JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate for the review petitioners. Also heard Mr. D. Majumdar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. T. Gyadi, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This application, under Chapter X of the Gauhati High Court Rules, read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is preferred by the four petitioners i.e. (1) the State of Arunachal Pradesh, represented by the Chief Secretary, (2) The Secretary, District Administration Department, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, (3) Chairmancum- Deputy Commissioner of DPC dated 30.06.2020 and (4) the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa, East Kameng District, Arunachal Pradesh for reviewing the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 12/2021 (Shri Kacho Gyadi Vs. the State of A.P & Others). 3. The factual background leading to filing of the present petition is briefly stated as under:- “On 30.06.2020, a DPC was held under the chairmanship of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa for filling up of 8 vacant posts of Multi Tasking Staffs (MTS). The DPC has decided to fill up 3 posts by direct recruitment, out of the 8 posts, and further decided to fill up the remaining 5 posts, 3 from the senior most members of Agency Labour Corps (ALC) and 2 from senior most unskilled contingency workers of the establishment of Deputy Commissioner, Seppa. Out of the 3 posts, reserved for the ALC, 2 posts were filled up by APST and one post was filled up by non-APST against unreserved vacancies. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the DPC, the respondent No. 1, namely, Shri Kacho Gyadi had filed one writ petition, being WP(C) No. 12/2021, challenging the appointment of non-APST candidate to the post of MTS even though, the candidate was junior to him. The said appointments were made from the ALC, following the Cabinet decision of 1984. Thereafter, vide Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, while allowing the writ petition, this Court was pleased to set aside the DPC recommendation dated 31.06.2020, with regard to private respondents in the said writ petition, and it was directed to constitute a fresh DPC in terms of the observations made in the said Judgment. Thereafter, vide Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, while allowing the writ petition, this Court was pleased to set aside the DPC recommendation dated 31.06.2020, with regard to private respondents in the said writ petition, and it was directed to constitute a fresh DPC in terms of the observations made in the said Judgment. But, the said Judgment dated 06.12.2021, could not be given effect to as it was found that the Rules 2019, governing the appointment to the post of Group ‘C’ MTS, does not provide for appointment from the post of ALC and only unskilled Contingency staffs are eligible for such promotion/appointment to the post of MTS, though, subsequently, new Rules were framed making such avenue for the ALC. As there was no provision in the Rules 2019 for ALC, the entire DPC proceeding, in respect of appointment from the post of ALC is illegal and therefore, the petitioners approached this Court for review of the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021 on a grounds that:- (a) That, there was error apparent on the face of the record that has crept in the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021; (b) That, patent mistake had been crept in the impugned Judgment & Order, dated 06.12.2021; (c) That, while promoting the ALCs to the post of MTS, the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa relied upon a Cabinet decision of 1984, though such amendment was never made in the Recruitment Rules; (d) That, the Recruitment Rules to the post of MTS was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa only after the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021. As such, the said Recruitment Rules could not be brought to the notice of this Court before passing the impugned Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021; (e) That, the Recruitment Rules to the post of Group ‘C’ MTS only provides for filling up the posts from amongst the unskilled contingency staffs and there is no provision under the said rules for appointment of ALC to the post of MTS; (f) That, the 2019 Recruitment Rules to the post of MTS was not within the knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa and as such, could not be brought to the knowledge of this Court when the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, was passed; (g) That, the implementation of the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, would be against the Recruitment Rules of 2019, and as such, the same cannot be legally given effect to and therefore, it is contended to allow this petition by reviewing the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, in WP(C) No. 12/2021, and to issue direction to the review petitioner, to constitute a fresh DPC in terms of the Rules of 2019, to fill up the post of MTS;” 4. The respondent No.1 has submitted his affidavit-in-opposition denying the assertions made in the review petition. It is stated that on the basis of the said Cabinet Decision, 1984, many promotions were made to the post of MTS from the ALC and there is no patent error on the face of the record in the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, passed by this Court and that the said Rule was within the knowledge of the petitioners and that column No.10 of the Recruitment Rules 2011 and 2019 are and as such discovery of new documents does not arise. Therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. Mr. S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the review petitioners reiterated the grounds mentioned the petition and submits that while the Deputy Commissioner had convened the DPC on 30.06.2020, for filling up the 8 vacant MTS posts, then he relied upon the Cabinet decision dated 03.07.1984. But, the said Cabinet decision has not been given effect to by amending the Recruitment Rules and the Recruitment Rules of 2019 for MTS was not brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa and therefore, the DPC was held on 30.06.2020, as per the Cabinet decision of 1984. 6. Mr. But, the said Cabinet decision has not been given effect to by amending the Recruitment Rules and the Recruitment Rules of 2019 for MTS was not brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa and therefore, the DPC was held on 30.06.2020, as per the Cabinet decision of 1984. 6. Mr. Tapin further submits that as “The General Arunachal Service, Group-C (Ministerial) Multi Tasking Staff (Duftary/Peon/ Chowkidar/Mali/Barber/Cook/Washerman/Cobbler and equivalent posts) Common Recruitment Rules, 2019” (Recruitment Rules of 2019) was not brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner has promoted the ALC to the post of MTS following the Cabinet decision and as the Recruitment Rules of 2019 does not provide for promotion of ALC to the post of MTS, the error was committed by the Deputy Commissioner and consequently, the impugned Judgment and Order was passed by this Court on 06.12.2021, and as material irregularity is committed, the same may be reviewed by directing the Deputy Commissioner to convene a fresh DPC in terms of the Recruitment Rules of 2019, to the post of MTS. 7. Per contra, Mr. D. Majumdar, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. T. Gyadi, learned counsel for the respondents submits that this Court was pleased to pass impugned Judgment & Order on the basis of Affidavit-in-Opposition submitted by the respondent authorities, who are the present review petitioners and the same was based on the Cabinet decision in the year 1984. The Recruitment Rules of 2019, to the post of MTS was never brought to the notice of the Court. 8. Mr. Majumdar, the learned Senior Counsel further submits that this Court while passing the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, this court had relied upon the documents, whatsoever, were submitted along with the Affidavit-in-Opposition, by the Government Advocate and also produced at the time of hearing before this Court, and now the review petitioners’ cannot turn around to contend that a mistake has been committed by this Court in passing the Judgment and Order, and as such there is no error apparent on the face of the record as contended by the petitioners. Mr. Mr. Majumdar further pointed out that vide DPC, held on 30.06.2020, 5 incumbents were promoted and this Court was pleased to set aside only the promotion of private respondent No. 1 and if this Court review its Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, as contended by the learned Senior Government Advocate, then the same will affect the promotion of the other 4 incumbents, who are not before this Court and the same will cause grave prejudice to them and that lack of diligence on the part of the review petitioners are apparent on the face of the record as they could not produce the said Rules 2019 being the custodian of the same, in proper time and place and therefore, Mr. Majumdar contended to dismiss this review petition. 9. Having heard the submissions of learned counsels of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the impugned Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021. 10. It is not in dispute that vide the DPC, held on 30.06.2020, 5 posts were filled up, 3 posts from senior most ALCs and 2 posts from senior most unskilled contingency workers from the establishment of Deputy Commissioner, Seppa. Out of the 3 posts, 2 posts were reserved for ALC to be filled up by APST candidates and one post was filled up by non-APST candidates against unreserved vacancies. The respondent No. 1, who was in a position No. 3 at the select list, filed the writ petition challenging the appointment of non-APST to the post of MTS, who was junior to him and thereafter, hearing both the parties, this Court was pleased to set aside the appointment of private respondent to the post of MTS and the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa was directed to convene a fresh DPC and to promote the petitioner to the post of MTS within a period of one month. Further, it appears that the Judgment and Order of this Court, dated 06.12.2021, could not be given effect to as the Review Petitioner No. 4, the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa was pre-occupied with the treatment of his father, who was suffering from ailment and also due to his preengagement with the Covid-19 pandemic and thereafter, while the DPC was convened, then it was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that there was a Rules governing promotion to the post of Group ‘C’ MTS and there was no provision under the said Rules for appointment of ALC to the post of MTS. 11. The submission, so advanced at the bar received due consideration of this Court. Also, I have carefully gone through the 2019 Recruitment Rules to the post of Group ‘C’ MTS. And it appears that the said Rule was not considered by the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa during the time of holding the DPC nor by this court at the time of hearing the writ Petition(C) No. 12/2021, allegedly for being not in the knowledge of the review petitioners. 12. From a careful perusal of the pleadings of the parties and hearing submissions of learned Advocates of the parties to questions to be answered by this is indentified as under:- (i) Whether there was error apparent on the face of the record and that patent error has crept in the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 12/2021 ( Shri Kacho Gyadi Vs. the State of A.P & Others), ? (ii) Whether discovery of the new material i.e. the Recruitment Rules of 2019, was not within its knowledge of the review petitioners, and they could not produce the same even after having exercised due diligence, prior to passing of the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021 ? 13. Before directing a discussion into the points so identified above, it would be beneficial to understand what actually ‘review’ means and under what circumstances it can be exercised. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code is the substantive provision that deals with the scope of review and the grounds available for filing review petition against judgments have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC. This issue is elaborately dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. In the case of Shri Ram Sahu (Dead), through LRS Vs. This issue is elaborately dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. In the case of Shri Ram Sahu (Dead), through LRS Vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 3601 of 2020 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 28150 of 2017) while considering the scope and ambit of the Court’s power under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, referring to some of its earlier decisions, has discussed as under :- 6.1 In the case of Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 78 , while considering the scope and ambit of Section 114 CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is observed and held in paragraph 14 to 18 as under: “14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 it was held that:- “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:- “It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.’ ” 15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. 16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 , this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the Judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: (SCC p. 390, para 3) “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 17. The judgment in Aribam case has been followed in Meera Bhanja. In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long - drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 were also noted: “An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 18. It is also pertinent to mention the observations of this Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 . Relying upon the judgments in Aribam and Meera Bhanja it was observed as under: “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not selfevident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 6.2 In the case of Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 , it is observed and held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed in the said decision that the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 . 12.3 In the case of Inderchand Jain vs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663 in paragraphs 7 to 11 it is observed and held as under: 7. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) provides for a substantive power of review by a civil court and consequently by the appellate courts. The words “subject as aforesaid” occurring in Section 114 of the Code mean subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court but such limitations have been provided for in Order 47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as under: “17. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: ‘1. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: ‘1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the court which passed the decree or made the order.’ ” 8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) “6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.” 9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order. 11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 251, para 56) “56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.” 14. Again while dealing with the error apparent on the face of the record Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “8. What can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the proceedings has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T.Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 . It is held that such an error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , it is observed as under: “It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned counsels on either side were unable to suggest any clear cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.” 8.1 In the case of Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi, (Supra) in paragraph 7 to 9 it is observed and held as under: 7. Learned counsels on either side were unable to suggest any clear cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.” 8.1 In the case of Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi, (Supra) in paragraph 7 to 9 it is observed and held as under: 7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 this Court opined:- “What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (supra) this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. 8.2 In the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Anr., (2008) 8 SCC 612 , this Court had an occasion to consider what can be said to be “mistake or error apparent on the face of record”. In para 22 to 35 it is observed and held as under: “22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision. 23. We may now notice some of the judicial precedents in which Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and/or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act have been interpreted and limitations on the power of the civil court/tribunal to review its judgment/decision have been identified. 24. 23. We may now notice some of the judicial precedents in which Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and/or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act have been interpreted and limitations on the power of the civil court/tribunal to review its judgment/decision have been identified. 24. In Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao (18991900) 27 IA 197 the Privy Council interpreted Sections 206 and 623 of the Civil Procedure Code and observed: (IA p.205) “… Section 623 enables any of the parties to apply for a review of any decree on the discovery of new and important matter and evidence, which was not within his knowledge, or could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the latter words should be confined to reasons strictly ejusdem generic with those enumerated, as was held in Roy Meghraj v. Beejoy Gobind Burral, ILR (1875) 1 Cal 197. In the opinion of Their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event.” (emphasis added) 25. In Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, 1949 FCR 36 a five Judge Bench of the Federal Court while considering the question whether the Calcutta High Court was justified in not granting relief to non-appealing party, whose position was similar to that of the successful appellant, held: (FCR p.48) “That a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.” 26. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius (supra) this Court interpreted the provisions contained in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which are analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 and observed: “32. … Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely:- (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, least analogous to those specified in the rule’. “27. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (supra) it was held that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereof an erroneous decision can be corrected. 28. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (Supra) it was held as under: (SCC p. 716) “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 29. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 29. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (supra) this Court made a reference to the Explanation added to Order 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and held:- “13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it ‘may make such order thereon as it thinks fit’. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing ‘on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason’. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.” 30. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.” 30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (Supra) this Court considered the scope of the High Courts’ power to review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, referred to an earlier decision in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab (Supra) and observed: (Aribam Tuleshwar case (Supra), SCC p. 390, para 3) “3. … It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab (Supra), there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 31. In K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 , it was held that even though Order 47 Rule 1 is strictly not applicable to the tribunals, the principles contained therein have to be extended to them, else there would be no limitation on the power of review and there would be no certainty or finality of a decision. A slightly different view was expressed in Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 ). A slightly different view was expressed in Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 ). In that case it was held that the power of review granted to the tribunals is similar to the power of a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1. 32. In Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596 , this Court reiterated that power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a civil court and held: (SCC p. 608, paras 3031) “30. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression ‘any other sufficient reason’ used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the Rule. 31. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.” 33. In State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla, (2007) 1 SCC 457 this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 46566, para 27) “27. A review petition filed by the appellants herein was not maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. In State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla, (2007) 1 SCC 457 this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 46566, para 27) “27. A review petition filed by the appellants herein was not maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.” 34. In Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers’ Assn., (2007) 9 SCC 369 this Court held that after rejecting the original application filed by the appellant, there was no justification for the Tribunal to review its order and allow the revision of the appellant. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below: (SCC p. 387, para 40) “40. The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Sinha, J.) that the Tribunal has travelled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect.” 35. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are:- (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.” 15. Again in a very recent case, in S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy delivered on 18 August, 2022 in Civil Appeals No. 5503-04 of 2022, arising out of petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.9602-03 of 2022, along with Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022, arising out of petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.11290 of 2022, held as under:- “33. A perusal of the averments made in the second set of review petitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discovery of new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. A perusal of the averments made in the second set of review petitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discovery of new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. When it is the case of the respondents themselves that the relevant documents were all along available in the revenue records and they had already filed xerox copies thereof during the second revision proceedings, they can hardly be heard to state that the said documents were unknown to them and were unavailable for being produced before the learned Single Judge prior to passing of the common judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013. It is evident from the above that the respondents had not discovered any new material for them to have moved a second set of review petitions. In order to satisfy the requirements prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, it is imperative for a party to establish that discovery of the new material or evidence was neither within its knowledge when the decree was passed, nor could the party have laid its hands on such documents/evidence after having exercised due diligence, prior to passing of the order. What to speak of conclusive proof of having undertaken an exercise of due diligence for accessing the relevant documents, there is not an averment made by the respondents in the second set of review petitions to the effect that they could not trace the documents in question earlier or that they had made sincere efforts to obtain certified copies thereof before the common order dated 9th July, 2013 was passed, but could not do so for some cogent and valid reasons. 34. In other words, nothing has been stated on affidavit to substantiate the plea taken by the respondents at such a belated stage that the documents sought to be filed by them with the second set of review petitions had come to light after passing of the judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring loopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings that was all along in their power and possession and ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring loopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings that was all along in their power and possession and ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. In fact, it appears that the Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued to the hilt on several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record, which were all considered and turned down as meritless. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that non-production of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents at the appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of the judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013 particularly, when five opportunities enumerated in para 31 above, were available to them for production of the said documents, which were all frittered away, one by one.” 16. So, what can be crystallized from the illuminating discourse, made herein above, is that the court can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. An error, which is not self-evident, and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying review of its judgment. The power of review cannot be exercised to correct an erroneous judgment/order. While dealing with an application for review, the courts have to confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial judgment as vitiated by an error apparent. Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has to satisfy the requirement prescribed in order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. It is imperative for a party to establish that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier. 17. Having understood the law of review presently holding the field now an endeavor will be made to answer the question identified here in above. 18. 17. Having understood the law of review presently holding the field now an endeavor will be made to answer the question identified here in above. 18. Here in this case, the Recruitment Rules of 2019, for the post of MTS was neither produced before the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa at the time of conducting the DPC on 30.06.2020, nor was the same produced at the time of hearing of the Writ Petition (C) No. 12/2021 before this Court before pronouncement of Judgment and Order on 06.12.2021. It is to be noted here that the aforesaid Recruitment Rules does not provide for appointment of ALC to the post of MTS. However, it eschewed consideration of the DPC held on 30.06.2020. The judgment Order dated 06.12.2021, was pronounced on the basis of materials, whatsoever was produced before this court and whatever points argued before this court. Existence of Recruitment Rules 2019, was never whispered by the petitioners as it was found subsequently. This court was confined to its adjudication with reference to materials which was available at the time of initial decision. And as such subsequent happening or development cannot be taken note of now for declaring the initial judgment as vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The error apparent on the face of the record, as pleaded by the petitioners, is not self-evident. Mr. D. Majumdar, the learned Senior Counsel has rightly pointed out during argument and I find substance in the same. In view of above, and also in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases, discussed herein above, it cannot be said that there is error apparent on the face of the record. The arguments, so advanced on behalf of the reviewer petitioners, are thus appears to be misconceived. The first point is answered accordingly. 19. Now, coming to the second point i.e. the Recruitment Rules of 2019 was neither within the knowledge of the review petitioners when the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, was passed and the petitioners could not produce the same after having exercised due diligence, prior to passing of the order, it appears that the review petitioners are the custodian of the same being in the helm of affairs. 20. The review petitioners have missed the opportunity of using the same when the DPC was convened on 30.06.2020. 20. The review petitioners have missed the opportunity of using the same when the DPC was convened on 30.06.2020. And subsequently the petitioners missed the same when the writ petition was heard by this court. It is to be mentioned here that the said judgment dated 06.12.2021, was passed on the basis of Cabinet Decision of 1984, which was produced before this court by the review petitioner. But, interestingly, the said Rule was all along under the custody of the review petitioners. They failed make good use of it when the DPC was held on 30.06.2020, and the matter was extensively argued before this court at the time of hearing the writ petition and before pronouncement of the judgment on 06.12.2021. Having been failed to make good use of the Rules, inspite of being custodian of the same, and inspite of getting sufficient opportunities, can it be said that the review petitioners have exercised due diligence prior to passing of the Judgment and Order, which is sought to be reviewed ? In view of the given facts and circumstances on the record, and also in view of the ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases discussed herein above, and also in view of the considered opinion of this court, the answer is got to be emphatic no. The pleadings of the review petitioners and the documents placed on record and the arguments so advanced by the learned Sr. Govt. Advocate, have failed to give such an impression to this court, even too remotely. No cogent and valid reason is assigned as to why the Rules, which was all along in their power and possession, and which ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that non-production of the said Rules, on the part of the review petitioners at the appropriate stage, cannot be a ground for seeking review of the judgment dated 06.12.2021. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the cases discussed herein above, mere discovery of new or important matter is not sufficient ground for review. The petitioners have to show exercise of due diligence, which the petitioners herein this petition have failed to establish. 21. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the cases discussed herein above, mere discovery of new or important matter is not sufficient ground for review. The petitioners have to show exercise of due diligence, which the petitioners herein this petition have failed to establish. 21. Another important aspect, which cannot lost sight of, is that if this Court is inclined to allow this petition then the promotion of four other incumbents, who were promoted to the post of MTS by the said DPC held on 30.06.2020, also will be affected as their promotion and appointment also has to be declared as not in accordance with the Rules 2019. The said incumbents are not before this Court. And without hearing them, if by allowing this review petition, the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2021, is reviewed then it would cause serious prejudice to them. Mr. D. Majumdar, the learned Senior Counsel has rightly pointed it out during his argument and rightly contended to dismiss this petition and I record concurrence to the same. 22. In the result, and in view of above discussion, I find no merit in this Review Petition, No. 5(AP) of 2022, and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own costs.