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2022 DIGILAW 1106 (JHR)

Binod Agarwal v. Haridwari Prasad

2022-09-02

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2022
ORDER : The present Civil Revision has been filed for setting aside judgment dated 28.01.2010 (decree signed on 09.02.2010) passed by the Munsif, Latehar in Title Eviction Suit No. 02 of 2007 filed by the plaintiff/opposite party under section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (in short, “the Act, 1982”) whereby decree for eviction has been passed against the defendant/petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the plaintiff/opposite party filed Title (Eviction) Suit No. 02 of 2007 against the defendant/petitioner under section 11(1)(c) of the Act, 1982 praying for a decree of eviction of the defendant from a room measuring 36’ X 13’ situated over plot No. 314, Khata No. 80 of Mouza Durwa, Latehar (hereinafter to be referred as “the suit premises”) claiming that the same was constructed by his father and the defendant/petitioner was inducted as tenant in the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs.75/-. It was further claimed that the said suit premises was needed by him for running grocery shop. The defendant/petitioner appeared in the said case and filed written statement claiming that Bechu Ram (the father of the plaintiff) and his brother-Chaturgun Sao jointly constructed the suit premises. Bechu Ram died living behind four sons namely Badri Prasad, Kedar Prasad, Haridwari Prasad (plaintiff/opposite party) and Dinesh Prasad whereas Chaturgun Sao died leaving behind four sons namely Naurang Prasad, Rajendra Prasad, Arun Prasad and Vijay Prasad. After death of Bechu Ram, the elder son Badri Prasad being head and Karta of the family inducted the defendant/petitioner as tenant in the said suit premises on monthly rent of Rs.75/- and also allotted other portion of house to different tenants who were running their respective businesses. It was further claimed that the plaintiff was also running a grocery shop in his own house situated in the heart of Latehar township. The plaintiff and his brothers had houses suitable for running their business and thus there was no bonafide requirement of the said suit premises by the plaintiff. It was also stated that Partition Suit No. 01 of 1999 was filed by Naurang Prasad and Others against Badri Prasad and Others wherein separate Takhta for the said suit premises was prepared in favour of Naurang Prasad and others. Moreover, the defendant had refused to pay rent to the plaintiff as it was being paid to Badri Prasad. It was also stated that Partition Suit No. 01 of 1999 was filed by Naurang Prasad and Others against Badri Prasad and Others wherein separate Takhta for the said suit premises was prepared in favour of Naurang Prasad and others. Moreover, the defendant had refused to pay rent to the plaintiff as it was being paid to Badri Prasad. Finally, the trial court decreed the eviction suit in favour of the plaintiff/opposite party vide judgment dated 28.01.2010 (decree signed on 09.02.2010) with a direction to the defendant/petitioner to vacate the premises in question within three months from the date of decree and to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff/opposite party. Aggrieved with the said order, the defendant/petitioner filed the present Civil Revision under Section 14(8) of the Act, 1982. In the meantime, the plaintiff/opposite party filed Execution Case No. 01 of 2010 and thus the defendant/petitioner filed interlocutory application being I.A No. 1434 of 2011 for staying the further proceeding of the said execution case. This court, vide order dated 11.11.2011, allowed the said interlocutory application staying further proceeding of the said execution case. It is also submitted that the executing court, vide order dated 01.04.2021, vacated the order of stay granted by this court relying on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Asain Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited & Another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2018) 16 SCC 299 . 3. On the contrary, learned counsel for the opposite party submits that the said suit premises has been constructed by the father of the plaintiff/opposite party and the opposite party has become the exclusive owner of the said suit premises after partition took place among the brothers. It is an admitted fact that the elder brother of the plaintiff had inducted the defendant as tenant who was Karta of the family. The plaintiff had however bonafide requirement of the said suit premises for business purpose of his sons and the said claim of the plaintiff has rightly been decided in his favour. Thus, the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court may not be interfered by this Court under its revisional jurisdiction. The plaintiff had however bonafide requirement of the said suit premises for business purpose of his sons and the said claim of the plaintiff has rightly been decided in his favour. Thus, the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court may not be interfered by this Court under its revisional jurisdiction. It is also submitted that no other person has come forward to claim the ownership of the said suit premises and mere filing of Partition Suit No. 01 of 1999 does not confer any right to the defendant to question title of the plaintiff over the suit premises. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the executing court has misinterpreted the spirit of the judgment of Asian Resurfacing (supra) and as such the stay granted vide order dated 11.11.2011 may be extended and thereafter the order dated 28.01.2010 (decree signed on 09.02.2010) may be set aside by this Court. 6. Looking to the nature of the case as well as the fact that the present Civil Revision is pending since 2010, I feel it appropriate to decide the present case itself on merit without going into the legality of order dated 01.04.2021 passed by the executing court. 7. Thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the plaintiff/opposite party has no right, title and interest over the suit premises as he was inducted as a tenant in the same by the elder brother of the plaintiff namely Badri Prasad to whom the petitioner was paying the rent regularly. 8. On bare perusal of the judgment dated 28.01.2010 it appears that Badri Prasad has been examined as P.W.1 who has stated that partition among all the brothers has taken place and the said suit premises has come in the share of the plaintiff. He has further stated that the suit property was given on rent to the defendant by his father on monthly rent of Rs.75/-. During cross-examination, he has stated that after the death of his father, he was realizing rent being Karta of the family, however since 1995, when the partition took place among his brothers, the defendant has not paid rent to him. During cross-examination, he has stated that after the death of his father, he was realizing rent being Karta of the family, however since 1995, when the partition took place among his brothers, the defendant has not paid rent to him. The plaintiff has examined himself as P.W. 3, who has stated that the defendant has paid him the rent till July 2006. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. Vs. M. Chinniyan & Anr. reported in (2016) 3 SCC 296 has held that when the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. 10. The own admission of the petitioner is that he was inducted as tenant by the elder brother of the plaintiff/opposite party namely Badri Prasad being the Karta of family and was paying rent to him. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the opposite party, has no leg to stand moreso when Badri Prasad was examined as P.W.1 in the eviction suit who supported the claim of the plaintiff. The claim of the petitioner that the plaintiff/opposite party is not the owner of the property in question, rather in Partition Suit No. 01 of 1999, the suit property came in the share of Naurang Prasad, has also not been accepted by the trial court in absence of any documentary proof regarding the said fact. Moreover, in an eviction suit, the landlord is required to prove contract of tenancy between him and the tenant and also the ground on which the eviction is sought. In such a suit, the Rent Court is not required to go into the serious question of title otherwise the very purpose of the Act would stand frustrated. Since the landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was proved by the own admission of the defendant/petitioner, any further contention made on his behalf has rightly not been entertained by the trial court. 11. Since the landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was proved by the own admission of the defendant/petitioner, any further contention made on his behalf has rightly not been entertained by the trial court. 11. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the opposite party has no bonafide requirement of the said suit premises. Learned trial court in the judgment dated 28.01.2010 after taking into consideration the evidences of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W.3 (the plaintiff) has come to the finding that the said suit premises was required by the plaintiff/opposite party for business purpose of his sons namely Pankaj Kumar and Chandan Kumar. The trial court has further observed that the defendants failed to controvert the averment of the plaintiff during cross-examination. 12. It is settled position of law that the High Courts exercising revisional jurisdiction under Rent Control Statutes are not supposed to interfere with the finding of facts, rather should be confined to see that finding of facts recorded by the court below/authority is according to law and does not suffer from any patent error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court below/authority, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous and, if allowed to stand, would result in gross miscarriage of justice, then the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Control Statutes is required to set aside the impugned order being illegal or improper. In the case in hand, the petitioner has failed to show sufficient material before this Court so as to assail the finding of facts arrived at by the trial court. 13. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, I find no infirmity in the judgment dated 28.01.2010 (decree signed on 09.02.2010) passed by the Munsif, Latehar in Title Eviction Suit No. 02 of 2007 so as to make any interference under the revisional jurisdiction. 14. The Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed. 15. I.A. Nos. 22 of 2012 and 7085 of 2021 also stand dismissed.