaya all land belongs to the people/community until the same is acquired by State. IV. IV. While matter was pending thus, on 29.03.2009, the Deputy Secretary to the Forest and Environment Department, Government of Meghalaya intimated the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Meghalaya that for implementation of scheme under acquisition for ecological importance areas, the Governor of Meghalaya has sanctioned an amount of Rs. 10 crores for acquisition of land in Mawpali. V. Thereafter, the Forest and Environment Department by communication dated 16.05.2010, forwarded the land acquisition documents for the acquisition of land in question including map, draft notifications and Collector’s report to the Revenue Department, State of Meghalaya. VI. Thereafter, on 02.03.2011, a notification under Section 4 of L.A. Act, 1894 was issued. In the said notification it was further clarified that the land was supposed to be acquired urgently and therefore, Section 5A of the L.A. Act, 1894 shall not be applicable. VII. Thereafter, on 06.04.2011, notice under Section 6 of the L.A. Act 1894 was issued notifying that the land in question is required to be taken by the Government at the public expenses for a public purpose namely for establishment of protected forest at Mawpali. VIII. Thereafter, an award was passed, where it is shown the petitioner No. 2 be claimant in the award. It is the stand of the petitioners’ herein that the petitioner No. 1 appointed the petitioner No. 2 as its attorney for the purpose of the land acquisition. IX. Subsequently, on 14.06.2011, a notification under Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894 was issued taking over the possession on payment of 80% of the estimated compensation. X. Thereafter, in the proceeding of L.A. Case No. 9/2009, the Collector passed an order on 16.06.2021, issuing a notice to the person interested for payment of 80%. Accordingly, notice was issued to the petitioner No. 2 and cheque was handed over to him. XI. Thereafter, on 08.10.2012, the Deputy Commissioner by the even dated communication addressed to the petitioners being land owner/general power of attorney holder intimated that the plantation in Mawpali has been under the Soil Conservation Department last 4052 years and therefore the land acquisition proceeding needs to be quashed and payment made needs to be recovered. Accordingly, a notice on 15.10.2012 was issued to the Headman of the petitioner No. 1. Accordingly, a notice on 15.10.2012 was issued to the Headman of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 by its communication dated 25.10.2012 objected to such proposal and on failure to evoke any response, approached the High Court of Meghalaya by filing a writ petition with a further prayer to direct the respondents to release the outstanding amount. XII. The said writ petition being WP(C) No. 299 of 2012, was disposed of by judgment and order dated 17.02.2014. The High Court set aside and quashed the notice of annulment dated 08.10.2012 and 15.10.2012. It was further held that the Government should get a chance to redress their grievance as public money is involved and accordingly it was observed that the Government may file recovery suit before the appropriate Court. It was further provided that if such suit is not filed, the State was directed to pay the remaining compensation of Rs. 2 crores within four months from the receipts of date of judgment with interest etc. XIII. A suit was filed, which was dismissed and appeal preferred by the State also met the same fate. XIV. In the meantime, on 12.11.2012, the FIR before the Director General of Police was filed. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, Mr. S. S. Dey, learned Senior Counsel challenges the entire proceeding on the following grounds :- I. The entire gamut of the allegations of money laundering leveled against the petitioners arose in the backdrop of the land acquisition. The said land has already been settled to be belonged to the petitioner No. 1 and same has been confirmed in different proceeding. The Syiem of Mylleum who is competent authority under the law has already certified on 08.11.1994 by Annexure 5 to the writ petition that the land belong to the petitioner No. 1. The judicial orders, including the decision of the Meghalaya High courts lead no room of doubt that the land belongs to the petitioner No. 1 and that the land was acquired following due process of law. Therefore, there is no question of any tainted money, the money paid in the account of the petitioner was made as the attorney holder and materials are available on record to show that the compensation money was used for the community and the villagers, including purchase of land for the villagers. II. Mr. Therefore, there is no question of any tainted money, the money paid in the account of the petitioner was made as the attorney holder and materials are available on record to show that the compensation money was used for the community and the villagers, including purchase of land for the villagers. II. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel further argues that there is no complain from the petitioner No. 1 against petitioner No. 2 and the petitioner No. 2 is the attorney of the petitioner No. 1. III. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel further contends that even if the FIR dated 12.11.2012 or the charge sheet by the CID are assumed to be factually correct, no ingredients to constitute any offence under Section 120(B) or 420 or 423 or 109 IPC are available. IV. The definition of “Money Laundering” has to be understood by conjointly reading of Section 2(p) read with Section 3 and also the definition of “proceeds of crime” as given under Section 2 (u) of the PMLA, 02. V. The aforesaid provision of law clarifies that to exercise the jurisdiction of attachment of property” involved in money laundering”, pre condition of commission and proof of a schedule offence is required. The word “property involved in money laundering” used under Section 5 has to emanate from a determination by a Court of law and not by mere assertion of any prosecuting agency of the State, submits Mr. Dey, learned Senior counsel. VI. He further submits that in the present case except a mere allegation, nothing is discernable and therefore the stage at which the proceeding under the PMLA’ 02 has been initiated, the prosecuting agency was not having a jurisdiction to initiate such proceeding and therefore, the entire proceeding is nothing but a nullity, the same being initiated without having jurisdiction. VII. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel submits that, the terms used in Section 5(1) (a) & (b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 i.e. “proceeds of crime” itself makes the position clear that is not the proceeds of a suspected or alleged crime but the commission of crime itself, the factum of commission whereof can be proved and certified to be so, only by a final judgment & order of a Court established by law and not by a prosecuting agency merely alleging such commission of crime. VIII. Mr. VIII. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel further submits that in the instant case, no charges have yet been framed against the petitioners by any court of Law in respect of any alleged Scheduled offence, not to speak of any proof or adjudication to that effect even remotely hinting at commission of offence. Thus, the authorities invoking the powers under Section 5 of the PMLA’ 02 ordering attachment of properties do not have any authority of law even under the charging provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 itself to exercise any jurisdiction for attachment of property of the petitioners. IX. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel while interpreting Section 3 and 4 of the PMLA, 02 submits that unless there is a criminal activity relating to a Schedule offence, there can be no proceeds of crime. Therefore, proceeding under Section 3 of the PMLA, 02 can be initiated only in a case, the person is held guilty of receiving proceeds of crime as a result of commission of schedule offence. In the factual backdrop of the present case, it is clear that the money received cannot be treated as proceeds of crime and not even a charge is framed against the petitioners herein. In support of such contention, Mr. Dey relies on the judgment of High Court of Allahabad in Sushil Kumar Katiyar vs Union of India and Others reported in 2016 SCC Online ALLahbad 2632. X. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel further submits that there is no materials on record or evidence available on record to initiate proceeding under Section 3 or 4 of the PMLA, 02 more particularly in the factual background of the case inasmuch as the reason for initiation of the proceeding / impugned provisional attachment are only the fact narrated in the FIR dated 12.11.2012 and the charge sheet dated. 01.09.2017 which has not made out even any prima facie case under the alleged schedule offences. In support of his contention, Mr. Dey relies on an unreported decision of Delhi High Court dated 09.04.2014 in Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. –Vs-Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Misc. Case No. 5581/2014) and Arun Kumar Mishra –Vs-Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Misc. Case No. 5508/2014) decided on 09.04.2014 XI. Mr. In support of his contention, Mr. Dey relies on an unreported decision of Delhi High Court dated 09.04.2014 in Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. –Vs-Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Misc. Case No. 5581/2014) and Arun Kumar Mishra –Vs-Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Misc. Case No. 5508/2014) decided on 09.04.2014 XI. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel further submits that the fundamental basis to initiate a proceeding under PMLA, 02 is commission of a schedule offence and until and unless such schedule offence is proved, proceeding under PMLA, 02 cannot even be initiated. In support of his contention, Mr. decision of Delhi High Court in case of Rajeev Charnan –Vs- Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Misc. Case No. 5508/2014) decided on 09.04.2014. XII. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel argues that in the present case, there is no material, which could proceedly lead to a belief that petitioner is likely to transfer or conceal the property in any manner. The satisfaction of the authority to provisionally attach under Section 5, must have a reason be believe on the basis of materials on his possession that the property sought to be attached is likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner, which may result in frustrating any proceeding for confiscation of their property under the Act. Therefore, without having any materials, the provisional attachment is required to be set aside. In support of his contention, Mr. Dey relies of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mahanivish Oil & Foods Pvt. Ltd. –Vs-Directorate of Enforcement reported in AIR 2016 Delhi 54. 6. The respondent Enforcement Directorate has filed an affidavit-in-opposition controverting the stand of the petitioners herein. Ms. A. Gayan, learned CGC submits the following:- I. During the PMLA investigation, the accused persons and other witnesses were interrogated and their statements were recorded under Section 50 of the PML Act, 2002 and trail money was found out. The petitioners appeared before the investigating authority, tendered evidences and the same are reflected in the provisional attachment order. As case of money laundering was established, the property in question which are involved in the offence of money laundering were provisionally attached and the adjudicating authority has issued notices to show cause the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners are having statutory remedy available under Section 8 of the PMLA, 02, to raise all contentions before the Adjudicating Authority. II. As case of money laundering was established, the property in question which are involved in the offence of money laundering were provisionally attached and the adjudicating authority has issued notices to show cause the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners are having statutory remedy available under Section 8 of the PMLA, 02, to raise all contentions before the Adjudicating Authority. II. On the basis of materials and record, the investigating authority had arrived at the reasonable belief which, is recorded and reflected in the provisional attachment dated 28.09.2018. Such subjective satisfaction of the investigating authority arrived at on the basis of material on record should not be replaced by this Court in exercise of power of judicial review. III. The term reason to believe though not defined in the PMLA, 2002 however, the same is defined under Section 26 of IPC and a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe to thing but not otherwise. The officers must have reason to believe on the basis of material in his possession that the property sought to be attached is likely to be concealed transferred or dealt with in a manner, which may result in frustrating any proceeding for confiscation of their property under PMLA, 2002. Such satisfaction was available on the basis of materials collected and accordingly the order of provisional attachment was issued. IV. The adjudicating authority on receipt of the provisional attachment order, issued notice under Section 8(1) of the PMLA, 2002. The adjudicating authority is not required to record the reason in writing as is required in case of the authority exercising power under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002. Therefore, adjudicating authority on the basis of complaint filed by the initial authority under Section 5(5) of the PMLA, 2002 can proceed with the adjudication on the basis of subjective satisfaction, submits Ms. A. Gayan, learned C.G.C. V. The petitioners are having alternative remedy to file their reply before the adjudicating authority and in the event the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is against them, they can approach the statutory appellate tribunal and even if such appeal is against them, they can approach this Court and therefore, in the given facts of the present case, this writ petition should not be entertained as the petitions are having officious alternative for redressal of their grievance. 7. The respondent Nos. 7. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6, though is not related with PMLA, however, the initial prosecution under IPC was lodged by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 by filing FIR before the CID. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has raised a preliminary objection that the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of forum convenience. In this regard, the learned counsel submits that the petitioners are residence of Meghalaya and ordinarily resides and carry on their business in the State of Meghalaya. Therefore, the Hon’ble High Court of Meghalaya is the appropriate forum to file the present writ petition. 8. The facts pleaded by the petitioners and the CID PS Case No. 3(11)/2012 were investigated at Meghalaya by the CID, Meghalaya and therefore, the Hon’ble High Court of Meghalaya is the appropriate jurisdiction. The appeal provided under Section 42 of PMLA, 2002 should also be the High Court, in which the aggrieved party ordinary resides etc. and in case where Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within jurisdiction of which the respondent resides shall have the appellate jurisdiction under Section 42 of the PMLA and therefore, though the present is not an appeal under Section 42, the jurisdiction provided under Section 42 shall also be applicable in the present case. In support of his contention, Mr. Sarma, relies on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Asma Md. Faruk –Vs-Union of India reported in 2018 SCC Online Delhi 12800 and the order of dismissal of appeal preferred against such judgment by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal © No. S 32941/2018 to contend that the Hon’ble Apex Court has also affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and Mr. Sarma contends that the said judgment of Delhi High Court is therefore binding upon this Court. 9. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the pleadings on record. 10. Plea of alternative remedy and maintainability of the present writ petition. Sarma contends that the said judgment of Delhi High Court is therefore binding upon this Court. 9. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the pleadings on record. 10. Plea of alternative remedy and maintainability of the present writ petition. The law is well settled that alternative remedy is not a bar to the exercise of power judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court, if the writ petition is filed when it is filed alleging breach of enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of principles of natural justice and where the order or the proceeding are wholly without jurisdiction or when the vires of an act is challenged. In the case in hand the petitioners had questioned the power and jurisdiction or of the authority and the entire proceeding initiated under PMLA, 2002 has been challenged on the ground that the authorities under PMLA are not having their jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding in the given facts of the present case. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the aforesaid factual backdrop neither the adjudication under Section 8 or Section 26 can be treated as an officious alternative remedy when the jurisdiction of authority itself is questioned. 11. Plea of forum non convenience: Forum non convenience is a discretionary power that allows Court to dismiss a case where another Court or forum is much better suited to hear the case. Dismissal on such ground does not prevent a litigant refilling such case in the more appropriate forum. While determining such issue one of the important factor of considering is the interest of the party, who has raised the issue. Another consideration is whether the forum/Court chosen by the petitioner shall be burdensome to the party raising such plea. Law is well settled that the Court while dismissing a petition on the ground of forum non convenience, must have satisfaction that there is another available forum having jurisdiction and the forum chosen by the plaintiff is not disturbed until and unless, the balance of convenience is strongly in favour of the party raising such plea. While determining such issue, Court is to consider certain factors such as availability of more appropriate forum, other important factors which affect the convenience of parties like expenses involved. While determining such issue, Court is to consider certain factors such as availability of more appropriate forum, other important factors which affect the convenience of parties like expenses involved. Therefore, while determining such issue, the convenience of all the necessary parties to be seen. In the case in hand, neither the Union of India nor the Enforcement Directorate has raised any issue regarding forum non convenience. Such issue has been raised in the present litigation by the State of Meghalaya which is a formal party in the present case and no relief is sought against them. Therefore, in the aforesaid background, this Court is of considered opinion that the present writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of forum non convenience, more particularly when this matter is pending before this Court since 2018, the parties have filed their affidavit touching the merit of the controversy and it is not the case of the respondent State of Meghalaya that this Court is not having any jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. This Court is of the considered opinion that the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High and the Hon’ble Apex Court relied on by the State of Meghalaya was decided in the given fact of that case and same are having no applicability in view of given facts of the present case relating to forum non convenience inasmuch as such plea has been raised in the present case by a formal party, without specifying its inconvenience. Further the parties have deliberated in details on the merit of this petition and no respondents including the State of Meghalaya has raised any issue questioning the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the argument of the Mr. Sarma, learned counsel regarding the forum convenience is rejected. 12. Section 42 of the Act, provides that High Court shall be an appellate authority against the decision of the appellate tribunal constituted under Section 25 of the PMLA, 2002. Therefore, the argument of the Mr. Sarma, learned counsel regarding the forum convenience is rejected. 12. Section 42 of the Act, provides that High Court shall be an appellate authority against the decision of the appellate tribunal constituted under Section 25 of the PMLA, 2002. In the case in hand, the proceeding was admittedly initiated by the authorities of the Enforcement Directorate at Guwahati Zonal Office, Rajgarh in the State of Assam and as the jurisdiction of the said authority in initiating the proceeding under PMLA, 2002 is the subject matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court shall have a jurisdiction to entertain the petition inasmuch as at least cause of action in part arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, this court is of the view that when the jurisdiction of an authority, more particularly the authority under PMLA, 2002 is under challenged in a writ proceeding, the explanation given in Section 42 relating to appeal before the High Court shall not be applicable in toto. Therefore, the argument of the Mr. Sarma, learned counsel in this regard is also rejected. 13. The jurisdiction: Mr. S. S. Dey, learned Senior Counsel heavily relies on that the term criminal activity used in Section 2(u) to project that to initiate a proceeding under the PMLA, 2002, the condition precedent is that the proceeds of crime must result from criminal activity relating to a schedule offence and the criminal activity shall all meaning or purport should mean “proved criminal activity” by a court of law, which adjudicated the schedule offence and then only the question of initiation of proceeding under PMLA, 2002 shall be permissible. Mr. Dey, further submits that the authority under PMLA, 2002 cannot be allowed to initiate a proceeding where the base that is the criminal activity is not yet established. In substance, his argument is that the criminal activity as reflected in Section 2(u) shall mean “proved criminal activity” by a competent court relating to a schedule offence. Criminal activity though not defined in the Act, shall mean act or commission which are punishable under law in force. In substance, his argument is that the criminal activity as reflected in Section 2(u) shall mean “proved criminal activity” by a competent court relating to a schedule offence. Criminal activity though not defined in the Act, shall mean act or commission which are punishable under law in force. “Money laundering” as defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 requires the following pre conditions:- Direct or indirect attempts to indulge in any process or activity connected with proceed with crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, or use and projecting or claiming as untended property or knowingly assist or knowingly is a party to such proceed with crime. 14. In the considered opinion of this Court, criminal activity shall mean kind of criminal involvement in commission of offence punishable and it will not mean proved involvement. The legislature in its wisdom has used the word “criminal activity” relating to the schedule offence under Section 2 (u) and has not used the word “guilty of schedule offence”. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this court that criminal activity will mean alleged involvement. Such conclusion is also necessary to harmoniously interpret Section 5 and Section 6 and Section 3 of the Act, 2002. Section 5 is a kind of preventive action to protect the proceeds of crime from being transferred or concealed or frustrated. 15. The Section 8 and 5 empowers the authority to act when they are satisfied that there are reasons to believe that any person has committed an offence under Section 3 of PMLA, 2002. The legislature has not used the word for “proof of commission of offence” but reasonable believe can be a basis to proceed under Sections 5 and 8 of the Act, 2002. Therefore, the criminal activity shall mean not a proof of criminal offence but an alleged criminal activity relating to schedule offence. In view of the aforesaid finding, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the authority in initiating the proceeding in the case in hand is having the jurisdiction. 16. Now, the next question is whether the subjective satisfaction arrived at while issuing the impugned provisional attachment order, the authority had before it, any credible materials or information or such decision was supported by supervening factor. 17. 16. Now, the next question is whether the subjective satisfaction arrived at while issuing the impugned provisional attachment order, the authority had before it, any credible materials or information or such decision was supported by supervening factor. 17. Section 5 of the PMLA Act, authorizes the Deputy Director or Director to issue provisional attachment order when he has reasoned to believe, on the basis of materials on his possession that the person whose property sought to be attached is in possession of any proceeds of crime and that such proceeds are likely to be concealed, transferred or be dealt in a way which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation. It is further provided that the power of provisional attachment can be exercised with additional ground that if such property is not attached immediately, it is likely to frustrate the proceeding under the Act. Such satisfaction must based on material in his possession and should be in writing. 18. Section 5 of the PMLA Act, empowers attachment and provisional attachment to protect the proceeds of crime being frustrated from confiscation by way of concealment, transfer etc. The provisional attachment can be made when the situation is urgent and immediate action is necessary. However, such apprehension/ satisfaction must have on the basis of material in the possession of the authority issuing such attachment. Such satisfaction, a reading of the language of the Act, is a subjective satisfaction and therefore, there is no scope for this Court to examine the sufficiency of ground on the basis of which such opinion is formed. However, the language of the Section 5 of the PMLA Act, clarifies that there must be materials and only on the basis of which it can have the belief that the person is in possession of any proceeds of crime and that such proceeds are likely to be concealed/frustrated. Therefore, the condition precedent is existence of material to the aforesaid affect and availability of such materials. 19. The Sub Section 2 of Section 5 of the PMLA Act, provides that after provisional attachment under Sub Section 1 of Section 5 of the Act need to forward a copy of such order along with the materials in his possession to the adjudicating authority. 19. The Sub Section 2 of Section 5 of the PMLA Act, provides that after provisional attachment under Sub Section 1 of Section 5 of the Act need to forward a copy of such order along with the materials in his possession to the adjudicating authority. Sub Section 5 of Section 5 of the PMLA Act, provides that the authority who had issued the order of provisional attachment shall within a period of 30 days, shall file a complaint stating the fact of such attachment before the adjudicating authority. 20. The adjudicating authority under Section 8 of the PMLA, Act is having the power of adjudicate the correctness of the attachment including provisional attachment. For the purpose of such determination, the persons whose property has attached are given opportunity to be heard and to prove that the property is not involved in money laundering. Further when the provisional attachment order is passed in violation of the Sub Section 1 of Section 5 of the PMLA, Act and its proviso, such as that the property attached is not proceeds of crime and there is no likelihood of concealment of property etc., can be raised before the adjudicating authority and adjudicating authority, in the scheme of the Act, need to determine such objection also while exercising its power under Section 8 of the PMLA, Act. It is also well settled that more the stringent provision, more the stricter requirement for adherence of procedural safeguard. Thus, the issue that whether the twin condition of clause (a) and clause (b) are satisfied or not while passing the attachment order the Director etc., and whether there were urgency, can very well be examined by the adjudicating authority, while exercising of power under Section 8 of the PMLA Act, inasmuch as the aggrieved person whose property has been attached in exercise of power under Section 5 can be very well raise such objections. 21. 21. While dealing with the constitutional validity of the PMLA, Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bijay Madanlal Choudhary –Vs-Union of India in SLP (Criminal) No. 4634/2014 by its judgment dated 27.07.2022 uphold the constitutional validity of Section 5 of the PML Act, 2002, and came to a conclusion that the Section 5 provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interest of the persons and also ensures that proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the PMLA Act. The Court also came to a conclusion that there were procedural safeguard to protect the interest of the person in the Section 5 of the PMLA, Act itself. 22. While dealing with Section 8 of the PMLA Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) held that the adjudicating authority may disagree and not confirm the provisional attachment, in which case attachment over the property seizes. 23. The order of the adjudicating authority can also be challenged before the Appellate Authority. Section 26 (1) of the PMLA Act gives a right to the person aggrieved by an order of confirmation of provisional attachment to approach to the Appellate Tribunal. The order of such Appellate Authority can further be challenged before the High Court under Section 42 of the PMLA Act. The High Court shall have power to deal with any question of fact or law in such a proceeding. 24. From the aforesaid it is clear that the present petitioner shall have opportunities as provided under the Act and agitate the same before the authority under the PMLA Act as discussed herein above. 25. Accordingly, in view of the forging reasons and discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present is not a fit case wherein this Court should interfere with the order of provisional attachment in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as this Court has held that the authority is having its power and jurisdiction to issue the impugned order of attachment and that the adjudicating authority is having the power and duty to examine the validity of the order of attachment and test the same including the ground of satisfaction that is required under Section 5(1) (a) and (b) of the PMLA Act. Accordingly, the provisional attachment order is not interfered with. Accordingly, the provisional attachment order is not interfered with. The petitioner shall have at liberty to avail it’s right to file reply before the adjudicating authority, if so advised. 26. While parting with the record, it is made clear that the Court has not decided or commented anything on the validity of the impugned attachment order. 27. In terms of the aforesaid reasons, this preset writ petition is disposed of. Parties of bear their own cost.