ORDER : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.05.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Rajmahal in Sessions Case No. 121 of 1999 and Sessions Trial No. 171 of 2002, in connection with Taljhari P.S. Case No. 49 of 1996, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 399 of 1996, Rajmahal, Jharkhand, whereby and where under the learned trial court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable u/Ss.341, 326 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the I.P.C.) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as the R.I.) for 5 (five) years u/s 326 of the I.P.C., further sentenced to undergo R.I. for 5 (five) years under section 394 of the I.P.C. and simple imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as the S.I.) for one month u/s 341 of the I.P.C. and all the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case as per F.I.R. (Ext.2) in brief is that on 16.09.1996 at about 7.30 pm, informant Nandu Mohali was going to his house which was situated in village Purato within P.S. Taljhari, District-Sahibganj from his Aunt’s house. The informant was having a plastic bag which was containing Rs. 270/- (Rupees two Hundred and Seventy only) in cash and 200 gm (two hundred gram) of mustard oil in a bottle. The informant was also having an umbrella in his hand. When the informant covered distance of hundred yards, accused Shankar Prasad Gupta met him on the way, stopped him and caught hold of him and tried to snatch the bag. The informant protested upon which the accused inflicted a dagger blow upon the informant. As a result, the informant sustained long cut bleeding injury on his cheek. Thereafter, the accused took the bag and took to his heels. The informant became unconscious and when he regained his sense he found himself in the Sadar Hospital, Sahibganj where he was being treated. 3. On 19.09.1996 the police recorded his fardbeyan when he became able to speak and on that basis registered a case u/Ss. 341, 324, 307 and 379 of the I.P.C. against the present accused and after investigation submitted charge-sheet u/Ss. 341, 326, 307 and 379 of the I.P.C. Thereafter, the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge framed the charges on 05.09.2002 against the accused appellant for the offence punishable u/ss. 341, 324, 307 and 379 of the I.P.C. against the present accused and after investigation submitted charge-sheet u/Ss. 341, 326, 307 and 379 of the I.P.C. Thereafter, the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge framed the charges on 05.09.2002 against the accused appellant for the offence punishable u/ss. 341, 326, 307 and 394 of the I.P.C. The charges were read over and explained to the accused in Hindi to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Learned trial court after conducting the full-fledged trial passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence which is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Heard Mr. Gautam Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Ram Chander Sahoo, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the informant and Mrs. Nihala Sharmin, learned Addl.P.P. appearing for the State. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants & Informant 6. Learned defence counsel appearing for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for wife of the informant (since deceased) and for Anjala Tudu (P.W.4 ) submitted that although the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable u/Ss. 341, 394, and 326 of the I.P.C. which are not compoundable in nature, but, now over a period of time a good sense has prevailed amongst them and now the matter has been compromised and, therefore, a joint compromise petition has been filed vide Interlocutory Application (hereinafter referred to as the I.A.) No. 2043 of 2022 which has duly been sworn in on affidavit by one of the eye witness AnjaliyaTudu @ Anjala Tudu and by the wife of the informant (since the informant is dead) Sona Hembrom stating that both the parties have resolved their dispute amicably and the wife of the informant and the P.W. 4 who were aggrieved party on the side of prosecution don’t want to pursue this case because the compromise and settlement has been arrived at between the parties amicably. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties also submitted that another I.A. being the I.A. No. 2042 of 2022 has also been filed on behalf of Sona Hembrom wife of late Nandu Mohali @ Nandu Marandi (P.W. 7) who was the informant in the present case stating therein that her husband has expired and therefore, the wife of the informant (P.W.- 7) has sought permission to make an application jointly on behalf of him being his wife, submitting therein that over the period of time now the matter has been resolved between both the parties and since her husband was the informant of this case and he was also the injured and aggrieved party and, therefore, being his wife she is submitting on behalf of her late husband, that the dispute between both the parties has been resolved once and for all and a compromise has taken place and in this view of the matter it is urged that let this appeal be allowed as compounded on behalf of both the parties. 7. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of both the parties (i.e. appellants and informant) relied upon the rulings of Hon’ble Apex Court, where the circumstances have been set out to compound the offences which are non-compoundable in nature, as under: 1. Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Another, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , 2. Yogendra Yadav&Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 , 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2012)10 SCC 303 ,and 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan &Ors. reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 Arguments advanced on behalf of the State 8. Yogendra Yadav&Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 , 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2012)10 SCC 303 ,and 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan &Ors. reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 Arguments advanced on behalf of the State 8. On the other hand, learned, Add.P.P. for the State did not deny the fact with respect to compromise and settlement arrived at between the parties and also submitted that the compromise petition has been filed vide I.A. No. 2043 of 2022 and duly sworn by the eye witness Anjala Tudu (P.W. 4 ) and by the wife of the informant Sona Hembrom and further another I.A. No. 2042 of 2022 has been filed by the wife of the informant( since the informant is dead) where it is urged on her behalf that compromise has taken place between the parties and the dispute has been resolved and therefore, both the parties have submitted before this Court that let this appeal be allowed as compounded despite the fact that the offences under which the appellant was convicted are not compoundable in nature. Now the matter has been settled between the parties and they wanted to resolve the dispute amicably once and for all and in this view of the matter it is urged on behalf of the State that let a suitable order be passed. Appraisal & Findings 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record of this case including the lower court records and the I.As. filed by the parties. 10. It is found in the informant’s fardbeyan that it was basically a case of snatching by the accused from informant Nandu Mohali who was carrying a bag in his hand and when he opposed, the appellant after assaulting the victim informant by the knife, took the bag. It is found that during the course of pendency of this appeal, a compromise has taken place between both the parties which has been duly sworn on affidavit by the witness- P.W. 4 (Anjala Tudu), the wife of the informant Sona Hembrom (since the informant is dead) and one Ajay Kr. Gupta (on behalf of the appellants). It is found that during the course of pendency of this appeal, a compromise has taken place between both the parties which has been duly sworn on affidavit by the witness- P.W. 4 (Anjala Tudu), the wife of the informant Sona Hembrom (since the informant is dead) and one Ajay Kr. Gupta (on behalf of the appellants). From the perusal of the joint compromise petition filed on their behalf vide I.A. No. 2043 of 2022, it is found that both the parties, including the prosecution party namely Anjala Tudu (P.W. 4) and the wife of the informant Sona Hembrom (since the informant is no more alive), submitted therein that due to intervention of the common friend and well-wishers, the dispute has been resolved and a cordial relationship has been restored between them. It is found that the informant Nandu Mohali @ Nandu Marandi (P.W. 7) has expired and his wife Sona Hembrom has come forward to submit about the compromise which has been taken place between both the parties and has sworn on affidavit by virtue of this compromise petition vide I.A. No. 2043 of 2022. The said Sona Marandi, the wife of the informant, has also Filed an I.A. No. 2042 of 2022 by which she stated that she is the wife of the informant and being the wife she is the legal representative and therefore she is a competent person to file an application before this Court submitting therein that a compromise has taken place between both the parties and the dispute has been settled once and for all between both of them. 11. The death certificate of the informant (Nandu Mohali @ Nandu Marandi) has also been enclosed which has been issued by the competent authority of the State Government vide Annexure- A of the I.A. No. 2042 of 2022. 12. Having taken into consideration, the aforesaid submission and also the contents of the I.A., it is found that the sole appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable u/ss. 12. Having taken into consideration, the aforesaid submission and also the contents of the I.A., it is found that the sole appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable u/ss. 341, 394 and 326 of the I.P.C., but, in the light of a few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under certain facts and circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that even if the offences under which the appellant has been convicted are non-compoundable offences, it may be allowed to be compounded in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, if other factors are conducive for resolving the dispute amicably for the ends of justice, the appeal may be allowed to be compounded despite the facts that the appellant has been convicted in non-compoundable offences. The authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are appreciated under the facts and circumstances of the present case as under : The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs.State of Punjab & Anr. (2012)10 SCC 303 laid down following principles: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor...............................” 59. xxxxxxxxx 60. xxxxxxxxx “61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” These principles are subsequently reiterated in a number of cases. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in para 15 as under: “15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. xxx xxxxxx 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of noncompoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” Further in the case of Yogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2014) 9 SCC 653 recapitulating the Gian Singh's case principle (Supra) it has been observed as under: “4. ---------- Needless to say that offences which are noncompoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2012) 10 SCC 303 ). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh's case (Supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (Supra), and Yogendra Yadav's Case (Supra) it is now well settled that the offences which are noncompoundable cannot be compounded by a criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of that there is a scope of compounding the offences by invoking inherent powers of the High Court vested under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between the parties, and further due consideration to the nature and seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. But, such power is to be exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab &Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , as follows : “22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is dis cernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is dis cernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”. 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC.” 24. xxx xxxxxx 25. xxx xxxxxx 26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties. 13. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid proposition of law and its application in the present case, it is found that as per the allegations set out in the fardbeyan of the F.I.R. that the appellant had snatched the bag from the informant at the point of knife and he was injured by the alleged weapon knife and after the trial the learned trial court has convicted the accused appellant for the offence punishable u/ss. 341, 326 and 394 of the IPC. 14. Now, one of the witnesses -P.W. 4 had stated that during the course of the trial he was the eye witness of occurrence and he had stated in his evidence that there was a scuffle between him and the sole accused-appellant Shankar Prasad Gupta, and at the same time the informant reached there and thereafter the incident took place and he (P.W.- 4) being the competent witness and being known about the genesis of the occurrence, has come forward to resolve the dispute amicably, along with the prosecution party including the wife of the informant because the informant is no more alive now. A joint compromise petition has been filed vide I.A. No. 2043 of 2022 by which it appears that peace and tranquility has been restored and a good relationship has developed and cordial relationship is prevailing between them and, therefore, in the interest of justice, it is found that let this appeal be compounded despite the fact that the offence under which the appellant has been convicted are non– compoundable in nature which are sections 341, 326 and 394 of the I.P.C. The nature of dispute between them was purely personal in nature. Under such circumstances if the conviction is confirmed the relationship may get strained and the peace which is now prevailing between the parties may be disturbed. Therefore, in order to, accord quietus to the disputes between the appellant at one side and the P.W.4 and the wife of the informant on the other side in the light of compromise and settlement arrived at between the parties and the contentions raised by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of both the parties, it is found a fit case in the larger interest of peace where the appeal may be allowed as compounded and the offence punishable under sections 341, 326 and 394 of the I.P.C. is allowed to be compounded on the basis of compromise and settlement. 15. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid conclusion under the present facts and circumstances, this appeal is fit to be allowed to be compounded. 16. In the result, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.05.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Rajmahal in Sessions Case No. 121 of 1999 and Sessions Trial No. 171 of 2002, in connection with Taljhari P.S. Case No. 49 of 1996, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 399 of 1996, Rajmahal, Jharkhand against the appellant is set aside. 17. This appeal is allowed as compounded. 18. The appellant is acquitted from the charges leveled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liabilities of the bail bonds. 19. Let the LCR be sent back to the concerned learned court below along with the copy of the judgment.