ORDER : 1. This Criminal Revision Case is filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Criminal Procedure Code (‘Cr.P.C.’ in short), by the petitioners, who are the accused/A-1 to A-3 in P.R.C.No.32 of 2017 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, Guntur, concerned to Crime No.244 of 2012 of Nagarampalem, Guntur Urban Police Station, feeling aggrieved by the docket order dated 04.09.2017 ordering summons to the petitioners/A-1 to A-3. 2. The petitioners herein are the accused/A-1 to A-3 whereas the 1st respondent herein is the complainant in P.R.C.No.32 of 2017 on the file of the Court of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Guntur. 3. The 1st respondent/ complainant filed a private complaint on the file of the Court of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Guntur under Sections 190 & 200 of Cr.P.C. against the petitioners/A-1 to A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 509 r/w. 34 of Indian Penal Code and section 3(x)(i) of S.Cs. & S.Ts. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, West Circle, Guntur District for investigation and report under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the complaint was registered as a case in Crime No.244 of 2012 by the Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur Urban for the offences punishable under sections 323,509 read with 34 IPC and section 3(1)(x) of S.Cs. & S.Ts.(Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the petitioners/A-1 to A-3 and investigated into the case and filed final report into the Court referring the case as false. Pursuant to the notice issued, the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant filed objections before the Court below. The Court below, on 04.09.2017 passed the impugned orders ordering summons to the petitioners/A-1 to A-3 observing that the material available on record discloses a prima facie case against the petitioners/ A-1 to A-3 under Sections 506, 323 of IPC and section 3(x) of S.Cs. &S.Ts. (PoA) Act. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners/A-1 to A-3 preferred this Criminal Revision Case. 5. &S.Ts. (PoA) Act. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners/A-1 to A-3 preferred this Criminal Revision Case. 5. The contentions raised by the petitioners in this Criminal Revision Case, in brief, are that, the final report, which was filed after thorough investigation, discloses that the de facto complainant filed the complaint with false allegations only at the instigation of one Shaik Naazir Basha, who has illicit intimacy with the de facto complainant and who was indebted lakhs of rupees to the 2nd petitioner/A-2. The 1st respondent/ de facto complainant is a Court employee and she worked for sometime in the Court below and thus the action of the Court below is biased, impermissible and void abinitio. The Court below ought not to have taken into consideration the protest petition, which contains baseless allegations, in taking cognizance of offence. The impugned order is erroneous and it is illegal, arbitrary and passed without assigning any reasons. Hence, prayed to allow the Criminal Revision Case by setting aside the order impugned. 6. Heard Sri Atchutananda Dondeti, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant and Sri Sravan Kumar Naidana, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor for the 2nd respondent-State. 7. Sri Atchutananda Dondeti, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the impugned order was passed by the Court below in a mechanical way and without assigning any reasons. He would further submit that the Investigating Officer, after due investigation, having found that the 2nd respondent/ de facto complainant had illegal intimacy with one Nazir Basha, who owed lakhs of rupees to A2- Bhashyam Venkata Apparao, and at the instigation of the said Nazir Basha she has foisted this false case against the petitioners/ accused to give criminal colour to the civil disputes between the parties. However, the Court below erroneously took into consideration the protest petition and has taken cognizance against the petitioners. The learned counsel would further submit that the order impugned is very cryptic and the same clearly demonstrates nonapplication of the mind by the Magistrate and thus the order impugned is liable to be set aside. However, the Court below erroneously took into consideration the protest petition and has taken cognizance against the petitioners. The learned counsel would further submit that the order impugned is very cryptic and the same clearly demonstrates nonapplication of the mind by the Magistrate and thus the order impugned is liable to be set aside. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on Birla Corporation Limited vs. Adventz Investments and Holdings, [(2019) 16 Supreme Court Cases 610], Vishnu Kumar Tiwari vs. State of U.P., [(2019) 8 Supreme Court Cases 27] and Pepsi Foods Ltd. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, [(1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 749] . Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, leaned counsel for the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant would submit that the impugned order being interlocutory, revision is not maintainable under Section 397(2) of CrPC and the remedy available to the petitioner is invocation of inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 CrPC. The learned counsel would further submit that at the stage of taking cognizance and issuing summons, the Court is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At that stage, the Court need not enter into a detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of the case and a detailed order is not required. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied on the decision in Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal, [ 2000(1) SCC 722 ] and M.Ramesh Babu & others vs. State of A.P. and another, [2005(2) Crimes 204]. The learned counsel would further submit that even otherwise the Court below upon considering the material available on record found that prima facie case is made out against the accused and issued summons accordingly and the said order does not suffer from any illegality or procedural irregularity and the same does not warrant interference of this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. On the above grounds, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant prayed to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 8. Sri Sravan Kumar Naidana, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that order impugned being interlocutory revision is not maintainable. On the above grounds, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant prayed to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 8. Sri Sravan Kumar Naidana, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that order impugned being interlocutory revision is not maintainable. He would further submit that though investigation revealed that it is a false case, the Court below has taken cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the petitioners/accused and prayed to pass appropriate orders. 9. In reply to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2; the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order impugned is not an interlocutory order, since if it is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings itself and thus revision petition is maintainable. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision in Mohit alias Sonu and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, [(2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 789]. 10. Regarding maintainability of revision against the impugned order taking cognizance of an offence, in Mohit Alias Sonu and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to various pronouncements of the Apex Court, held at paras-25 and 27 as follows: “25. In the light of the ratio laid down by this Court referred to hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the trial court refusing to issue summons on the application filed by the complainant under Section 319 CrPC cannot be held to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 CrPC. Admittedly, in the instant case, before the trial court the complainant's application under Section 319 CrPC was rejected for the second time holding that there was no sufficient evidence against the appellants to proceed against them by issuing summons. The said order passed by the trial court decides the rights and liabilities of the appellants in respect of their involvement in the case. The said order passed by the trial court decides the rights and liabilities of the appellants in respect of their involvement in the case. As held by this Court in Amar Nath case [ Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] , an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order as contemplated under Section 397(2) CrPC. 27. In our considered opinion, the complainant ought to have challenged the order before the High Court in revision under Section 397 CrPC and not by invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. Maybe, in order to circumvent the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 397 or Section 401, the complainant moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. In the event a criminal revision had been filed against the order of the Sessions Judge passed under Section 319 CrPC, the High Court before passing the order would have given notice and opportunity of hearing to the appellants.” 11. It is appropriate to extract the observations of their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of Investigation, [2017(14) Supreme Court Cases 809]. “21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind—an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.” 12. From the above, it is evident that order taking cognizance is an intermediate order, since if it is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against the accused. Thus, revision is maintainable. As such, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant and the learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor in this regard are not tenable. 13. Regarding the next contention as to the cryptic nature of the order is concerned, in M. Ramesh Babu and others vs. State of A.P. and another relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, a learned Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows: “24. This then takes up to consider the next question as to whether the Magistrate is expected to give reasons at the time of issuing process. 25. In Kanti Bhadra Shah and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal, it was held in para as thus: “The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.” 14. Thus, there is no need for the Court below to write a detailed order while issuing process to the accused. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.” 14. Thus, there is no need for the Court below to write a detailed order while issuing process to the accused. However, keeping in view the fact that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter, the order summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and law governing the issues. Hence, what all required at this stage is consideration of the material made available on record to find out whether any prima facie case is made out against the accused. 15. For expediency, the impugned order is extracted hereunder: “Complainant present and heard the counsel and perused the material available on record, disclose a prima-facie against accused U/Ss.506,323 of IPC and S. 3(x) of ST SC (POA) Act against A1 to A3. Issue summons to A1 to A3, call on 12.10.2017.” 16. A perusal of the order shows that the Magistrate upon perusal of the material available on record, having satisfied that there exists a prima facie case against the accused ordered for issuance of summons. Thus, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order impugned is cryptic is unsustainable. 17. Regarding duties of the Magistrate while taking cognizance, in Birla Corporation Ltd. Vs Adventz Investments and Holdings relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held at para-38 as follows: “38. Extensive reference to the case law would clearly show that the allegations in the complaint and complainant’s statement and other materials must show that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. In the light of the above principles, let us consider the present case whether the allegations in the complaint and the statement of the complainant and other materials before the Magistrate were sufficient enough to constitute prima-facie case to justify the Magistrate’s satisfaction that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the respondents-accused and whether there was application of mind by the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offences and issuing process to the respondents.” 18. The observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would go to show that the allegations in the complaint and complainant’s statement and other materials must show that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. 19. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. And another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and law governing the issue In para-28 of the Judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” The principle that summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and that as a matter of course, the criminal case against a person cannot be set into motion was reiterated in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Limited (2013) 4 SCC 505 .” 20. The observations referred to supra would show that the Court has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine as to whether any offence is prima facie committed by the accused. 21. In Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P. relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held at paras- 18 to 20, 38 and 42 as follows: “18. Thus, when he proceeds to take action by way of cognizance by disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at in the police report, he would be taking cognizance on the basis of the police report and not on the complaint. And, therefore, the question of examining the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would not arise. This was the view clearly enunciated. 19. In Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy [Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy, (2003) 1 SCC 734 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 425] , the appellant complainant had lodged report alleging commission of offences by the respondent. Subsequently, being dissatisfied with the investigation, he filed a criminal complaint in the court of the Magistrate. In the meantime, the investigating officer filed a final report finding that the controversy was of a civil nature. The appellant filed a protest petition. The final report was accepted by the Magistrate. The complaint case filed by the appellant was also closed. It became final. The appellant filed a third complaint, as it were, under Section 200 of the Code. On summons being issued, it was successfully questioned before the High Court. We may notice the following discussion by this Court profitably: (SCC pp. 737 & 740-41, paras 12 & 16-19) “12. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that only because the Magistrate has accepted a final report, the same by itself would not stand in his way to take cognizance of the offence on a protest/complaint petition; but the question which is required to be posed and answered would be as to under what circumstances the said power can be exercised. *** 16. *** 16. In Munilal Thakur case [Munilal Thakur v. Nawal Kishore Thakur, 1984 SCC OnLine Pat 339 : 1985 Cri LJ 437 : 1984 PLJR 774 ] the Division Bench of the Patna High Court was concerned with the question as to whether a Magistrate even after accepting final report filed by the police, can take cognizance of offence upon a complaint or the protest petition on same or similar allegations of fact; to which the answer was rendered in the affirmative. 17. The question which has arisen for consideration herein neither arose therein nor was canvassed. 18. In Jayashankar Mund case [Food Corpn. of India v. Jayashankar Mund, 1989 SCC OnLine Ori 89 : (1989) 67 Cut LT 426 : 1989 Cri LJ 1578] the Orissa High Court again did not have any occasion to consider the question raised herein. The Court held: (SCC OnLine Ori para 14) ‘14. … Even though a protest petition is in the nature of a complaint, it is referable to the investigation already held by the vigilance police culminating in the final report and because the informant was not examined on solemn affirmation under Section 202 of the Code, thereby no illegality or prejudice was caused to the accused. If such a view is accepted and there is no reason why such a view should not be accepted, the necessary consequence in this particular case shall be that the protest petition which is of the nature of a complaint petition filed by the petitioner shall be in continuation and in respect of the case instituted and investigated by the vigilance police.’ 19. Keeping in view the settled legal principles, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in holding that the second complaint was completely barred. It is settled law that there is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. In a case where a previous complaint is dismissed without assigning any reasons, the Magistrate under Section 204 CrPC may take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. As held in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case [Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 SC 876 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770] second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. As held in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case [Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 SC 876 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770] second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further, second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the matter, therefore, should have been remitted back to the learned Magistrate for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether any case for cognizance of the alleged offence had been made out or not.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra [Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 7 SCC 768 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 404] , this Court reiterated that the Magistrate can, faced with a final report, independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from investigation and take cognizance under Section 190(1)( b), and in this regard, is not bound to follow the procedure under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance under Section 190(1)( b). It was, however, open to the Magistrate to do so. *** 38. In H.S. Bains [H.S. Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 93] , there was a private complaint within the meaning of Section 190(1)( a) of the Code. The matter was referred to the police under Section 156(3). The investigating officer filed a final report. Therein, the court took the view that apart from the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance notwithstanding the final report, under Section 190(1)( b), he could also fall back upon the private complaint which was initially lodged but after examining the complainant and his witnesses, as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code. In regard to taking cognizance under Section 190(1)( b) of the Code of a final report, undoubtedly, it is not necessary to examine the complainant or his witnesses though he may do so. *** 42. In regard to taking cognizance under Section 190(1)( b) of the Code of a final report, undoubtedly, it is not necessary to examine the complainant or his witnesses though he may do so. *** 42. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the investigating officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)( b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court.” 22. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court.” 22. The above observations would make it clear that when the Magistrate disagrees with the conclusions arrived at in the police report and proceeds to take action, he would be taking cognizance on the basis of the police report and not on the complaint and therefore, question of examination of the witnesses does not arise. When faced with a final report, the Magistrate can independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from investigation and take cognizance under section 190(1)(b) CrPC and in this regard, there is no need to follow the procedure under sections 200 and 202. It is however, open to the Magistrate to do so. 23. In para-44 of the above referred decision, their Lordships have held thus: “44.We may also notice that in Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa [Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa, 2001 SCC OnLine Kar 447 : 2002 Cri LJ 2150] , the High Court of Karnataka observed as follows: (SCC OnLine Kar para 9) “9. From the above, the position that emerges is this: Where initially the complainant has not filed any complaint before the Magistrate under Section 200 CrPC, but, has approached the police only and where the police after investigation have filed the ‘B’ report, if the complainant wants to protest, he is thereby inviting the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190(1)( a) CrPC on a complaint. If it were to be so, the protest petition that he files shall have to satisfy the requirements of a complaint as defined in Section 2( d) CrPC, and that should contain facts that constitute offence, for which, the learned Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC. Instead, if it is to be simply styled as a protest petition without containing all those necessary particulars that a normal complaint has to contain, then, it cannot be construed as a complaint for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 CrPC.” 24. In para-46 of the above referred decision, their Lordships observed as follows: “46. If a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. ……...” 25. In para-46 of the above referred decision, their Lordships observed as follows: “46. If a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. ……...” 25. Thus, it is evident that if a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with 202 of the Code. 26. It is relevant here to note that scope of enquiry under Section 202 of Cr.P.C. is limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, [1962 Supp (2) SCR 297] held as follows: 50. “……The scope and extent of Sections 202 and 203 were laid down in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker [ (1961) 1 SCR 1 , 9, 10]. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is limited to finding out the truth or otherwise of the complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or not and Section 203 lays down what materials are to be considered for the purpose. Under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses and the result of the investigation or enquiry if any. He must apply his mind to the materials and form his judgment whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Therefore if he has not misdirected himself as to the scope of the enquiry made under Section 202, of the Criminal Procedure Code, and has judicially applied his mind to the material before him and then proceeds to make his order it cannot be said that he has acted erroneously……" 27. The above observations make it clear that scope of enquiry under Section 202 of CrPC is very limited to finding out the truth or otherwise of the complaint. 28. The above observations make it clear that scope of enquiry under Section 202 of CrPC is very limited to finding out the truth or otherwise of the complaint. 28. Now it has to be seen whether the material available on record makes out any prima facie case and whether the Court below has applied its mind to the facts of the case and law governing the issue and if so, Whether the Court below is justified in coming to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for proceedings against the petitioners/ Accused. 29. The 1st respondent/ de facto complainant- Thalakola Chinnamma filed a complaint under sections 190 & 200 CrPC in CFR No.3966 of 2012 on the file of the Court of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Guntur against the petitioners/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 509 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(x)(1) of the Scheduled Casts & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act alleging that she borrowed amount from A-1 to purchase a flat and later she failed to repay interest for three consecutive months and hence A-1 was pressurizing her to pay interest and that on 09.06.2021 at about 4.00 p.m., A-1 to A-3 trespassed into her house, beat her with hands and legs, abused her touching her caste name and on the intervention of neighbours, they left the place. The learned Magistrate referred the same to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, West Circle, Guntur for investigation and report under Section 156(3) of CrPC. The said complaint was registered as a case in Crime No.244 of 2012 of Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur Urban. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed final report on 03.03.2014 referring the case as false. Pursuant to the notice, the 1st respondent/ de facto complainant filed protest-complaint under sections 199 & 200 CrPC. Thereupon, the learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statements of L.W.1/ de facto complainant/1st respondent and two other witnesses-L.W.2 and L.W.3 and vide orders dated 04.09.2017 ordered issuance of summons to A1 to A3. 30. A perusal of the protest petition filed by the 1st respondent would indicate that it fulfils the requirements of a complaint. It is a verified petition containing the particulars as to date, place and nature of offence, brief facts of the case. 30. A perusal of the protest petition filed by the 1st respondent would indicate that it fulfils the requirements of a complaint. It is a verified petition containing the particulars as to date, place and nature of offence, brief facts of the case. It contained the list of documents relied on by the complainant and so also the list of witnesses. Thus, the Court below treated the same as a complaint and dealt with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code and recorded the sworn statements of the de facto complainant as well as other witnesses referred to in the protest petition. 31. A perusal of the material available on record would go to show that specific allegations are made against the petitioners/ A-1 to A-3 in the complaint. L.W.1 to L.W.3 in their sworn statements clearly deposed the manner of the incident making specific overt acts against each of the accused. 32. In view of the above, this Court finds that the Court below upon perusing the material available on record in right perspective, having found that there is prima facie material against the petitioners/accused, ordered issuance of summons to A-1 to A-3 and this Court does not find any illegality or irregularity amenable for interference of this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. There are no merits in the Criminal Revision Petition and the same deserves dismissal. 33. In view of the above, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. The trial Court shall dispose of the case uninfluenced by the observations, if any, made by this Court in this order. It is made clear that this order does not stand in the way of the petitioners to avail other remedies at appropriate stages, if they are so advised. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, shall stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, shall stand vacated.