ORDER : The petitioner is before this Court calling in question two orders passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Kolar – one dated 10-01-2022 under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’ for short) and the other dated 11-07-2022 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 311 of the CrPC. 2. Heard Sri B. Keshava Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.V. Ananda, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. Facts germane for consideration of the lis succinctly stated are as follows:- Respondent is the complainant and the petitioner is the accused. The petitioner and the respondent had certain transaction which leads the petitioner giving an instrument i.e., a cheque for an amount of Rs.10/- lakhs. The cheque having been presented for its realization is returned by the Bank for want of sufficient funds. Statutory notice being issued and all legal requirements being complied with, the complainant registers a crime invoking Section 200 of the CrPC in P.C.R.No.327 of 2021 and the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and registers a criminal case in C.C.No.1926 of 2021. The issue in the case at hand is not with regard to merit of the matter. In the said proceedings, the complainant prefers an application under Section 143A of the Act seeking interim compensation to the tune of 20% as is available under Section 143A of the Act. 4. This is allowed in part by the learned Magistrate by his order dated 10-01-2022 directing 10% of the amount involved in the instrument to be paid as interim compensation. The accused/petitioner had not complied with the order dated 10-01-2022. Pending compliance with the said order, at the time when the matter was posted for recording of statement under Section 313 CrPC, the petitioner files an application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. seeking recall of PW-1 for further cross-examination. The concerned Court by its order dated 11-07-2022 rejected the application inter alia on the ground that the petitioner had not deposited interim compensation amount in terms of its order dated 10-01-2022 and, therefore, the petitioner would not be permitted to cross-examine PW-1. It is these orders that are called in question in the subject petition. 5. The concerned Court by its order dated 11-07-2022 rejected the application inter alia on the ground that the petitioner had not deposited interim compensation amount in terms of its order dated 10-01-2022 and, therefore, the petitioner would not be permitted to cross-examine PW-1. It is these orders that are called in question in the subject petition. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend with vehemence that both the orders suffer from non-application of mind as there are no reasons indicated for passing the order under Section 143A of the Act and for passing the order as rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, the right to cross-examine by recall of the witness, is denied. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has no objection for allowing the petition insofar as it concerns rejection of application under Section 311 of the CrPC but would defend the order passed on 10-01-2022 with regard to the payment of 10% of the amount of compensation as is directed by the Court. 7. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that he would restrict the petition challenging the order dated 11-07-2022 reserving liberty to challenge the order dated 10-01-2022 in a manner known to law, by filing an independent petition before this Court or any other competent judicial fora. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record, in furtherance whereof, the only issue that falls for my consideration is, “whether cross-examination of the witness by his recall could be denied on the ground that the petitioner has not complied with the order directing payment of interim compensation under Section 143A of the Act?” 9. To consider the said issue, it is germane to notice the reason rendered by the concerned Court for rejection of the application on 11-07-2022 is as follows : “Complainant absent. Accused present. Counsel for the accused filed application under Section 311 CrPC seeking recall of PW-1 for cross-examination. Learned counsel for the complainant orally oppose the application and he relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Ravi v. Mogganna Gowda. On the other hand learned counsel for the accused relied upon judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka passed in Smt. Vijaya v. Shekarappa. Learned counsel for the complainant orally oppose the application and he relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Ravi v. Mogganna Gowda. On the other hand learned counsel for the accused relied upon judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka passed in Smt. Vijaya v. Shekarappa. The question before the Court is whether the accused can claim right of cross-examination of complainant PW-1 even though he defaulted by non-depositing of the interim compensation amount as per the order of this Court. In Vijaya v. Shekarappa the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has issued guidelines regarding the exercise of the discretion by the Magistrate while passing orders on application filed under Section 143A of the N.I.Act. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has not laid down any law regarding the right of cross-examination of complainant PW-1 even though he defaulted by non-depositing of the interim compensation amount as per the order of the Court. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the case on hand. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Ravi v. Mogganna Gowda’s has raised points for consideration and also laid the law on the point after discussing the various propositions of law. In the said judgment the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka is clearly held that if the compensation is not deposited, accused would not have right to continue to defend the proceedings. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka further held that filing of application under Section 145(2) does not entitle the accused to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses without complying with the orders passed by the Court. In view of the above clear proposition of law, the application filed by the counsel for the accused is devoid of merits. Accordingly application filed by the accused under Section 311 CrPC is hereby rejected. State of the accused as required under Section 313 CrPC recorded. Accused has denied the evidence of the complainant as false. Accused those to adduce defence evidence. Plea of the accused is recorded. Learned counsel for the accused submits that accused has no rights to adduce defence evidence, since he has not complied with the order of the Court. State of the accused as required under Section 313 CrPC recorded. Accused has denied the evidence of the complainant as false. Accused those to adduce defence evidence. Plea of the accused is recorded. Learned counsel for the accused submits that accused has no rights to adduce defence evidence, since he has not complied with the order of the Court. Hence, call on to hear both counsel on the said aspect by 1.08.2022.” (Emphasis added) The point formulated by the concerned Court is ‘whether the accused can claim right of cross-examination of complainant even though he defaulted by non-depositing of the interim compensation amount as per the order of the court’. The right to cross-examine is a valuable right. A case cannot be closed denying cross-examination of the complainant by the accused particularly on the ground that the accused has not deposited interim compensation amount. If the interim compensation amount is not deposited, the provisions under Section 143A of the Act bestows such opportunity to the complainant to take recourse to such remedy as is available in law. 10. The learned Magistrate has grossly erred denying cross-examination of PW.1, making it subject to the payment of 10% of interim compensation as was ordered on 10-01-2022. No doubt, the learned Magistrate has followed the judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of RAVI v. A.N. MOGGANNAGOWDA, [Criminal Petition No.462 of 2020 decided on 13th October, 2020], wherein, the Co-ordinate Bench holds as follows : “7.5. I am of the considered opinion that those proceedings though always available to complainant to enforce the order would not permit the accused to continue to defend the proceedings without compliance of the order passed by the Court. …………” …… …… 8. Answer to Point No.2 – Whether on an application being filed under Section 45(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act the accused would be automatically entitled to cross examine complainant’s witness even though accused has defaulted with or not complied with the directions issued by the said Court. 8.1. Sri Bhargava D. Bhat, learned counsel for petitioner has relied on the decision in Mandavi’s case stated supra to contend that once an application under Section 145(2) of the Act is filed, court would not have any discretion but to permit the accused to cross-examine complainant’s witness. 8.2. 8.1. Sri Bhargava D. Bhat, learned counsel for petitioner has relied on the decision in Mandavi’s case stated supra to contend that once an application under Section 145(2) of the Act is filed, court would not have any discretion but to permit the accused to cross-examine complainant’s witness. 8.2. This would be the case if there was no violation or non-compliance by the accused with any of the orders passed by the Magistrate. The accused cannot by relying on Section 145(2) and decision of the Apex Court contend that the accused is entitled to cross-examine the witness without complying the orders passed by the Court. This compliance could be as regards orders passed under Section 143A of the Act or any order that might have been passed requiring the compliance of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) The Co-ordinate Bench interpreting Section 143A of the Act, holds that the accused would not get the right to defend, if he has violated the order directing payment of interim compensation under Section 143A of the Act. The Co-ordinate Bench holds that the accused cannot rely on Section 145(2) of the Act to contend that he is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses pending compliance of any order. It is further held that the Court would have no discretion to permit the accused to cross-examine the complainant’s witness. The reason so rendered by the coordinate Bench, to-day, runs contrary to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of NOOR MOHAMMED v. KHURRAM PASHA, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 956. The Apex Court considers the very submission/contention of the accused that he was not permitted to cross-examine by the concerned Court on the score that he had not complied with the order passed under Section 143A of the Act. The Apex Court has held as follows : “12. On the other hand, Mr. Nuli submits that the orders passed by the courts below were consistent with the mandate of Section 143A and the right to cross-examine was rightly closed by the courts below. 13. Before we examine the matter in issue, we may extract the relevant provision namely Section 143A of the Act, which is to the following effect:— “143A. Nuli submits that the orders passed by the courts below were consistent with the mandate of Section 143A and the right to cross-examine was rightly closed by the courts below. 13. Before we examine the matter in issue, we may extract the relevant provision namely Section 143A of the Act, which is to the following effect:— “143A. Power to direct interim compensation.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant - (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under subsection (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial years, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.” 14. After empowering the court to pass an order directing the accused to pay interim compensation under Sub-Section 1 of Section 143A, Sub-Section 2 then mandates that such interim compensation should not exceed 20 per cent of the amount of the cheque. After empowering the court to pass an order directing the accused to pay interim compensation under Sub-Section 1 of Section 143A, Sub-Section 2 then mandates that such interim compensation should not exceed 20 per cent of the amount of the cheque. The period within which the interim compensation must be paid is stipulated in Sub-Section 3, while Sub-Section 4 deals with situations where the drawer of the cheque is acquitted. Said Sub-Section 4 contemplates repayment of interim compensation along with interest as stipulated. Sub-Section 5 of said Section 143A then states “the interim compensation payable under this Section can be recovered as if it were a fine”. The expression interim compensation is one which is “payable under this Section” and would thus take within its sweep the interim compensation directed to be paid under Sub-Section 1 of said Section 143A. 15. The remedy for failure to pay interim compensation as directed by the court is thus provided for by the Legislature. The method and modality of recovery of interim compensation is clearly delineated by the Legislature. It is well known principle that if a statute prescribes a method or modality for exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable. While relying on the decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, a Bench of three Judges of this Court made following observations in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh. “7. In Nazir Ahmed case, (1935-36) 63 IA 372 : ( AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)) the Judicial Committee observed that the principle applied in Taylor v. Taylor [[L.R.] 1 Ch. 426, 431] to a court, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under Section 164 and, therefore, held that the Magistrate could not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which he had purported to record under Section 164 of the Code. It was said that otherwise all the precautions and safeguards laid down in Sections 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to be almost idle and that “it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves”. 8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor [[L.R.] 1 Ch. 426, 431] is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted. A Magistrate, therefore, cannot in the course of investigation record a confession except in the manner laid down in Section 164. The power to record the confession had obviously been given so that the confession might be proved by the record of it made in the manner laid down. If proof of the confession by other means was permissible, the whole provision of Section 164 including the safeguards contained in it for the protection of accused persons would be rendered nugatory. The section, therefore, by conferring on Magistrates the power to record statements or confessions, by necessary implication, prohibited a Magistrate from giving oral evidence of the statements or confessions made to him.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, exercise of power of dismissal having not been done in conformity of the Act, the same was set aside. It was stated:— “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error in reaching the conclusion that the dismissal of the appellant from service, in utter violation of Rule 35 of the Rules, was an “act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act …”. It is no doubt correct that the General Board of the Municipality had the power under the Act to dismiss the appellant but the said power could only be exercised in the manner indicated by Rule 35 of the Rules. It is no doubt correct that the General Board of the Municipality had the power under the Act to dismiss the appellant but the said power could only be exercised in the manner indicated by Rule 35 of the Rules. Admittedly the power of dismissal has not been exercised the way it was required to be done under the Act. It is settled proposition of law that a power under a statute has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute and in no other manner. In view of the categoric finding given by the High Court to the effect that the order of dismissal was on the face of it illegal and void, we have no hesitation in holding that the dismissal of the appellant was not an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act. The order of dismissal being patently and grossly in violation of the plain provisions of the Rules. It cannot be treated to have been passed under the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, a Constitution Bench of this Court stated the normal rule of construction in such cases as under:— “27. Then it is to be seen that the Act requires the Board to exercise the power under Section 119 in a particular manner i.e. by way of issuance of orders, instructions and directions. These orders, instructions and directions are meant to be issued to other income tax authorities for proper administration of the Act. The Commission while exercising its quasi-judicial power of arriving at a settlement under Section 245-D cannot have the administrative power of issuing directions to other income tax authorities. It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. If that be so, since the Commission cannot exercise the power of relaxation found in Section 119(2)(a) in the manner provided therein it cannot invoke that power under Section 119(2)(a) to exercise the same in its judicial proceedings by following a procedure contrary to that provided in sub-section (2) of Section 119.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. If that be so, since the Commission cannot exercise the power of relaxation found in Section 119(2)(a) in the manner provided therein it cannot invoke that power under Section 119(2)(a) to exercise the same in its judicial proceedings by following a procedure contrary to that provided in sub-section (2) of Section 119.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. The concerned provision nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. Any such order foreclosing the right would not be within the powers conferred upon the court and would, as a matter of fact, go well beyond the permissible exercise of power. 19. Since the right to cross-examine the respondent was denied to the Appellant, the decisions rendered by the courts below suffer from an inherent infirmity and illegality. Therefore, we have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and setting aside the decisions of all three courts with further direction that Complaint Case No. 244 of 2019 shall stand restored to the file of the Trial Court. The Trial Court is directed to permit the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent and then take the proceedings to a logical conclusion. With these observations the appeal is allowed. 20. It is also directed that 20% of the cheque amount namely Rs.1,40,000/- must be deposited by the Appellant as interim compensation. The Registry is directed to make over a sum of Rs.1,40,000/- to the Trial Court i.e. Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Nagamangala, Karnataka. The amount shall be kept in deposit in Complaint Case No. 244 of 2019 and shall abide by such orders as the Trial Court may deem appropriate to pass. Rest of the amount along with accrued interest, if any, shall be made over to the Appellant. The Registry shall take out a Pay Order in the name of the Appellant which shall be handed over to the learned counsel for the Appellant.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court clearly holds that if interim compensation is not paid, it can be recovered as fine, by initiation of proceedings in terms of Section 143A(2) of the Act. The Registry shall take out a Pay Order in the name of the Appellant which shall be handed over to the learned counsel for the Appellant.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court clearly holds that if interim compensation is not paid, it can be recovered as fine, by initiation of proceedings in terms of Section 143A(2) of the Act. Therefore, the judgment relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the complainant which was followed by the learned Magistrate to deny cross-examination on the ground that the accused had not complied with the order directing payment of interim compensation, as was directed, is rendered unacceptable, as it runs contrary to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court, which I deem appropriate to follow, and not the judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench afore-quoted. It is trite law that a right to cross-examine is a valuable right of the accused. Such a valuable right cannot be taken away by making it subject to payment of interim compensation for which a remedy is available in the statute itself. Such remedy that is available under the statute must be accordingly exercised. 11. Therefore, the reason rendered by the learned Magistrate for rejecting the application filed under Section 311 CrPC seeking cross-examination of PW-1 is on the face of it erroneous. Wherefore, the accused has to be given an opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 by allowing the application so filed by the petitioner, which would be the last opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine or further cross-examine PW-1, as the case would be. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the next date of hearing is on 05-09-2022. Therefore, the concerned Court shall on that date permit the petitioner to cross-examine the complainant and the cross-examination shall conclude on the same date. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following : ORDER (i) Criminal petition is allowed and the order dated 11.07.2022 stands quashed. (ii) The application filed by the petitioner under Section 311 of the CrPC is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to cross/further examine the respondent /PW-1 as one last opportunity on 05-09-2022, the ensuing date or any other date, the Court would deem fit to assign. (iii) The petitioner shall conclude cross-examination on the said date and shall not be entitled to file any such application in future. (iv) Ordered accordingly.