JUDGMENT : Vikas Budhwar, J. 1. The present appeal at the behest of the State of U.P. emanates from the proceeding in Sessions Trial No. 445/2016 (Registration No. 473 of 2016) wherein the court of Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court) No. 2, Rampur by virtue of the judgment dated 28.01.2021 has acquitted the accused-respondent nos. 1 and 2 in Case Crime No. 108C/2016 u/s 498A, 304B, 201 IPC and Section ¾ of the D.P. Act, P.S. Patwai, District Rampur. 2. The present appeal was presented before this Court on 09.08.2021wherein the Stamp Reporter had reported delay of 81 day. On 07.08.2021 the Stamp Reporter had tendered its report which reads as under:- “Although the instant Criminal Appeal is beyond time by 81 days till today. It should be considered with in time in light of the Hon’ble Supreme Court order Application 665/2021 in SMW (C) 3/2020” 3. On 25.08.2021 this Court passed the following order:- “This appeal is reported to be filed beyond limitation by 81 days. It has been filed along with a delay condonation application. Issue notice to the accused respondents on delay condonation application returnable at an early date. Accused respondents shall file counter affidavit to the delay condonation application within three weeks. Appellant shall have a week thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit.” 4. List/ put up in the additional cause list before the appropriate bench on 29.11.2021. 5. A recall application no. 1 of 2021 was preferred by the State-appellant for recalling of the order dated 25.08.2021 in the factual back drop that consequent to the passing of the order by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Misc. Application No. 665/2021 in SMW (C) No. 3/21 in the case of “In Re Cognizance For Extension of Limitation Vs. XXXX on 27.04.2021 wherein the delay which had occurred during the pandemic relating to Covid-19 was condoned and the limitation which fell due during the intervening period was extended. 6. Accordingly, in view of the office report dated 07.08.2021 the present appeal was treated to be within limitation and thus regular number was allotted. In view of the said background now there is no occasion for this Court to proceed with the recall application so preferred by the State-appellant. Thus, the recall application No. 1 of 2021 has rendered infructuous. 7. Though, in this appeal the State-appellant has arrayed two accused being respondent nos.
In view of the said background now there is no occasion for this Court to proceed with the recall application so preferred by the State-appellant. Thus, the recall application No. 1 of 2021 has rendered infructuous. 7. Though, in this appeal the State-appellant has arrayed two accused being respondent nos. 1 and 2 however, this Court finds that there is an office report dated 15.07.2022 accompanied with the letter dated 23.12.2021 of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur address to the Section Officer (Criminal Appeal Section bearing No. 1188/2021) certifying the fact that so far as the accused-respondent no. 2 Naubat Ram S/o Mewa Ram is concerned, he expired on 10.05.2021. A copy of the death certificate issued by Registrar (Birth And Death) Gram Panchayat, Mandaiyan Kali is also on record showing the fact that the respondent no. 2 Naubat Ram S/o Mewa Ram has expired on 10.05.2021. 8. Resultantly, the present appeal stands abated against accused-respondent no. 2 Naubat Ram S/o Mewa Ram. 9. Prosecution story encompasses that one Som Pal who happens to be the father of the deceased Pushpa Devi is said to have solemnized marriage with accused-respondent no. 1 Dhan Seth S/o Naubat Ram on 27.11.2015. Though various gifts and offering were extended to accused side but as per the allegations the accused fractions were not happy with the gifts and the offering as the same were not commensurate to the expectations of the accused fraction. Consequently, demand of the additional amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was sought to be made from the accused prosecution side. Even reconciliation were sought to be made and the matter was also put before the concerned panchayat, however, the same was of no avail as administering of beating as well as harassment was being sought to be meted to the deceased daughter. As per the prosecution case on 28.04.2015 at about 6 in the evening it is being stated that the accused being Dhan Seth (husband) Naubat Ram (father-in-law), Jaminiya (Mother-in-law) had the common intention to dispose of the deceased daughter and they strangulated her. Further allegation have been made that the deceased daughter Pushpa Devi was six months pregnant and at 06:30 in the evening on 24.08.2015 the accused who were marked in the FIR in question, made a phone call and thereafter apprised the informant that they had murdered the deceased daughter.
Further allegation have been made that the deceased daughter Pushpa Devi was six months pregnant and at 06:30 in the evening on 24.08.2015 the accused who were marked in the FIR in question, made a phone call and thereafter apprised the informant that they had murdered the deceased daughter. On receiving the said information, the informant along with his close associates who were residing in the same village which obviously is of the informant being Mukhram, Harfool, Mangal Sen, Chhote Lal proceeded to the in-laws of the deceased and witnessed that the deceased was lying in a cot in dead condition. According to the informant the neighbours and the other inhabitants who were present over there, informed that his daughter on the date of the death in the morning was subjected to beating. Further allegation was made that the deceased sustained sever injuries. According to the informant he was apprised that nobody should disclose the said fact regarding the murder of the deceased daughter to anybody otherwise the accused will treat it as an enmity. According to the informant he thereafter in the next morning proceeded to police station for tendering his complaint for lodging of FIR however, the police so stationed in the concerned police station detained him till noon and thereafter, the informant without lodging of the FIR came back. Further it is also stated that threats were also administered to the informant that in case the informant does not enter into any settlement or compromise then the informant will be put in a very disasters condition and thereafter, faced with the circumstances, the informant again went to the police station, however, in between the accused along with accomplish who are stated to be resourceful and powerful came to the house and took away the dead body of the deceased and behind his back consigned the dead body of the deceased on flames and threw away the ashes in river Ganga. As per the prosecution proceedings purported to be u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. was undertaken on 27.11.2015 before the court of C.J.M., Rampur and the FIR has been lodged u/s 498A, 304B, 201 IPC and section ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act being Case Crime No. 108C/2016. It has come on record that investigation was put to motion and consequently charge sheet was also submitted u/s 498A, 304B, 201 IPC and Section ¾ D.P. Act.
It has come on record that investigation was put to motion and consequently charge sheet was also submitted u/s 498A, 304B, 201 IPC and Section ¾ D.P. Act. Case was also committed before the Sessions Court and on 22.01.2019 the learned trial court abated the criminal proceedings against the mother-in-law of the deceased Smt. Jaminiya consequent to the death. 10. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution produces the following witnesses namely, Som Pal-P.W.1, Smt. Bhuri Devi-P.W.2, Dinesh Kumar-P.W. 3, Constable Lokesh Kumar-P.W. 4. 11. Prosecution also produced the following documents to bring home the charges:-(i) Application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Ex. A-1, (ii) Affidavit Ex. A-2, (iii) Site Plan Ex. A-3, (iv) Charge Sheet Ex. A-4, (v) F.I.R Ex. A-5, (vi) G.D. No. 039 Ex. A-6. 12. Further the prosecution also produces the following additional documents being the material Ex.-1 Photograph and material Ex.-2 Postal Receipt. 13. The proceedings u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. was also undertaken and thereafter, charges were read over to the accused they claimed not guilty and innocence. The learned trial court by virtue of the order dated 28.01.2021 passed in Session Trial No. 445/2016 (Registration No. 473/2016) State of U.P. Vs. Dhan Seth and another, acquitted the accused with respect to section 304B, 498A, 201 IPC and section 3/4 D.P. Act. 14. Challenging the order of acquittal now the State-appellant is before this Court. 15. Heard Sri Ratan Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State-appellant and perused the record. 16. Before elucidating the controversy so sought to be raised in the present appeal u/s 378 of the Cr.P.C., this Court is to re-memorize itself the boundaries within which the frame work of the case is to be drawn. Meaning thereby that this Court has to remain oblivious to the limitations so envisaged while exercising appellate powers against the judgment of acquittal. The appellate Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot act in a routine or cursory manner as the jurisdiction can only be exercised when there is gross misappreciation of the evidence coupled with erroneous interpretation and palpable illegality so as to suggest that no prudent person can comprehend the same.
The appellate Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot act in a routine or cursory manner as the jurisdiction can only be exercised when there is gross misappreciation of the evidence coupled with erroneous interpretation and palpable illegality so as to suggest that no prudent person can comprehend the same. Even if the view taken by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused is found to be a plausible and possible view then there is no occasion for this Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction to reverse the judgment from acquittal to conviction while taking another view. 17. Nevertheless in the Case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar And Another reported in 2022 (3) SCC 471 the Hon’ble Apex Court in following paragraphs have observed as under:- “21. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to review the approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr.P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal and observed as under: “16. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” It was stated that the appellate court has full powers to review and to reverse the acquittal. 22. In Atley vs. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 , the approach of the appellate court while considering a judgment of acquittal was discussed and it was observed that unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the acquittal was perverse, it could not set aside the same. To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 : “9.
To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 : “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court’s approach to a case disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, (ii) ‘good and sufficiently cogent reasons’, and (iii) ‘strong reasons’ are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.” The need for the aforesaid observations arose on account of observations of the majority in Aher Raja Khimavs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 which stated that for the High Court to take a different view on the evidence “there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.” 23. M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was). This Court observed that the approach of the High Court (appellate court) in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial.” 24. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: “In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic.
In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: “In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.” 25. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 , spoke about the approach of the appellate court while considering an appeal against an order acquitting the accused and stated as follows: “While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then and then only reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. In another words, there should not be an acquittal of the guilty or a conviction of an innocent person. 26. In Ajit Savant Majagvai vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110 , this Court set out the following principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court: “16. This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction.
These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.” 27. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 observed visàvis the powers of an appellate court while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, as under: “7. … While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
… While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then— and then only—reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” 28. This Court in Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , highlighted that there is one significant difference in exercising power while hearing an appeal against acquittal by the appellate court. The appellate court would not interfere where the judgment impugned is based on evidence and the view taken was reasonable and plausible. This is because the appellate court will determine the fact that there is presumption in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt but if it decides to interfere it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of acquittal. 29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 30. In Nepal Singh vs. State of Haryana– (2009) 12 SCC 351 , this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court and restored the judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused on reappreciation of the evidence. 31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed upto the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai, AIR 1981 SC 1442 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunachalam v. Sadhananthan, AIR 1979 (SC) 1284 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh, (1990) CrLJ 2274 (SC)] B) 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarised as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse: a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning; [State of UP v. Shanker, AIR 1981 SC 879] b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were ‘interested’ witnesses; [State of UP v. Hakim Singh, AIR 1980 SC 184 ] c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter.
[State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207 ] d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam v. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 SC 1284 ] e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of ‘implicit proof ’ rather than that of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of UP v. Ranjha Ram, AIR 1986 SC 1959 ] f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 ] or where acquittal rests merely in exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. [Gurbachan v. Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209 ]. g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it unnecessary on the part of the prosecution to establish ‘motive.’ [State of AP v. Bogam Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899 ] 31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice: a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of UP v. Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205 ] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pussu 1983 AIR 867 (SC)] b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 ] [Source : Durga Das Basu – “The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973” Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]” 18. To begin with this Court finds appropriate to analye the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 19.
[State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 ] [Source : Durga Das Basu – “The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973” Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]” 18. To begin with this Court finds appropriate to analye the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 19. P.W. 1 Sri Som Pal Singh entered into the witness box and had deposed that he had offered various gifts at the time of marriage of the deceased daughter which were as per his capacity, however, the same was found to be insufficient and additional demand of Rs. 2 lakhs was sought to be made and when the same was not fulfilled then on 24.08.2015 the accused disposed of her daughter while strangulating her showing it to be a suicide and informed about the said offence of 24.08.2015 at 06:30 in the evening. It has been further deposed that the first informant P.W. 1 immediately rushed to the in-laws place along with his wife and one Sri Harfool, Mukhram and Kafi who were his close associates and at that point of time he saw his daughter in a dead condition lying over a cot and the accused had run away from their house and were not traceable. It has been further deposed that the natives who were present in the site of occurrence apprised him that in the morning itself, the deceased was subjected to beating and they were further threatened that they should not disclose the said fact and rather the informant was also threatened. Even threat was also administered that in case, the first informant does not enter into settlement with the accused then the will have to face the music. According to P.W. 1 his daughter sustained several injuries and he on the next day in the morning proceeded to the police station for lodging of the FIR, however, he was detained till the noon but no FIR was lodged and then he came back and saw that the dead body of his daughter was missing and it was forcefully taken away by the accused and the accused have consigned the dead body of the deceased on flames and threw away the ashes in the Ganga river. As per the P.W. 1 proceedings were undertaken u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on 27.11.2015 and the FIR has been lodged. 20.
As per the P.W. 1 proceedings were undertaken u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on 27.11.2015 and the FIR has been lodged. 20. As P.W. 2 mother of the deceased Smt. Bhuri W/o of P.W. 1 Som Pal appeared to give their testimony. According to the testimony of P.W. 2 she also deposed that the husband of the deceased being accused-respondent no. 1 called upon the P.W. 1 apprising the fact that the deceased had died and she along with her husband, P.W.1 and Bhoopram and other family members proceeded to the house of in-laws of their daughter and the accused has ran away from the place of occurrence and she returned along with her family members on the next day at 12 noon. 21. So far as P.W. 3 is concerned, he happens to be the Station House Officer, Kotwali and P.W. 4 is Constable Lokesh Kumar who are formal witnesses. 22. Before proceeding further, this Court has to bestow its consideration about the fact as to whether delay in lodging of FIR would demolish the case of the prosecution or not and whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond doubt that the ingredients so contained u/s 498A, 304B IPC and 113B of the Evidence Act stands attracted and lastly the fact as to whether the accused are liable to be chaired with the thrown of acquittal or put behind the bars while being convicted. 23. So far as the issue with regard in delay in lodging of the FIR and its effect on the prosecution theory is concerned, a remarkable fact need to be noticed that as per the prosecution they received the information regarding commission of crime on 24.08.2015 at 06:30 in the evening through telephonic call wherein it was stated that stated that the crime was committed on 24.08.2015 at 06:00 in the evening. Notably P.W. 1 Som Pal (father of the deceased) and P.W. 2 Smt. Bhuri (mother of the deceased) along with Harfool, Mukhram and kafi proceeded to the house of in-laws of the deceased whereat the dead body of the deceased was found lying over a cot. Meaning thereby, the P.W.1 and P.W. 2 had full knowledge about the death of the daughter and further as per prosecution, the accused herein were not in the house but they were absconding.
Meaning thereby, the P.W.1 and P.W. 2 had full knowledge about the death of the daughter and further as per prosecution, the accused herein were not in the house but they were absconding. As per prosecution, on the next day in the morning P.W. 1 Som Pal proceeded to concerned police station for lodging of FIR, however, the same was not lodged and he was detained till noon and when he came back, the dead body of the deceased was found missing. Normally, when the parents are confronted with a situation wherein their daughter had died and the allegation is that she had been strangulated that too in her in-laws place and the parents are witnessing the dead body of the deceased then it is highly implorable and inconceivable that FIR would not be lodged promptly and a person will wait for the next day to get the FIR lodged and in case FIR is also not lodged then he would wait for such a long time and undertake proceedings u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. that too after approximately more than three months. The learned trial court has analysed the said issue while recording findings that though it had been pleaded before it by the prosecution that applications were filed on 01.09.2015, 25.09.2015, 05.10.2015, 28.11.2015 for lodging of the FIR before the police station but when the same was not lodged then on 18.11.2015 a registered letter was sent to the Superintendent of Police for lodging of the FIR and proceedings were undertaken on 27.11.2015 u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. 24. Though it is well settled that delay in lodging of FIR cannot be the sole ground to demolish the prosecution case, however, what is to be seen is the explanation so offered by the prosecution. Even otherwise, each and every case is to be judged according to its own fact. Additional fact needs to be noticed is this that according to the prosecution case on 24.08.2015 the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and others found the dead body of the deceased in her in-laws place. Further as per the prosecution the body itself was consigned to flames and ashes whereof was thrown in the Ganga river. The reaction of a normal person would be that a prompt FIR should be lodged, however, barring writing of letters there is nothing on record to give explanation regarding delay in lodging of FIR.
Further as per the prosecution the body itself was consigned to flames and ashes whereof was thrown in the Ganga river. The reaction of a normal person would be that a prompt FIR should be lodged, however, barring writing of letters there is nothing on record to give explanation regarding delay in lodging of FIR. More so, no independent witness has been put up in the witness box so as to prove the fact that the deceased died in the accused house and the body itself was consigned to flame and let of. 25. Hon’ble Apex Court on the question of delay in lodging the FIR and its impact upon the prosecution theory has observed in the case of (1973) 3 SCC 114 Apren Joseph Alias Current Kunjukunju and others Vs. The State of Kerala wherein para 11 following was mandated: 11. Now first information report is a report relating to the commission of an offence given to the police and recorded by it under Section 154, Cr. P. C. As observed by the Privy Council in K. E. v. Khwaja, the receipt and recording of information report by the police is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. Nor does the statute provide that such information report can only be made by an eye witness. First information report under Section 154 is not even considered a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant's evidence in court. But this information when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the informant. It is very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant's memory fades. Undue unreasonable delay in lodging the F.I.R., therefore, inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. In our opinion, no duration of time in the abstract can be fixed as reasonable for giving information of a crime to the police, the question of reasonable time being a matter for determination by the court in each case. Mere delay in lodging the first information report with the police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the prosecution.
Mere delay in lodging the first information report with the police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the prosecution. The effect of delay in doing so in the light of the plausibility of the explanation forthcoming for such delay accordingly must fall for consideration on all the facts and circumstances of a given case. 26. In the case of Tara Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab 1991 Supp (1) SCC 536, the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 4 has observed as under:- 4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report. Of course the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts have pointed out that in cases arising out of acute factions there is a tendency to implicate persons belonging to the opposite faction falsely. In order to avert the danger of convicting such innocent persons the courts are cautioned to scrutinise the evidence of such interested witnesses with greater care and caution and separate grain from the chaff after subjecting the evidence to a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the FIR also will have to be scrutinised carefully. However, unless there are indications of fabrication, the court cannot reject the prosecution version as given in the FIR and later substantiated by the evidence merely on the ground of delay. These are all matters for appreciation and much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 27. Yet, in the case of P. Rajagopal and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2019) 5 SCC 403 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 12 has held as under:- 12.
These are all matters for appreciation and much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 27. Yet, in the case of P. Rajagopal and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2019) 5 SCC 403 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 12 has held as under:- 12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. 28. Keeping aside the fact regarding the explanation so sought to be offered by the prosecution in delay in lodging of the FIR, another fact needs to be noticed that in case taking the prosecution case into face value another question arises that no proceedings what so ever either by filing a written complaint culminating into lodging of the FIR or undertaking any proceeding with respect to demand of dowry was restored to. The prosecution has in fact miserably failed to show any document or evidence so as to reinforce their stand that dowry was being sought to be demanded and the same become the basis for commission of the crime. As per the prosecution postal receipt of lodging of FIR with relation to the commission of the crime has been produced as material Ex.-2 however, the same is thoroughly insufficient to rope in the accused for commission of crime particularly in the light of the enactment so contained u/s 498A, 304B IPC read with section 113B of the Evidence Act. 29. The onus to prove that the accused has committed offence u/s 498A, 304B of the IPC is heavily upon the prosecution. Nonetheless, the same should be proved beyond doubt. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the same in this regard. 30. As per the testimony of the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, they were present and they had seen the dead body of the deceased on 24.08.2015.
Nonetheless, the same should be proved beyond doubt. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the same in this regard. 30. As per the testimony of the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, they were present and they had seen the dead body of the deceased on 24.08.2015. Further according to P.W. 1 Som Pal who happens to be the father of the deceased, he witnessed that several injuries sustained by the deceased, however, so far as the P.W. 2 is concerned, she had taken the dead body of the deceased in her village Patariya and on 25.08.2015 according to the statement of P.W. 2, she in her deposition during the ritual of death ceremony while giving bath to her deceased daughter she found certain marks on her neck and she apprised the said fact to her husband P.W.1 Som Pal. The aforesaid statement of P.W. 2 Bhuri Devi who happens to be mother of the deceased puts the last nail upon the coffin of the prosecution’s case as once the mother of the deceased P.W. 2 had given bath to the deceased on the next day on 25.08.2015 in her own house and in her presence the ritual ceremony pertaining to death (cremation) was done then how it could be stated by the P.W. 1 Som Pal that the accused along with certain influential and daring persons disposed of the body of the deceased while consigning her to flames and throwing the ashes in river Ganga. Thus there appears to be material contradictions in the statement of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 who happens to be the father and the mother of the deceased. 31. It is also inconceivable that in the death ceremony mother would be present and not the father. Thus the very basis of the allegation which forms the part of investigation itself is false, concocted and the story has been implanted just to implicate the accused herein. 32. The learned trial court has further found inconsistency in the statement and contradictions also between the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and according to P.W.1 Som Pal he received information on 24.08.2015 at 06:30 in the evening on telephone that the accused has killed the deceased however, on the other hand Bhuri Devi in her deposition has come up with stand that as per the version of the accused, the accused had stated that his daughter died.
These are material contradictions which cannot be lightly ignored as they have to be considered together with the other factors also. 33. Another aspect which also assumes significance is the medical angle. Present case is a case wherein there has been no postmortem done, thus, the court below was denuded of its benefit to go through the postmortem report. Postmortem report is a vital document (evidence) which could be a game changer. Once it has come on record that P.W. 2 Bhuri Devi had taken the body of the deceased to her village and before cremation got the last ceremony of bathing done and further the fact that she noticed certain marks around her neck which could be the cause of strangulation then in that event the matter ought to have been reported to the police officials and postmortem done. 34. The entire series of events and sequence undisputedly point out that every attempt has been sought to be made by the prosecution to dispose of the body while putting blame upon the accused. Thus, this Court cannot take a different view from the view taken by the learned trial court that too in absence of any postmortem report. 35. Even otherwise, the prosecution has not produced any independent witness to step-in in the witness box to support their case as according to the prosecution case, Mukhram, Harfool, Mangal Dev and Chhote Lal were also present on 24.08.2015 when the P.W.1 Som Pal had gone to the in-laws place of the deceased. They could have come forward and deposed and the entire truth whatever surfaced. Nonetheless, it has come on record that the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation had made queries while asking questions from the nearby persons who are present on the place of occurrence and according to him statements were made that the deceased wanted to extract money from the accused fractions and she was creating all sorts of dramas in that regard. 36. After marshalling the entire fact on record inclusive of ocular testimony of the witnesses as well as the documents and evidences so adduced thereon, this Court finds that the prosecution theory proceeds on weak premises.
36. After marshalling the entire fact on record inclusive of ocular testimony of the witnesses as well as the documents and evidences so adduced thereon, this Court finds that the prosecution theory proceeds on weak premises. There are major contradictions in the statements of P.W.1 and P.W. 2 occasioned with delay in lodging of the FIR which sans explanation, absence of postmortem report and the fact that the last rites of the deceased was done by the prosecution itself though blame has been sought to be put upon the prosecution for disposing of the dead body in flames and throwing the same in the river Ganga, coupled with the fact that no independent witness has stepped into the witness box to support the case of the prosecution. 37. After bestowing anxious consideration, this Court finds that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity as the learned trial court has meticulously analysed the case from all corners of law while appreciating the ocular testimony and evidences so adduced by the prosecution. Notably, there does not exist any compelling or substantive ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal while substituting it by conviction. The view so taken by the learned trial court is possible view and need not to interfere. 38. Resultantly, no ground is made as to accord leave to appeal and accordingly, the same is rejected. 39. As the leave to file the present appeal stands rejected thus, the present appeal so instituted at the behest of the State-appellant u/s 378 (3) of the Cr.P.C. stands dismissed.