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2022 DIGILAW 1103 (RAJ)

Jeeva Ram v. State Of Rajasthan

2022-04-06

DINESH MEHTA

body2022
JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. - The petitioners have preferred the present petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), inter alia, challenging the FIR No. 114 dated 02.07.2017, that has been registered in Police Station Rani, District Pali seeking petitioners' prosecution for the offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Mr. Deora, learned counsel for the petitioners narrated the broad facts in relation to disputed plot and construction raised thereupon and submitted that one Rupa Ram was the owner of the disputed property, who passed away in 2006 leaving following legal heirs: (i) Khumi Devi (widow); (ii) Shiv Lal; (iii) Jeevraj (iv) Dalpat; (v) Fancy and (vi) Jaynti. 3. It is informed by learned counsel that one of the above referred legal heirs, namely, Shiv Lal transferred the entire property to the complainant claiming himself to be the sole owner of the property on the basis of a will purportedly executed by his father Rupa Ram. 4. In the meantime, the present petitioners being legal heirs of Rupa Ram executed a power of attorney in favour of Hanwant Singh, who in turn transferred the property to one Mohan Singh, who is one of the petitioners herein (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 91/2018). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Mohan Singh is bona-fide purchaser of the property as all the legal heirs of Rupa Ram excluding Shiv Lal sold their 5/6th share in the property through Hanwant Singh a power of attorney holder and therefore, the transfer in question was valid. 6. He pointed out that the petitioners have already challenged the will purportedly executed in the favour of Shiv Lal by way of suit, which is pending consideration before the competent Court. 7. Learned counsel read the contents of the FIR and argued that the complainant- Pritam, having purchased the property from Shiv Lal has levelled false allegation that the petitioners have created forged and concocted documents, simply in order to ward off a decree against him/Shiv Lal in the said suit. 8. Learned counsel argued that allegation of forgery in creation of the documents in absence of or when it is not alleged that signatures on the power of attorney, which has been executed by Khumi Devi; Jeevraj; Dalpat; Fancy and Jaynti are in any manner forged. 8. Learned counsel argued that allegation of forgery in creation of the documents in absence of or when it is not alleged that signatures on the power of attorney, which has been executed by Khumi Devi; Jeevraj; Dalpat; Fancy and Jaynti are in any manner forged. It cannot be said that the contentious property has been irregularly transferred to Mohan Singh by creating forged and fabricated documents. 9. It was also argued that in any case, since the complainant-Pritam himself does not claim to have been cheated by the petitioners, no offence under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been committed. 10. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751 and argued that at the best, it is a case of civil dispute but the same has been given colour of crime. 11. Mr. Shrimali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant on the other hand argued that the petitioners have fraudulently transferred a land, may be on the basis of a validly executed document being power of attorney given to Hanwant Singh, who in any case was well aware of the fact that the property did not belong to them in the teeth of the will, which they knew that their prepositus Rupa Ram had executed in favour of Shiv Lal. 12. Mr. Shrimali, thus, argued that in spite of the factum of the property belonging to Shiv Lal, his mother and remaining brothers and sisters have executed a power of attorney and transferred the land to Mohan Singh in order to deprive the complainant from the rightful ownership of the property in question. 13. Learned Public Prosecutor informed the Court that after thorough investigation, the Investigating Officer has found the petitioners guilty of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and the investigation is over and charge-sheet is ready to be filed in the competent Court, however, since, there is an interim protection from arrest granted to the petitioners, the same has not been done. 14. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, including the factual report dated 31.03.2022, produced by learned Public Prosecutor, this Court is of the considered view that a purely civil dispute has been given colour of a crime and a dispute which should otherwise be agitated and settled by a competent Civil Court has been brought within the domain of Criminal Court. 15. Without making any observation on the correctness of the assertion of any of the parties, this Court is of the view that if the complainant- Pritam feels that power of attorney in question has been illegally executed given the fact that Shiv Lal was having right title in possession of the property pursuant to a will executed in his favour, then the proper course available to the complainant-Pritam is to take his remedies in Civil Court by seeking appropriate declaration. 16. A perusal of the FIR clearly shows that the complainant-Pritam has not alleged that signatures on the power of attorney are forged. That apart, it does not and cannot concern the complainant- Pritam because he has derived the property from Shiv Lal. In other words, he is an alien to such transaction- he cannot claim to have been cheated. 17. Since, the complainant- Pritam has not been cheated in any manner by way of the documents in question, the controversy involved in the present cases is fully covered by judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751 . The relevant paras thereof are reproduced hereunder: "There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of 'false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code are attracted." 18. As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, these misc. petitions are allowed. 19. The FIR No. 114/2017, registered in Police Station Rani, District Pali and consequential proceedings (if any), are hereby quashed. 20. The stay petition(s) also stands disposed of accordingly.