JUDGMENT 1. The appellant has been convicted, inter alia, under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. In addition, the appellant has been fined Rs.50,000/-; and, in default of payment thereof, the appellant has to suffer another year's imprisonment. 2. The victim in this case was about 13 years old at the time that the initial act of sexual assault was alleged to have been committed by the appellant. The victim asserted that she had been raped on at least three other occasions. There is a statement of the appellant recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 wherein he, apparently, confessed to having raped his minor step-daughter at least four times and being the father of the girl-child that the victim delivered. It was a premature delivery and the child survived barely over a week. However, because of the tardy investigation that we are accustomed to in this country, poor samples drawn led to an inconclusive DNA report. 3. Two principal grounds have been urged on behalf of the appellant: first, that he retracted the alleged confession at the trial, but the trial court proceeded to convict him on the basis of the confession alone; and, secondly, that the alleged victim's statement did not sound true and there was confusion as to the place or places of occurrence. 4. There is no dispute that the victim was a minor. The matter came to light only after September 17, 2013, at a time when the victim was working as a maid in Nongstoin, when she experienced unbearable abdominal pain, was taken to a medical facility and gave premature birth to a girl- child. The victim's mother was informed of the victim being unwell whereupon the victim told her mother that it was her step-father who was the father of her baby daughter and that her step-father had raped her on several occasions. The first information report came to be lodged on September 24, 2013 by a brother of the victim's mother. 5. The victim's mother was informed of the victim being unwell whereupon the victim told her mother that it was her step-father who was the father of her baby daughter and that her step-father had raped her on several occasions. The first information report came to be lodged on September 24, 2013 by a brother of the victim's mother. 5. In between, after the victim informed her mother and others that she had been raped by her step-father and the father of the child that she delivered was her step-father and the time that the complaint came to be made with the police, village meetings were held in the presence of the elders of the two clans. It is the evidence that in course of such meetings, the mother of the victim announced her decision to separate from the appellant. It is also the evidence that immediately after one of the clan meetings was over, the appellant herein confessed to having raped his step- daughter on several occasions. 6. It is in such light that the confessional statement of the appellant has to be read. Such statement was made on September 25, 2013, immediately upon the appellant being arrested and it is evident from Exhibit-13, which is the record of the confession and the notings of the Executive Magistrate, that, at least on paper, both the letter and spirit of Section 164 of the Code were complied with. The appellant's statement reads as follows: My name is Donboklang Ryntathiang, son of (Lt) Shri Dwi Nongsiej. I reside in Mawbri near Riangdo and I am a labourer by profession. I was living with Smoldaris Ryntong as husband and wife. She has one daughter from another man and five children with me. She is 14 (fourteen) years of age. We use to play, me and the young girl, Dibialin. One day last year while playing with her I felt the urge to have intercourse with her. We were at home that time. I asked her to let me have intercourse with her. She resisted and I held her by force and rape her. After that I told her that if she told anyone, I would beat her. Since then I raped her four more times. When she was pregnant she was in Nongstoin and the matter was known only after she had delivered. She resisted and I held her by force and rape her. After that I told her that if she told anyone, I would beat her. Since then I raped her four more times. When she was pregnant she was in Nongstoin and the matter was known only after she had delivered. I had confessed to her relatives and I confess here too that I had raped her and that I am her baby daughter's father. 7. The victim was steadfast in her version through the three statements that she rendered. The initial statement was to the police under Section 161 of the Code. Thereafter, her statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code. She repeated the same version in court and was unshaken by the cross-examination that she had to endure. The victim narrated that it was sometime in January, 2013 when her step-father was working in the fields and she was also present, that she was suddenly grabbed by the step-father who, thereupon, raped her. She recollected that she lost her consciousness and when she regained consciousness she realised that her undergarments had been put back on her. She narrated that she struggled to get on her feet and noticed that her step-father was sitting a distance away where a temporary shed had been constructed. She recounted that her step-father threatened to kill her if she mentioned the matter to any person. She claimed that she was too frightened to talk of the incident. 8. The victim then went on to say that a day or two later when she was lying down at night, her step-father crept up beside her and again raped her. The appellant apparently followed it up with the threat that she must not disclose the same to any other person. The victim described at least two other occasions when she was raped by her step-father. In or about March, 2013, according to the victim, she went to work as a maid and she was not back home till after everything came to light upon her experiencing abdominal pain and delivering the premature baby on September 17, 2013. 9. Apart from the victim and her mother, the maternal uncle of the victim who lodged the FIR and the wife of such maternal uncle were also called as witnesses. 9. Apart from the victim and her mother, the maternal uncle of the victim who lodged the FIR and the wife of such maternal uncle were also called as witnesses. Though neither the mother of the victim nor any of the other relatives was an eyewitness to any of the incidents of rape reported by the victim, the evidentiary value of their testimonies is only for the purpose of corroboration with what the victim had told them and the fact that the appellant herein had confessed before them and other family members of having raped the victim at least four times. Such assertion of the appellant of having raped the victim several times is also found in his confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code where, towards the end of such statement, he indicated that he had earlier confessed his guilt and was again confessing the same before the Magistrate. This was not a case of a solitary incident of confession at a moment when the appellant may have been weak or was otherwise coerced into submission. The clear evidence at the trial was that the appellant willingly confessed before the family members that he had raped the victim on several occasions and was the father of the premature child that she delivered. 10. It is true that in matters pertaining to serious offences which entail strict penalties, the mere confession of the accused ought, generally, not to be made the only basis for his conviction. Indeed, the practice in this country is that the surrounding circumstances are seen and if the confession of the accused is in sync with the surrounding circumstances, that is to say that the presence of the accused was more probable than not at the place of occurrence and at the time of occurrence, the confession is then taken more seriously. Here is a case of a 13-year-old victim who complained that she had been raped by her step-father, under whose roof she resided and who had threatened to kill her if she so much as made a whimper. There was no possible motive that could be attributed to the victim for seeking to falsely implicate her step-father. Here is a case of a 13-year-old victim who complained that she had been raped by her step-father, under whose roof she resided and who had threatened to kill her if she so much as made a whimper. There was no possible motive that could be attributed to the victim for seeking to falsely implicate her step-father. Indeed, she had gone away quietly to work as a maid far from home and it was only the accidental fact that she had conceived - of which she was still innocent to be aware - that the matter came to light. The dates are also of significance, since the victim complained that the initial incident had taken place in January, 2013 and it was repeated at least three times shortly thereafter. The premature delivery of the child was on September 17, 2013. 11. The trial court referred to the evidence in great detail and, in particular, dealt with the confessional statement of the appellant herein, which the appellant sought to resile from in course of the trial. In response to several questions put to the appellant in course of his examination under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant appears to have sung a tune which was different from his apparent confession before his relatives and the formal confession before the Magistrate. In response to question No.23 put by the trial court to the appellant pertaining to his confessional statement, the appellant replied that he had not admitted his guilt before the police, but I confessed the same because the police beat me up and put chilly on my eyes. When the trial court specifically referred to the statements of the victim and the appellant recorded under Section 164 of the Code in the next question and sought the appellant's response, he replied: I do not know anything regarding the findings of the I/O. 12. On a further question as to his confession and that he had apparently threatened to beat up the victim girl if she disclosed the incidents of her step-father raping her to any other, he denied that he had confessed to the Magistrate that he had threatened the victim. 13. In the light of the appellant's attempt to wish away his confessional statement or retract therefrom, the trial court dealt at length on the submission put forth in such regard. 13. In the light of the appellant's attempt to wish away his confessional statement or retract therefrom, the trial court dealt at length on the submission put forth in such regard. The trial court noticed that all the safeguards as indicated in Section 164 of the Code were followed by the Magistrate and the Magistrate testified to such effect in course of the trial. The trial court referred copiously to Exhibit-13, which was the recording of the appellant's confession, and found that the Magistrate had clearly enquired of the appellant whether the appellant wanted to voluntarily make the statement, whether the appellant was aware that the Magistrate did not belong to the police or the investigating agency and made every attempt to ensure that the appellant realised the consequence of his confession. The trial court found that sufficient time was afforded to the appellant to reflect on whether he would go through with the confession. 14. In course of the appeal, Exhibit-13 has been taken out from the lower court records and it appears that the relevant Magistrate followed the steps without any demur. On a plain reading of the statement, coupled with the relevant Magistrate's testimony at the trial, there does not appear to be any doubt as to its validity and the fact that such statement was voluntarily given by the appellant. 15. In this context, the trial court extracted the entirety of the appellant's confessional statement and found how parts thereof were otherwise corroborated. The trial court referred to Section 80 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the fact that there was nothing to detract from the oral evidence of the relevant Magistrate. 16. On how a confessional statement should be recorded and the same should be read and dealt with, the appellant relies on a judgment reported at (1978) 3 SCC 435 (Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan). In that case, the appellant was charged with a double murder and the only material against him was a confession recorded under Section 164 of the Code and circumstantial evidence. The facts revealed that the appellant was taken to a place where a crime of a similar pattern had been committed and it was at such other place that his statement under Section 164 of the Code was recorded. 17. Several objections were taken as to the manner in which the confession was recorded. The facts revealed that the appellant was taken to a place where a crime of a similar pattern had been committed and it was at such other place that his statement under Section 164 of the Code was recorded. 17. Several objections were taken as to the manner in which the confession was recorded. It was asserted, inter alia, that the confession was not voluntary because there was no explanation why the appellant in that case was taken to a different place for recording of the confession; that the judicial lock-up in which the appellant was kept was contiguous to the police station; that the appellant was not free from police surveillance and influence at the time; that the Magistrate did not give enough time to the appellant for reflection; and, that after recording the statement, the appellant was handed over to the police in apparent violation of Section 164(3) of the Code. Most importantly, the further ground of challenge was that there was no corroboration of the confession. 18. It was in the light of the nature of the challenge to the confessional statement, coupled with the admitted position that there was no corroboration thereof, that the Supreme Court was pleased not to rely on the alleged confession for the several anomalies in the recording thereof, not the least of them being unusual procedure of having recorded the same at a completely different place. 19. In the present case, the evidence cannot be lost sight of. The victim gave as good a description of the initial incident as a 13-year-old girl could upon reflecting on the trauma that she must have experienced. Unlike other cases of sexual assault, here there was a child delivered by the victim without any attempt by the defence to indicate who, other than the appellant, may have been the father of such child. It is a matter of regret that much court time could have been saved if appropriate DNA samples were drawn and it was established that the appellant herein was the father of the child who died within 10 days of her birth. However, when it comes to crimes committed by poor persons against other poor persons in this country, the investigation is of the kind as in this case. 20. However, when it comes to crimes committed by poor persons against other poor persons in this country, the investigation is of the kind as in this case. 20. As to the perceived discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence of the initial incident and others, the appellant relies on a judgment reported at (2012) 8 SCC 21 (Rai Sandeep Alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi). Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the report have been placed for the qualities that are found in a sterling witness. In that case, the allegation was that the victim had been gang-raped at her sister's house at 1:30 am and little other than a minor abrasion on the right side of the neck below her jaw was found as an injury mark with no injury to her private parts. The other persons present in the house at the time of the occurrence did not corroborate the victim's narration of the incident. It was in such circumstances that the Supreme Court did not accept the victim's version. 21. It is, however, the general law of the land that, particularly in cases of sexual abuse, the victim's version of the incident cannot be discarded merely because there is no other ocular evidence in support thereof. Generally, crimes like rape are not committed in the middle of a market-place or in the presence of several persons. The law as it stands requires the court to ascertain whether the victim's version has a ring of truth about it. In this case, despite the later antics of the appellant, the defence was not able to make a dent in the victim's version of the incident or her narration of how the after the first occasion, she was raped on at least three other occasions within a short duration before she left her home to work as a maid elsewhere. 22. On the overall appreciation of the material before the trial court, the judgment of conviction cannot be faulted. The trial court read the evidence in the proper perspective, took relevant considerations into account and appropriately dealt with the vain attempt by the appellant to disown the confessional statement that he had made. 22. On the overall appreciation of the material before the trial court, the judgment of conviction cannot be faulted. The trial court read the evidence in the proper perspective, took relevant considerations into account and appropriately dealt with the vain attempt by the appellant to disown the confessional statement that he had made. The sentence awarded is in accordance with law and the trial court had no discretion in the matter, particularly considering that the case is of aggravated sexual assault as the minor victim in this case was under the care of the appellant who is her step-father. 23. The judgment of conviction and the sentence pronounced on October 21, 2020 do not call for any interference. There is no merit in the appeal and as it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant herein who had raped his step-daughter on several occasions and caused her the misery of going through a pregnancy that she did not realise and a premature child birth, apart from the trauma that may haunt her for the rest of her life. The mental agony and the pain will be difficult for the victim to get over and the appellant will have enough time to reflect in solitude as to what drove him to commit the offence. 24. Crl.A.No.7 of 2020 is dismissed. 25. Crl.M.C.No.20 of 2020 stands disposed of. 26. Let a copy of this judgment be immediately made over to the appellant free of cost.