JUDGMENT : These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 13.01.2022 in C.C No.16/2011 passed by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur. The appellant in Crl.A No.124/2022 is the sole accused. The appellant in Crl.A No.155/2022 is the defacto complainant. By the impugned judgment, the Trial Court convicted the accused under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'). While disposing of the Case, the Trial Court held that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC against the defacto complainant (PW1) and directed to file a complaint against him. CRIMINAL APPEAL No.124 of 2022 Prosecution Case: 2. The accused was a Village Officer of Mundur-1 Village in Palakkad District in 2009. The defacto complainant (PW1) owned the landed property covered by sale deed No.1855/07/1 of SRO, Parali. His father had 'verumpattom right' over the land, having an extent of 24.75 cents. PW1 purchased the said right from his father under Ext.P3 sale deed in 2007. A thandaper number had been assigned to the property in favour of the father of PW1 and he had been remitting the property tax in the thandaper number before the registration of Ext.P3 sale deed. On 20.08.2009, PW1 approached the accused for effecting mutation regarding the property in his name and to remit the property tax. The accused insisted on measuring the property. After measuring the property on 21.08.2009, the accused demanded a sum of Rs.1,500/-as a bribe for effecting mutation. The accused accepted Rs.1,000/-on 21.08.2009 at 12.00 p.m. at the Village Office, Mundur-1. He demanded Rs.500/-more from PW1. As PW1 had not possessed the money as demanded by the accused, he returned to his native place at Ootty. The accused continued demanding the balance sum of Rs.500/-. PW1 finally complained to the Dy.SP, VACB, Palakkad (PW9) on 07.09.2009. Based on the complaint, PW9 registered Ext.P1(a) FIR, and a trap was laid. On 08.09.2009, PW1 handed over Rs.500/-which the accused accepted. The accused was arrested along with the trap money. Phenolphthalein test was conducted on the currency notes recovered from the possession of the accused. The test turned positive. 3. The accused is, therefore, alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The accused was arrested along with the trap money. Phenolphthalein test was conducted on the currency notes recovered from the possession of the accused. The test turned positive. 3. The accused is, therefore, alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 9 and proved Exts.P1 to P32 and MOs 1 to 5. Exhibits D1 to D4 were marked on the side of the defence. 5. PW1 is the defacto complainant. PW2 is a relative of PW1. PW3, an independent witness, was examined to prove the trap. PW4 was an officer of the Revenue Department who was examined to prove the recovery of certain documents from the office of the accused. PW5, who was holding additional charge of the Assistant Executive Engineer (PWD), prepared the sketch of the place of occurrence. PW6 is the Village Officer who succeeded the accused. PWs 7 and 8 were examined to prove the seizure mahazar. PW9 is the DySP, VACB, the Trap Lying Officer who seized MO1 currency notes. Defence Case: 6. PW1 approached the accused on 20.08.2009 to remit the tax for the property covered by Ext.P3 sale deed, along with the tax receipt of the year 2007 and a possession certificate. Exhibit P3 sale deed appeared as a 'created document' as there were no prior documents. PW1 had yet to regularly remit the tax after 2007. The accused informed PW1 that only after measuring the property and verifying the relevant documents, could tax be remitted for the property in respect of the extent he claimed. On 21.08.2009, the accused visited the property and measured the same. Since the pathway situated on the northern and eastern sides was widened, the property had an extent of only 17.5 cents as against 24.75 cents claimed by PW1. The accused represented to PW1 that he could accept tax only in respect of 17.5 cents of property. On 08.09.2009, PW1 thrusted a sum of Rs.500/-into his pocket and also shook his hands with a request to accept the tax for 24.75 cents of property. Then and there, the accused informed PW9, the Trap Laying Officer, that PW1 had thrusted the money into his pocket. On 08.09.2009, PW1 thrusted a sum of Rs.500/-into his pocket and also shook his hands with a request to accept the tax for 24.75 cents of property. Then and there, the accused informed PW9, the Trap Laying Officer, that PW1 had thrusted the money into his pocket. After the trap, to create evidence, PW1 attempted to remit the tax in respect of the entire extent of 24.75 cents, but he could not succeed. The accused has been falsely implicated in this crime as part of the attempt of PW1 to remit tax in respect of 24.75 cents of land. The accused has not committed any offences as alleged. 7. The Trial Court convicted the accused, holding that the prosecution proved the demand and acceptance of the bribe. Submissions: 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted that there is no legal evidence to establish the demand and acceptance as pleaded by the prosecution. The learned counsel submitted that the defence version is more probable than the prosecution version from the circumstances brought out in the evidence. The learned counsel submitted that PW1 is not a 'wholly reliable' witness. According to the learned counsel, no positive independent evidence is available to establish the demand for money. The prosecution examined no probable witnesses in support of the case of acceptance. It is submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the acceptance of bribe money. The defence also contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the application of mind by the sanctioning authority in according sanction under Section 19 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel relied on B.Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (2014) 13 SCC 55 ], P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P [ (2015) 10 SCC 152 ] and State of Kerala v. Rao [ 2011 (2) KLT 812 ] to substantiate his contentions. 10. The learned Special Government Pleader, per contra, contended that though PW1, the defacto complainant, did not fully support the prosecution, the portion of evidence tendered by him in support of the prosecution case corroborated by Ext.P1 FIS and the oral evidence of PWs 3 and 9 would lead to the factual inference that the accused demanded bribe. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the evidence of PW1 and the other witnesses examined to prove the trap proceedings established the acceptance as pleaded by the prosecution. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the evidence of PW1 and the other witnesses examined to prove the trap proceedings established the acceptance as pleaded by the prosecution. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of N.C.T of Delhi) [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1029] in support of his contentions. 11. The appellant/accused faces charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Relevant Statutory Provisions 12. It is profitable to go through the relevant provisions in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as they existed prior to 2018 amendments are extracted below. 13. Section 7 of the Act reads thus: “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (Explanations)—(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”. If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”. The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” 14. Section 13(1)(d) of the Act reads thus: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.— (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or" 15. Section 20 of the Act reads thus: “20. Section 20 of the Act reads thus: “20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.— (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7, or as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be drawn.” 16. The ingredients of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are as follows: (i) the accused was either a public servant or expecting to be a public servant; (ii) the accused accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain illegal gratification from any person; (iii) for himself or for any other person; (iv) such gratification was not a remuneration to which the accused was legally entitled. (v) the accused accepted such gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or to show any favour or disfavour. 17. The ingredients to bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act are as follows: (i) the accused must be a public servant; (ii) the accused used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant, and (iii) the accused obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. (iv) to make out an offence under Section 13(1)(d), there is no requirement that the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage should have been received as a motive or reward. 18. Section 20 of the Act deals with the legal presumption that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act in any trial if it is proved that he has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain himself or for any other person, any gratification or any valuable thing from any person. 19. In B.Jayaraj a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act. The Court further held that mere recovery of currency notes does not constitute the offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The Apex Court further held that presumption under Section 20 of the Act is permissible to be drawn only in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not in respect of the offence under Section 13(1) (d) of the Act. The principles declared in B.Jayaraj was followed by the Supreme Court in C.M.Sharma v. State of A.P [ 2010 (15) SCC 1 ] and C.M.Girish Babu v. CBI [ 2009 (3) SCC 779 ]. 20. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy the Supreme Court held that mere recovery by itself would not prove the charge against the accused, and in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of a bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, no conviction can be sustained. 20. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy the Supreme Court held that mere recovery by itself would not prove the charge against the accused, and in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of a bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, no conviction can be sustained. The Apex Court declared that failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the accused would not be sufficient to convict him under Section 7 or 13 of the Act. 21. In M.Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P [ 2001 (1) SCC 691 ] the Apex Court held that for the purpose of reaching one conclusion, the Court can rely on factual presumption and unless the presumption so drawn is disproved or rebutted the Court can treat the presumption as tantamount to proof. The Apex Court however held that as a caution of prudence it may be unsafe to use the factual presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. In Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) [ 1980 (2) SCC 390 ] the Apex Court observed that it is not necessary that the passing of bribe money should be proved by direct evidence, it could also be proved by circumstantial evidence. In State through CBI v. Dr.Anup Kumar Srivastava [ 2017 (15) SCC 560 ] the Supreme Court held that proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality to enter a conviction under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. 22. While holding that there is no conflict in the Three-Judge Bench decisions of the Apex Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the other Three-Judge Bench decision in M.Narsinga Rao with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d) of the Act in Neeraj Dutta, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court summarised the principles to be applied in establishing demand and acceptance in a case in which a public servant faces charges under the above sections. The Apex Court came to the following conclusions: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature. 23. I shall analyse the evidence in the present case on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta. PW1, the defacto complainant, filed Ext.P1 FIS before PW9 on 07.09.2009. In Ext.P1, PW1 alleged that on 20.08.2009 at 10.00 a.m, he approached the accused to effect mutation in respect of the property covered by Ext.P3 sale deed. The accused insisted that he could consider the request of PW1 only after the measurement of the property. After measuring the property the accused represented to PW1 that he can receive tax only for 17.5 cents of land as against 24.75 cents of land covered by Ext.P3 sale deed. PW1 further alleged that on 21.08.2009, the accused demanded Rs.1,500/-as a bribe for effecting mutation and that on the same day, he gave Rs.1,000/-to him at 12.00 p.m at the Village Office, Mundur-1. But the accused demanded Rs.500/-more from the complainant. As he had a shortage of money to satisfy the demand made by the accused, he returned to his hometown. But the accused continued to demand the money, and thereafter, he filed Ext.P1. 24. While giving evidence, PW1 stated that he had paid Rs.1000/-on 21.08.2009 to Appunni, a person engaged in drafting complaint to the public on the premises of the Village office and that the accused had not demanded money from him. PW1 further stated that he was not well conversant in malayalam and he had affixed his signature on the complaint prepared by the Police personnel attached to the VACB office. According to PW1, he wanted to file a complaint regarding the refusal of the accused to effect mutation in respect of the property as per his demand. But the Vigilance people informed him that they could register a complaint only regarding the demand and acceptance of a bribe. According to PW1, he wanted to file a complaint regarding the refusal of the accused to effect mutation in respect of the property as per his demand. But the Vigilance people informed him that they could register a complaint only regarding the demand and acceptance of a bribe. PW1 further gave evidence that he had no knowledge regarding the entire contents of Ext.P1 as he was not conversant with the malayalam language. According to PW1, he was born and brought up in Tamil Nadu. 25. PW3, an independent witness, was examined to prove the trap. PW3 was a Special Thahsildar working in the Revenue Department at Palakkad. PW3 has given evidence as to the proceedings before and after the trap. PW3 stated that at the time of preparation of pre-trap mahazar the defacto complainant had stated regarding the demand made by the accused. PW3 had not witnessed the handing over of the bribe money to the accused at the time of the trap. PW9, the Trap Laying Officer supported the prosecution case regarding the demand and acceptance. In order to establish the factum of demand, the prosecution relies on the oral evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 9 and Exts.P1 FIS, P7 pre-trap mahazar and P8 trap mahazar. 26. The challenge of the defence is that PW1 is not a 'wholly reliable' witness. The learned counsel for the accused contended that there is no direct evidence to establish the demand as PW1 did not speak about the demand as pleaded by the prosecution. The learned defence counsel contended that the evidence of the solitary witness (PW1) is not credible. The learned counsel relying on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras ( AIR 1957 SC 614 ) and Mahendra Singh and Others v. State of M.P [ (2022) 7 SCC 157 ] contended that as the evidence of PW1 regarding the demand is not wholly reliable, corroboration is the rule. The learned counsel further contended that Ext.P1 FIS is not a substantive piece of evidence. Relying on Mohanan v. State of Kerala [ 2011 (4) KLT 59 ] the learned counsel submitted that the First Information Statement would become evidence only when the informant deposes the relevant facts in Court. The learned counsel contended that the FIS could be used only to contradict or corroborate the maker of such a statement. 27. Relying on Mohanan v. State of Kerala [ 2011 (4) KLT 59 ] the learned counsel submitted that the First Information Statement would become evidence only when the informant deposes the relevant facts in Court. The learned counsel contended that the FIS could be used only to contradict or corroborate the maker of such a statement. 27. The learned Special Government Pleader, on the other hand, contended that even in the absence of direct evidence, the Court might come to the inference regarding demand with the aid of circumstantial evidence. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on the evidence of PW1 during the chief examination to the effect that the accused demanded bribe and Ext.P1 FIS along with the oral evidence of PWs 3 and 9. 28. Though in Ext.P1, PW1 stated that the accused had demanded money on 21.08.2009 and that he had given a sum of Rs.1,000/-on the same day, while giving evidence, he stated that the sum of Rs.1,000/-was given to one Appunni and he had not given money to the accused. PW1 further stated that the accused had not demanded money. 29. The learned Special Government Pleader further contended that a presumption might be drawn regarding the factum of demand based on the oral evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 9 with the aid of Ext.P1 FIS. 30. PW1 has not given evidence to the effect that the accused demanded money and that he received the sum of Rs.1,000/-on 21.08.2009. At one stage of his chief examination, PW1 stated that he had given money. But he had not specified as to whom he had given the money. While examined in cross PW1 clarified that he gave money to one Appunni. PW1 specifically stated in his cross-examination that the accused had not demanded money. The learned defence counsel brought to my notice the contradictory statements of PW1 during the different stages of his examination. 31. Where a person has made two contradictory statements on oath, it is plainly unsafe to rely implicitly on his evidence {Vide Sharnappa Mutyappa Halke v. State of Maharashtra [ 1964 (4) SCR 589 ]}. 32. On the reliance placed on the First Information Statement, it is relevant to note that the facts contained therein may be proved only by direct oral evidence of the first informant in Court. The facts stated in the FIS are not provable by mere production of it. 32. On the reliance placed on the First Information Statement, it is relevant to note that the facts contained therein may be proved only by direct oral evidence of the first informant in Court. The facts stated in the FIS are not provable by mere production of it. The FIS is not considered as substantive piece of evidence but can be used to corroborate or contradict informant's evidence in Court. {Vide: Apren Joseph and Others v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1973 SC 1 ) and Mohanan v. State of Kerala [ 2011 (4) KLT 59 ]}. 33. PW3 and PW9 have not given any acceptable evidence to prove the factum of demand. 34. For drawing an inference or presumption of fact with regard to the demand, there shall be the foundational facts proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and other circumstances. The prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the foundational facts to draw a presumption with regard to the demand. 35. Admittedly the accused insisted on measuring the property before receiving tax in respect of the property as claimed by PW1. The accused had measured the property and found that PW1 possessed only 17.5 cents, which is more evident from Ext.P2 sketch. PWs 3 and 4, the independent witnesses stated that the document relied on by PW1 to claim right over the entire property of 24.75 cents was a “created document”. Therefore it has come out in evidence that the accused had refused to receive tax for 24.75 cents of land. This is more evident from the admission of PW1 that he wanted to file a complaint regarding the non-acceptance of tax in respect of the entire property covered by Ext.P3 sale deed. 36. It has also come out in evidence that PW1 was not well conversant with malayalam language and he has given evidence that the complaint was prepared by the Police personnel attached to the Vigilance wing and that he was only putting his signature thereon. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the prosecution could establish the facts for drawing the presumption that the accused demanded money from PW1, that presumption stands rebutted in view of the various circumstances that appeared in the prosecution evidence itself as a result of cross-examination. 37. Coming to the factum of acceptance. According to the prosecution, on 08.09.2009 the accused accepted Rs.500/-from PW1 at the Village Office, Mundur-1. 37. Coming to the factum of acceptance. According to the prosecution, on 08.09.2009 the accused accepted Rs.500/-from PW1 at the Village Office, Mundur-1. PW1 gave evidence that he thrusting the money into the pocket of the accused and shook his hands, requesting to do whatever required for accepting tax in respect of the property. No other witnesses supported the case of the prosecution regarding the acceptance of bribe by the accused. Exhibit P8 recovery mahazar would show that immediately on recovery of the money, the accused represented to PW9, the Trap Lying Officer that PW1 was thrusting the money into his pocket and that he shook his hands. His statement in Ext.P8 reads thus: 38. Even according to the prosecution, two Police Constables who were deputed to overhear the conversation between the defacto complainant and the accused were there, but the prosecution did not examine them. There is evidence to show that other officials were also present at the relevant time in the office of the accused. But the prosecution did not attempt to examine these officials. Therefore, what is available is the evidence of PW9, the Trap Laying Officer, to establish acceptance. Based on the available evidence the probable inference is that the accused had not voluntarily accepted the bribe money. 39. The necessary conclusion is that the prosecution failed to establish demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. 40. The proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, and, in the absence thereof, unmistakably, the charge therefore, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder {Vide: P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P [ (2015) 10 SCC 152 ], K.Shanthamma v. The State of Telangana [ (2022) 4 SCC 574 ], B.Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (2014) 13 SCC 55 ], Rajesh Gupta v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1107) and Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt of N.C.T of Delhi) [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1029]}. 41. The defence has further challenged the legality of the sanction to prosecute the accused. The learned defence counsel contended that the non-examination of the sanctioning authority is fatal to the prosecution. 42. The learned counsel relied on Dr. H.Prakash Pai v. State of Kerala [ 2015 (4) KLJ 146 ], Antony Cardoza v. State of Kerala [ 2011 (1) KLT 946 ] and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat [ (1997) 7 SCC 622 ] to substantiate his contentions. 43. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P v. Jiyalal ( AIR 2010 SC 1451 ). 44. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan the Apex Court held that if it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply independent mind “the sanction order” would be bad in law. In Dr.H.Prakash Pai and Antony Cardoza this Court held that where the independent application of mind in the process of granting sanction itself is an issue in a case, the sanctioning authority will have to be examined to prove the sanction. In State of M.P v. Jiyalal the Apex Court in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment held thus: “7. In State of M.P v. Jiyalal the Apex Court in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment held thus: “7. In the case before us, even if it were to be accepted that there has been an “error, omission or irregularity” in the passing of the sanction order, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has not made a finding which shows that a serious failure of justice had been caused to the respondent. In the absence of such a finding it was not correct for the High Court to set aside the conviction and sentence given by the Special Judge. 8. It was also not justified for the learned Single Judge to hold that the District Magistrate who had passed the sanction order should have been subsequently examined as a witness by the prosecution in order to prove the same. The sanction order was clearly passed in discharge of routine official functions and hence there is a presumption that the same was done in a bona fide manner. It was of course open to the respondent to question the genuineness or validity of the sanction order before the Special Judge but there was no requirement for the District Magistrate to be examined as a witness by the prosecution.” 45. In the present case, there is no specific challenge to the independent application of mind by the sanctioning authority. Therefore, the non-examination of the sanctioning authority has no consequences. 46. I have already held that the prosecution has not proved the demand and acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appellant/accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. He is found not guilty of the offences alleged. He is acquitted of the offences alleged. He is set at liberty. CRIMINAL APPEAL No.155 of 2022 47. The appellant herein is the defacto complainant (PW1). While disposing of the case, the Trial Court directed the filing of a complaint against the defacto complainant, holding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC. CRIMINAL APPEAL No.155 of 2022 47. The appellant herein is the defacto complainant (PW1). While disposing of the case, the Trial Court directed the filing of a complaint against the defacto complainant, holding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC. The foundation of the finding of the Trial Court is that in Ext.P1 FIS, the defacto complainant had alleged that the accused, on 21.08.2009 demanded and received a sum of Rs.1000/-from him and that the accused had continued his demand for the balance sum of Rs.500/-and received the amount on the date of the trap whereas he stated in the Court while giving evidence that on 21.08.2009, he had paid the sum of Rs.1,000/-to one Appunni and not to the accused and further that he thrusted Rs.500/-on the trap date into the pocket of the accused. The Trial Court dispensed with a preliminary inquiry but held that it appears that PW1 intentionally gave false evidence, and it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC. 48. The learned counsel for the appellant/defacto complainant contended that being proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Trial Court should have conducted a preliminary inquiry. 49. The learned Special Government Pleader contended that preliminary enquiry is not mandatory while proceeding under Section 340 Cr.PC. 50. I shall first consider whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory or not. 51. It is relevant to refer Section 340 Cr.P.C which reads thus: “340. 49. The learned Special Government Pleader contended that preliminary enquiry is not mandatory while proceeding under Section 340 Cr.PC. 50. I shall first consider whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory or not. 51. It is relevant to refer Section 340 Cr.P.C which reads thus: “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.-(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf. (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195.“ (Emphasis added) 52. (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195.“ (Emphasis added) 52. A plain reading of the statutory provision reveals that the legislature did not contemplate holding a preliminary inquiry in all cases but only in cases where the Court feels such an inquiry is necessary. This is manifested from the words to which emphasis is added in the statutory provision extracted above. 53. While considering the question whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory or not, in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra [ (2002) 1 SCC 253 ], the Apex Court in paragraphs 9,10 and 11 of the judgment observed thus:- “9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the court can form such an opinion when it appears to the court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court. It is important to notice that even when the court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This subsection has conferred a power on the court to do so. It does not mean that the court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the court decides to do so, then the court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the court regarding its opinion. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed. 10. “Inquiry” is defined in Section 2(g) of the Code as “every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court“. It refers to the pre-trial inquiry, and in the present context it means the inquiry to be conducted by the Magistrate. Once the court which forms an opinion, whether it is after conducting the preliminary inquiry or not, that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence the said court has to make a complaint in writing to the Magistrate of the First Class concerned. As the offences involved are all falling within the purview of “warrant case“ [as defined in Sec.2(x)] of the Code the Magistrate concerned has to follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code. In this context we may point out that Section 343 of the Code specifies that the Magistrate to whom the complaint is made under Section 340 shall proceed to deal with the case as if it were instituted on a police report. That being the position, the Magistrate on receiving the complaint shall proceed under Section 238 to Section 243 of the Code. 11. Section 238 of the Code says that the Magistrate shall at the outset satisfy himself that copies of all the relevant documents have been supplied to the accused. Section 239 enjoins on the Magistrate to consider the complaint and the documents sent with it. He may also make such examination of the accused, as he thinks necessary. Then the Magistrate has to hear both the prosecution and the accused to consider whether the allegations against the accused are groundless. If he finds the allegations to be groundless he has to discharge the accused at that stage by recording his reasons thereof. He may also make such examination of the accused, as he thinks necessary. Then the Magistrate has to hear both the prosecution and the accused to consider whether the allegations against the accused are groundless. If he finds the allegations to be groundless he has to discharge the accused at that stage by recording his reasons thereof. Section 240 of the Code says that if the Magistrate is of opinion, in the aforesaid inquiry, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence he has to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Such charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or not. If he pleads not guilty then the Magistrate has to proceed to conduct the trial. Until then the inquiry continues before the Magistrate.” 54. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [ (2005) 4 SCC 370 ], on the scope of Section 340 Cr.P.C. held thus:- “23. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.” (emphasis supplied) 55. The Apex Court in Sharad Pawar v. Jagmohan Dalmiya [ (2010) 15 SCC 290 ] held that it is necessary to conduct a preliminary enquiry as contemplated under Section 340 Cr.P.C and also to afford an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused. 56. In State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh [ 2020 (12) SCC 96 ] the Apex Court, after noting the conflicts in Sharad Pawar and Pritish referred the following questions to a larger bench: “(i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a court? (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry?” 57. While answering the reference, in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh (2022 LiveLaw SC 776) the Apex Court held thus:- “We have little doubt that there is no question of opportunity of hearing in a scenario of this nature and we say nothing else but that a law as enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) is in line with what was observed in Pritish’s case (supra). Interestingly both the judgments in Pritish’s case and the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) have not been noted in order passed in Sharad Pawar’s case (supra). The answer thus to the first question raised would be in the negative. Insofar as the second question is concerned, the scope and ambit of such a preliminary inquiry, also stands resolved in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) as referred to aforesaid. The reference is answered accordingly.” 58. In the reference, the Apex Court answered that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case is in line with what was observed in Pritish’s case. Therefore, the principle that emerges from the precedents referred to above is that it is not always necessary or mandatory to conduct a preliminary inquiry to record a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence that appears to have been committed. Formation of an opinion to that effect is the crux of the provision. Such an opinion may be formed in a given case even without a preliminary inquiry. The absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate the finding recorded by the Court. 59. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on Babu. P Benedict v. Principal MACT ( 2010 (1) KLT 445 ) and Sajeevan v. State of Kerala [2022 LiveLaw (Ker) 644] = [ 2022 (7) KHC 643 ]. The observations made in those decisions that a preliminary inquiry contemplated under Section 340 Cr.P.C is mandatory is seen to have been made without referring to the law declared by the Apex Court in Pritish and Iqbal Singh Marwah. Therefore the above observation relied on by the counsel for the appellant is of no assistance to him. 60. In the instant case the Trial Court, after examining the evidence of the defacto complainant and the other relevant materials, had sufficient materials to form an opinion. Therefore, the contentions of the appellant that the proceedings under challenge are vitiated due to the lack of preliminary inquiry cannot be sustained. 61. Now, I consider the merits of the findings recorded by the Trial Court to the effect that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence under Section 193 IPC. 62. 61. Now, I consider the merits of the findings recorded by the Trial Court to the effect that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence under Section 193 IPC. 62. In the present case, PW1 has a definite case that he was not conversant with Malayalam and further that Ext.P1 complaint was drafted by the Police personnel attached to the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau. This leads this Court to conclude that there is no material to enter into a conclusion that PW1 was intentionally giving false evidence. The elements of deliberate falsehood are absent in the statements made by PW1. 63. The Court, while making a complaint invoking Section 340 Cr.PC has to be satisfied that it appears that an offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 has been committed and that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into that offence. The requirement is that the court should see whether the person has given false evidence intentionally (See Johnson v. State of Kerala [1996 (1) ILR 293]. It is trite that even when the Court forms an opinion as referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 340 Cr.PC, it is not mandatory that the Court should make a complaint. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah observed that the course of filing complaint is to be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. 64. In A.K. Padmanabhan, Ex. M.L.A (1991 KHC 364), considering the scope of the proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C., this Court held that before proceeding to have an enquiry the Court must consider whether it is worthwhile in public interest or not. This Court cautioned that it is not every false declaration or statement that is intended to be subject matter of prosecution. This Court further held that there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge and that prosecution of the offender is necessary in the interest of justice. This Court further held that there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge and that prosecution of the offender is necessary in the interest of justice. In Thomman v. IInd Additional Sessions Judge (1993 KHC 418), this Court reiterated that to attract the procedure under Section 340, the person concerned should have intentionally given false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial procedure. In Muraleekrishna Das v. Inspector General of Police and Others ( 1978 KLT 292 ) a Division Bench of this Court held that it is not any and every statement which is alleged to be false that calls for notice by the Court. The Division Bench further held that the gravity of the false statement, the circumstances under which such statement was made, the object of making such statement and its tendency to impede and impair the normal flow of the course of justice are matters for consideration when the court decides on the propriety of instituting a complaint for perjury. Another Division Bench of this Court in Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (1995 KHC 19) observed that the proceedings under Section 340 of the Code should not be initiated as a matter of course, even when the witnesses give contradictory evidence and the Courts should act with utmost circumspection in launching prosecution. In Amarsang Nathaji as himself and as Karta and Manager v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and others (2016 KHC 6783) = ( AIR 2016 SC 5384 ), the Apex Court held that the mere fact that a person has made contradictory statements in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution, but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings. 65. In the present case, the circumstances on record lead this Court to conclude that the appellant has not intentionally given a false statement warranting prosecution. The preponderance of the judicial opinion leads this Court to conclude that the Trial Court was not justified in proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Resultantly, the order directing the filing of the complaint against PW1 invoking Section 340 Cr.PC is liable to be set aside. I do so. Further proceedings, if any, initiated shall stand quashed. The preponderance of the judicial opinion leads this Court to conclude that the Trial Court was not justified in proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Resultantly, the order directing the filing of the complaint against PW1 invoking Section 340 Cr.PC is liable to be set aside. I do so. Further proceedings, if any, initiated shall stand quashed. The appeals are allowed as above.